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by ian bremmer
If we encountered our planet as an alien species today, what would we see?
An expanding population of eight billion people experiencing unprecedented growth after tens of thousands of years of stagnation. Staggering opportunities afforded by new technologies, especially the human capital and industrial breakthroughs that AI is about to unlock for millions (and soon billions) that otherwise would have no such access.
Even looking at the geopolitical headlines, we can work up some optimism about the year ahead. Three years after Russia invaded Ukraine and attempted to overthrow its leadership, negotiations (and even a possible ceasefire) appear close. So, too, in the Middle East, after more than a year of fighting in Gaza and beyond, there’s less stomach or purpose for expanding the violence. And in the United States, a hotly contested presidential election led to an undisputed winner with a clear mandate, and almost nobody claimed it was unfree, unfair, or stolen.
But take a closer look, and we've got big problems.
The United States and China, the two most powerful countries in the world by a wide margin, assertively reject responsibility for the rest of the planet. They cast an eye at enemies first and foremost within their own borders and worry increasingly about threats to their stability. Both are informed by political and economic value systems focused on the short term, despite the increasingly obvious reality that they’re not working for most of their people – especially the increasingly disillusioned youth.
A “community of nations” is today the stuff of fairy tales, with governance that isn’t meeting the needs of citizens. Our challenges – from climate change to technological disruption to security threats – are increasingly global. They demand far stronger international cooperation than is thought desirable or would be feasible with the institutions that exist today. And the political actors most essential to strengthening global institutions are moving in the other direction.
We are heading back to the law of the jungle – where the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must. This is the G-Zero world I’ve been warning about for over a decade now – an era when no one power or group of powers is both willing and able to drive a global agenda and maintain international order.
This leadership deficit will reach critical mass and grow critically dangerous in 2025, creating a recipe for endemic geopolitical instability. The risk of a generational world crisis, even a new global war, is higher than at any point in our lifetimes. That’s why the G-Zero winning tops Eurasia Group’s 2025 Top Risks report.
The central problem facing the global order is that core international institutions – the United Nations Security Council, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and so on – no longer reflect the underlying balance of global power. This is a geopolitical recession, a “bust cycle” in international relations that can be traced back to three fundamental causes.
First, the West failed to integrate Russia into the US-led global order after the Soviet Union's collapse, breeding deep resentment and antagonism. We can argue about who’s to blame, but the consequences are undeniable: Now a former great power in severe decline, Russia has transformed from a potential partner into the world’s most dangerous rogue state, bent on destabilizing the US-led order and forging military-strategic partnerships with other chaos actors like North Korea and Iran.
Second, China was brought into the international order – crucially as a member of the World Trade Organization – on the presumption that global economic integration would encourage its leaders to liberalize their political system and become responsible global stakeholders as defined by the West. Instead, China grew far more powerful but no more democratic or supportive of the rule of law. Deepening tensions, and even confrontation, between China and the West, are the result.
Third, and perhaps most consequentially, tens of millions of citizens in advanced democracies concluded that the globalist values their leaders and elites had been promoting no longer worked in their favor. Rising inequality, demographic shifts, and technological disruption have eroded trust in democratic institutions and reduced these nations’ capacity for global leadership. President-elect Donald Trump has both fed and profited from this anti-globalist, anti-establishment surge.
There are three ways out of a geopolitical recession: reform existing institutions, build new ones better aligned with current power realities, or destroy the old system and impose new rules through force. While all three are happening to some extent, in 2025 the focus will be overwhelmingly on the third.
The United States is the only nation powerful enough to lead – in fact, it’s in many ways more powerful than ever, at least compared to its allies and adversaries. But it is no longer willing to serve as world sheriff, architect of free trade, and promoter of common values. Trump’s return to power with a politically consolidated, solidly unilateralist administration will definitively accelerate America’s retreat from global leadership. But though Trump is the principal symptom and political beneficiary of the geopolitical recession, he’s not the cause. That’s why we didn’t make Trump our number one risk this year.
Just as the US embraces a transactional, “America First” unilateralism, its traditional allies face unprecedented political weakness. Canada’s government has just collapsed. So has Germany’s, where populist parties are likely to make gains in the upcoming federal elections. France is in the throes of a protracted political crisis. The UK is led by an unpopular new government still finding its feet. Japan’s ruling party has lost its majority, with new Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba unlikely to last long. South Korea’s political system is in disarray. Rather than stepping into the leadership void, these nations are focused on playing geopolitical defense – keeping their heads down and hoping to avoid becoming targets of disruption.
Meanwhile, the Global South, despite growing economic heft, lacks both the cohesion and capability to lead. India, the strongest and most plausible global leader among developing nations, remains a lower-income country, focused on building bridges mainly in support of its national interests. Gulf states like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, despite their growing ambitions, lack the standing to drive global reforms.
For its part, China – the second most powerful country on Earth and only viable US challenger – couldn’t lead even if it wanted to. Not only does it lack the legitimacy and “soft power” needed to attract a stable following, but its ongoing economic woes, combined with President Xi Jinping’s prioritization of national security and political control, leave Beijing too preoccupied with domestic challenges.
In short, with no one willing and able to lead, what’s left is ever greater geopolitical instability, disruption, and conflict. Power vacuums will expand, global governance will languish, and rogue actors will proliferate. The world will grow more divided and more combustible. The most vulnerable will pay the biggest price.
We’re entering a uniquely dangerous period of world history on par with the 1930s and the early Cold War. This doesn’t mean we’re headed toward World War III or even a US-China cold war, though both scenarios become more likely in a G-Zero world. The more immediate danger is the unraveling of the world’s security and economic architecture leaving many spaces – both countries and crucial domains like cyberspace, outer space, and the deep seas – ungoverned and under-governed, wide open for rogue actors to increasingly operate with impunity.
The G-Zero winning isn't just Eurasia Group’s top risk this year – it's the force multiplier that makes every other global challenge more dangerous and harder to solve. The tail risk of something truly catastrophic will grow fatter every day.
China’s Population Collapse, Mysterious Drone Sightings, Post-war Ukraine, and more: Your questions, answered
How serious is China's demographic problem?
China’s demographic problem is massive (And yes, Elon Musk is right to be worried about it). The United Nations estimates China’s population will be roughly cut in half by 2100. Even though Beijing ended the one-child policy years ago, birth rates remain low. The country’s population is aging rapidly, which puts more pressure on the (smaller) working-age population to support them. As a result, economic growth will continue to slow, increasing the probability of domestic social instability. There are still near-term adjustments that can help, like: extending the retirement age, making agriculture more efficient/less labor intensive, and increasing urbanization.
Are you worried about the recent highly publicized drone sightings over the northeast United States?
No, not particularly. What I am concerned about is the broader decentralization of dangerous technologies and the rapid-fire dissemination of conspiracy theories that only confuse and further polarize the American public. Not only are UAVs getting easier and cheaper to produce, but so are a whole host of cyber weapons and other rapidly advancing technologies that will have broad impacts on society. And while some theories about the uptick in drone sightings may be fun to explore, it’s becoming obvious that people are having a harder time than ever deciding if what they see online is true or not. Senators are mistaking Star Wars props as downed aircraft and theories about missing nuclear weapons or looming alien invasions are racking up millions of views online. That’s troubling. My advice: consume a diverse media diet, have a healthy dose of skepticism, and touch some grass to help prevent a bad trip down the rabbit hole.
Can the United States win a tariff trade war and maintain the status of the US dollar as a world currency?
Yes, the United States would make it out of a full-on trade war with US dollar dominance still intact, but not without damage to the US economy. The US dollar is king partly because of the enduring stability and strength of the US economy and trust in its financial institutions, partly because everyone else uses the dollar already, and partly because there is no (better) alternative. A full-fledged and prolonged trade war would hurt the US economy and undermine global confidence in US policymakers, which would ultimately weaken the dollar’s position. But it would hurt other countries’ economies more than it would hurt America’s, meaning that the dollar would likely still come out on top in relative terms. Still, I expect Trump won’t go full Smoot-Hawley. The market backlash will limit how far he actually goes as opposed to what he’s currently threatening. Plus, countries that are significantly weaker than the United States will be less likely to retaliate and more willing to negotiate. Also, Trump’s incoming economic team will act as at least a marginal constraint.
Does Europe have the ability to help Ukraine defeat Russia without US help?
To put it simply: no. The United States is (by far) the most important supporter of Ukraine, and Europe doesn’t have the funds or political will to make up the gap by itself. Heck, Europe’s own defense is seriously constrained by its dependence on America’s' weapons systems and intelligence. A ten-year window for Europe to build up its defense readiness is plausible, but Russia is knocking on its proverbial doorstep today. If the United States were to give up all support for Ukraine, many European states would probably join the Americans diplomatically.
What's your view on what comes after a ceasefire between Ukraine and Russia? Do you think Ukraine has a chance of joining NATO anytime soon?
Although a ceasefire would mark a significant shift in the conflict, I wouldn’t expect it to end the conflict in its entirety. As nearly three years of war have taught us, Vladimir Putin will do everything in his power to gain the territory he seeks – regardless of the price paid by Russia’s population or economy. So, a pause in the fighting is only a temporary solution. A sustainable diplomatic agreement is going to be incredibly difficult as long as Putin remains in power. One way President Zelensky envisions securing what remains of his country: joining NATO, thus making allies like the United States treaty-bound to respond to another incursion on Ukraine’s sovereignty. But as it stands now, I think Ukraine is going to have to punt its hopes of joining NATO down the road for at least a decade. Putin won’t accept anything less. Trump won’t either. And other leaders like France’s Emmanuel Macron are starting to come around as well.
How will President Trump's foreign policy affect the developing world?
What we know about Trump’s first term is that his foreign policy approach is transactional: if agreements don’t directly give a “win” to the United States, we can expect them to be reexamined. When looking at Trump’s proposed tariffs, new trade barriers may make exports from developing countries less competitive, which would certainly create bigger economic challenges for them. US foreign policy has already eroded American soft power/influence over many nations in the Global South, which is likely to continue under Trump given his record on human rights, climate change, and staunch Israel support. Some developing countries, on the other hand, are led by leaders with pro-Trump sensibilities. In those cases, personal relationships with (and praise for) Trump will lead to stronger relations with the United States.
Do you think the United States is in decline?
In terms of its political system, yes I do. When the Berlin Wall came down 35 years ago, people around the world really admired the United States’ political system—the “shining city upon a hill,” as Reagan said in his farewell address. Very few people outside the United States feel that way now. Political polarization is weakening the fabric of American society and getting in the way of addressing America’s domestic troubles, including income inequality, below-average healthcare access, and above-average gun violence. It’s been an incredibly notable—and pretty disheartening—decline. That’s only one perspective, though. The US is not at all in decline in most other ways: economically, technologically, militarily, in its human capital, in the status of the dollar as the global reserve currency, in its natural resources, and in the stability of its geopolitical corner of the world, to name a few.
Can you name one positive thing you think will happen in 2025?
In 2025, I’m confident that the world will be as interconnected as ever, even if some linkages are in flux. Countries around the world will continue to engage economically with everyone they can. Plus, the supply of people who want to engage with digital content from around the world will continue to grow. The cat’s out of the bag with globalization, so to speak. I know that word can be politically charged, but globalization has been a net positive to humanity. Between 1981 and 2015, the number of people living on less than $1.90 a day dropped from 1.81 billion to around 700 million. That global economic growth wouldn’t have happened without increased trade brought on by globalization. Fragmented politics won’t change that economic reality.
How is it that you came to do what you do? It looks like you made up your own job and became successful at it.
Well, don’t forget it took over thirty years to get here. But yes, I feel very lucky to have landed where I did. I’ve always loved studying international politics. It’s a discipline you can devote your entire life to yet still learn new things every day. What I hadn’t appreciated in my studies was that the private sector wasn’t exactly hiring political scientists. Like any new grad, I had to hustle and keep forging ahead anyway. I did my best to network and got to know people at different companies who seemed to find my insights worthwhile. At the time, they didn’t have a job for what I did: explaining to people how world events shape global markets (and thus their companies). After a while, I finally asked, “What if I hang out a shingle…start my own business…would any of you become a client?” To my surprise, almost everyone was on board. So, in 1998 (which is before some of you were born, horrifyingly), the very modest beginning of the global risk consulting firm I have today was born—and more importantly, so was the whole political risk industry. The rest, as they say, is history.
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Assad’s fall, Romania’s canceled election, Trump’s Taiwan approach, and more: Your questions, answered
How did Bashar Assad get driven out of Syria after more than 20 years in power? What are your thoughts on his replacements?
I was surprised that Assad fell. He’s been such an important client for both Iran and Russia for decades and received their immediate support when the rebels began their offensive. But this was a particularly opportune time for the rebels to strike. Assad’s powerful friends were both distracted in other arenas: Iran with Israel (in both Gaza and, more importantly for Iran, Lebanon) and Russia with Ukraine. Interestingly, there is one key throughline connecting the fall of Mosul (Iraq), Kabul (Afghanistan), and Damascus (Syria) — all three were held by conscript armies that were fed, equipped, and trained by corrupt regimes … and when attacked by fierce radical groups fled as quickly as they could.
On its face, the fall of one of the world’s most oppressive dictators should be good news. Assad’s war against his own people led to the deaths of over 500,000 Syrians and millions of refugees fleeing into Turkey and from there to Europe. But I’m not yet confident that what’s replacing his regime will be much better. The Turkish-backed militants in charge are Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, or HTS, a former al-Qaida affiliate in Syria that formally cut ties with the terrorists but is still (as of now) labeled a terrorist organization by the United States and NATO. Turkey wasn’t all in on removing Assad (at first). If the regime change goes well (a big if), the real winner here will be Turkey, with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan sending millions of Syrian refugees back home, becoming the main influence on strategically important Syria, and leading the fight against the Islamic State. This would land Erdoğan in Donald Trump’s good graces if it leads to a withdrawal of American troops.
HTS is clearly serious about establishing itself as the new, legitimate government — and a policy (for now) of relative moderation and tolerance toward other groups in the country is making that easier. But there are still so many unknowns and reasons that this can go terribly wrong.
Can Romania just cancel an election?
The constitutional court decided it’s “better to ask for forgiveness than permission.” After a massive far-right influence campaign by external (well … Russian) forces on TikTok and other social platforms was uncovered, Romania became the first democracy to ever cancel an election because of a disinformation campaign. This move will land the country in hot water regardless of the results of the rescheduled election. The court is viewed as highly politicized, so the decision will ultimately undermine it and whoever the future president may be – unless the far-right fringe candidate is allowed to run, and win, again.
How could President Trump’s plan to negotiate a ceasefire in Ukraine on “day one” impact China’s approach to Taiwan?
Whether China will push to undermine the cross-strait status quo during Trump’s second term is still up for debate. But Trump’s transactional approach to the war in Ukraine won’t affect China’s approach to Taiwan, at least in the near term. Beijing is still several years away from being able to credibly launch an invasion and take over the self-governing democracy. For now, China’s leaders are much more focused on regaining their own economic footing. That said, President-elect Trump’s interest in defending an island thousands of miles from the United States (and incredibly close to mainland China) is questionable at best. Many of his advisors care a great deal about Taiwanese sovereignty as a matter of US national security and longstanding American values, but Trump himself is much more interested in the country’s bilateral trade balance with the US.
What does Russia after Putin realistically look like?
If Vladimir Putin dies tomorrow, don’t expect a seismic shift at the Kremlin. Far more likely, his replacement would be another strongly anti-Western, nationalist leader who would fill the vacuum left by Putin’s departure. Such a successor would likely be more risk-averse, having to derive legitimacy and maintain power through the support of the country’s military, intelligence, and security leaders. It’s hard to imagine a dramatic shift in Russia’s geopolitical orientation when most of the country feels like the United States and “the West” have been out to squash their country’s power for decades.
Could a multi-party proportional representation system fix American politics?
America’s two-party system provides unique challenges for government representation by fostering an “us vs. them” tribalist sentiment, dividing the country into only two camps. It would be harder to immediately brand the opposing party as “the enemy of the state” if Americans had more choices. So, a shift to a multi-party system would allow a broader spectrum of ideologies into DC, and across the country, that would more closely reflect the diversity of the country’s population as a whole, which I think would be a constructive development. That said, it's hard to see how we could ever get from here to there given the stronghold on American politics (and the insane amount of funding) that the current duopoly has.
Why do you always defend the United Nations?
Some may find it controversial, but I’m proud of the United Nations. A truly global institution created by the United States out of the rubble of World War II, the UN charter reflects the very best of American values. As an institution, the UN no doubt has problems. The Security Council (and its veto powers) reflects a geopolitical order that no longer exists, lacks representation, and is accordingly broken. In the General Assembly, each country (no matter how small) has one vote but without enforcement power is generally weak and ineffective. Countries vote and veto in ways many of us wish they didn’t (but you should blame those countries, not the UN, for that).
What gets lost in the critiques of the bureaucracy of the United Nations is the amount of good that the organization does on a global scale, and with limited expenses (which, by the way, is where most of American funding for the United Nations is spent). The World Health Organization, World Food Organization, UNICEF, and other UN arms are systematically looking out for the world’s poorest and most vulnerable in ways most singular countries couldn’t be bothered to do alone.
Today, the world is heading to a post-carbon energy future, and that’s in no small part due to the architecture set up by the United Nations. Plus, new initiatives like the creation of a global framework for artificial intelligence (which I’ve been happy to be a part of) signal more positive developments are still to come on the only stage where every country in the world can have a voice.
What is on your radar over the next 24 months and not being discussed enough?
While there’s constant talk about artificial intelligence impacting our daily lives, the deployment of large-scale AI applications to an individual’s every dataset is not being discussed nearly enough. Personalized decisions or predictions based on human behavior patterns ascribed in large datasets are coming our way shortly. Before you know it, we will all have tools that will change humanity as we know it — in productive ways and post-human ways.
Where do you get your news, and what news sources do you trust?
As you might expect, the folks at Eurasia Group and GZERO Media act as my North Star when news breaks. With about 250 brilliant employees scattered across the globe working tirelessly to understand the inner workings of their areas of expertise, they bring priceless insight into what’s going on in the world on any given day. More broadly, it’s helpful for people to look outside their bubbles and read news coverage from outside their country of origin. For me, the Canadians (CBC), Germans (DW), Japanese (NHK), Arabs (Al Jazeera, etc.), and others cover the world in a much more effective way than the coverage we get from one hour of insular news coverage on cable television (or even from sitting down with the New York Times or Wall Street Journal).
What are your thoughts on pineapple on pizza?
Well, that depends. I’ll allow pineapple if there’s also ham and something spicy on top like jalapenos or chili flakes. Even then, I can probably think of 20 other things that I’d rather have as a pizza topping. Still, pineapple is preferable to cuttlefish – a Japanese fan favorite.
Are you hiring?
Eurasia Group is always looking for new talent – not just in our New York office but around the world. I am not personally involved in hiring, though, which is probably for the best. Thankfully we have a CEO and management team who make running the firm look easy. We’d be nowhere near as successful without them. Left to my own devices, I might run us into the ground. Ask anyone at Eurasia Group, they’ll totally agree with me.Political K-drama, Lebanon ceasefire, Trudeau at Mar-a-Lago, and more: Your questions, answered
Ian Bremmer surrounded by world leaders.
It’s beginning to look a lot like the holiday season here in New York — so in the Christmas spirit, I decided to answer your most pressing questions in a December edition of my mailbag series. Want to know what I think about Trump’s latest picks for his new administration? What’s next for the Middle East? Gladiator II vs. Wicked? Ask, and you shall receive.
Hoping to crack a few echo chambers at once, I put out a call for questions onX,Threads, andBluesky, and — as usual — you all delivered an avalanche of insightful and thought-provoking queries. I sorted through hundreds of questions, spanning everything from “Is America in decline?” to “What is Moose’s favorite toy?” to “What is the meaning of life?” I’ll leave the philosophizing to Plato but am excited to tackle the questions more political in nature — with a few personal ones thrown in for amusement.
So grab some hot cocoa as I dive into your first round of questions (some of which have been edited for clarity).
What the heck happened in South Korea?
On Tuesday, President Yoon Suk Yeol shocked the world by (briefly and unlawfully) declaring emergency martial law before reversing course some six hours later. Martial law means all activities by parliament and political parties become prohibited, the media gets placed under state control, and protests and demonstrations are banned. Yoon claimed the move was meant “to eradicate” a fifth column of North Korea-aligned opposition elements, despite there being no evidence of such a threat. The truth: Yoon had become deeply unpopular after being swept up in several corruption scandals (with one notably including his wife). When the opposition refused to pass his budget, he snapped. Today, Yoon awoke to a political hangover, realizing that his decision destroyed any remaining legacy he might have had. He'll be impeached in short order (with a motion already submitted), and new elections will likely favor the opposition. South Korea will remain a democracy thanks to its institutions holding strong against the immediate threat of illiberalism (unlike some other countries I know). I predict the country will be able to move past this blip swiftly, and I doubt the rest of the world will be talking much about it in the coming weeks.
Do you expect the recent ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah to last?
Despite reports of some fire from both sides, which is to be expected, I think there’s a good chance that the truce will hold. About 60,000 Israelis evacuated the northern part of the country near the Lebanon border after Hamas attacked on Oct. 7, 2023. So a positive sign to look for would be if the displaced Israelis start heading back home. Israeli forces have pummeled Hezbollah, decimating their capacity to expand the war. Plus, Israel wants to give Donald Trump a win, and the two-month ceasefire will become "permanent" just as he is inaugurated. Coincidence? I think not.
How do you feel about Canada’s Prime Minister Justin Trudeau flying down to Mar-a-Lago in response to Trump's tariff threats? A weak move? A smart play? Somewhere in-between?
The Canadians are stuck between a rock and a hard place. America’s northern neighbors rely heavily on economic and political cooperation with the United States, so this was Justin Trudeau’s only move. Provincial governors across the political spectrum are demanding cooperation with the Trump administration as a matter of utmost urgency. The primary issue for Trudeau: He won’t be in power for long and, accordingly, has very limited leverage.
Has the United States become a rogue nation?
I’d define a rogue state as one that actively wants to break the norms and rules of the international order — diplomatic, economic, and military. By that definition, while the United States has taken rogue actions (the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the treatment of prisoners in Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib, etc. etc.), on most issues, the US doesn’t belong in that bucket. However, the US is now far less committed to strengthening or even leading multilateral institutions. It has become more transactional, less oriented toward common values, and more interested in bilateral negotiations with a clearer power advantage than multilateralism. In that way, US foreign policy is becoming less “exceptionalist” and more akin to China’s — though with a stronger focus on national security leverage than China’s more principally commercial perspective.
When you visited Mexico a bit more than a year ago, you concluded that the country was doing better than expected and shared a fairly optimistic outlook for the country’s future. Do you still hold that view?
I feel less optimistic than a year ago, for sure. The Mexican economy should be doing far better, given its level of integration with the United States (the strongest economy in the world) and its favorable positioning vis-a-vis derisking/decoupling from China. However, some market-unfriendly decisions during Claudia Sheinbaum’s presidential transition, particularly but not limited to judicial reform, have hurt Mexico’s investment climate. Plus, concerns that the bilateral relationship with the US will come under pressure from the incoming Trump administration adds to the looming economic uncertainty. Still, Sheinbaum’s orientation is much more technocratic — and her Cabinet overall is more professional — than her predecessor, and that will help.
Can you please make sense of what's now happening in Syria/Aleppo? Will the Assad regime collapse?
Basically, a Turkey-backed militant Islamist group called HTS managed to snag Aleppo, Syria’s second-biggest city, in a matter of days, catching everyone off guard. It’s a huge deal, basically flipping the script on who controls what in Syria. But why now, after the Syrian civil war had been frozen for years? Two words: G-Zero, baby. Assad’s regime is extremely dependent on Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah for its survival. But Israel recently wiped out Hezbollah in Lebanon and weakened Iran’s proxy network, leaving Assad seriously vulnerable. Plus, Russia is racing to grab as much ground as possible before a potential Trump-forced ceasefire in Ukraine. With Assad’s main backers distracted and resource-strained, it was the perfect opportunity for the rebels to make a move. But here’s the kicker: Assad isn’t going down. Iran and Russia are too invested in keeping him in power, so they'll absolutely jump in to save his bacon. Even countries that are happy to see Assad and Iran weakened, like Israel and Turkey, don’t want to deal with the chaos that his overthrow would leave behind. So, while this is a massive shake-up, don’t bet on Assad getting the boot just yet – he’s survived crazier situations, and he’s got some powerful friends helping him hang on.
How are things looking for Russia given the ruble, Syria, and Iran?
In terms of those specific perspectives, things might not be looking too good for Russia. Low oil prices, new sanctions, and government spending on the war effort propelled the Russian ruble to its lowest levels in over two years. Rebel advancement in Aleppo makes both Russia and Iran look weak and distracted. Plus, there’s been anastronomical number of Russian casualties in Ukraine as Putin’s invasion has dragged on.
But that’s not to say that things are looking bad for Russia in the long term. Russian forces have been gaining more and more territory in the Donbas; President-elect Trump aims to end the war as soon as possible; Volodymyr Zelensky is under an immense amount of domestic pressure to stop the bleeding; and the Europeans are increasingly split on continuing economic and military support for Kyiv. With no direct internal threat to Putin’s position, the Russian president is still sitting comfortably in Moscow … with large bits of Ukraine essentially his.
What got you interested or started in politics to begin with?
My first trip outside the United States really kicked off my interest in politics. Picture it: Soviet Union in 1986, the Cold War in full swing. It was such a transformative experience for a kid from the projects. My perception of Moscow, Leningrad, and the former Soviet republics was so different than what the news was telling me, which was fascinating and made me want to explore other parts of the world. I wanted to go everywhere, study hard, and learn as much as possible to understand the world better. I thought of that kid when I made my trip to Antarctica last year, completing my journey to all seven continents.
Who is the most well-known person on your cellphone contact list?
Besides Beyoncé? Just kidding — I don't know many Hollywood types, but I suspect the few I do are the most broadly well-known, not all the political leaders. So I would probably say it’s Ashton Kutcher, who is extremely interested in international relations, especially in China. Bet you didn’t expect that answer.
Donald Trump on a throne spinning a globe on his finger.
The global response to Donald Trump’s imminent return to power has been nothing short of remarkable.
From Israel's Benjamin Netanyahu hinting at a potential Lebanon cease-fire as a "gift" to the president-elect, to Ukraine's Volodymyr Zelensky saying the war will “end faster” under the incoming administration, to European and Asian leaders expressing Stockholm syndrome-levels of excitement to work with him, foreign leaders have been lining up to kiss the president-elect’s ring since his election victory two weeks ago.
To be sure, most US allies and adversaries still dislike and mistrust Trump. But with memories of the clashes, chaos, and unpredictability of his first term still fresh, they know that they get crosswise with Trump at their own peril. The president-elect still believes America is being taken for a ride, values are something other countries use to constrain US power, and allies are only as good as the money they spend on US goods and protection. And Trump is willing to flex Washington’s full military and economic muscle – whether in the form of high tariffs or the withdrawal of US security support – to extract gains from other nations.
World leaders are accordingly doing everything they can to avoid becoming a target of his wrath, using flattery and favor to appeal to Trump’s ego and transactional nature in the hopes of getting in his good graces. After all, they know Trump is nothing if not willing to sit down with anyone – whether a longstanding democratic ally or a brutal dictator – to try to cut a deal that makes him look good at home.
The upshot is that at least in the early days of his presidency, Donald Trump is poised to rack up far more foreign policy wins than many people appreciate. Not because he’s a “stable genius” or a particularly gifted negotiator, but because he’ll be running the world’s largest economy and most powerful military, with leverage over virtually every country and less aversion to wielding it than any US president that came before him.
But that’s table stakes for Trump. There are three reasons why his ability to get concessions from other countries and put points on the board early on will be greater than during his first term.
First, Trump is no longer isolated, with a growing number of world leaders eager to welcome him to the international arena. Eight years ago, the president-elect was an outlier, with few true friends on the global stage apart from Netanyahu, Gulf leaders, Hungary’s Viktor Orban, Japan’s Shinzo Abe, India’s Narendra Modi, and a handful of others. But things have changed since.
Italy's Giorgia Meloni, currently the most popular G7 leader, shares Trump's views on immigration, social policy, and economic nationalism. Argentina’s Javier Milei, the chainsaw-wielding “Trump of the Pampas,” was the first foreign leader to meet with him after the election. In Canada, the Conservative Party's Pierre Poilievre is poised to replace Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, promising a much more Trump-aligned relationship. Germany’s Olaf Scholz will likewise soon be replaced, probably by the opposition conservative Christian Democrat leader Friedrich Merz, a wealthy former businessman who is ideologically closer to the incoming American president. South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol is strategically positioning himself to become the new Shinzo Abe, going as far as taking up golf again to establish a closer relationship with Trump. The list goes on.
Trump is no more a fan of multilateralism than he was eight years ago. He remains mistrustful of alliances and indifferent to other countries’ values and political systems. But whenever he attends gatherings of the G7, G20, and NATO now, the president-elect will at least be surrounded by like-minded leaders who will be much more receptive to his “America First” agenda and inclined to play by his rules.
Second, the world is much more dangerous than it was in 2017, raising the stakes of misalignment with Trump. Major wars raging in Europe and the Middle East, heightened US-China tensions, and a more fragile global economy make the costs of being on the wrong side of the president-elect exponentially higher than they were during Trump’s first term.
And third, Trump’s domestic political power is significantly more consolidated this time around. The president-elect has unified control of Congress and a pliant Republican Party, knows his way around Washington, DC, and is surrounding himself with far more ideologically aligned loyalists than in his first term. Gone are the institutionalist career staffers and establishment Republicans who often checked Trump’s most disruptive impulses. For world leaders, this means alternative backchannels to get around the president-elect’s foreign policy preferences won’t be nearly as available or effective. Whether or not they like it, it’s Trump’s way or the highway now.
It’s no wonder that we’re seeing so many countries preemptively bend the knee, desperate to find common ground with Trump before he takes office. China, for instance, is floating potential concessions to avert an economically destabilizing trade war, from organizing a Ukraine peace conference to buying US Treasuries and increasing purchases of American goods. Iran granted a meeting to Trump advisor-extraordinaire Elon Musk in an apparent effort to facilitate a de-escalatory deal. Taiwan’s leadership is planning a massive new American arms purchase offer to show Trump they’re serious about paying more for US protection. Meanwhile, Ukraine is not only expressing readiness to negotiate a cease-fire but is also weighing several sweeteners – including potential business deals, access to the country’s natural resources, and Ukrainian troop deployments to replace US forces in Europe after the war – to convince Trump that continued US support is in his personal and political interests.
None of this means that every effort to appease Trump will succeed, or that Trump’s mere presence in the White House will end every war, de-escalate every conflict, and resolve every disagreement. If history is any guide, most attempts to strike a lasting deal with the president-elect will fail. In the long run, his approach will erode America’s influence on the global stage, deepen the G-Zero vacuum of leadership, and make the world a more dangerous place.
In the near term, however, Trump’s penchant for bilateral deal-making, disregard for longstanding American norms and values, reputation for unpredictability, and unrestrained leadership of the world’s sole superpower will increase the odds of improbable breakthroughs.
Welcome to Trump’s international honeymoon – it may not last long, but at least nobody’s having any fun.
While the United States was still busy counting votes, Germany’s ruling coalition led by Chancellor Olaf Scholz suddenly fell apart last Wednesday, plunging Europe’s largest economy into chaos. Now, Germans are set to head to the polls on Feb. 23 – seven months earlier than originally planned – to elect a new government at a particularly challenging time for their country, the EU, and the world.
What happened?
After less than three years in power, the so-called “traffic light” coalition of Scholz’s center-left Social Democrats, the environmentalist Greens, and the pro-business Free Democrats collapsed on Nov. 6 when the chancellor unceremoniously fired his finance minister and the Free Democrat leader, Christian Lindner.
The move followed months of bitter negotiations over how to plug a roughly €10-billion hole in next year’s federal budget. The coalition’s progressive partners favored taking on more debt to boost spending on infrastructure, defense, and aid to Kyiv (Germany is the second-largest contributor of military aid to Ukraine after the US). The fiscally conservative FDP opposed any new borrowing despite Germany’s low debt-to-GDP ratio, instead pushing for tax and spending cuts that would reduce welfare transfers, aggravate Germany’s malaise, and curtail support for Kyiv.
The standoff came to a head because Germany has a strict constitutional debt limit the government is not allowed to exceed outside of exceptional circumstances like the COVID-19 pandemic. When Scholz asked his finance minister to suspend the “debt brake,” citing the exceptional impact of the war in Ukraine, Lindner refused to budge, and the traffic light broke.
This was the conclusion of an uneasy marriage of convenience riven by ultimately irreconcilable differences about how to kickstart Germany’s long-stagnant economy and execute the foreign and security policy Zeitenwende (or “turning point”) that Scholz proclaimed when he replaced Angela Merkel as chancellor in 2021. One Russian invasion of Ukraine and three years of gridlock, high energy costs, and flat growth later, Germans have soured on their government. A recent poll found that only 14% of voters were satisfied with the ruling coalition, with 54% wanting early elections.
What now?
Scholz’s Social Democrats and Friedrich Merz, who succeeded Merkel as leader of the opposition conservative Christian Democratic Union, have agreed to hold a vote of confidence to trigger the dissolution of parliament on Dec. 16. Provided Scholz loses it – as is widely expected – early elections will then be held on Feb. 23.
In the meantime, Germany will be in a limbo of sorts. The chancellor and his remaining Green coalition partner will remain in office until a new coalition is elected, but as the head of a minority government, he now has to secure support from opposition parties on a case-by-case basis to get any laws passed. In particular, Scholz needs votes from Merz’s conservatives to pass an all-important 2025 compromise budget. But that’s a very tall order, requiring not only painful concessions from the CDU – especially on the suspension of the debt brake – but also that the SPD give up core elements of its legislative agenda in return.
If no budget is passed by year-end, as looks likely, Germany will enter into “provisional budget management” – a state of limited government operations and funding based on 2024 numbers. While this won’t lead to a government shutdown like it would in the United States, no new obligations or programs could be passed before a new government finally approves a 2025 budget, potentially not until the second or third quarter of next year. This would restrain Berlin from active policymaking during the critical early days of Donald Trump's presidency, at a time when Europe is more rudderless than ever and Russia continues to threaten Ukraine and NATO.
The road ahead
The opposition CDU/Christian Social Union center-right alliance leads the national polls with 34%. Of the “traffic light” coalition parties, Scholz’s SPD is polling at around 16%, while the Greens hover at 11%. Lindner’s Free Democrats, meanwhile, are currently below the 5% threshold required to get into parliament.
The far-right Alternative for Germany is the second-most popular national party, with 17% support, but all other parties continue to explicitly rule out the possibility of entering into a coalition with it. The newer pro-Russian, anti-immigration, left-wing Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance, which made large gains in September’s state elections, is somewhat less domestically toxic than AfD and polling at 6%.
Of course, there are still more than three months to go until the election, and these numbers will change, especially in the wake of the government’s collapse. But barring any major surprises, the CDU’s Merz is all but certain to become the 10th German chancellor since 1949. Assuming the conservatives’ most natural partner, the FDP, is unable to clear 5%, the only open question is whether the next government will be a grand coalition of the CDU/CSU and the SPD or another three-way coalition including them plus the Greens.
Grand coalitions have a long history in Germany and are popular with voters for their track record of delivering moderation and stability. Three-way coalitions, by contrast, are an unwieldy, unstable last resort for mainstream parties to form majority governments in Germany’s increasingly fragmented party landscape – a challenge that is only going to accelerate as the anti-establishment AfD and BSW continue to grow in popularity.
Whatever it looks like, the next government will have to contend with the big challenges that the current administration failed to address. Germany faces deep structural problems, including chronically low productivity and investment, high energy and labor costs, unfavorable demographics, a fragile export-dependent growth model, and an overly rigid debt limit rule.
But Berlin’s biggest challenges aren’t economic – they’re existential. At a time when Russia is testing NATO's resolve, China is challenging the Western-led international order, and America's commitment to Europe is in question, Germany must decide what kind of power it wants to be.
Will Europe’s economic engine finally step up as a geopolitical leader, or will it continue to punch below its weight? For Germany’s next government, there may be no more kicking this can down the road.
Donald Trump
America has spoken. Donald Trump will become president of the United States again. And I can’t say that I’m surprised.
This election comes at a time when people all over the world are unhappy with where their countries are going, and they don’t trust their political institutions to right the ship. Some of that is a product of the deepening geopolitical recession, which is in part driven by a backlash against globalization and the globalist elites who promoted their own economic and political interests at the expense of their populations. Some of it has to do with the economic and social disruption caused by post-pandemic surges in inflation and immigration.
As a result, what was historically an electoral advantage in democracies has become a liability in the current cycle: incumbency. Over the past year, most incumbents around the globe have either been forced out of office or seriously underperformed at the ballot box (e.g., in the United Kingdom, Japan, France, Germany, Austria, India, South Africa, etc.). Those who haven’t faced voters yet are deeply unpopular and expected to lose power soon (e.g., Canada, Germany, Norway, etc.).
The fact that Kamala Harris couldn’t escape this fate after four years as vice president to an unpopular administration was therefore hardly unexpected. No party has ever retained the White House when incumbent approval is as low as it is. Over 70% believe the country is on the wrong track, and Americans have little confidence in their government’s handling of the top issues they care about: inflation and immigration.
Sure, inflation – the average rate at which prices in the economy increase over time – has come way down from its pandemic-induced highs and is now near the Fed’s target. But prices themselves are still high owing to years of above-target inflation, and those prices aren’t coming down absent a recession (not to mention the fact that Trump’s plans promise to increase inflation). Fair or not, the party in power gets blamed for that. Similarly, illegal immigration has also been coming down, but crossings are still at elevated levels, and most illegal immigrants find ways to stay in the country. Many illegal immigrants also moved (or were moved) from red states to blue states, making the issue more important to more of the country than before.
Democrats had hoped to counter these headwinds with messages about access to abortion, the economy, and Trump’s threat to democracy and general unfitness for office. But a problem got in their way: a hyperpolarized information environment that makes it difficult for either side to reach across the aisle to the other half of the country. There are two radically different information spaces in the US, and the gap between these algorithmically boosted, media-driven bubbles is only growing. It’s increasingly difficult to have a single conversation on any policy issue, let alone to find compromise on solutions, when we don’t even agree on basic facts about what the problems are. That’s a very dysfunctional place to be for our civic democracy.
Ultimately, though, the American people looked at the two candidates and found Trump’s message more compelling, and they handed him as resounding a national victory as either candidate could’ve hoped for in today’s polarized environment. Trump shattered his previous ceiling of national support and made gains across the board relative to 2020. He is on track to sweep every swing state and become the first Republican to win the popular vote in 20 years on the back of a broad-based shift to the right in almost every geography – from rural areas to my very own New York City – and with nearly every demographic group, including young, female, Black, and Hispanic voters.
The Republican Party also took control of the Senate, with at least 52 and as many as 56 seats in the 100-seat chamber – enough to confirm Trump’s appointees, but not enough to get away with repealing the legislative filibuster or confirming obviously unqualified nominees. Republicans are favored to win a narrow House majority, too, though the exact margin may not be known for several weeks due to slow counting in states like California and close races elsewhere. A unified government – along with an already friendly judiciary – will make it significantly easier for Trump to enact his domestic policy priorities, from tax cuts and defense spending increases to immigration overhauls.
And if you think Trump’s return will have a profound impact on the United States (fact-check: true), it will matter even more for the rest of the world.
The biggest loser is Ukraine. Trump has repeatedly said he will end the war there in 24 hours. Of course, what he really means is that he wants to freeze the conflict along the current territorial lines, with Russia de facto getting to keep the land it has conquered. The war is already going badly for the Ukrainians, with Western military and economic support past its peak. Trump will try to unilaterally cut a cease-fire deal with Zelensky and President Vladimir Putin even before the lame-duck period ends, using military aid to Kyiv as leverage over both sides without coordinating with America’s European allies. If Trump calls Zelensky first and demands a cease-fire (and the de facto cession of territory), and Zelensky refuses, the ball will then shift to Putin’s court.
Regardless of the election outcome, Ukraine would have been forced to negotiate sooner or later. The difference is that Harris would have coordinated that negotiating position with Ukraine and the EU. Trump doesn’t want to be responsible for “losing” Ukraine, nor does he take issue with Ukrainian self-defense. But he thinks Ukraine’s defense should be paid for primarily by the countries that have the biggest stake in it: the Europeans. Trump’s bargaining approach may succeed at ending the war … or it may not.
Either way, Europe will have a big problem on its hands. Trump’s Ukraine policy will put a lot of strain on the trans-Atlantic relationship. The Europeans, many of whom are already struggling economically, will also be facing higher tariffs from the Trump administration. Will they take a stronger, more consolidated position on Ukraine, or will they fragment? Will they continue to align closely with the US on trade with China, or will they start to hedge more? Will the European Union crack under the pressure, or will it be galvanized by Trump to finally build a stronger, more strategically autonomous union? Those are all huge question marks.
Then there’s the Middle East. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was already riding high politically on the back of a string of military wins. He was a big winner yesterday as well, as he can expect greater support from Trump than he could have from Harris. The vice president was not going to end the special relationship with Israel, but Trump is going to make even more of a push to support the Israelis and the Gulf States – another group of winners. Trump and Netanyahu are also aligned in their enmity toward Iran. Will Trump’s blank check embolden Bibi to take even more aggressive actions in the region, potentially against Iranian nuclear facilities? That’s a very dangerous situation that bears close watching.
And let’s not forget China. The world’s second-largest economy is already underperforming, and Beijing is feeling increasingly defensive about the tariff threats coming from hawks like former Trump trade czar Robert Lighthizer. The Chinese are going to be frantically trying to establish back-channels to China-friendly Trump allies like Elon Musk, hoping they can facilitate a less confrontational relationship. Will Trump support that, or will his hawks get the upper hand and push for an even more confrontational approach? Beijing will move cautiously and slowly in this environment.
To be sure, just as he did in his first term, Trump will be able to get some foreign policy wins just by virtue of being the president of the most powerful country in the world. But the potential for things to go sideways is much greater in this environment. Geopolitics are in for a volatile and unpredictable ride, and the United States is about to become the epicenter of it.
So take a deep breath and strap in, folks. It’s going to get bumpy.