The United States is ramping up its “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran.
In a letter sent to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in early March, President Donald Trump gave Tehran an ultimatum: reach a new nuclear deal with the US within two months or face direct military action – “bombing the likes of which they have never seen before,” as he told NBC News’ Kristen Welker on Sunday.
The letter proposed mediation by the United Arab Emirates (whose emissaries delivered the missive in question) and expressed Trump’s preference for a diplomatic solution. “I would rather have a peace deal than the other option, but the other option will solve the problem,” the president said.
In the three weeks it took the Iranian leadership to figure out how to respond, the US turned up the temperature.
First came intense airstrikes (of Signalgate fame) against Iran’s last remaining functional ally in the region, the Houthis in Yemen, starting on March 15 and continuing to this day. Then, the US issued its first-ever sanctions against Chinese entities for buying Iranian crude oil, including a “teapot” refinery in Shandong and an import and storage terminal in Guangzhou. And in recent days, the US military deployed a fleet of B-2 stealth bombers – capable of carrying the 30,000-lb. bunker-busting bombs needed to blast through Iran’s hardened enrichment sites – to its Diego Garcia base in the Indian Ocean, in range of both Yemen and Iran. This move was “not unrelated” to Trump’s ultimatum, according to a senior US official.
Iran finally rejected direct negotiations with the US in a formal response to Trump’s letter delivered last Thursday via Oman, its preferred mediator. President Masoud Pezeshkian stated on Sunday that although the Islamic Republic won’t speak directly with the Trump administration while maximum pressure is in place, Tehran is willing to engage with Washington indirectly through the Omanis.
Whether Trump’s two-month deadline was to strike a deal or to begin negotiations remains unclear. Either way, there’s no chance that two sides that deeply mistrust each other – especially after Trump unilaterally withdrew from the original nuclear deal in 2018 – could reach an agreement over issues as complex as Iran’s nuclear program and support for regional proxies in just a couple, or a few, months (let alone a single one).
But does that mean that Trump’s ultimatum is doomed to end in confrontation? Not necessarily. In fact, his “escalate to de-escalate” strategy could be the best hope to avoid a crisis this year.
A ticking time bomb
While US intelligence assesses that Iran is not building a nuclear weapon, it has become a threshold nuclear state with enough 60% enriched uranium to produce six nuclear weapons (if enriched to 90%) and the ability to “dash to a bomb” in about six months (though weaponizing a device would probably take it 1-2 years).
European governments have long made it clear that unless Iran reins in its enrichment activities by this summer, they will “snap back” the UN sanctions that were lifted as part of the 2015 nuclear deal before the agreement expires in October and they can no longer do so.
Iran has vowed to respond to snapback sanctions by withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Given the precedent set by North Korea – whose NPT exit in 2003 was followed by ever-greater steps toward weaponization – and the already advanced state of Tehran’s nuclear program, NPT withdrawal could be the action-forcing event Israel needs to convince Trump to support a joint strike on Iran’s underground nuclear facilities.
Which means that the US and Iran were likely headed for a collision later this year even if Trump hadn’t issued his ultimatum.
Strange bedfellows
And yet, both Trump and Iran’s leadership would much prefer to avoid a military confrontation in the near term.
Trump’s political coalition includes both traditional Republican war hawks and “America First” isolationists who are averse to US involvement in new forever wars. Whereas cabinet officials like Secretary of State Marco Rubio, National Security Advisor Mike Waltz, and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth advocate for a more combative approach toward the Islamic Republic, none of these prominent national security hawks are in charge of the Iran file – Middle East Special Envoy Steve Witkoff, a Washington outsider and a restrainer, is.
Most importantly, Trump ran as a peacemaker and has repeatedly stated his preference for a deal, believing that bombing Iran could mire the US in an unpopular war that’d divert precious resources from his domestic priorities and endanger his friends in the Gulf for little political upside. The solidly MAGA Vice President JD Vance echoed this concern when, in the leaked Signal group chat, he flagged the risk to oil prices from striking the Houthis for the sake of “bailing out” the Europeans.
For its part, Iran is historically vulnerable and eager to negotiate a deal that brings sanctions relief to its battered economy. While capitulating to Trump’s demands is politically dangerous for Khamenei and would weaken the regime’s domestic position, neither he nor other hardliners would welcome a military showdown with the US and Israel.
Take it or leave it
The threat of a crisis later this year creates an opening for Trump to pressure Tehran into offering concessions that allow the US president to claim progress and avoid triggering snapback sanctions.
Last year’s effective destruction of Iran’s regional proxy network – Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Bashar al Assad’s regime in Syria – dealt a blow to the country’s conventional deterrence and heightened the importance of its nuclear program. Iran will therefore resist making any meaningful concessions on this front. If there’s one piece of the nuclear file it could cede ground on, it’s its stockpile of 60% enriched uranium, which Tehran could conceivably agree to freeze.
Where Iran could potentially offer more is in backing away from its proxies, at least temporarily. Though it doesn’t have operational control over the Houthis (unlike the decimated Hezbollah), the Islamic Republic could deprive them of the bulk of the weapons systems and intelligence they rely on to attack Red Sea shipping lanes. It could also instruct Shia militias in Iraq to refrain from targeting US troops.
The regime would find these choices politically and ideologically unpalatable. But with its so-called Axis of Resistance already in shambles and little Tehran can do to rebuild it in the near term, its strategic value is nowhere near what it was a year ago. A chance at avoiding a snapback and US bombing could accordingly be seen as a worthwhile trade.
Less for less
While a breakthrough agreement is highly unlikely to be reached before the summer (or at all), the two sides’ mutual desire to avoid escalation suggests that Trump would be receptive to the relatively minor concessions Tehran could be willing to make – the most it can conceivably offer under the circumstances.
But those concessions would need to come soon, before snapback is triggered. And even this best-case scenario wouldn’t buy Iran any sanctions relief. Instead, they’d get to kick the can on snapback sanctions and possible US military action while negotiations on a more comprehensive – and aspirational – deal are underway.
If, however, Iran’s modest concessions fall short of what Trump deems acceptable, the risk of military escalation this year will rise sharply – either when Trump’s ultimatum comes to a head or when snapback gets triggered, Iran exits the NPT, and Israel considers a strike (whether solo or joint with the US).
Iran has not yet made the decision to build a nuclear weapon. And unless it’s attacked, it remains unlikely to do so, knowing full well that any overt steps toward weaponization would invite certain, immediate, and devastating retaliation. But nothing would make the Islamic Republic dash for a bomb more than getting bombed.
