TRANSCRIPT: Nobody wins in nuclear Armageddon: Rafael Grossi's plan to keep us safe in time of war
Rafael Grossi:
We are playing with fire. No one, neither Ukraine nor Russia would benefit from a nuclear accident in that part of the world.
Ian Bremmer:
Hello and welcome to the GZERO World Podcast. This is where you'll find extended versions of my interviews on public television. I'm Ian Bremmer, and on today's episode we're keeping things light by asking how real is the threat of nuclear Armageddon? As Vladimir Putin's battle losses in Ukraine mount his nuclear saber-rattling has gotten louder. Meanwhile, the Iran nuclear deal shows no signs of life at all. Unlike the country's nuclear program, which experts believe is weeks away from developing a viable weapon and don't sleep on North Korea. Not that you were going to, because they have signaled plans to significantly increase their nuclear arsenal in the year to come. So, how do we get through 2023 alive and on the bright side, what's going on with nuclear fusion? Hey, there's got to be something positive. That's what I'm asking Rafael Grossi, he's the director general of the Nuclear Weapons Watchdog Group, the International Atomic Energy Agency. Let's get to it.
Announcer:
The GZERO World Podcast is brought to you by our founding sponsor, First Republic. First Republic, a private bank and wealth management company understands the value of service, safety and stability in today's uncertain world. Visit firstrepublic.com to learn more. GZERO World would also like to share a message from our friends at Foreign Policy, the Hidden Economics of Remarkable Women. A podcast from Foreign Policy is back for season three. This season you'll hear from reporters around the globe who are covering under-reported ways women are challenging the status quo, from justice for domestic migrant workers in Gulf States to how to break down gender barriers in the film industry. Follow and listen to the Hidden Economics of Remarkable Women, wherever you get your podcasts.
Ian Bremmer:
Rafael Grossi, thanks so much for joining us today.
Rafael Grossi:
My pleasure, how are you?
Ian Bremmer:
I'm very well. I'm very well. To start off, very quickly, for those that are not familiar with your organization, the IAEA. Could you just give us a moment on what it does and how it helps protect us from nuclear proliferation?
Rafael Grossi:
Well, the IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency founded in 1957, an American idea originally Atoms for Peace. That may ring a bell to, for some. President Eisenhower at the General Assembly of the United Nations. But now it does a lot, lots of things. It tries by inspections to prevent nuclear material in any of the countries operating nuclear power plants. There are more than 400 all over the world and associated facilities that this material is deviated to non-peaceful uses. It also oversees the safe and secure operation of nuclear facilities over the world and on the promotional side, if you want, it also helps countries in areas less known by the general public areas like nuclear medicine, nuclear applications, everything nuclear. So, we are from the nuclear watchdog to the nuclear enabler for development. A big portfolio.
Ian Bremmer:
Of all of the concerns globally. In terms of the most imminent nuclear threats, what are you most worried about right now?
Rafael Grossi:
Well, at the moment it's of course the possibility of a nuclear accident in Ukraine at the moment. We have many things on our plate, I'm sure you may know, Iran, North Korea, other things. But since you used the word imminent or more urgent or more pressing, undoubtedly what's going on in Ukraine with the largest nuclear power plant in Europe is Zaporizhzhia being regularly shelled. I think it's quite a thing and we are working actively on this.
Ian Bremmer:
I know and I've seen that you've actually had inspectors on the ground now for a few months, if I understand it correctly, in Zaporizhzhia.
Rafael Grossi:
Yeah, indeed. I went there, I took them there. It's not the same people they have rotated, but we went there in the beginning of September, was quite a dangerous itinerary there. But finally we made it to the plant and we were able to settle a permanent mission by the IAEA, which performs the number of functions. First and foremost, provide assistance, technical advice to the plant operators and at the same time inform because quite clearly because of the nature of the situation, as you know, this is a Ukrainian facility but that has been occupied or which is sits in territory occupied by Russia thereby or controlled by Russia, which creates an unprecedented situation. So, we are there are overlooking the situation. We are informing on the condition of the plant, the problems that may appear and in particular the physical integrity of the place, which as I said, incredible as it may sound has been shelled on a number of occasions.
Ian Bremmer:
No, it does sound incredible, and I want to be clear about this because this is a Ukrainian plant, it's the largest plant, as you say, nuclear plant in all of Europe. It has been physically occupied by Russian soldiers illegally, but it's being shelled now. I assume it's being shelled therefore by Ukrainians. Is that correct?
Rafael Grossi:
Well, what you say is a very complicated issue since we are there on a combat zone, on an active disputed combat zone. So I try, from my perspective, I have a mission to accomplish, which is to prevent a nuclear accident from happening. So, and my organization is among other things, as I was saying in the beginning, it's an inspectorate. So, good inspector, an auditor, before coming to any conclusion has to have the elements to a certain things like what you said. What we know is that this is happening and that this should stop now. So, what I have been trying to do, and I'm trying as to speak to do, is to bring everybody to an agreement on protecting sanctuarizing, if you allow me the word, the plant, so that it is not used as a platform for any military action or it is not attacked whoever may be doing that, that could be relevant at some stage. But what we need to have and to find is a common understanding on the fact that no one, neither Ukraine nor Russia would benefit from a nuclear accident in that part of the world.
Ian Bremmer:
Can I ask you how close we've come in your view to a nuclear accident so far and what's such an accident God forbid would look like?
Rafael Grossi:
Well, we have been close to it. For example, when I visited the plant, I was taken to a roof, a rooftop of a large hall where fresh nuclear fuel sits on racks waiting to be moved to the plants. Well, there were two very large holes on that roof that have been caused by ammunition, high caliber ammunition which could have impact the fuel there and creating a big accident there. There have been other occasions where other parts of the facility were impacted by ammunition, by shelling. So, the possibility that of an accident is there. It's not a hypothetical scenario that we are creating to alarm anybody. The dimension of the accident would depend on the amount of radioactive material that would be involved. It could range from a very limited amount to something quite big. And I'm sorry if I'm not being precise, but the gap is the Delta that it is so worrying because it could be, you have literally dozens, thousands of uranium and rich uranium sitting there, some plutonium in the spent fuel. So, the consequences could be really dramatic.
Ian Bremmer:
So that that's the potential for a shell ammunition artillery to directly hit the plant. I've also heard a lot of speculation. I want to ask you about it because you are the real expert about what might happen to the plant itself if you no longer have access to direct electricity and the backup generator, which has been... I mean they've been forced to rely on the backup generator for at least a number of occasions over the past months. Is that also a significant structural risk or has that largely ebbed away?
Rafael Grossi:
I would say it's even worse and I thank you for raising it. Otherwise, I would've mentioned it myself because the most, I would say, evident danger that one can't imagine is the direct attack, a kinetic direct attack, different parts of the plant. But this other possibility that you are mentioning is less obvious, it's less evident, but perhaps even more dangerous I would say because this could lead to meltdown of the reactor course because the moment the cooling function of the... Actually, is what happened in Fukushima for example, where basically because of an earthquake combined with a huge tsunami took away the emergency diesel generators that were cooling the plant. Then of course, this a nuclear core is at a few hundred centigrades or Fahrenheit temperature. So, of course, the famous meltdown could happen. So, in this case, and we had several occasions where we had interruptions.
Actually, it happens almost every week. To give you an idea, the plant being a very large plant used to have several lines, high tension lines feeding it. Some of them are completely off and some are still operational. And from this it has become commonplace that one or the other goes down. The most extreme situations is when they go to complete blackout and in these occasions you have the diesel emergency diesel generators kicking in and frankly you don't want to have the largest nuclear power plant in Europe operating or being cooled by virtue of a few diesel generators. All right, so we are playing with fire. I've said it, I've said this with this expression at the United Nations Security Council. I think we need to find a way to prevent this from happening and the establishment of this security zone.
Ian Bremmer:
I mean, this is an insane situation. Before we move on to a couple other places, I want to ask you a last piece. Do you think the Russians and the Ukrainians are now finally taking your proposal adequately seriously?
Rafael Grossi:
They do. I must say I met with President Zelensky a few times. I'm expecting to see him again soon. I met President Putin in October. We were discussing this. So, I think the seriousness, the problem at hand is very well understood. The problem here is that this table I'm negotiating at has become a bigger table where you do not only have diplomats or nuclear safety experts, you have generals, you have people in green fatigues, and this is a war. So, people are looking at the establishment of the zone through the lens of the military advantage or disadvantage that it may create. And this is what makes a bit more elusive. But I'm working very hard to try to bring them to some sort of agreement, not among themselves because they will never agree with each other. They will agree and this is what I'm asking them. They have to agree with me and that is good enough.
Ian Bremmer:
No, I mean frankly, between your work and the Secretary General's work on the food and fertilizer deal, the United Nations has been the absolutely essential actor in trying to reduce global catastrophe that comes out of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. I hope something that we can make everyone watching this show aware of, but I need to move to a couple other areas. You're not only focused on Russia, Ukraine, Iran has been of course a big headline issue for a long time. The nuclear deal feels farther away now than it has for really since it's been put together. And we see higher amounts of uranium enrichment, higher amounts of stockpiling deep in a mountain that the Israelis tell me that they couldn't get at militarily if they wanted to. How close do you think we are to Iranian nuclear breakout, and do you see this as increasingly inevitable?
Rafael Grossi:
Well, I think this has already happened. In the IAEA, we don't use this metric of the breakout. If by breakout one means the amount of material that you would need if you decided to do that, to have a nuclear device, that line has been passed. But of course, having the nuclear material does not mean automatically that you have a nuclear weapon. There is a lot of nuclear material around the world. Here you have to have a bird's eye view and the IAEA is the only eyes and ears of the international community through its inspections. To do that, to ascertain what is the nature of the program of the Iranian nuclear program, the JCPOA that you're mentioning is one big important part of this because it was a way that had been agreed to try to provide some containment to what was otherwise and a rapidly growing nuclear program.
But in parallel with that, there is a program that exists independently of JCPOA or no JCPOA and there also we have come to a very... I would say, difficult situation with Iran. I'm trying to reestablish the level of cooperation which is needed commensurate with what you just described. It's a program that is adding capacity, is adding material. They are having last generation centrifuges, which are these machines where you enrich uranium, you separate the isotope that is useful for you. And at the moment they are enriching uranium at large quantities at a level of enrichment, which is very, very close to the military level, which is 90% of an isotope of Iranian. They are at 60%, which is a technicality. It's a couple of steps more. So, I've been saying that of course the IAEA wants to provide the diplomatic, technically neutral platform for a good understanding. I hope this message is heard in Iran and I hope that I will be there soon or that I can be there soon to restart, to reset this dialogue in a way that would prevent this situation from becoming a very, very critical situation.
Ian Bremmer:
What's the credible reason why the Iranians might want to enrich to 60% levels. I mean, are there any civilian uses, I mean when you mention this to them, do they have any explanation or is it all a Sharrod simply to improve their leverage?
Rafael Grossi:
Well, as a director general of an international organization, I don't know if I could have the freedom to describe it like you are doing it. I would say what we are telling them is frankly, "You had reached at that level. Let our inspectors do their job." The uranium enrichment per se is not forbidden. At the same time, you have to allow my inspectors to account for every ground of that material to make sure that this is not deviated. If they want to make a mountain, a mountain out of that, okay. But my inspectors need to know where this material is to the last gram, and this is very important and the facilities that are associated with it, we should not forget that Iran to today is a state party to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, and I don't have a doubt to question that.
So, they have said and described themselves and enter into the legal international commitments that define a country that does not have nuclear weapons and that allows the inspectors, the IAEA to prove that. So, when you start having problems in that process, then I worry and then I have to say it. So, this is the situation in which we are. And on top of that, and I will go back to the initial part of this question, the JCPOA, is it possible to revive it? Is it not possible to revive it. If we do not revive it, what is the alternative? If there is any alternative? This is why I think a political conversation, a very serious political conversation, frank, well disposed, honest discussion is needed.
Ian Bremmer:
At the beginning of the JCPOA, the Iranian nuclear deal. My understanding is that they were largely cooperating fully and transparently with your organization. Is that fair to say?
Rafael Grossi:
Well, I was not director general at that time, but I can say that according to the reports that we were looking at, there was compliance with the agreement as it was described and as it was agreed, yes.
Ian Bremmer:
And we can say that they're now near fully out of compliance.
Rafael Grossi:
Well, I would say that the JCPOA, although, as formality still exists, Iran itself has announced that it is not bound by any of the nuclear obligations that were part of it.
Ian Bremmer:
Last place I want to bring you to is North Korea. We could do this for hours, but I know you were just in South Korea recently. The North Koreans have been testing a lot more ballistic missiles, some of which seem to be ICBMs. I know that they have announced that they are planning on significantly expanding their nuclear weapons program. Talk to me a little bit about what extent you see a breakdown in the stability between South and North Korea relations as a consequence of that.
Rafael Grossi:
As you rightly say, I was there in December. I could meet with President Yoon, and the Foreign Minister and others in Seoul, and of course the IAEA was kicked out from North Korea back in 2009. That doesn't mean that we do not have a pretty good idea of what is happening there and a very precise idea of what is happening there. And we see that this program, which was originally relatively limited to the Nyongbyon nuclear compound near Pyongyang, has now spawned and expanded to other sites, to other facilities in country that now they are not only reprocessing nuclear fuel to get plutonium. Now, they are enriching uranium, as you know. So, they are developing all the acquisition paths that are necessary to have even more nuclear weapons. What I have been saying, and I was discussing this with the president, is that of course, given other geopolitical tensions in the world that are obvious for all of us to see the reconstruction of a diplomatic dialogue will have to include a bigger role for the IAEA.
I think conversations that used to take place in the assumption of certain commonalities between East and West and between, let's say the five permanent members of the Security Council, unfortunately cannot be taken for granted anymore. But we cannot sit on our hands. I think it's important to reconstruct channels of dialogue and conversation. And I manifested to President Yoon and I would be ready to do that, of course with the DPRK, to contemplate the possibility of having the IAEA, much as we are doing with two countries at war like Ukraine and Russia, to provide an arena, a platform, a table for some understanding in trying to prevent this problem to become bigger. Of course, the situation has changed. DPRK is now a nuclear possessor state, although outside the remit of what is legitimate, but they have them, they have these nuclear weapons and something must be done about it. The IAEA is ready.
Ian Bremmer:
So, since we've been talking about all these horribly depressing things that you're spending so much time working on, before we close, let me ask you about a little more upside, which is this recent fusion breakthrough announcements. I'd love to just hear how excited, how surprised you were to hear about these experiments being successful, and do you think within a decade or two that we might actually see fusion energy as a viable technology?
Rafael Grossi:
I do. And I think that the good thing about this successful experiment, the Lawrence Livermore Lab in the United States, is that it proves that we are on the right track. That the lines, I don't want to get to techie here, but the research lines that are being pursued are correct. That we are extracting from these experiments far more energy that we are putting inside. It's a matter of getting the necessary stability. Plasma physics is incredibly delicate, and it requires a lot of conditions to be reached in order to have a commercially usable means in this area. But I think we are in a good track. I would like to extend my congratulations to the groups here. The IAEA, of course is in contact with all of them. We have these groups in the United States. Of course, there is another very important group in Europe where the United States also participates in ITER.
So, there are different ways, but we can see that we are moving closer to that. But let me say, since we are talking about this very important things that we see a very interesting time for nuclear energy in general. Now, we see that to get to a decarbonized energy mix, nuclear must be part of the solution. Nuclear is part of the solution, so be it fusion in a few years, but good old fission, now it has a very important role to play and the IAEA is there to ensure that it's done safely.
Ian Bremmer:
Raphael Grossi, thanks so much for joining us on GZERO World.
Rafael Grossi:
My pleasure. Thank you very much.
Ian Bremmer:
That's it for today's edition of the GZERO World Podcast. Like what you've heard, come check us out at gzeromedia.com and sign up for our newsletter signal.
Announcer:
The GZERO World Podcast is brought to you by our founding sponsor, First Republic. First Republic, a private bank and wealth management company understands the value of service, safety, and stability in today's uncertain world. Visit firstrepublic.com to learn more. GZERO World would also like to share a message from our friends at Foreign Policy, the Hidden Economics of Remarkable Women. A podcast from Foreign Policy is back for season three. This season, you'll hear from reporters around the globe who are covering under-reported ways women are challenging the status quo, from justice for domestic migrant workers in Gulf States to how to break down gender barriers in the film industry. Follow and listen to the Hidden Economics of Remarkable Women, wherever you get your podcasts.
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