Podcast: Ukraine crisis: the signals pointing to Russian invasion

TRANSCRIPT: Ukraine crisis: the signals pointing to Russian invasion

Alina Polyakova:

I think a lot of what's driving Putin and Russian foreign policy as a result is this desire to have the sphere of influence, but even more than that, to have Russia whole again. Ukraine is really seen as the historical heart of ancient Russia, now modern Russia.

Ian Bremmer:

Hello and welcome to the GZERO World Podcast. This is where you'll find extended versions of my interviews on public television. I'm Ian Bremmer, and today we look at President Joe Biden's biggest foreign policy challenge yet, Ukraine. Russia has amassed roughly 100,000 troops along the border. They're still expanding. They've ramped up their cyber attacks on Kyiv, and they've announced joint military exercises in nearby Belarus. Though the Biden administration has been trying to build a more stable and predictable relationship with Moscow, US-Russia relations are right now on a knife edge. But will Putin invade or is this just a high stakes game of political chess? I speak with Alina Polyakova. She's President and CEO of the Center for European Policy Analysis. And she thinks that NATO countries need to get on the same page if they're going to stand a chance against Putin. Let's get to it.

Announcer:

The GZERO World Podcast is brought to you by our founding sponsor, First Republic. First Republic, a private bank and wealth management company understands the value of service, safety and stability in today's uncertain world. Visit firstrepublic.com to learn more.

GZERO World would also like to share a message from our friends at Foreign Policy. How can sports change the world for the better? On The Long Game, a co-production of foreign policy and Doha debates, hear stories of courage and conviction both on and off the field, directly from athletes themselves. Ibtihaj Muhammad, Olympic medalist and Global Change agent, hosts The Long Game. Hear new episodes every week on Apple, Spotify, or wherever you get your podcasts.

Ian Bremmer:

Alina Polyakova, thanks so much for joining me today.

Alina Polyakova:

Thanks for having me.

Ian Bremmer:

Maybe start with an impossible question. What do you think Putin is thinking right now?

Alina Polyakova:

Well, I think anybody that tells you that they know what's going on in Putin's likely somewhat demented mind these days doesn't know what's really going on. I think we can look at the facts on the ground to assess what might be going on in his head. And what we see on the ground is that he's slowly positioning forces to really close a noose around Ukraine from the north and from the east and from the south. So I think what that signals to me is that he's thinking about an invasion in the very near-term.

Ian Bremmer:

It's clear that Putin is displaying an enormous amount of pressure on the Ukrainians and wants to display to the rest of the world that he should be taken seriously. Does that equate to you into invasion is likely or does that equate to you to invasion is something he wants to display and it's possible?

Alina Polyakova:

I think a couple of weeks ago I was very much on the skeptical side that what the Kremlin was really planning. What Putin really wanted was to deploy a huge amount of resources against a country which is already very much under Russia's thumbs. In many ways, Russia still occupies Crimea. It has forces, Russian military forces in the Ukraine's East and the Donbas. So it seemed as a little unclear as to why now, why use up all these resources at a relatively tenuous time it seems for Russia. The economic situation isn't great. Obviously, the pandemic situation is ongoing. So why? But unfortunately, I think the signals we've seen from Russia over the last month and certainly, the last several days, I think are very much pointing in direction that they have made a decision. And decision, frankly, from a strategic perspective, doesn't make a lot of sense to use those forces and to do something quite aggressive on the military side against Ukraine.

Ian Bremmer:

And the points that you would make that most convince you of that?

Alina Polyakova:

I think a couple of things. One, when the US tried to have this very expansive diplomatic conversation with the Russian side, we didn't see much give. The US came to the table in a series of discussions with the Russian counterparts, with NATO and the OSCE, and had some real proposals. And the Russian interlocutors that Putin sent obviously had no room to negotiate or to even put anything useful on the table. And then when they went back to give the readout to the man who's going to make the decision, what we heard was just much more aggressive tactics, aggressive language, and they basically have walked themselves into a corner. They made really unrealistic demands, which signals to me they weren't interested in diplomacy in the first place. And they really had a plan for more military aggression rather than even trying a diplomatic approach because they didn't get any of their demands met. But those demands were so unrealistic they must have known that they weren't going to get anything out of it.

Ian Bremmer:

So before we talk about escalation, maybe one more off-ramp piece that I want to talk about, which is when the Russians announced that they had arrested 14 members of the REvil cyber criminal gang and that they had decommissioned that organization, which happened to be on the same day, that presumably the Russians engaged in cyberattacks against the Ukrainian government, a number of its institutions, do you think that is coincidence or do you think that reflects some effort by the Russian government to provide an opportunity for diplomacy to work?

Alina Polyakova:

When that happened, my initial thought was this may be a signal of deescalation. We've been trying to get the Russians to do more to control the cyber criminal groups that are functioning freely inside Russia's borders, primarily to Russia's own advantages most of the time. And the Russians have kind of slowed any progress in that. They've done almost nothing and all of a sudden, you have this relatively significant development.

But of course, everything that's happened since then has been signaling in the other direction once again that perhaps this was a coincidence. Maybe at the end of the day this group got on the Kremlin's nerves and did something that the Kremlin didn't want them to do, and they put the kibosh on it finally. When people see strategy in something that the Kremlin does, I usually see some circumstantial reasons and coincidence, and maybe some incompetence here and there. So I think these were two separate events. I don't think the cyber arrests of REvil actually were connected to the conversations that are happening in Ukraine.

Ian Bremmer:

Now, let's talk more about where we're heading from all of this. Talk about how you perceive the European reaction to date, both to what the Russians are up to, and also American efforts of coordination.

Alina Polyakova:

I think the United States has deployed an absolutely Herculean effort on the diplomatic side, to always make sure that allies were informed that there were consultations and coordination happening with European allies, within the context of NATO, with EU member states, with the UK as well, of course, no longer EU member state. So I think the US has actually done a very good job leading on the diplomatic coordination effort here.

I think the other part of your question is really the key here. Why is it, that when clearly Russia poses the greatest direct threat to Europe, not to the United States, that we have a situation in which the United States is once again having to take lead is the US is expected to send security assistance and military support? It's again, the United States that has to get NATO allies, European allies on board. Unfortunately, it's impossible to talk about European position right now because Germany has been sending very mixed messages between the chancellor and the foreign minister who seem to be speaking about two different policies sometimes. And then we have the Baltic states-

Ian Bremmer:

The foreign minister taking a much harder line from the Green Party than the Chancellor. Yes.

Alina Polyakova:

Exactly. And then of course, we have the Baltic states in Poland, which have had very bad experiences back during the Cold War with Soviet occupation raising alarm bells. And interestingly, the UK really taking that side and doing a lot more to raise alarm bells, to provide security assistance. But there is no European position. Europe is very divided. Germany is a key, key issue here, and the new government doesn't seem to have a real strategy or policy in place.

Ian Bremmer:

So clearly, the Americans putting a lot of effort in, but some obvious divisions between the US and Europe. NATO has announced that it is sending more forces to Bulgaria, to Romania, to the Baltic states, to the Black Sea. That has included countries like France participating in those moves. And in fact, I think you could argue that NATO has, if anything, gotten stronger and more aligned because of the Russian behavior. Now, it seems to me like the one thing that would ensure that NATO is as close-knit and as high morale as possible would be if the Russians engaged in a full invasion against Ukraine. Do you agree with that?

Alina Polyakova:

Look, we've seen this movie before in some ways. When Russia invaded Crimea in 2014 and then launched this hybrid war against Ukraine's East that continues to this day, we really saw NATO united. And we really saw these Russian actions give new life to NATO. NATO has had trouble since the end, the Cold War really finding its identity again. And certainly, that is no longer the case. And that's in many things because of Russian renewed aggression in Europe.

So of course, what's happening now again, is Russia is being a very direct military threat. They're being very escalatory and that is uniting NATO around a common sense of defense, a common sense of community, and I think that's been a very positive development. I think I always have to ask myself, we think the Russians are great tacticians, maybe even great strategists, and they keep running circles around us and setting the agenda and forcing the United States and NATO to constantly respond to them versus the other way around.

But I have to wonder, what's their real strategy here? If they're so worried as they say they are about US troops, NATO troops, in places like Poland, in central Eastern Europe more broadly, this isn't helping them. If anything, it's having the opposite effect where they're going to have a much more assertive NATO posture in NATO member states that are closest to Russia. And of course now, we've heard the US administration is considering sending potentially 5,000 more US troops to that part of NATO as well. We could see Russia as committing a serious strategic miscalculation here. But I also think we may want to acknowledge that they're willing to accept those risks because Ukraine is so important to them that they're willing to accept a reality in which they have all the things they say they don't want in Central Eastern Europe as long as they get Ukraine.

Ian Bremmer:

Because of course, it's not just a question of NATO being united, but the Ukrainian people and the Ukrainian government is much more anti-Russian today than it was in 2014 because of the steps that the Russians took. And that continues apace today, and I sort of wonder what is the Russian endgame here? I understand why they would want to get rid of Zelensky, the Ukrainian president, Putin thought he was going to be able to work more effectively with, and he can't. I absolutely see why the Russian government would say, "Let's just get rid of this guy." But that's very different from, "We want to have control over Ukraine." I don't know how you get from here to there.

Alina Polyakova:

I think there's a couple of things at play here. One, Ukraine as a country, is an incredibly emotional issue, not just for Putin, but for many Russians. There's a vision of the Russian world that many, certainly in the Kremlin, Russian officials subscribe to, that isn't limited to Russia's political borders. It goes far beyond that. It's Belarus, it's Ukraine. And really, Ukraine is really seen as the historical heart of ancient Russia, now modern Russia.

And I think Putin, looking at probably his legacy as really the maker of modern Russia at this point, after more than 20 years in power, sees that he cannot leave a legacy in which Russia doesn't regain some of that territorial imperial vision of itself. And I think there's a few things at play here that are not rational in that sense of the world or strategic from a military sense. I think a lot of what's driving Putin and Russian foreign policy as a result is this desire to have the sphere of influence, but even more than that, to have Russian whole again. That is how Russian political analysts and Russian state control television talk about Ukraine, as a part of Russia. And I think when we see from that perspective the risks they're willing to take in this potential invasion, make a little bit more sense in some ways when we don't see this as complete military strategy, but really something that Putin sees as part of its legacy and the future of Russia.

Ian Bremmer:

To the extent that you say that this is not just about national security, but it's also making Russia whole again, then I wonder if that makes it less of a threat to the United States, to the Europeans, none of whom are considered to be part of the Russian nation for Moscow. This isn't China where they've been growing, growing over the last couple of decades and are going to be the largest economy in the world. The Russian economy is smaller than the Canadian economy right now. They got a lot of nukes and they're willing to take some risks. But in reality, when former President Obama called them a regional power, I mean I wish he hadn't said that publicly, but they're kind of a regional power. Should that thinking at least be part of the discussions that the Americans and the NATO allies are having when they think about how to respond to this Ukraine crisis?

Alina Polyakova:

I think that's the million-dollar question there, because at the end of the day, the way I would answer this is to say that what's happening today in Ukraine isn't just about Ukraine, and we cannot assume, let's say in a terrible hypothetical scenario, we just say, okay, we're not going to get involved. Our priority is China and the Indo-Pacific. Let's shore up NATO and the security of NATO member states and Ukraine, Belarus, okay, what can we do? We're not going to expand all of our resources to protect these countries that are not NATO members at the end of the day.

Ian Bremmer:

Which functionally has been the NATO response on Belarus so far.

Alina Polyakova:

Exactly, exactly. But Ukraine is a democracy that wants to be part of Euro-Atlantic institutions, and Belarus is a dictatorship, at least with a regime that doesn't want to be part of Euro-Atlantic institutions. So there is a difference there. The Ukrainians want to be part of NATO, they want to be part of the EU. This is the path the Ukrainian people want for themselves, and this is what Putin is trying to prevent.

But again, going back to my hypothetical reality, we can't assume that once Russia gets a taste and senses that weakness in the West, which they're sensing right now, that they will stop. Because then we have the southern caucuses, we have Georgia, we have Armenia, Azerbaijan. You can easily see Russian rhetoric shift and suddenly say, "Well, we're not really talking about just Ukraine and Belarus. It's about the former Soviet states." Why not? The West Soviet territory, the entire East Block, Poland, the Baltic states, et cetera. So we can't assume that if we, quote, unquote, "Give them Ukraine," that that's going to be satisfying for them for the long-term. I don't think it will be. That kind of appeasement never works.

Ian Bremmer:

Putin has, of course, said that the dissolution of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century, in his view, about as antithetical from the American perspective on geopolitics as one could make in terms of a statement.

One thing, of course, Alina, we have not spoken about so far is Ukraine. We've spoken around Ukraine, we haven't spoken about Ukraine. The Ukrainian government, virtually no support inside NATO for allowing them to actually join NATO. A lot of support to provide them with military weapons. There's been a lot of challenges in terms of that governance itself. Zelensky's popularity has shrunk down to the 30s at this point despite though you'd think with the common threat that he'd be sort of seen as more of a wartime president. That's not the case. How much do you think the West should be betting on him in terms of his ability to be a useful interlocutor with NATO countries?

Alina Polyakova:

Look, Zelensky came into office with no political experience. Let's remember who he is.

Ian Bremmer:

Zero. Yeah, yeah.

Alina Polyakova:

He was a TV star and a well-known comedian and really won because he had name recognition in the country for playing a president on TV. So let's just remember who he is. Look, at the end of the day, we have to bet on Ukraine. In countries like Ukraine, there are such new democracies. We can't forget how really new and fragile Ukraine's democracy is. It hasn't had 200 years to develop. It's really had about 30. It's a country that is still finding out what it means to be a democracy. And despite Zelensky's inexperience as a political leader, he did win a huge landslide. So he is the legitimate leader. He's not popular, but not many leaders are. Look at Macron's numbers sometimes, look at President Biden's numbers these days.

I think we have to bet on Ukraine and we have to work with the government that's in place. And absolutely, you're right. When the Russians say they were really worried about Ukraine joining NATO, this is a complete falsehood. There was no avenue for Ukraine to join NATO anytime soon, as you rightfully said. So we have to bet on Ukraine, and I think we have to bet on Ukraine developing as a democracy in the years ahead, whether that's with Zelensky or another democratically elected president. That should be our goal to make sure it is a democracy in this part of the world that's increasingly surrounded by authoritarian states like Belarus and Russia.

Ian Bremmer:

Alina Polyakova, thanks for joining us on GZERO World.

Alina Polyakova:

My pleasure.

Ian Bremmer:

That's it for today's edition of the GZERO World Podcast. Like what you've heard? Come check us out at gzeromedia.com and sign up for our newsletter, Signal.

Announcer:

The GZERO World Podcast is brought to you by our founding sponsor, First Republic. First Republic, a private bank and wealth management company understands the value of service, safety, and stability in today's uncertain world. Visit firstrepublic.com to learn more.

GZERO World would also like to share a message from our friends at Foreign Policy. How can sports change the world for the better. On The Long Game, a co-production of foreign policy and Doha Debates, hear stories of courage and conviction, both on and off the field, directly from athletes themselves. Ibtihaj Muhammad, Olympic medalist and Global Change agent, hosts The Long Game. Hear new episodes every week on Apple, Spotify, or wherever you get your podcasts.

Subscribe to the GZERO World Podcast on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Stitcher, or your preferred podcast platform to receive new episodes as soon as they're published.