TRANSCRIPT: What's next for Syria after Assad, with Beirut-based journalist and author Kim Ghattas
Ian Bremmer:
Hello and welcome to the GZERO World Podcast. This is where you can find extended versions of my conversations on public television. I'm Ian Bremmer, and today we are asking a simple question: How did Syria's government rule with an iron fist for five decades only to collapse in two weeks? And after 14 years of bloody civil war, why was now the moment that a frozen war exploded into the global spotlight? Since 2011, more than 500,000 Syrians have died, including 200,000 civilians. Nearly six million Syrian refugees flooded neighboring Arab states and some European nations, most notably Germany. The cost Syrians have already paid is greater than any nation could reasonably be expected to bear, but there's no guarantee that the suffering will end just because the Assad regime has. And here to help make sense of these shocking past few weeks and the potential power vacuum to come, Middle East expert and Beirut-based journalist, Kim Ghattas. Let's get to it.
Kim Ghattas, welcome back to GZERO World.
Kim Ghattas:
Great to be with you Ian. Thanks for having me.
Ian Bremmer:
50 years we had an Assad dictatorship, and now two weeks after HTS begins rebel opposition, we don't. How surprised were you by the implosion?
Kim Ghattas:
I was surprised by how quickly it all ended. First of all, of course, we were surprised by the sudden takeover of Aleppo last week. But there was a confluence of events in the region which led to a decision by HTS Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, to seize this moment of weakness of various supporters of Bashar al-Assad in the region and try to push for the takeover of Aleppo. What I did not expect after that is the rapid progress that they made and the fact that there was no last stand by the regime in Damascus. But thank God there wasn't because I think that would have been very bloody.
Ian Bremmer:
I'm sure that's true. So when you talk about the weakness of various actors, really we're talking about three. I mean, it's the Iranians who've been very distracted by other wars and stretched. It's the Russians who have been very distracted by other wars and stretched, but it's also Bashar al-Assad's own forces. So maybe we start with the latter because I mean this was a regime that had terrorized and brutalized lots of different minority populations across Syria. Huge numbers of detentions, no opposition was able to really stand up well against them when they attempted back in 2011 to make an effort. I mean, he mocked them up. So why in 2024 were his forces so incapable and/or unwilling to fight?
Kim Ghattas:
It's a very good question, Ian, and I think the Syrian army was really depleted by a 13-year-long war trying to repress this uprising civilian, but also armed uprising that started in 2011. The country is exhausted, the economy is wrecked. The corruption of the Assad regime means that or meant that the aftermath of the battle to recapture Aleppo or to hang on to Damascus, did not bring an improvement to people's lives, who stood by the regime, did not bring an improvement to the lives of these soldiers. And so I think there was a decrepitude that installed itself within the regime's ranks and just a general exhaustion. Life was not getting better for those who stood by the regime. And so I think there was a feeling that it was time to abandon him. And I think that that's what happened. We may find out more about some of the deals that were made behind the scenes between these rebel groups and members of the Army command regime officials to make it possible for this rapid advance to be rather bloodless.
But I think the regime was exhausted. And remember, Ian, those two other players that will talk about Iran and Russia, they were essential for the survival of Bashar al-Assad. He could not have done this. He could not have survived that long without Iran and Hezbollah, the Shia militant group from Lebanon, which is a proxy and ally of Iran, and deployed thousands of men in Syria. And he could not have survived without Iran and Hezbollah and Russia, which had to intervene militarily big time in 2015. So on its own, the regime would have been possibly already gone by 2015 had it not received all this outside help.
Ian Bremmer:
Now, over the course of this most recent uprising, successful overthrow, in the initial days, we did see some willingness of the Russians to provide military support. We also saw the Iranians saying that they were going to send proxy forces over from Iraq, for example, and they cut and ran very quickly. Were these the same calculations that were being made by the Russians and the Iranians in real time or were they different?
Kim Ghattas:
There are some who claim that the Iranians and the Russians just didn't feel like it was worth fighting for Bashar al-Assad anymore. I disagree with that. I think that they would have fought if they had the capability. This is a key ally of both Iran, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and of the Russians since the Soviet time. So you don't give up so easily on the crown jewel of your influence in the Mediterranean, for the Iranians and for the Russians. But as we've been saying, this comes at a time when Russia is occupied with the war in Ukraine and has had to shift some of its resources there from Syria to Ukraine and is not able to assist Bashar al-Assad the way it did in 2015, which was a big military intervention and required constant fighter jets dropping bombs across rebel-held areas, including on hospitals, which is a pattern we're seeing also in Ukraine. And then for the Iranians-
Ian Bremmer:
And which happened again in Syria, by the way, Russian warplanes just in the last two weeks.
Kim Ghattas:
Absolutely. And which to me indicated when they, instead of striking the rebel advances, they started striking civilian targets. It struck me as a sign that they were not prepared for this and they weren't quite sure what the battle plan was going to be. And when Aleppo fell, Aleppo was a huge battle back when it fell first to the rebels and then the regime retook it. It just demands a huge amount of military hardware and planning and battle and blood. So I just don't think the Russians were able to get together and organize as quickly anymore. And then on the Iranian side, again, I don't think they were ready to give up on Bashar al-Assad and said, "Okay, sure, yeah, we'll walk away." They're spinning it now as though they thought that it was the best thing for the Syrian people, that no more blood should be shed and that Bashar al-Assad should withdraw and exceed to the will of the people.
Very magnanimous of them to say that when that's not how they rule in their own country. But I think it's a reflection of Iran's current vulnerability, the fact that it has stretched itself too thin over the last decade or so, from Yemen to Iraq to Lebanon to Syria. That its investments in this 'Axis of Resistance,' as they like to call it, are crumbling. But they would have preferred, I'm sure, to keep their relationship with Syria under Bashar al-Assad. Which a relationship that goes back to 1979 and the foundation of the Islamic Republic and the rule of Hafez al-Assad. So the Iranians and the Russians have lost a key element of their Middle East strategy. That's not to say they won't find a way to come back, but right now it's not looking good for both of them.
Ian Bremmer:
Yeah, I mean, I see that the Russians have withdrawn their ships, for example, from the Port of Tartus. But I mean they're still staying in the area and clearly they're trying to maintain access to their two military bases with the new government, the HTS-led government. You say you're skeptical that that's going to be able to work, clearly the Russians would be willing to pay some treasure to maintain that access. It is important to them. Why do you think it won't work?
Kim Ghattas:
I think what I mean is that they've lost a lot of power all of a sudden and influence in the region. That doesn't mean that they won't be able to come back. And I think as you point out, yes, they are going to try to develop new ties with the transition government in Damascus. b=Both the Iranians and the Russians will try that. I don't know whether it'll work. I think we are hearing very clear messages from the Syrian people, but also the various factions on the ground that they would like no more intervention by outsiders. If this Russians offer a lot of money, perhaps. I don't know what the Iranians can offer. I think the suffering that the Iranians inflicted on the Syrian people with the help of Hezbollah over the last 13 years is not going to be forgotten that easily.
But what could happen, and as much as I've been insisting that we focus on the joy of the Syrians at their newfound freedom, there are of course apprehensions on the future. And I think a situation of chaos is possible where players like Russia and Iran could thrive again because players like Russia and Iran thrive in chaos.
Ian Bremmer:
So going forward, Iran is the country, I mean after Syria, that's losing the most influence here, they're losing their 'Axis of Resistance' which hardly seems to merit the branding at this point. Where do they go? I mean, is this a question of they have no choice but to try to engage with their adversaries or does this push them faster towards a nuclear weapons program, or both?
Kim Ghattas:
Probably both. They will threaten that they will accelerate their nuclear program, but they want to engage I think with the outside world and they hope that that can guarantee regime survival. Because Iran is going through so much change at the moment. It is also going to go through a transition. It's already had the transition from one president to another very quickly this year. The supreme leader is aging and looking to see how he can ensure the transition to a new supreme leader, or at least ensure the survival of the Islamic Republic. That's a lot to manage at the same time. And meanwhile, they look incredibly vulnerable and exposed to Israeli military action. And they've also lost so much of what they thought they had built over the last four decades. When October 7th happened, I wrote a piece in the Atlantic saying that this was in essence the end of Iran's strategy of proxy militias around the region because they had suddenly found themselves faced with the limitations of such a strategy, which they used to keep the enemy far away from their borders, the enemy being Israel and the United States.
And suddenly they were risking being drawn straight into the fight and they realized they wouldn't be able to use these proxies anymore the way they had over the last four decades. And this is where we are. But Iran also wants to be accepted by the international community. They were very stung in 1990, 1991 when they were not invited to the Madrid Peace Conference. Even though they had done everything the West asked of them, including push for the release of Western hostages in Lebanon. And so they're looking for this kind of acceptance and guarantees of survival of the regime, but that's also up to the Iranian people.
Ian Bremmer:
I want to get to the situation on the ground and talk about the human element of that. But first, while we're talking about what happened, another major player on the other side of this conflict is Turkey. And I mean, HTS had been talking to the Turks and trying to get them to proactively support these strikes for months. And the Turkish government said no. There was a lot of skittishness on the part of Erdogan. And even when they said yes, it wasn't "Take Assad out." It was more, "Give us some space to get refugees back to clear out the Kurds." That kind of thing. That's not what happened here. So how do you think the Turks misplayed this?
Kim Ghattas:
I think they were too slow. And keep in mind that HTS is not the closest group to-
Ian Bremmer:
To Turkey.
Kim Ghattas:
... Turkey. They supported or funded by them, but I think there was some coordination because obviously they're on the border with Turkey. I think events outpaced everyone, and I think that that means that we should give credit to the Syrian people for having made that happen. They have agency. They've been through 13 years of a terrible civil war that divided the country and 54 years of a terrible murderous dictatorship. And in the end, they made this happen. And it was a pincer movement that just closed in on Bashar al-Assad from the north with HTS and from the northeast with the Kurds and from the south as well from the Daraa province, where interestingly enough, some of these groups have been in contact with the Russians. This was supposed to be part of a reconciliation process with the government that never got anywhere. So I'm very curious to see over the next few weeks or months what emerges in terms of details of what were the discussions happening in the background to make this possible.
Ian Bremmer:
So you've talked about, you've reported on the joy that the Syrians are feeling just at taking this incredibly repressive, torture-riven weight off of their nation. And I think we can all say it's a great thing that Assad is gone, but of course everyone has trepidation. You've already talked about it, that we could end up seeing a lot of chaos and we don't have a lot of experience of what HTS is going to be like when they actually have to govern. They've said a lot of good things in terms of tolerance of various people, but again, the proof of the pudding is in the eating. How do you think the Syrian people are responding to this new government right now?
Kim Ghattas:
So I was listening to a young Syrian woman being interviewed on television in English broadcasting to the world. Lovely young lady from Damascus, no veil, lots of makeup, nice clothes with armed men behind her chanting different things. And some were rebels and some were civilians from Damascus. And she was asked that question, "Are you afraid of chaos or are you afraid of Islamist rule?" And I just loved her answer, and I just loved the Syrian people and their bravery and their courage and their determination and their wit. She said, "We'll take it. We'll take the rebels. We'll take this Islamic nonsense. We'll take it because what can be worse than what this regime has done to us over the last 50 years?" And I think we should listen to the Syrian people because they've seen the horrors. They've lived the horrors. And these horrors were not just inflicted on the Syrians, but also on the Lebanese next door.
Syria occupied Lebanon for 35 years until 2005. We have a very long list of Lebanese leaders, religious leaders, political leaders, intellectual leaders who were assassinated by the Syrian regime over the last four decades. And beyond that, let's say that we don't care about the Syrian people and the Lebanese people, we care only about Western interests. Let's assume that. How exactly did Bashar al-Assad serve Western interests? The stability of this dictatorship was just an illusion. Bashar al-Assad is the man who encouraged jihadists from around the world to travel through Syria into Iraq to make life difficult for American troops there after the US invasion of 2003. And that led to the insurgency. Bashar al-Assad is the man whose murderous regime and violent clampdown on his people who were demanding freedom and reforms caused a massive exodus of millions of Syrians leaving the country after 2014 heading to Europe.
So America's interests and Europe's interests are clearly not served by a man like Bashar Assad. Now, yes, there are going to be a lot of problems down the road for Syria, but I think we need to listen to Syrians and we need to give them the space. We need to trust that they can come together and support this transition and make sure that regional players, the Turks, the Emiratis, the Saudis, the Israelis, and we should talk about what the Israelis are doing at the moment in Syria, that they're not all going to fight out their power games on Syrian territory again. I know that sounds like a naive request for a geopolitical analyst, but it is not impossible to consider that countries around Syria should give these people some space and look towards a better future and enable them to look towards a better future by supporting this transition.
Ian Bremmer:
You mentioned Israel. There's also the United States. I mean, in the aftermath of Assad falling, the Americans engaged in a number of bombing sorties against assets that they say were under the control of ISIS affiliates. The Israelis have also engaged in striking a lot of military capabilities that Assad had control over. They've also expanded, they say temporarily, border controls around the occupied Golan Heights. So definitely a power vacuum brings opportunity for other actors outside of Syria to take care of things that they'd like to take care of in their own national interests. Tell me how you respond to both of those and others.
Kim Ghattas:
It reminds me also about a point I wanted to make to the previous answer. What purpose did Bashar al-Assad serve anymore, if we put aside the terrible things he did to his own people? When it comes to Israel, for the longest time, the assumption in Israel was "better the devil we know than the devil we don't." And the Assad regime served Israel's interests pretty well. There was barely a shot fired across that border on the Golan Heights since 1973, except that over the last decade, Bashar Assad also enabled the rise of Iranian power inside Syria and the rise of Hezbollah as a massive fighting force. And that was on Israel's eastern flank and I think very clearly-
Ian Bremmer:
And those weapons were going from Iran through Syria, into Lebanon.
Kim Ghattas:
Through Syria-
Ian Bremmer:
Yeah.
Kim Ghattas:
... into Lebanon. And that was always the case over the years, over the last 40 years. But now Iran and Hezbollah were right there, not just in southern Lebanon, but on Israel's Eastern flank, its border with Syria. And that did not suit Israel anymore. And we're seeing now reports coming out of Damascus, these documents that are being found that show that the Israelis were warning repeatedly the Syrians, that they would not allow all these Iranian officers there. That they would not allow the deployment of these weapons and those weapons. And Israel had been striking Iranian assets in Syria for many years now. And so my information, going back to October speaking to European diplomats, was that Israel had come to the conclusion that Assad was no longer useful to them. That alerted me to the fact that Assad was in an even more precarious position than we thought.
Now, Israel is bombing all these targets preemptively to try to destroy the arsenal of the Syrian army or what was left of it because it doesn't want these weapons, especially fighter jets and anti-artillery, anti-aircraft missiles to land in the hands of the rebels. I mean, the Syrian army barely had anything that was of any use to fight Israel at this point. But we can take the argument that better to be safe than sorry in the case of Israel. But this is not a good way to support also the Syrian people as they reassert their grip over their own country and reclaim their own country. Israel also took over the buffer zone between Israel and Syria, and that is a land grab, which the Israelis say is temporary. But there's nothing temporary in the Middle East, as we've seen from various Israel annexations of the Golan Heights or occupation of the West Bank.
So I think the United States, to answer the second part of that question, the United States should also make that clear to Israel that international borders need to be respected and that continued military sorties over Syria are only going to cause further chaos and possibly agitate Sunni militant groups in Syria that suddenly think, "Oh, well, now we're under attack by Israel." And although we've heard from some of them saying, "Our fight is not with Israel, we just wanted to remove Bashar al-Assad," but if you're being bombed by Israel every day, you may change your mind.
Ian Bremmer:
Now, the Americans have elected a new president, will be coming into power within weeks, and his public response to Assad falling is, "This is not the fight of the Americans. Stay clear of it." And on the one hand, a lot of American intervention in the Middle East has led to an awful lot of pain and bloodshed. On the other hand, as you say, support is required for this new government to get its feet up underneath them. So how do you respond when you hear the Americans, when you hear the leader of the United States coming in saying, "We want absolutely nothing to do with this." Good, bad, or somewhere in between, and why?
Kim Ghattas:
There's a difference between supporting a country and having a military intervention?
Ian Bremmer:
Sure.
Kim Ghattas:
So I think yes, military intervention really should be off the table in any sort of way. There's no need for it. The Syrians are going to do this hopefully by themselves. We've heard already from the Biden administration, and President Biden is still president until January the 20th. We've heard from his administration and Secretary of State, Anthony Blinken specifically saying that the US would be willing to recognize the new government of Syria, the transitional government of Syria if they abided by certain rules, including respect of freedoms and minorities. And I think that's a good step. HTS is a designated terrorist group. They have come a long way. They're doing their best to at least advertise a new image. They are saying all the right things, and they are what's available at the moment. And I think we should also trust the Syrians to push back against HTS if it thinks it can impose Islamic rule on Damascus. That's not going to go down well.
Other kinds of support are support for reconstruction and convening power. The convening power of the United States of regional players in the Middle East and to bring them together in a way to support this transition. Those are, I think, positive steps. As it relates to President-elect Trump when he comes in power, yes, absolutely. He said, "This is not our fight." Although he said that before Assad fell. And I think that what he meant was the US shouldn't do anything to sway this either way, and that this was something that Syrians should do on themselves. And they have. And I think that he has a lot of people in his circle who are very interested in supporting Syria's transition going forward. So it's not our fight, yes, but it is of national security interest to the United States to make sure this transition goes forward as smoothly as possible, and no one comes in as a spoiler.
Ian Bremmer:
Now, Kim, before we close, I want to ask you just a moment on your home country, Lebanon. There is now a temporary ceasefire in place. And with Assad being overthrown as a key ally of the Iranians, it's going to be a lot harder for Iran to provide support for Hezbollah going forward. Does this make you more optimistic that the ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon/Hezbollah will stick and become permanent?
Kim Ghattas:
I always thought that the ceasefire would stick, but that it would be chaotic for some time. And most of the violations are Israeli violations. And I think it's also important and incumbent on the United States to press Israel to step back from all these continued strikes and violations in Syria and in Israel because the ceasefire could collapse and we could return to fighting. I foresee many weeks, if not months, of continued chaos, but this has to be contained as much as possible. But absolutely, the fall of Assad regime is going to make it very difficult, if not impossible, for Iran to continue to supply Hezbollah in Lebanon. Having said that, Hezbollah also has local capabilities to produce its own weapons. And I assume they still have somewhat of a stockpile but much of it has been destroyed by Israel. So I wouldn't write off Hezbollah completely, and I wouldn't write off their ability to spoil things completely either.
But it does change a lot to the power dynamics in Lebanon where Hezbollah had a stranglehold, a choke hold on Lebanese politics for more than two decades now. And stands accused of participating, if not conducting and planning some of these assassinations of our political leaders and various other figures, including our former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri, friends of mine such as journalist Gebran Tueni, and Samir Kassir. This is a big moment for Lebanon as well. And we are finding that some of our citizens were in some of those jails. 30 years, 35 years later, two of them at least, I believe, have now come home. And so for the Lebanese people, this is also a moment to rejoice at a newfound freedom and ability to reclaim their politics from what was this stranglehold of Iran and Syria over Lebanon, to go forward and demand that Hezbollah become just another political party with the number of members of parliament that they have, and if they want to participate in future cabinets.
But they should no longer be able or allowed to lay the law in Lebanon, particularly after they dragged the country into this terrible war that has cost Lebanon so much. But beyond that, I think we as Lebanese also need to reform our own system because the problem in Lebanon is not just Hezbollah or Syrian influence. But also a corrupt mafia establishment that has drained the country of all its riches and resources.
Ian Bremmer:
But Hezbollah, which has been the most powerful, not just proxy of Iran as a non-state actor, but frankly in many ways the most powerful military non-state actor in the world, and I mean has terrorized the Lebanese people, has terrorized the Israeli people. They are a lot weaker today because of military strikes from Israel. They're a lot weaker today because of overstretch of Iran. They're a lot weaker because of the overthrow of Syria. Do you now see a day in the near future where we can say that the people of Lebanon can unshackle themselves from the terror that has been rested upon them from Hezbollah as an organization?
Kim Ghattas:
I think we are already seeing that. I think we're seeing, and we're hearing the pushback against Hezbollah's power because it is a much diminished power. It can no longer bully and blackmail. But I also want to make clear that our problems extend beyond just Hezbollah. And we have former warlords who still rule our politics and who have gotten away with a lot and total impunity over the last four decades. And I'm not suggesting a violent day of reckoning in Lebanon, but certainly a reckoning in terms of how we choose our leaders and how we want to reform our country and move forward. Because I think we don't have many outside players to blame anymore for our own problems. There was always this, "Oh, but the Iranians, their support for Hezbollah means that we can't do this or that. Oh, the Syrians, et cetera, et cetera." Now it's really going to be up to us.
Ian Bremmer:
So I'm talking to you in California, but you are about to go to Beirut to spend Christmas time with friends and family. That's a little bit of hope, isn't it?
Kim Ghattas:
Absolutely. I was in Beirut throughout the war, over the last year, Gaza tensions on the border between Lebanon and Israel, the war that started between Hezbollah and Israel after the pager attacks on the 17th of September. And that was deeply painful, difficult, discombobulating, terrifying. I came to the US for some work a couple of weeks ago with the intention, I have my ticket, of going back for Christmas. And I was really hoping that I would be flying into a ceasefire rather than more missile strikes on Beirut. And I'm glad to report that as of now the ceasefire is holding and thousands of Lebanese are flying home.
It's very difficult to book seats to Beirut because not many airlines are flying back to Beirut at the moment. So we only have our national carrier, Middle East Airlines, and I think people will be relieved that they can go home. People who spent a few months abroad sent their parents away or their kids away. Everybody's coming back. We have a huge diaspora that is very connected to Lebanon. That is highly educated, financially successful, that wants to participate in reforming and improving Lebanon and building a better future.
Ian Bremmer:
Kim Ghattas, thanks so much.
Kim Ghattas:
Thanks for having me.
Ian Bremmer:
That's it for today's edition of the GZERO World Podcast. Do you like what you heard? Of course you do. Why not make it official? Why don't you rate and review GZERO World five stars, only five stars, otherwise, don't do it. On Apple, Spotify, or wherever you get your podcasts. Tell your friends.
