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What We’re Watching: US and Russia’s peace framework, West Africa on edge, Iran asks Saudi Arabia to put in a good word with Trump
A psychologist comforts a resident in front of an apartment building that was hit yesterday by a Russian missile, amid Russia's attack on Ukraine, in Ternopil, Ukraine, November 20, 2025.
Details emerge of US-Russia plan for Ukraine
The proposal would give Russia more territory, cap the size of Ukraine’s military, and grant both the Russian language and the Russian Orthodox Church official status within Ukraine. While it envisions some US security guarantees for Kyiv, it also prohibits foreign troops and long range weapons on Ukrainian soil. In its current form, some consider it a Kremlin Christmas list, though officials say it’s just an initial “framework.” The Ukrainians see the plan as a non-starter, but the corruption scandal currently engulfing President Volodymyr Zelensky may complicate his ability to push back. Who’s funding Ukraine’s war effort now? See our recent Graphic Truth here.
Military governments continue to struggle with militants in West Africa
Islamist militants with ties to al-Qaeda killed at least 10 government soldiers in western Niger on Wednesday. The attack from the Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam al-Muslimin (JNIM) group, which controls a portion of West Africa that spans Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, will likely fuel further fears of these insurgents seizing power in this trio of military-controlled West African countries – the militants already have Mali’s capital surrounded (read more here).
Iran’s leader asks Saudi Arabia to help bring Washington back to the table
Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian sent a letter to Saudi Arabia’s leader on the eve of his visit to the White House asking him to pass on a message to Donald Trump: please resume US-Iran nuclear talks. Since the US and Israel attacked Iran’s nuclear program during the 12-day war in June, diplomacy has stalled. Iran is getting desperate to return to talks in order to lift the sanctions that are crippling its economy and worsening chronic water and energy shortages. The note marks that Iran’s leadership may be scrambling for a breakthrough with Washington — now we’ll see if Trump bites.
Hard Numbers: 80 years since the Nuremberg trials, Gazan ceasefire holds despite strikes, US and India inch closer to detente, Epstein files out before Christmas
Senior Nazi figures – Hermann Goering (1893-1946), Rudolf Hess (1894-1987), Joachim von Ribentrop (1893-1946), and Wilhelm Keitel (1882-1946) – stand trial in Nuremberg, Germany, 1945-46.
80: Exactly 80 years ago today, the Nuremberg trials began. One scholar who knows a thing or two about the subject says it’s a reminder that international law – despite the punchline that it sometimes seems to be – can also make a real difference.
25: The Israeli military struck parts of Gaza yesterday, killing at least 25 people, per Hamas-linked local health officials. Israel said the attacks were in response to Hamas militants opening fire on its forces. There were another set of Israeli airstrikes on Wednesday that reportedly killed five. Both sides said they were still committed to keeping the ceasefire, though each side is struggling to move forward with the second phase of the ceasefire deal.
$93 million: In another sign that trade tensions between the world’s richest country and the world’s most populous country are easing, the US approved a $93-million deal to sell arms to India. The purchase also marks Delhi’s latest move away from buying Russian arms and toward purchasing US ones.
30: After US President Donald Trump signed the bill last night, the Justice Department has 30 days to release all of the Epstein files. It remains to be seen whether the release will be comprehensive – the department can withhold documents related to ongoing investigations – but Attorney General Pam Bondi has said that she would “encourage maximum transparency.”
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen delivers the State of the European Union address to the European Parliament, in Strasbourg, France, September 10, 2025.
While the European Union has never been more critical, it is also facing a trifecta of divisive challenges.
There are real forces strengthening the EU’s cohesion. Militarily, Russia’s war on Ukraine and challenges to EU members poses a profound security threat to the continent. Economically, the 27-country bloc has coordinated its response to US tariffs. And public support remains strong — 73% of EU citizens say their country has benefitted from membership.
Yet beneath this united front, three divisive issues are exposing the fault lines between European solidarity and individual national interests.
Issue #1: Funding Ukraine with frozen Russian assets. Ukraine desperately needs more funding, but European budgets are stretched and no country wants to prioritize Ukraine over its own citizens. Now the EU has reached an impasse: Belgium recently blocked a long-awaited loan plan that would have used $160 billion in frozen Russian central bank assets to support Ukraine's war effort. Belgium fears it could be held liable if Russia successfully demands its money back, with Euroclear, the Belgian securities depository holding the funds, calling any confiscation illegal and accusing leaders of seeing the assets as a “pot of gold.”
EU proponents are scrambling to address Belgium's concerns by proposing to jointly guarantee the funds against potential Russian legal claims. But the Russian-friendly states of Slovakia and Hungary are opposed to this approach, or taking the funds at all.
According to Eurasia Group's Managing Director for Europe Mujtaba Rahman, “using these reserves has become a really important goal for many member states” as a way to demonstrate commitment to Ukraine without straining their own budgets. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen agrees, calling the frozen assets “the most effective way to sustain Ukraine's defense and its economy.” The challenge is convincing the holdouts to come onside.
Issue #2: Migration gridlock. Last month, interior ministers gathered to hammer out implementation details for the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum. The deal was adopted in 2024 to tighten border security, share the cost of hosting migrants, and streamline deportations. While most EU leaders support reform in principle, putting the pact into practice has sparked fierce disagreement.
At the heart of the dispute is the pact’s “solidarity pool,” designed to ease pressure on Southern European states — namely Spain, Greece, Italy, and Cyprus — by redistributing asylum seekers across the continent. Countries unwilling to accept migrants can provide financial compensation instead. But many nations, particularly in Eastern Europe, resist accepting migrants who wouldn’t otherwise reach their borders, and resent being financially penalized for refusing.
This pressure is fueling nationalist parties throughout the EU. “It’s not going to get better,” warns Rahman. “You’re going to continue to see far-right support increase because the perception is migration is running out of control and governments don’t have a handle on how to secure their borders.”
Issue #3: National sovereignty versus European law. The EU’s handling of migration provides ammunition for nationalist and Euroskeptic leaders like Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico. Riding that moment, Fico recently changed his country’s constitution to assert that national laws take priority over EU legislation.
The constitutional change accompanied an amendment recognizing only two sexes, and explicitly prioritizing Slovak law on matters of national identity, culture, and ethics. It echoes Poland’s 2021 clash with the EU, when Warsaw faced tribunal proceedings over conflicting laws on judicial reforms, media freedoms, and LGBT rights.
Slovakia’s moves directly challenges the EU’s legal framework, in which EU law supersedes national legislation to maintain unity across the bloc. “I want to be absolutely clear: the primacy of EU law must be upheld in all cases across the European Union,” declared EU Justice Commissioner Michael McGrath. The EU has issued a warning to Slovakia and will soon decide whether to pursue legal action.
The EU hopes cracking down on Slovakia will reinforce its own control over the bloc. But as ever, it risks exacerbating the current issues that it faces, and encouraging member states to prioritize national interests over that of the bloc.
So the United States is gearing up for what looks like regime change. And I think it's a bad idea.
Don’t get me wrong, I’d love to see the back of Maduro. He’s a brutal dictator who's rigged elections, destroyed Venezuela's economy, overseen a humanitarian catastrophe that's displaced 9 million people, and turned his country into a narco-state playground for transnational cartels and Cuban intelligence. The opposition leader María Corina Machado is a genuine democrat who won the Nobel Peace Prize this year. Her running mate Edmundo González won last year's presidential election in a landslide that Maduro brazenly stole.
If we lived in a world where removing tyrants by force was very likely to produce better outcomes, I'd be all for it. But we don’t live in that world.
The 1989 Panama regime-change intervention gets trotted out as the model to emulate here – quick, surgical, successful. Remove Manuel Noriega, restore an elected government, get out. But Venezuela is not Panama.
Panama had 2.5 million people; Venezuela has nearly 30 million. Panama is tiny; Venezuela spans a territory the size of Texas and Oklahoma combined. The US had deep knowledge of Panamanian politics and faced minimal armed resistance; even then, the operation killed hundreds of civilians and left lasting scars.
Venezuela is far more complicated. It's got a heavily armed, economically entrenched, Cuban-supported military apparatus. Dissident FARC units. The ELN. Hezbollah. The Tren de Aragua gang. Armed colectivos loyal to the regime. And American intelligence on the ground has been spotty – which is why, despite months of military buildup, the US has mostly been blowing up fishing boats it claims are running cocaine, killing over 80 people since September without much evidence to show for it (and with little legal justification).
The Trump administration's theory of victory is that targeted strikes will crack Maduro's inner circle. Hit enough cartel assets, maybe take out figures like Iván Hernández Dala – who runs military counterintelligence and is responsible for kidnapping Americans – and senior military leaders will do the math and push Maduro out.
It's not crazy. These guys aren't ideologues; they're in it for money, power, and – ultimately – survival. Change their risk calculus enough and maybe Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino López or other top brass decide Maduro isn't worth dying for.
But if that pressure campaign fails – and history suggests it will – Trump will face pressure from Rubio and CIA Director John Ratcliffe to escalate by targeting Maduro directly. A full ground invasion remains off the table despite Trump saying Monday that he doesn't "rule anything out." The president wants to avoid the political costs of a botched operation or a lengthy quagmire; he’s increasingly comfortable with limited strikes à la Iran.
But then what? Even if the US manages to force Maduro out, the most likely outcome is an internal transition. Someone from the regime takes over, probably from the military or existing power structure. Maybe it's Vice President Delcy Rodríguez or her brother Jorge, the National Assembly president. They're no democrats but they’re pragmatic, have negotiated with Washington before, and could potentially mend fences while keeping enough of the state apparatus functioning to prevent anarchy.
Getting from that to an actual opposition-led government with Machado or González at the helm? That's the hard part. It requires street pressure, contentious negotiations, and credible guarantees for the security apparatus – you know, the guys currently running drugs, torturing regime critics, and starving millions of their fellow citizens. Some need to stay for the sake of stability; others need to go because of their crimes. Who decides which is which? Who enforces it?
Not Machado, who has moral authority but no armed forces and limited organizational capacity on the ground. When I interviewed her on GZERO World earlier this year, she told me she has plans for the first 100 hours and the first 100 days of a transition. But Ambassador James Story, who served as US Ambassador to Venezuela from 2018 to 2023, thinks Machado needs to be much more public about her plans for regime figures. "There needs to be a plan in place that says when we change, not everybody is gonna be out," he told me. “De-Baathification was a disaster.” No matter how unpalatable it sounds, some form of amnesty or integration will be necessary.
This is where the "anything is better than Maduro" argument falls apart. Not because Maduro doesn't deserve to go – he does. But because US-led regime change risks creating the kind of chaos that produces more refugee flows, more drug trafficking, and more regional instability. Iraq taught us that toppling a dictator is easy; building a functioning state is hard. Libya taught us that even "leading from behind" can produce chaos. Afghanistan taught us that twenty years and trillions of dollars can't conjure competent governance from scratch.
Now, Venezuela isn’t Iraq or Libya. The country is not riven by deep ethnic, religious, or sectarian cleavages. Any violence following Maduro's fall would likely be short-lived, rather than a protracted civil war. But the underlying problem remains: removing a dictator creates a vacuum, and vacuums get filled by whoever has the most organization and firepower. Not necessarily by the people with the best democratic credentials.
These are risks the Trump team doesn’t seem equipped to manage. Rubio is a true believer who sees Caracas as the linchpin for toppling the regimes in Cuba and Nicaragua – a domino theory for the 21st century. Trump himself is uncomfortable with prolonged foreign entanglements and wants quick wins he can sell to his MAGA base. That's a recipe for going in hard, declaring victory prematurely, and leaving a mess behind.
What Venezuela needs is a multilateral diplomatic solution with buy-in from Brazil, Colombia, and other regional players. Back-channel negotiations to guarantee safe exit for regime figures. A phased transition roadmap – the kind that worked in Brazil and Uruguay – that brings in opposition leadership gradually while keeping enough institutions functional. And a commitment to stick around – diplomatically, economically, maybe even with security assistance – for years, not months. Does any of that sound like Trump 2.0 to you?
There's one asterisk. Trump's Gaza ceasefire, like the Abraham Accords during his first term, showed that the president can occasionally pull off complex diplomatic breakthroughs when he's personally invested and has capable people executing. Maybe – and it’s a big maybe – Venezuela could become that if Trump sees it as legacy-defining. But stacking maybes on top of maybes isn't a bankable strategy.
Even as it has ramped up preparations for military escalation, the White House has simultaneously reopened negotiations with Maduro – "I talk to anybody," Trump told reporters Monday, though he rejected Maduro’s offer to step down after a two-to-three-year transition. It’s classic Trump: maximize pressure while keeping diplomatic options open. But if talks fail – and they probably will – the massive buildup leaves him little choice but to strike, likely before the year’s end.
So here we are. Maduro needs to go. But we've seen this movie before, and it doesn't end well.
Graphic Truth: Europe tries to fill US void in Ukraine funding
Under former President Joe Biden, the United States had been a major supporter of Ukraine, handing more than €100 billion to Kyiv in cumulative financial, humanitarian and military aid. In 2024, the US gave more to Ukraine than all of Europe combined. That has changed since US President Donald Trump took office, with Washington halting most forms of aid to Ukraine (it does still offer some military support, and has handed weapons to Ukraine via money allocated during the Biden administration). Europe has tried to fill the void, as the graphic shows, but there are concerns the European money well is starting to dry up.
United States President Donald J Trump awaits the arrival Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud at the White House in Washington, DC, USA, on November 18, 2025. Featuring: Donald J Trump Where: Washington, District of Columbia, United States When: 18 Nov 2025
Ten months into the second administration of US President Donald Trump, the most pressing foreign policy puzzle is not about the Middle East, the war in Ukraine or even relations with China. The question top of mind right now is what is going on in the Western Hemisphere, and does it reveal an emerging Trump Doctrine?
It is fair to say that Trump’s 2025 engagement with its regional neighbors was not on the market’s radar when he assumed office in January. There were, however, indicators of what was to come. In December 2024, Trump cast a spotlight on Panama, pledging to retake control over the canal to prevent the US from continuing to be “ripped off.” Trump also spoke early on about targeting regional trading partners Canada and Mexico with tariffs. In the case of Canada, these threats and musings about the possibility of a “51st state” contributed to then-Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s resignation in January.
Trump’s longstanding commitment to curbing regional migrant flows and “executing the immigration laws” of the US offered another clue of what lay ahead. From the travel ban issued in the first week of Trump 1.0 in 2017, to appropriations for the southern border wall to dispatching US Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents on the streets in 2025, Trump and his team care deeply about enforcement, who is allowed to enter the country, and who is permitted to stay in the country.
The administration’s Day 1 executive order on foreign policy built on these indicators and set forth a vision for Trump 2.0: “From this day forward, the foreign policy of the United States shall champion core American interests and always put America and American citizens first.” The “America First” isolationism of Trump’s first term was replaced with an activist, no-stone-left-uncovered approach.
A neighborhood unsettled
Despite transparency about its foreign policy ambitions, the way in which the current US administration has gone about pursuing its policy objectives in the Western Hemisphere – designating drug cartels as terrorist organizations, striking alleged narcotraffickers operating in the Caribbean and eastern Pacific, moving an advanced aircraft carrier into waters off of Venezuela, reopening a military base in Puerto Rico, among other measures - has surprised many and rankled regional leaders and US allies.
In recent days, Colombia announced it would suspend intelligence sharing with the US after months of tension with the Trump administration. Colombia is not alone. Close allies in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands have also halted intelligence sharing over the Trump administration’s tactics in the region and human rights concerns.
Drawing on doctrinal ghosts
To make sense of these regional developments and their fallout, analysts and watchers have called upon the Monroe Doctrine. Some have gone so far as to label the administration’s foreign policy approach the “Donroe Doctrine.”
Although pithy and appealing, the 1823 Monroe Doctrine was primarily a response to external (European) interference in Western Hemisphere affairs. Pursuant to the doctrine, the American continents would not be open to future colonization, and the US would consider any violation of this tenet to be “dangerous to our peace and safety.” It is from the Monroe Doctrine that the concept of “spheres of influence” was derived. Europe would be for Europe. Existing European colonies were also for Europe. Everything else in the Western Hemisphere was for itself, with the caveat of a “connected” and invested US standing readily by.
It would be naïve to disregard all analogies to the current landscape. The Trump administration is aware of the deep trade, economic, and security relations between countries in the region and China and Russia. In 2025, China is now South America’s top trading partner and a major regional investor. The US administration’s forthcoming National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy will both reportedly highlight the need for greater attention to the region in light of these global dynamics.
Even still, there are limits to the dispositive power of the Monroe Doctrine. The recent US overtures in the Western Hemisphere are not principally animated by the threat of external interference. Rather than the original Doctrine, the Trump administration’s strategy in the region better recalls its 1904 Roosevelt Corollary set forth by then-President Theodore Roosevelt. According to the Roosevelt Corollary, in the event of “chronic wrongdoing” or “impotence” in the Western Hemisphere it was the US’s responsibility to serve as an “international police power” for the region. The Roosevelt Corollary empowered American vast interventionism based on conditions within the Western Hemisphere itself, regardless of any external threat.
The Trump Doctrine
In a similar manner, the second Trump administration is also directing a message to the region. The US will not tolerate hostile neighbors, unfettered narcotics, and unregulated migration flows. And over the long term, the US intends to achieve better access to regional markets and natural resources like rare critical minerals to support US domestic markets and its economic agenda. To these ends, there will be force – “police power” - (war exercises, military buildups, targeted strikes), but the administration will also leverage all the tools in its portfolio from economic (tariffs, bailouts, aid suspensions and sanctions) to political (visa restrictions, renaming water bodies). Posting last week on social media, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth explained: “The Western Hemisphere is America’s neighborhood and we will protect it.”
This is the developing Trump Doctrine: use all available means at any time to champion core American interests, and always put America and American citizens first. As defined, in each case, by the administration. But unlike Roosevelt, who aspired to “walk softly and carry a big stick,” the Trump administration has heavy footsteps and will be pulling many levers.
Hard Numbers: China-Japan tensions extend to seafood, Italy expands definition of rape, Klimt painting becomes second-most expensive ever sold, & More
A photo taken on September 14, 2024, shows seafood at Jimiya fishing port in Qingdao, China, on September 14, 2024. On September 20, 2024, China and Japan reach a consensus on the issue of the discharge of contaminated water from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, and China states that it will gradually resume the import of Japanese aquatic products that meet the regulations.
227: All 227 lawmakers who were present in Italy’s lower house yesterday voted to expand the definition of rape to include all non-consensual acts. Under the current penal code, rape is an act that involves violence, threats, or abuse of authority. Reports of sexual violence in Italy have risen in recent years: there were 6,231 in 2023, up from 4,257 in 2014.
2: After a gunman attacked a church in Nigeria, killing two people, rapper Nicki Minaj appeared before the UN to call for action against the persecution of christians in the country – something that US President Donald Trump has said he would also make moves to address.
$236.4 million: A portrait by the Austrian artist Gustav Klimt, famed for painting “Women in Gold,” sold in New York City on Tuesday for $236.4 million, becoming the second-most expensive painting of all time. Six people competed for “Portrait of Elisabeth Lederer,” which Klimt created between 1914 and 1916. Like “Women in Gold,” the Nazis had looted the painting from Jewish owners during World War II.
21 million: The concept of kissing dates back more than 21 million years, University of Oxford scientists have found, with humans and many of their ancestors engaging with the practice. The study didn’t explore why the practice began.