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Analysis
US President Donald Trump pardons a turkey at the annual White House Thanksgiving Turkey Pardon in the Rose Garden in Washington, D.C., USA, on Nov. 25, 2025.
Well, it’s about to be Thanksgiving in the United States. Although not all of our global readers celebrate that particular holiday, it’s still good to remind ourselves that while the world offers plenty of fodder for doomscrolling and despair, there are still lots of things to be grateful for too. Here’s a selection of five good news stories from around the world in 2025!
First, energy is getting cleaner, faster. This year, renewables quietly overtook coal as the planet’s top source of electricity – a milestone driven almost single-handedly by China’s clean-energy boom. Beijing added more solar capacity than the rest of the world combined, pushing solar-panel prices to record lows and making renewables the cost-effective choice for fast-growing power grids in the developing world. Across Africa, solar panel imports from China rose 60% over the last year, trends echoed from Malaysia to Mexico. Yes, the US wobbled a bit, with fossil-fuel use increasing and green-energy projects scuttled, but analysts still call 2025 a “turning point”: coal’s long, filthy reign is ending.
Second, people are much kinder than we think. Global data shows lost wallets are returned at about twice the rate people expect, according to the World Happiness Report. The researchers found that most of us dramatically underestimate the honesty of our neighbors. And that that optimism gap matters. The researchers found that believing you live among people who’d return your wallet turns out to be one of the strongest predictors of happiness. Big smiles to the Nordic countries, which top both the happiness rankings and the wallet-return charts.
Third, fragile but real diplomatic breakthroughs emerged in long-running conflicts. Whether you love or hate US President Donald Trump’s diplomatic style, he has made progress in stopping some of the world’s most intractable conflicts. In June, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Rwandan-backed M23 rebels agreed to US-brokered peace negotiations and signed a “comprehensive” peace framework in Qatar this month – their most concrete progress in years. Meanwhile, in August, Armenia and Azerbaijan’s leaders agreed to a political framework to end the 37-year long Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. And in Gaza, Hamas and Israel agreed to the first phase of a ceasefire. While the crucial second phase is riddled with challenges, the (mostly) sustained pause in violence has allowed for desperately-needed humanitarian aid to Gaza and diplomatic negotiations on the enclave’s future.
Fourth, stranded astronauts finally made it home. NASA’s Butch Wilmore and Suni Williams returned to Earth after an unplanned nine-month stay on the International Space Station. The pair were ferried back to earth by a SpaceX ship, which was greeted by dolphins when it splashed down off the Florida coast. Their eight-day mission stretched to more than a year after Boeing’s Starliner ran into trouble and couldn’t return back to earth, but they kept busy while waiting for their rescue: they ran experiments, went on spacewalks, and even celebrated Christmas in orbit. Williams now holds the record for most spacewalk hours by a woman.
And finally, the Smithsonian National Zoo is about to have another elephant in the room. Twelve-year-old Nhi Linh is expecting her first calf — the zoo’s first in 25 years! Early ultrasounds of the 150-pound fetus suggest everything looks healthy. The team is now reinforcing the enclosure for a newborn who is expected to arrive before spring, a symbol of home for a species with fewer than 50,000 living in the wild.
In news cycles that often swirl around negativity, these stories remind us that progress – whether in geopolitics or the pachyderm-population – marches on. Happy Thanksgiving!
Army Chief Asim Munir holds a microphone during his visit at the Tilla Field Firing Ranges (TFFR) to witness the Exercise Hammer Strike, a high-intensity field training exercise conducted by the Pakistan Army's Mangla Strike Corps, in Mangla, Pakistan, on May 1, 2025.
Earlier this month, Pakistan’s National Assembly rammed through a controversial constitutional amendment that grants Field Marshal Asim Munir, the country’s de facto leader, lifelong immunity from all crimes.
“What was effectively already de facto military rule has become constitutional,” said Eurasia Group’s South Asia Practice Head Pramit Pal Chaudhuri. “It’s effectively a constitutional coup.”
So how did Pakistan get here? As a country flanked by two longstanding rivals – India and Afghanistan – Pakistan has relied heavily on its military throughout its 80-year history. As a result, military leaders have typically wielded immense political power, controlling the country both directly and indirectly for most, if not all, of Pakistan’s near-80-year existence.
The military faced a challenge, though, in 2018, when the charismatic and telegenic former cricket star Imran Khan won a free and fair election on a populist platform. Although he initially enjoyed the support of “The Establishment,” as the military is known, Khan quickly got into conflict with the generals. One of his most brazen acts against the brass was, in fact, to reassign the head of the country’s spy unit at the time, one Asim Munir.
Khan’s power didn’t last. He was ousted in 2022, and jailed on corruption charges. His party would remain popular, winning the most seats in the 2024 election, but the government – under military influence – refused to seat many of its female and minority candidates, leaving Khan’s party in the minority.
As for Munir, he would get his own back: with Khan out of power and behind bars, the one-time spy chief rose the ranks of the military to become army chief. In May of this year, he seized on the latest Kashmir crisis – which put India and Pakistan on the brink of all-out war for several days – to become Pakistan’s second-ever five-star general, the highest possible military ranking. His latest effort goes a step further, amending the 1973 constitution in a way that opens the path for an outright power grab.
“One of the things in the 1973 constitution is: if you declare martial law, you’re tried for treason,” Dr. Ayesha Siddiqa, a Pakistani military expert at King’s College London, told GZERO. “So if tomorrow [Munir] declares martial law, he cannot be tried for treason.”
Munir’s in charge – what issues does he face? First and foremost, the economy. Pakistan’s economy has been stagnant for 50 years. In the 1970s it was the richest country in South Asia – now it’s one of the poorest. In addition, it has $6.5 billion in outstanding IMF loans, the fifth-most in the world. Many Pakistanis are seeking opportunities abroad.
“If you look at the size of the middle class in Pakistan, it’s effectively shrinking, which is the exact opposite of what you should want in a developing country. Because the taxation system is rising and incomes are not rising,” said Chaudhuri. “If you’re a smart young businessman, you fly to Dubai.”
The field marshal has been cozying up to the Trump administration – an unusual move given Pakistan’s close ties to China – in a bid to sell some of its sizable deposits of rare-earth minerals to the United States.
The other major issue for Munir is the Taliban, the one-time allies of Pakistan who now hold power again next door in Afghanistan. Last month, the two countries had one of their worst border disputes in years, and now Pakistan is bombing the Afghan capital of Kabul in response to a spate of terrorist attacks in Islamabad.
There’s one thing Munir won’t have to worry about. Pakistan’s opposition is toothless right now, Siddiqa said. The opposition has a top-down structure, meaning that with Khan in jail, the party is largely adrift, with weak local representation.
What’s more: the government has been cracking down on dissent.
“Imran Khan is in jail, and there’s nobody else around his party which can actually start a public movement, get people out on the streets,” said Siddiqa. “And also, as a result of the May 9 [conflict with India], the media has been managed. People have been tortured, people have been picked up, disappeared, etc. So with that kind of authoritarianism, people are too scared to come out.”relatively modest purchase.
The other major issue for Munir is the Taliban, the one-time allies of Pakistan who now hold power again next door in Afghanistan: last month, the two countries had one of their worst border disputes in years, and now Pakistan is bombing the Afghan capital of Kabul in response to a spate of terrorist attacks in Islamabad.
There’s one thing Munir won’t have to worry about. Pakistan’s opposition is toothless right now, Siddiqa says. The opposition has a top-down structure, meaning that with Khan in jail, the party is largely adrift, with weak local representation.
What’s more: the government has been cracking down on dissent.
“Imran Khan is in jail, and there’s nobody else around his party which can actually start a public movement, get people out on the streets,” said Siddiqa. “And also, as a result of May 9, the media has been managed. People have been tortured, people have been picked up, disappeared, etc. So with that kind of authoritarianism, people are too scared to come out.”
Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi (R) answers a question from Katsuya Okada of the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan during a House of Representatives Budget Committee session in Tokyo on Nov. 7, 2025. At the time, Takaichi said a military attack on Taiwan could present a “survival-threatening situation” for Japan.
Tensions between Tokyo and Beijing hit a boiling point last Friday when China accused Japan’s Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi of “a grave violation of international law.” Her alleged crime? Statements that a Chinese attack or blockade of Taiwan could threaten Japan’s survival and be met with military intervention. The ensuing diplomatic crisis has not just upended relations between China and Japan, but threatens to ensnare the United States in a geopolitical showdown in the Pacific.
Why were Taikachi’s comments so incendiary? Takaichi used the phrase, “situation threatening Japan’s survival,” to describe potential Chinese aggression towards Taiwan. That’s a specific legal designation under Japan's 2015 security legislation that allows the prime minister to deploy the military in self-defense.
This breaks with Tokyo’s traditional ambiguity on the use of force in the case of invasion, and signals publicly that it would stand with Washington in a crisis – something China considers a direct challenge to its sovereignty. Article V of the US-Japan security treaty obliges the US to defend Japan if it is attacked.
What has China done in response? Beijing has suspended seafood imports, discouraged Chinese tourists from traveling to Japan, and allowed mass cancellations of flights and tours without penalty. Concerts by Japanese artists in China have been abruptly pulled from venues and cruise ships that once filled ports in Kyushu are now being rerouted to South Korea. The goal is to hit Japan where it hurts: tourism has helped boost the economy post-Covid, and many small cities rely heavily on Chinese visitors.
On the diplomatic front, Beijing sent a letter Friday to UN Secretary-General António Guterres urging Japan to “deeply reflect upon its historical crimes,” a reference to Japan’s invasion of China during World War II, and calling on Tokyo to “retract its erroneous remarks.” On Sunday, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi posted a statement to the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s website that Japan’s leadership has “said things they shouldn’t have said, and crossed a red line that should not have been touched.”
How is Japan reacting? Tokyo is not taking back Takaishi’s words, saying instead that Beijing is misinterpreting them. According to senior Japanese government spokeswoman Maki Kobayashi, “The claim our country has altered its position is entirely baseless” and Tokyo remains “committed to dialogue” with Beijing.
What’s China’s goal? Beijing hopes to frustrate Takaichi’s pledge to accelerate Japan’s military buildup and raise defense spending to 2% of GDP by fiscal year 2025, two years ahead of the target set by her predecessor, Shigeru Ishiba. According to Chong Ja Ian, an associate professor at the National University of Singapore, China is seeking “to box Takaichi in and put her on the back foot early on – so she will be more reluctant to push forward on Japan’s investment in defense.”
But so far, the public is backing the prime minister. According to David Boling, Eurasia Group’s director of Japan and Asia Trade, “Takaichi’s approval ratings are very high – even climbing higher in some polls. The Japanese public has a very negative view of China, and China’s extreme response will only reinforce that view.”
Could Japan’s position deter an invasion of Taiwan – or accelerate it? If China believes that a Taiwan crisis would trigger a US-led coalition response, Beijing could escalate its preparations to get ahead of Japan’s planned military buildup. Beijing is already conducting invasion drills using its “shadow navy,” and Chinese coast guard ships have increased their presence around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, putting the Japanese air force and navy on high alert. That could increase the odds of a takeover – or an unintended encounter that could spiral into an international crisis.
German Chancellor and chairwoman of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) Angela Merkel addresses a news conference in Berlin, Germany September 19, 2016.
Angela Merkel was elected chancellor of Germany on November 22, 2005, becoming the first woman to hold that job. In many ways, she was the ballast of Europe through the Eurozone crisis, the refugee surge, and the COVID pandemic.
During that time Merkel was arguably the most powerful woman in the world, presiding over one of its largest economies for four terms in the Bundesregierung.
Twenty years on, the anniversary is a reminder of how singular her breakthrough remains. It’s still the exception when a woman runs a country.
Consider the scoreboard. As of September 2025, 29 countries had a woman as head of state or government, just 14% of nations on a planet that is half female. Even after 2024’s “year of elections” which sent more than 4 billion people to the polls, men still outnumber women by three to one in legislative positions.
In 1995, when then First Lady Hillary Clinton famously declared, “Women’s rights are human rights,” 11% of parliamentarians globally were female. Today it’s 27%, but their share of cabinet leadership roles slipped over the past year. In short: representation in legislatures inches forward glacially, but control of the levers of power remains overwhelmingly male.
There are high-profile women in top offices, Mexico’s Claudia Sheinbaum and Italy’s Giorgia Meloni among them, but they are still swimming against a powerful tide: more than 100 countries have never had a woman leader.
Why does it matter who sits at the top? Beyond basic fairness, evidence keeps mounting that diverse leadership broadens policy priorities and improves decision-making. Studies have pointed to reduction of violence, greater gender equality, and strengthened education, healthcare, and social welfare policies. In geopolitical terms, it also affects how states engage in multilateral forums and crisis response.
At the Paris Peace Forum in October, former Chilean President Michelle Bachelet said women are more likely to bring empathy to positions of power. “Empathetic doesn't mean sympathetic,” she told GZERO. “It means that you can put yourself in the shoes of the other so you can understand the problem.”
Madam Secretary-General. About a third of the 193 United Nations member states have had a female leader, but the UN itself has never elected a woman to its top spot. As the organization marks its 80th anniversary, there are growing calls to change that next year, when a new Secretary-General will be chosen.
The organization GWL Voices has backed a campaign called “Madam Secretary-General,” and several prominent geopolitical players vocally supported the movement at this year’s General Assembly.
Ecuador’s Permanent Representative to the UN and GWL Voices Executive Director Maria Fernanda Espinosa told GZERO, “I think after 80 years of history, the organization deserves to have a woman at the helm. If the UN really wants to be transformed, there is a shift in styles of leadership that is needed. And the question I ask is, ‘Why not a woman?’"
After Merkel. While in office, Chancellor Merkel often promoted women’s rights in her speeches and once said, “I hope we won’t have to wait 100 years to achieve [full equality].”
Actually, the organization UN Women reports at the current pace it will take 130 years to attain an equal balance of men and women in positions of power.
While there has been progress since Merkel made history two decades ago, the path to parity remains elusive.
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen delivers the State of the European Union address to the European Parliament, in Strasbourg, France, September 10, 2025.
While the European Union has never been more critical, it is also facing a trifecta of divisive challenges.
There are real forces strengthening the EU’s cohesion. Militarily, Russia’s war on Ukraine and challenges to EU members poses a profound security threat to the continent. Economically, the 27-country bloc has coordinated its response to US tariffs. And public support remains strong — 73% of EU citizens say their country has benefitted from membership.
Yet beneath this united front, three divisive issues are exposing the fault lines between European solidarity and individual national interests.
Issue #1: Funding Ukraine with frozen Russian assets. Ukraine desperately needs more funding, but European budgets are stretched and no country wants to prioritize Ukraine over its own citizens. Now the EU has reached an impasse: Belgium recently blocked a long-awaited loan plan that would have used $160 billion in frozen Russian central bank assets to support Ukraine's war effort. Belgium fears it could be held liable if Russia successfully demands its money back, with Euroclear, the Belgian securities depository holding the funds, calling any confiscation illegal and accusing leaders of seeing the assets as a “pot of gold.”
EU proponents are scrambling to address Belgium's concerns by proposing to jointly guarantee the funds against potential Russian legal claims. But the Russian-friendly states of Slovakia and Hungary are opposed to this approach, or taking the funds at all.
According to Eurasia Group's Managing Director for Europe Mujtaba Rahman, “using these reserves has become a really important goal for many member states” as a way to demonstrate commitment to Ukraine without straining their own budgets. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen agrees, calling the frozen assets “the most effective way to sustain Ukraine's defense and its economy.” The challenge is convincing the holdouts to come onside.
Issue #2: Migration gridlock. Last month, interior ministers gathered to hammer out implementation details for the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum. The deal was adopted in 2024 to tighten border security, share the cost of hosting migrants, and streamline deportations. While most EU leaders support reform in principle, putting the pact into practice has sparked fierce disagreement.
At the heart of the dispute is the pact’s “solidarity pool,” designed to ease pressure on Southern European states — namely Spain, Greece, Italy, and Cyprus — by redistributing asylum seekers across the continent. Countries unwilling to accept migrants can provide financial compensation instead. But many nations, particularly in Eastern Europe, resist accepting migrants who wouldn’t otherwise reach their borders, and resent being financially penalized for refusing.
This pressure is fueling nationalist parties throughout the EU. “It’s not going to get better,” warns Rahman. “You’re going to continue to see far-right support increase because the perception is migration is running out of control and governments don’t have a handle on how to secure their borders.”
Issue #3: National sovereignty versus European law. The EU’s handling of migration provides ammunition for nationalist and Euroskeptic leaders like Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico. Riding that moment, Fico recently changed his country’s constitution to assert that national laws take priority over EU legislation.
The constitutional change accompanied an amendment recognizing only two sexes, and explicitly prioritizing Slovak law on matters of national identity, culture, and ethics. It echoes Poland’s 2021 clash with the EU, when Warsaw faced tribunal proceedings over conflicting laws on judicial reforms, media freedoms, and LGBT rights.
Slovakia’s moves directly challenges the EU’s legal framework, in which EU law supersedes national legislation to maintain unity across the bloc. “I want to be absolutely clear: the primacy of EU law must be upheld in all cases across the European Union,” declared EU Justice Commissioner Michael McGrath. The EU has issued a warning to Slovakia and will soon decide whether to pursue legal action.
The EU hopes cracking down on Slovakia will reinforce its own control over the bloc. But as ever, it risks exacerbating the current issues that it faces, and encouraging member states to prioritize national interests over that of the bloc.
So the United States is gearing up for what looks like regime change. And I think it's a bad idea.
Don’t get me wrong, I’d love to see the back of Maduro. He’s a brutal dictator who's rigged elections, destroyed Venezuela's economy, overseen a humanitarian catastrophe that's displaced 9 million people, and turned his country into a narco-state playground for transnational cartels and Cuban intelligence. The opposition leader María Corina Machado is a genuine democrat who won the Nobel Peace Prize this year. Her running mate Edmundo González won last year's presidential election in a landslide that Maduro brazenly stole.
If we lived in a world where removing tyrants by force was very likely to produce better outcomes, I'd be all for it. But we don’t live in that world.
The 1989 Panama regime-change intervention gets trotted out as the model to emulate here – quick, surgical, successful. Remove Manuel Noriega, restore an elected government, get out. But Venezuela is not Panama.
Panama had 2.5 million people; Venezuela has nearly 30 million. Panama is tiny; Venezuela spans a territory the size of Texas and Oklahoma combined. The US had deep knowledge of Panamanian politics and faced minimal armed resistance; even then, the operation killed hundreds of civilians and left lasting scars.
Venezuela is far more complicated. It's got a heavily armed, economically entrenched, Cuban-supported military apparatus. Dissident FARC units. The ELN. Hezbollah. The Tren de Aragua gang. Armed colectivos loyal to the regime. And American intelligence on the ground has been spotty – which is why, despite months of military buildup, the US has mostly been blowing up fishing boats it claims are running cocaine, killing over 80 people since September without much evidence to show for it (and with little legal justification).
The Trump administration's theory of victory is that targeted strikes will crack Maduro's inner circle. Hit enough cartel assets, maybe take out figures like Iván Hernández Dala – who runs military counterintelligence and is responsible for kidnapping Americans – and senior military leaders will do the math and push Maduro out.
It's not crazy. These guys aren't ideologues; they're in it for money, power, and – ultimately – survival. Change their risk calculus enough and maybe Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino López or other top brass decide Maduro isn't worth dying for.
But if that pressure campaign fails – and history suggests it will – Trump will face pressure from Rubio and CIA Director John Ratcliffe to escalate by targeting Maduro directly. A full ground invasion remains off the table despite Trump saying Monday that he doesn't "rule anything out." The president wants to avoid the political costs of a botched operation or a lengthy quagmire; he’s increasingly comfortable with limited strikes à la Iran.
But then what? Even if the US manages to force Maduro out, the most likely outcome is an internal transition. Someone from the regime takes over, probably from the military or existing power structure. Maybe it's Vice President Delcy Rodríguez or her brother Jorge, the National Assembly president. They're no democrats but they’re pragmatic, have negotiated with Washington before, and could potentially mend fences while keeping enough of the state apparatus functioning to prevent anarchy.
Getting from that to an actual opposition-led government with Machado or González at the helm? That's the hard part. It requires street pressure, contentious negotiations, and credible guarantees for the security apparatus – you know, the guys currently running drugs, torturing regime critics, and starving millions of their fellow citizens. Some need to stay for the sake of stability; others need to go because of their crimes. Who decides which is which? Who enforces it?
Not Machado, who has moral authority but no armed forces and limited organizational capacity on the ground. When I interviewed her on GZERO World earlier this year, she told me she has plans for the first 100 hours and the first 100 days of a transition. But Ambassador James Story, who served as US Ambassador to Venezuela from 2018 to 2023, thinks Machado needs to be much more public about her plans for regime figures. "There needs to be a plan in place that says when we change, not everybody is gonna be out," he told me. “De-Baathification was a disaster.” No matter how unpalatable it sounds, some form of amnesty or integration will be necessary.
This is where the "anything is better than Maduro" argument falls apart. Not because Maduro doesn't deserve to go – he does. But because US-led regime change risks creating the kind of chaos that produces more refugee flows, more drug trafficking, and more regional instability. Iraq taught us that toppling a dictator is easy; building a functioning state is hard. Libya taught us that even "leading from behind" can produce chaos. Afghanistan taught us that twenty years and trillions of dollars can't conjure competent governance from scratch.
Now, Venezuela isn’t Iraq or Libya. The country is not riven by deep ethnic, religious, or sectarian cleavages. Any violence following Maduro's fall would likely be short-lived, rather than a protracted civil war. But the underlying problem remains: removing a dictator creates a vacuum, and vacuums get filled by whoever has the most organization and firepower. Not necessarily by the people with the best democratic credentials.
These are risks the Trump team doesn’t seem equipped to manage. Rubio is a true believer who sees Caracas as the linchpin for toppling the regimes in Cuba and Nicaragua – a domino theory for the 21st century. Trump himself is uncomfortable with prolonged foreign entanglements and wants quick wins he can sell to his MAGA base. That's a recipe for going in hard, declaring victory prematurely, and leaving a mess behind.
What Venezuela needs is a multilateral diplomatic solution with buy-in from Brazil, Colombia, and other regional players. Back-channel negotiations to guarantee safe exit for regime figures. A phased transition roadmap – the kind that worked in Brazil and Uruguay – that brings in opposition leadership gradually while keeping enough institutions functional. And a commitment to stick around – diplomatically, economically, maybe even with security assistance – for years, not months. Does any of that sound like Trump 2.0 to you?
There's one asterisk. Trump's Gaza ceasefire, like the Abraham Accords during his first term, showed that the president can occasionally pull off complex diplomatic breakthroughs when he's personally invested and has capable people executing. Maybe – and it’s a big maybe – Venezuela could become that if Trump sees it as legacy-defining. But stacking maybes on top of maybes isn't a bankable strategy.
Even as it has ramped up preparations for military escalation, the White House has simultaneously reopened negotiations with Maduro – "I talk to anybody," Trump told reporters Monday, though he rejected Maduro’s offer to step down after a two-to-three-year transition. It’s classic Trump: maximize pressure while keeping diplomatic options open. But if talks fail – and they probably will – the massive buildup leaves him little choice but to strike, likely before the year’s end.
So here we are. Maduro needs to go. But we've seen this movie before, and it doesn't end well.
United States President Donald J Trump awaits the arrival Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud at the White House in Washington, DC, USA, on November 18, 2025. Featuring: Donald J Trump Where: Washington, District of Columbia, United States When: 18 Nov 2025
Ten months into the second administration of US President Donald Trump, the most pressing foreign policy puzzle is not about the Middle East, the war in Ukraine or even relations with China. The question top of mind right now is what is going on in the Western Hemisphere, and does it reveal an emerging Trump Doctrine?
It is fair to say that Trump’s 2025 engagement with its regional neighbors was not on the market’s radar when he assumed office in January. There were, however, indicators of what was to come. In December 2024, Trump cast a spotlight on Panama, pledging to retake control over the canal to prevent the US from continuing to be “ripped off.” Trump also spoke early on about targeting regional trading partners Canada and Mexico with tariffs. In the case of Canada, these threats and musings about the possibility of a “51st state” contributed to then-Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s resignation in January.
Trump’s longstanding commitment to curbing regional migrant flows and “executing the immigration laws” of the US offered another clue of what lay ahead. From the travel ban issued in the first week of Trump 1.0 in 2017, to appropriations for the southern border wall to dispatching US Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents on the streets in 2025, Trump and his team care deeply about enforcement, who is allowed to enter the country, and who is permitted to stay in the country.
The administration’s Day 1 executive order on foreign policy built on these indicators and set forth a vision for Trump 2.0: “From this day forward, the foreign policy of the United States shall champion core American interests and always put America and American citizens first.” The “America First” isolationism of Trump’s first term was replaced with an activist, no-stone-left-uncovered approach.
A neighborhood unsettled
Despite transparency about its foreign policy ambitions, the way in which the current US administration has gone about pursuing its policy objectives in the Western Hemisphere – designating drug cartels as terrorist organizations, striking alleged narcotraffickers operating in the Caribbean and eastern Pacific, moving an advanced aircraft carrier into waters off of Venezuela, reopening a military base in Puerto Rico, among other measures - has surprised many and rankled regional leaders and US allies.
In recent days, Colombia announced it would suspend intelligence sharing with the US after months of tension with the Trump administration. Colombia is not alone. Close allies in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands have also halted intelligence sharing over the Trump administration’s tactics in the region and human rights concerns.
Drawing on doctrinal ghosts
To make sense of these regional developments and their fallout, analysts and watchers have called upon the Monroe Doctrine. Some have gone so far as to label the administration’s foreign policy approach the “Donroe Doctrine.”
Although pithy and appealing, the 1823 Monroe Doctrine was primarily a response to external (European) interference in Western Hemisphere affairs. Pursuant to the doctrine, the American continents would not be open to future colonization, and the US would consider any violation of this tenet to be “dangerous to our peace and safety.” It is from the Monroe Doctrine that the concept of “spheres of influence” was derived. Europe would be for Europe. Existing European colonies were also for Europe. Everything else in the Western Hemisphere was for itself, with the caveat of a “connected” and invested US standing readily by.
It would be naïve to disregard all analogies to the current landscape. The Trump administration is aware of the deep trade, economic, and security relations between countries in the region and China and Russia. In 2025, China is now South America’s top trading partner and a major regional investor. The US administration’s forthcoming National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy will both reportedly highlight the need for greater attention to the region in light of these global dynamics.
Even still, there are limits to the dispositive power of the Monroe Doctrine. The recent US overtures in the Western Hemisphere are not principally animated by the threat of external interference. Rather than the original Doctrine, the Trump administration’s strategy in the region better recalls its 1904 Roosevelt Corollary set forth by then-President Theodore Roosevelt. According to the Roosevelt Corollary, in the event of “chronic wrongdoing” or “impotence” in the Western Hemisphere it was the US’s responsibility to serve as an “international police power” for the region. The Roosevelt Corollary empowered American vast interventionism based on conditions within the Western Hemisphere itself, regardless of any external threat.
The Trump Doctrine
In a similar manner, the second Trump administration is also directing a message to the region. The US will not tolerate hostile neighbors, unfettered narcotics, and unregulated migration flows. And over the long term, the US intends to achieve better access to regional markets and natural resources like rare critical minerals to support US domestic markets and its economic agenda. To these ends, there will be force – “police power” - (war exercises, military buildups, targeted strikes), but the administration will also leverage all the tools in its portfolio from economic (tariffs, bailouts, aid suspensions and sanctions) to political (visa restrictions, renaming water bodies). Posting last week on social media, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth explained: “The Western Hemisphere is America’s neighborhood and we will protect it.”
This is the developing Trump Doctrine: use all available means at any time to champion core American interests, and always put America and American citizens first. As defined, in each case, by the administration. But unlike Roosevelt, who aspired to “walk softly and carry a big stick,” the Trump administration has heavy footsteps and will be pulling many levers.