Trending Now
We have updated our Privacy Policy and Terms of Use for Eurasia Group and its affiliates, including GZERO Media, to clarify the types of data we collect, how we collect it, how we use data and with whom we share data. By using our website you consent to our Terms and Conditions and Privacy Policy, including the transfer of your personal data to the United States from your country of residence, and our use of cookies described in our Cookie Policy.
popular
Need Valentine's Day tips? Don’t ask these world leaders. Trust us. #PUPPETREGIME
Watch more of GZERO's award-winning PUPPET REGIME series!
Donald Trump has an empire state of mind.
From his threats to make Canada the 51st state, buy Greenland, reclaim the Panama Canal, and, almost implausibly, “take” the Gaza Strip, Trump isn’t hiding his imperial ambitions. In his inaugural address, he explicitly said he sees an America that “expands its territory.” Is he serious about this, and, if so, what does it mean for its closest neighbor and biggest partner, Canada?
Let’s start with the first question: Is territorial expansion a real threat or just rhetoric he is using to shake down opponents in trade negotiations? It’s both. Trump is using these threats to gain better access to markets for American goods, and he’s flexing his imperial desires.
No moment better illustrated Trump’s empire state of mind than on Tuesday, when he met King Abdullah II of Jordan at the White House. With Trump’s radical promise to take Gaza and “clean out that whole thing ” — choice words not lost on anyone remotely familiar with the worst crimes under international law — the meeting was expected to be about as uncomfortable for the royal as a crown of porcupine quills. But it got even more interesting than expected.
The president was asked how he would buy Gaza, as he had initially proposed. “We’re not going to have to buy,” he said. “We’re going to have Gaza. We don’t have to buy. There’s nothing to buy. We will have Gaza.”
We will have Gaza.
Pause there for a moment because that was a foundational shift in US policy. The president of the United States declared he could unilaterally pluck up pieces of land the US has no legitimate claim over in blatant violation of international law. Because the statement was so shocking, Trump was immediately asked to clarify. You won’t even buy it?
TRUMP: No reason to buy. There is nothing to buy. It’s Gaza. It’s a war-torn area. We’re going to take it. We’re going to hold it. We’re going to cherish it.
We are going to “take” it.
The next moment was the one that Canadians, Greenlanders, and Panamanians took to heart.
The king was visibly uncomfortable with what he and every Arab leader have said is a totally unacceptable idea, so he tried to deflect a confrontation, saying the Arab leaders would propose a solution, but then Trump doubled down.
“Mr. President,” a journalist asked, “take it under what authority? It is sovereign territory.”
“Under the US authority,” the president answered, as if that was enough.
This is exactly the law of the jungle we described in Eurasia Group’s 2025 Top Risks Report, where international laws and norms — the same laws and norms the US built and underpinned after World War II — are no longer enforced. Under this rule, strong countries — the United States, China, and Russia — divvy up the world into their own imperial spheres of influence. In a cogent piece this week in the Financial Times, Gideon Rachman called this the age of neo-imperialism, a world “based around spheres of influence — with the US concentrating on the Western Hemisphere, Russia on Eastern Europe, and China on East Asia.”
It is exactly right. This week, Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin had a long phone call during which – without input from Ukraine – they appeared to unilaterally decide the terms on which the war, which Russia started, would end. On favorable terms for Russia. How do we know? Because US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said the same day while he was in Europe that Ukraine joining NATO is now off the table and that US support for Ukraine and European defense is a low priority. Putin must be popping vodka bottle tops. His war aims have been largely vindicated.
More importantly, it shores up Rachman’s thesis that Trump is reverting to the imperial spheres of influence model, where great powers gobble up land in their orbits and let other great powers, like Russia and China, do it in theirs. The empire state of mind in action.
How should Canada read this?
On his way to the Super Bowl, Trump was asked by Fox News’ Bret Baier whether taking over Canada is a real goal. “Yes it is,” Trump responded before sharing his rationale that Canada, in his view, is a leech on the American economy and military and that he believes it should be the 51st state. So, yes, he is serious about it.
Again, not to be a scold, but facts should matter here. On that day, Trump’s rationale for taking over Canada was a “$200 billion” deficit. That is wrong. According to Stats Canada, in 2023, the trade deficit was $94 billion, which includes the cheap energy Canada supplies. But to the empire state of mind, facts don’t matter. Neither does the rationale. Today, it could be about trade deficits, fentanyl, and illegal immigration, and tomorrow, it could be about banking or cars. The goalposts will shift. All that matters is what the US wants to “take.” The rest is pretext and commentary.
So how could Trump take Canada by “economic force”? Again, the president is not hiding his plan.
Step one: Weaken the Canadian economy with devastating tariffs.
The 25% tariffs on steel and aluminum will be punishing for Ontario and Quebec but not existential. That is just a start. Layer another 25% tariff on all Canadian goods crossing the border, and there will be a meltdown.
“If we stop allowing them to make cars — through tariffs and other things: cars, trucks, etc., what they make — they’re not viable as a country,” Trump told Baier in a chilling moment.
Step two: Sow divisions in Canada. By excluding energy from his threats — or by putting much lower tariffs on energy than on other goods – Trump heats up East-West tensions in Canada that have long been on a medium boil.
It also has the benefit of self-interest. The US needs Alberta energy for its Midwest refineries. Otherwise, voters there will see a price jump at the pumps. So, Trump cuts Alberta a break. The rest of Canada, meanwhile, will want to retaliate against his tariffs, and energy is a powerful weapon in the arsenal. The Alberta premier has said that is a no-go. Other leaders are not ruling it out. If – no, when – the tariffs come, the external threat of Trump will be strengthened by the internal disputes within Canada.
Step 3: Spread disinformation. Separatism has always been an issue between English-speaking provinces and French-speaking Quebec. The separatist PQ party has been steadily on the rise in Quebec, with the promise of a referendum in the near future. Fomenting that movement with more disinformation is not out of the question for a president who wants to swallow up Canada and take its minerals, water, and access to the Arctic.
These could add up to the “winning conditions” Trump needs. Does he start with an offer to let part of Canada split off and join the union? Maybe. Suddenly, Canada is in fragments and ready to be swallowed up, bite by bite.
Of course, this is all dark speculation. Annexing Canada is not just a matter of political barking any more than it was in the War of 1812, when taking Canada was supposed to be a mere matter of marching. It wasn’t then, and it won’t be today.
Former Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper was roundly celebrated by leaders of all parties when he said, “I would be prepared to impoverish the country and not be annexed, if that was the option we’re facing.” Trump’s threats have led to a dramatic spike in Canadian patriotism. Canada is gearing up for a fight it doesn’t want or need. The US is picking a fight to win a prize it already has: free and fair trade with its best friend.
The empire state of mind, however, doesn’t allow for the logic of mutual benefit. It is a radical shift in global politics and a warning to countries that once called themselves allies, neighbors, and friends.
Mark Carney, the former governor of the Bank of Canada, is seen here officially announcing his bid for the federal Liberal Party leadership at Laurier Heights Community League in Edmonton, Canada, on Jan. 16, 2025.
When was the vote supposed to happen? Canadian law requires that an election be held by Oct. 25, 2025. Federal elections last between 37 and 51 days and must be held on a Monday, so a March 10 call would mean a vote on April 21. Opposition parties are already planning to bring nonconfidence motions when Parliament reconvenes on March 24 to oust the minority government and force an early vote.
Why would Liberals call an early election? The resignation of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, US President Donald Trump’s tariff threats, and talk of Canada as the 51st state have changed the political conversation. The ballot question has shifted from the government’s economic record to who can best take on Trump.
As a result, the Liberals’ poll numbers have risen dramatically. If Carney were leader, they would be tied with Pierre Poilievre’s Conservatives, according to a new Leger survey. Since the opposition wants to force a vote anyway, there is arguably little to gain by waiting.
But it’s not a done deal. Liberal leadership candidate Chrystia Freeland says she would not hold an early election, citing the fact that, unlike Carney, she has a seat in Parliament and “would have the right to stand up in the House of Commons and to represent the government.” The timing could hinge on who wins the leadership – and where polls go between now and then.On Monday, President Donald Trump promised to hit Canada and other countries with 25% tariffs on steel and aluminum. The tax is set to come into effect on March 12, the same day Trump’s 30-day pause on across-the-board tariffs against Canada lifts.
As the US’ biggest source of aluminum and one of its top sources of steel, Canada stands to be hurt more than any other country by the president’s new metals tariffs. Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and his government are rushing to find ways to wriggle out from under the tariffs, but a national discussion is also underway to find ways to diversify the country’s trade relationships and to protect the economy from what’s seen as an increasingly unreliable partner: the United States.
To get a sense of what Canada could do to fight back against US tariffs, while developing a long-term plan to build economic resilience, GZERO’s David Moscrop spoke to economist Kevin Milligan, director of the Vancouver School of Economics at the University of British Columbia. This interview has been edited for length and clarity.
David Moscrop: How productive would Canadian counter-tariffs be against the US?
Kevin Milligan: The US economy is 10 times the size of ours. I've heard politicians and some others talking about dollar-for-dollar retaliation. The problem with that is our dollars don’t go very far when we put tariffs on their goods. To give an example, imagine we were to do one of the products that Canada loves to think about, like Harley-Davidson motorcycles from Wisconsin. Imagine we put a big tariff on them, and the sales to Canada dropped by half. What share of Harley-Davidson’s business overall comes from sales to Canada? Like 5% or something like that? Maybe, maybe 10%. So they’re losing a couple of percent off of their overall sales. They’re not going to be happy, but it’s not going to devastate them. In contrast, there are many businesses in Canada that sell almost everything they make to the US. When they’re faced with a big tariff, they will lose substantial sales, and it’s not going to be a couple of points off the top. It’s going to be existential to them. So that’s where the magnitude is different.
When we tariff US goods coming into Canada, that means that the cost of those goods coming into Canada goes up for Canadian consumers. And so we will be putting taxes on ourselves to make a small change to Harley-Davidson or whatever we tariff. So that’s where the counter-tariff is not something that I think will be super effective. It’s not to say we don’t do it. We have to strike back. This is an attack on our sovereignty, on our economy, and so we have to strike back and strike back hard. I’m just not sure that broad counter-tariffs are the way to go.
What about something like export controls on critical minerals or energy?
This is most easily understood in the context of oil. I’m not suggesting we do it for oil — there are a lot of political tensions within Canada when it comes to oil — but it is very tangible to think about this. Imagine the oil industry got together with the government and agreed that we’d purposely throttle both production and exports to the US. So, instead of 100 barrels a day, we’re now going to export only 50 barrels a day. If we did that, what happens? There are fewer barrels, and there are lots of people bidding for them, so the price goes up. The government doesn’t get the revenue. The industry keeps the revenue. They’re going to get less than they would’ve if they sold the full 100 barrels, but the revenue goes directly to the producers, which is better than washing it through a government program.
So you don’t have to worry about export taxes or anything else. You just do a curtailment in conjunction with the industry — though the government may have to organize that — but that just keeps the revenue in Canada by shrinking the amount of oil we export.
Trump’s threats have Canada talking about removing barriers that keep goods from flowing east to west within Canada. But breaking down internal trade barriers, primarily regulatory barriers, is tougher than people think. What are those barriers, and why are they so persistent?
There has been a lot of talk now and before, but especially now, on interprovincial barriers to trade. These aren’t like tariffs where if you buy something from Saskatchewan and you’re in Alberta, you have to pay some big tax. These are mostly regulations. And the thing about regulations is it’s kind of hard to tell sometimes which are really important regulations that keep us safe and which ones are designed for feather-bedding for some interest group.
When you dig in, what does it mean to have uniform standards across the country? The thing is that provinces are different. There’s a reason we have different regulations and different provinces. In British Columbia, we have these mountain highways where it really matters if you have snow tires. It really matters if your truck is too long and can’t snake through a mountain pass. In contrast, if you are from Saskatchewan or PEI carting a big load of potatoes, it’s a different set of regulations you need to worry about. Can you clean the truck so the potato worm doesn’t get in or out of a province? That’s a big deal In PEI, but it’s maybe less of a deal in other provinces.
One way to go forward on that is to have a mutual recognition system that if you’re licensed in one province, then other provinces will recognize that. So there’s kind of like a minimum standard that everyone has to meet. And then if a province wants to have special rules for mountain highways or potato bugs, you can do that. The challenge there is defining that minimum standard, which means 10 provincial governments, maybe three territorial governments, and the federal government all sitting around and figuring out what the minimum national standards need to be for tire size and snow chains.
What about external trade diversification? It’s easy to talk about more trade with Europe, South America, or China. It’s harder to do it. Why doesn’t Canada trade more with countries other than the US?
There are a couple of reasons for this. One is that economists have something we call the gravity model of trade, where the geographic distance between countries is a really good predictor of who trades with whom. One aspect of it is transportation costs. Another aspect of it is culture, language, legal similarities, and things like that. Personal ties. It makes it easier to trade when you have kinds of business contacts that are easier to make — when there are cultural, linguistic, and personal ties.
Thinking tangibly, I mean, we are not building a pipeline to Italy for oil, right? We’re building it to Cushing, Oklahoma, where they trade all the oil. That’s a geography constraint. We can ship oil to the coast and put it on the ships, but that gets prohibitively expensive for providing oil to Italians versus wherever they might get it already, so that’s it. The trade costs are going to be a big reason for why our trade is the way it is.
If we want to diversify, I think it’s a good goal. We have an unreliable economic and political partner to the south of us. This is a big deal. This is a hugely important deal. We want to make sure that we decrease our reliance on them. I’m fully on board with that strategy, but we have to be a bit modest in what we think we can get out of that because, at the end of the day, our oil is almost surely going to be going to the US.
Are we so dependent on north-south trade that we just have to find a way to manage this relationship no matter what it might be?
I think that’s the core truth of this. We’re not putting up a big wall at the border and not trading with the US. That would be immiserating for us. What the president says I guess is true: They don’t literally need our oil, our cars, our software, or whatever we might want to trade with them; they can get along without it. But boy, they’d be paying a lot more for it from other sources. We can offer them cheaper stuff they can get elsewhere. At the end of the day, this is about managing what all of this looks like going forward. We have to be extraordinarily wary of signed agreements and giving up stuff for a signature. I’m very wary of that because that signature has shown to be worth zero. This is an amazing choice that the American government is making and giving up all of its international credibility. But even nations at war will trade with each other because there’s just a fundamental economic logic that when something is way cheaper brought in from abroad, that just is better for everyone to allow those trades to happen.
Would a Canada-first industrial strategy be a non-trade measure we could consider?
It definitely could be. You can think about industrial strategy as, say, subsidizing a pipeline. That’s industrial strategy. We’ve had a battery strategy over the past few years for EVs. I’m not quite sure where that sits now, but these are big bets that we could take. I’d be most keen on ones that involve public infrastructure for export. That could be actual tangible infrastructure. It doesn’t necessarily mean pipelines. It might mean improving our ports and things like that. But also intangible infrastructure like our trade missions abroad, like export encouragement for services and electronic services and software and apps and all of those good things that are way easier to trade across borders that don’t really matter as much for geography.
How much, if any, of the Canadian strategy should be waiting Trump out, hoping that Americans feel the pain – like with steel and aluminum tariffs, which are going to be expensive for US consumers — and say, “OK, enough, we need to change this, drop the tariffs”? Or how much of this is about just waiting for someone better the next time around?
You can think of 2016 as an accident. I don’t know that we can think of electing Mr. Trump twice as an accident. I think this is a permanent state of affairs. I think we have to think about it that way. But an important element of your question is: “What strategy should we have?” I think that we should be upfront and ask whether we should do dollar-for-dollar tariffs. For those who support that, we need to ask, what is your strategy of action? What do you expect that to bring us? I don’t think it will bring people what they think. We need to think of strategies that will put pressure on the White House right now. I don’t think that is decreasing Harley-Davidson sales by 1%.
I think there are other measures we should look at. It can be trade measures. There are things that we have that are very rare in the US, that will mess up their production. Aluminum is one of them, and they just self-owned on that. Those are things we should focus on.
We should also be very open to nontariff barriers. What I mean by that is rather than throwing a tariff on US goods, which again could be part of the mix, we could talk about intellectual property reforms. I’ve heard people talk about not allowing US coal to be exported through BC. There are a ton of nontariff measures, regulatory measures, and other things we could do. There could be diplomatic measures. We could expel diplomats. I’ve seen people talk about not allowing the US ambassador to be sworn in. We could shut off electricity to New England for 24 hours.
Maybe some of these would work, and maybe some would not. But being creative and finding things that cause pain to the US is the point, while minimizing pain to us.
An important element of strategy here is to understand we are not in a regular old tit-for-tat trade war. Too many people are thinking of it on that small playing field. This is a much broader thing. Certainly, Mr. Trump thinks about it as a much broader thing, and I’m mystified that so many Canadian pundits — the Canadians themselves, I think, get it — are still thinking, “Oh, what tariffs should we put on them to counter their tariffs?” Tariffs are just a tactic in a broader strategy from Mr. Trump. It should be the same for us.
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: A Quick Take from Munich, Germany, where the Munich Security Conference is just about to kick off. And it is going to be a historic meeting, and not necessarily in a good way.
Everyone I've been speaking to here, deeply concerned about the sudden conversation, 90-minute conversation, with a full readout from, both the Kremlin and from the United States, between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin. Not so much concerned that a conversation took place, rather that it happened, and Trump is engaging unilaterally without coordinating in advance with the Ukrainians or the Europeans. And in that regard, very, very different than what we've seen over the first three years of the war.
Look, there's no question, everyone does want to see the war wind down. Everyone would love to see a ceasefire. The question is, how and what does the NATO alliance look like after that? What does Europe look like in terms of its engagement, its trust with the United States, the transatlantic relationship? And, of course, what happens with Ukraine? The statements that have been made by Trump and by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth are things that we've heard a lot about privately, not just from the Trump administration, from the Europeans, from the Biden administration too, the idea that NATO membership is not in the cards, long-term, if there's going to be some sort of formal peace agreement, that Ukraine is going to have to give up some kind of territory, not that they should, not that that's reasonable, not they don't have territorial integrity, but there's no way for them to get back all the territory that they had back in 2014. Those are things that have now been said publicly by the Americans. But they are being said both unilaterally and also in advance of any negotiation. In other words, concessions are being made to the Russians before both sides sit down. And that is, of course, a very significant concern, for the Europeans and the Ukrainians.
There is also a question what kind of security guarantees would be provided to Ukraine? According to the United States, certainly will not involve Americans on the ground. No troops. Would be European troops. They're the ones that have to do the bulk of the lifting. They're the ones that have to ensure that there was a response if Ukraine were attacked again, after a ceasefire. Now, it's not that the Americans are suddenly washing their hands of all of this. In fact, the first cabinet official to go to Kiev from the Trump administration, just met with Zelensky in the last 24-hours; that’s Secretary of Treasury Scott Bessent. Why Treasury? Because Trump is trying to get something for giving something. It's transactional, as he always is. And in this case, focusing on critical minerals from Ukraine. Nominally, the number is some $500 billion of what would be Ukrainian resources to the United States in return for ongoing, US military support for Ukraine.
Outgoing German Chancellor Olaf Scholz said, “This is selfish, the Americans shouldn't be doing this.” The Ukrainian president, who actually has to work with the Americans going forward, unlike Scholz, saying, “What a great offer. Happy to talk to you. Want to find a way to make this work?” So, on the one hand, it's not as if the United States is leaving Ukraine high and dry. And certainly, a level of engagement between the Americans and the Russians is very important. It’s essential going forward. But of course, what Putin wants is a deal not only to his favor, but not just about Ukraine. He wants to be talking just to the Americans, and he wants to be talking to them about missile defense, about NATO enlargement, about a whole range of issues that he has, that he takes issue with. And that's something that Trump is perfectly interested in.
At the end of the day, Trump is a lot more interested in cutting a deal for himself that allows the Americans to focus a lot more on China and on Asia, from a security perspective, than working with the Europeans to try to do something collectively on Ukraine. And this is the biggest challenge and also the biggest difference between Trump and Biden, in terms of foreign policy. Biden fundamentally believe that a strong Europe, coordinated with the United States, was long-term in American interests. President Trump does not. He believes that a strong Europe is a bad thing. He wants to see more exits, like Brexit, from other countries. He supports Euro-skeptic movements across Europe. He would much rather have individual negotiations with individual European countries where the Americans are stronger.
What does that mean for the Munich Security Conference? What does it mean for NATO? What does it mean for the transatlantic relationship? Long-term, nothing good. Final point here, the Europeans are taking this seriously, but it's late. They've been told, by Americans for several administrations now, they need to be spending more time and more money on their own defense, their own collective security. Macron has talked about it a fair amount in France. The Polish government is certainly taking the lead on that, especially after the Russians invade Ukraine. But most European governments aren't taking it nearly as seriously and aren't prepared to spend the money. And that reality, for decades now, made much more stark and severe with the Russian invasion in 2014 of Ukraine, which the Europeans did virtually nothing about, and now, when 2022, you've got Trump coming in and saying, “I'm not going to do this,” that's forcing the Europeans in a much more stark way, but also much too late for them to get their act together, in my view.
So, we'll see what we see over the next couple of days, but this is going to be a very, again, historic Munich Security Conference. Glad to be here, and we'll talk to you soon.
Germany’s Friedrich Merz in front of poker table.
Italy’s Fratelli d’Italia, Poland’s Law and Justice, and Germany’s Alternative for Germany (AfD) parties have so far remained outside the bloc, but the European Conservatives and Reformists group, which includes Italy’s Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, published a letter last month warning Europe’s center-right establishment to work more closely with the Patriots to obstruct left-wing migration, green, and other “woke” policies. Part of the goal, argued the letter’s authors, is to build durable new ties with US President Donald Trump.
This is the backdrop for a clever political maneuver from Friedrich Merz, leader of the traditional center-right Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and the prohibitive favorite to become Germany’s next chancellor following a general election on Feb. 23. Merz has wrestled for weeks with the question of how to peel voter support away from the anti-immigrant AfD — without appearing to cooperate with a party that many Germans consider openly fascist.
During a late January parliamentary vote on toughening Germany’s asylum and refugee policy, Merz’s CDU accepted support from the AfD for a tougher border approach without publicly seeking it. For the first time in the country’s postwar history, a non-binding motion passed the Bundestag with the help of the far right, shattering a decades-old taboo. In response, the AfD’s many critics among political officials, the media, and the public turned the rhetoric up to 11. Merz stood accused of tearing down the political firewall that separates Germany’s center right from the far right and throwing open the “gates of Hell.” Protests, some of them violent, erupted across the country. The measure was narrowly defeated.
Then came the political jiu-jitsu from Merz. The political veteran refused to apologize. He argued that he had not sought support from the AfD and that the political firewall that continues to leave the nativist party in the isolation ward remains fully intact, vowing to never form a coalition with it. But, argued Merz, the new immigration restrictions were the correct policy for Germany. They remain the right policy, even when supported by the wrong people.
Next came a polling surprise. Not only did this dust-up fail to damage Merz’s pre-election popularity ratings, but the display of political backbone strengthened his party’s position in pre-election polling. We shouldn’t be surprised. Merz is widely viewed as a capable technocrat but not an exciting politician. His move on migrant policy, and the willingness to take hits for perceived cooperation with the AfD, is seen as a major political gamble on the eve of an election he’s already favored to win.
By both defying political consensus and then reaffirming that direct cooperation with the AfD remains out of bounds, Merz has presented himself as a more forceful leader than current Chancellor Olaf Scholz. By breaking the taboo on tougher migration and asylum rules, he has also boosted the credibility of political arguments that equivocation on these policies by Scholz and his government has done more to boost the AfD than Merz’s party has done or will do.
Migration has been the primary fuel for the AfD’s surge over the past decade as the number of asylum-seekers has overwhelmed a German system designed for much smaller numbers of people. The CDU/CSU can now feel vindicated in their migration policy strategy and can open more space for tougher policies backed by centrist parties, robbing the AfD of its go-to campaign topic. In fact, it was Christian Lindner — leader of the pro-business Free Democrats and the man whose dismissal as finance minister in November collapsed Scholz’s coalition government — who made the argument most forcefully: “Democracy must deliver so that people don’t look for an alternative to democracy.”
If the CDU/CSU wins on Feb. 23 and Merz becomes the next chancellor, highly likely outcomes, he may have scored a political win that other center-right parties in Europe have consistently missed. In France and Britain, traditional conservatives have taken a migration beating. Following last July’s second-round parliamentary elections in France, Le Pen’s populist-nationalist National Rally won more than 37% of votes to just 5.4% for the traditional center-right Les Republicans. In the UK, the Conservative Party, which held power for 14 years before losing to Labour late last year, finished third place (!) in a poll published last week. Nigel Farage’s UK Reform Party, the most hardline anti-immigration choice on offer, has pushed past Labour to take the lead, though within the poll’s margin of error.
Has Merz changed the political rules on how Europe’s center-right handles the always emotive topic of immigration? Time will tell. If so, Merz’s bold political gamble might be remembered as a game-changer well beyond Germany.
Musk and Trump announce new executive order to reduce federal workforce
Elon Musk carries X Æ A-12 as President Donald Trump speaks in the Oval Office of the White House in Washington, D.C., on Feb. 11, 2025.
Donald Trump signed an executive order on Tuesday mandating federal agencies comply with Elon Musk’s Department of Government Efficiency, or DOGE, to slash their workforces – ordering agency heads to hire no more than one employee for every four who leave or are fired. The order does not apply to public safety, immigration, or law enforcement personnel.
The order was announced in a press conference between Trump and Musk on Tuesday night, where the world’s richest man faced questions about DOGE’s transparency and his own conflicts of interest. Musk rejected both accusations and claimed without evidence that he had uncovered billions of dollars of waste and fraud during his audit. At a minimum, eliminating 25% of federal employees would cut the federal budget by about 1%.
When it came to the judicial branch – which has stalled Trump’s “deferred resignation plan” and limited DOGE’s access to some of the government’s payment systems – Trump criticized the rulings but said that he would “always abide by the courts” though he is likely to appeal their findings up to the Supreme Court if they don’t go his way.