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Russia/Ukraine
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: A Quick Take from the Munich Security Conference. Just finished with the opening speech for Vice President JD Vance. Before that, Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission. Literally standing room only across the conference. I can't remember the last time it was so busy. And so busy because so many people believe that the NATO and the transatlantic alliance are at a crossroads, are facing a time of crisis.
First, the good news. The recognition on the part of the Europeans that action on their part is urgent is pretty consistent across the board. That a 2% spend on defense is not enough, that they have to take much more of a leadership role on Ukraine. That they have to be much more competitive in terms of growth. That indeed many of the criticisms that are being levied on the Europeans by Trump, as well as by Democrats and Republicans in the United States are things they have not taken adequately seriously, and now they do.
I think the level of urgency, the recognition of crisis is true across the board. The willingness to take action is a different story. We will see that over the course of the coming months, but there's no question it is significant.
Go beyond that to what JD Vance had to say. This speech did not include a mention of Russia and Ukraine. This is a speech to the Munich Security Conference to mention separately of elections in Romania overturned by their constitutional court, politicized questions about that to be sure. But not a speech that resonated or landed well for the Europeans in the audience. They were getting a lecture on freedom of speech and democracy from the United States. They were not getting a sense of how strong and secure the alliance needed to be.
JD Vance was talking about democracy for as opposed to protecting from. The Security Conference is of course much more about protecting from. It's about what kind of external threats exist to NATO, which is the reason it exists. And to the extent that Europeans are concerned about the future of NATO, a lot of it is coming from inside the house, a European sense that the Americans are not committed to them anymore. In fact, Defense Minister of Germany, Pistorius actually yelled out during JD Vance's speech, "This is unacceptable." I've never seen anything like that from a European leader during a major US plenary here at the Munich Security Conference before coming here for about 15 years. So that was quite surprising.
Having said all of that, when the vice president met with the German federal president earlier in the day, he was much more willing to talk constructively about working together on Ukraine, especially in terms of having the Ukrainians at the table, including the Europeans. How essential it'd be for everybody to work together to ensure that the Ukrainians can be reconstructed. That they'll have security guarantees and defense.
So to a degree, what we are seeing is a speech for Vance's domestic audience in the United States, as well as some of the anti-EU Euro-skeptic populace in Europe, including the AfD, the Alternative for Deutschland, who, of course, their support is going to the polls in a couple of weeks just like the rest of this country, Germany. But still, the level of tension here is extremely high. The level of trust has been reduced. And pretty much everyone I've talked to in this conference believes that the Russians today are in a considerably stronger position than they were in 48 hours ago. The Chinese are in a stronger position than they were in 48 hours ago. And that's something pretty much nobody in this conference wants to say, wants to hear. That's it for me. I'll talk to you all real soon.
“We cannot afford to be reactive,” said Alina Polyakova, President and CEO of the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), responding to the news of President Trump’s recent call with Vladimir Putin.
Trump’s conversation with Putin, which reportedly included discussions on reducing US commitments to NATO, has sent shockwaves through European security circles. Meanwhile, US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth’s recent remarks suggesting that Europe must take more responsibility for its defense have further fueled uncertainty among US allies.
Polyakova cautioned that authoritarian regimes are watching closely, using AI-driven disinformation and cyber warfare to exploit divisions. “The transatlantic alliance is at a crossroads,” she warned. “This is a moment where democracies must assert their leadership, not retreat.”
With European elections looming and global security tensions rising, the debate over the US commitment to its allies will remain a central issue in Munich in 2025—and one that will shape the future of Western security.
This interview, conducted by Tony Maciulis, is part of the Global Stage series at the 2025 Munich Security Conference, presented by GZERO in partnership with Microsoft.
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Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: A Quick Take from Munich, Germany, where the Munich Security Conference is just about to kick off. And it is going to be a historic meeting, and not necessarily in a good way.
Everyone I've been speaking to here, deeply concerned about the sudden conversation, 90-minute conversation, with a full readout from, both the Kremlin and from the United States, between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin. Not so much concerned that a conversation took place, rather that it happened, and Trump is engaging unilaterally without coordinating in advance with the Ukrainians or the Europeans. And in that regard, very, very different than what we've seen over the first three years of the war.
Look, there's no question, everyone does want to see the war wind down. Everyone would love to see a ceasefire. The question is, how and what does the NATO alliance look like after that? What does Europe look like in terms of its engagement, its trust with the United States, the transatlantic relationship? And, of course, what happens with Ukraine? The statements that have been made by Trump and by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth are things that we've heard a lot about privately, not just from the Trump administration, from the Europeans, from the Biden administration too, the idea that NATO membership is not in the cards, long-term, if there's going to be some sort of formal peace agreement, that Ukraine is going to have to give up some kind of territory, not that they should, not that that's reasonable, not they don't have territorial integrity, but there's no way for them to get back all the territory that they had back in 2014. Those are things that have now been said publicly by the Americans. But they are being said both unilaterally and also in advance of any negotiation. In other words, concessions are being made to the Russians before both sides sit down. And that is, of course, a very significant concern, for the Europeans and the Ukrainians.
There is also a question what kind of security guarantees would be provided to Ukraine? According to the United States, certainly will not involve Americans on the ground. No troops. Would be European troops. They're the ones that have to do the bulk of the lifting. They're the ones that have to ensure that there was a response if Ukraine were attacked again, after a ceasefire. Now, it's not that the Americans are suddenly washing their hands of all of this. In fact, the first cabinet official to go to Kiev from the Trump administration, just met with Zelensky in the last 24-hours; that’s Secretary of Treasury Scott Bessent. Why Treasury? Because Trump is trying to get something for giving something. It's transactional, as he always is. And in this case, focusing on critical minerals from Ukraine. Nominally, the number is some $500 billion of what would be Ukrainian resources to the United States in return for ongoing, US military support for Ukraine.
Outgoing German Chancellor Olaf Scholz said, “This is selfish, the Americans shouldn't be doing this.” The Ukrainian president, who actually has to work with the Americans going forward, unlike Scholz, saying, “What a great offer. Happy to talk to you. Want to find a way to make this work?” So, on the one hand, it's not as if the United States is leaving Ukraine high and dry. And certainly, a level of engagement between the Americans and the Russians is very important. It’s essential going forward. But of course, what Putin wants is a deal not only to his favor, but not just about Ukraine. He wants to be talking just to the Americans, and he wants to be talking to them about missile defense, about NATO enlargement, about a whole range of issues that he has, that he takes issue with. And that's something that Trump is perfectly interested in.
At the end of the day, Trump is a lot more interested in cutting a deal for himself that allows the Americans to focus a lot more on China and on Asia, from a security perspective, than working with the Europeans to try to do something collectively on Ukraine. And this is the biggest challenge and also the biggest difference between Trump and Biden, in terms of foreign policy. Biden fundamentally believe that a strong Europe, coordinated with the United States, was long-term in American interests. President Trump does not. He believes that a strong Europe is a bad thing. He wants to see more exits, like Brexit, from other countries. He supports Euro-skeptic movements across Europe. He would much rather have individual negotiations with individual European countries where the Americans are stronger.
What does that mean for the Munich Security Conference? What does it mean for NATO? What does it mean for the transatlantic relationship? Long-term, nothing good. Final point here, the Europeans are taking this seriously, but it's late. They've been told, by Americans for several administrations now, they need to be spending more time and more money on their own defense, their own collective security. Macron has talked about it a fair amount in France. The Polish government is certainly taking the lead on that, especially after the Russians invade Ukraine. But most European governments aren't taking it nearly as seriously and aren't prepared to spend the money. And that reality, for decades now, made much more stark and severe with the Russian invasion in 2014 of Ukraine, which the Europeans did virtually nothing about, and now, when 2022, you've got Trump coming in and saying, “I'm not going to do this,” that's forcing the Europeans in a much more stark way, but also much too late for them to get their act together, in my view.
So, we'll see what we see over the next couple of days, but this is going to be a very, again, historic Munich Security Conference. Glad to be here, and we'll talk to you soon.
Russian Yars intercontinental ballistic missile launcher takes part in the Victory Day military parade general rehearsal on the Red Square in Moscow, Russia, on May 5, 2024.
2,460,000,000,000: In 2024, global defense spending rose to a new height of $2.46 trillion, according to the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies think tank. Worth noting: The Kremlin outpaced all other European countries combined. Russia’s military expenditure equated $461.6 billion in purchase parity terms, eclipsing Europe’s $457 billion.
124: 2024 was the deadliest year for journalists on record since the Committee to Protect Journalists started tracking more than 30 years ago. At least 124 media workers were killed last year — nearly two-thirds of them in Gaza. The next deadliest nations were Sudan and Pakistan, with six deaths each.
20: At least 20 people, including children, were injured in Munich on Thursday when a driver plowed into a trade union demonstration. The driver was detained at the scene, and another man in the car, a Mini Cooper, was reportedly shot by police. The attack puts the German city on alert just a day before it's set to hold the 61st edition of the Munich Security Conference featuring world leaders. Some of those involved were critically injured, officials said.
200,000: A deeply unserious campaign for Denmark to purchase California from the United States gained significant traction online this week, following President Donald Trump’s repeated calls to purchase Greenland, an autonomous Danish territory. So far, more than 200,000 people have signed the virtual petition to “Måke Califørnia Great Ægain.”
14: Nearly 14 years after an earthquake and tsunami led to a triple meltdown at the Fukushima power plant, the Japanese government is considering an about-face on its plans to limit reliance on nuclear power. A draft strategic energy plan from the trade and industry ministry calls for a “maximization” of nuclear power to help reach its emissions and energy security targets. The plan calls for around 20% to stem from nuclear reactors by 2040, 40-50% from renewables, and 30-40% from coal (down from 70% at present).
Russian President Vladimir Putin meets with Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin at the Kremlin in Moscow, Russia, on Feb. 7, 2025.
Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump had a “lengthy and highly productive phone call” on Wednesday, during which they discussed ending the Ukraine War. The hour-and-a-half-long call came the same day that Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth told a gathering of allies at NATO headquarters that “the United States does not believe that NATO membership for Ukraine is a realistic outcome of a negotiated settlement.” He also said it was “unrealistic” to return Ukraine’s borders to where they were before Russia’s invasion in 2014.
The Kremlin-White House call marked the end to Washington’s three-year-long effort to isolate Russia and Putin, signaling that ceasefire discussions could be coming soon. After the call, Trump said that he planned to tell Volodymyr Zelensky to “start negotiations immediately.”
It also raised concern that Ukraine could be entering negotiations under pressure from its biggest military backer. But Hegseth said Thursday in Brussels that there “is no betrayal there” of Kyiv.
To increase his leverage, Zelensky has offered to trade Ukraine’s critical minerals in exchange for continued US support, an offer that Trump has smiled upon, but not clarified whether it would be in exchange for future or past aid. The Ukrainian leader has also made the domestically controversial decision to begin recruiting men aged 18-24 through hefty bonuses to the tune of $48,000 over a year – a sum that would take 10 years for most to earn in Ukraine. This is an attempt to make up for Ukraine’s manpower deficit and to appease Trump, who has criticized the country for keeping the conscription age at 25.Russian President Vladimir Putin speaks during a visit to the Lomonosov Moscow State University, in Moscow, Russia, on Jan. 24, 2025.
According to theFinancial Times, Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin presented a report last April to several dozen senior government officials and the heads of some of Russia’s largest state-owned companies that suggests the Kremlin hopes to create a “macro region” with Moscow as its center. This bloc would become a financial, trade, and transport network and political sphere of influence that includes much of the territory of the former Soviet Union.
Russian leadership of this bloc would allow the Kremlin to promote a common worldview among members and to set rules, standards, and sanction policies of its own. The establishment of this new bloc, which would be financed largely through trade in raw materials with the global south, would allow Russia to act as a global power on par with the United States, China, and the EU.
The report acknowledges that Western sanctions have limited Russia’s ability to realize this vision and that Moscow must look beyond the war in Ukraine to play a “long game.” It does not consider the possibility that the unwillingness of Russia’s neighbors to return to their former roles as Russian satellites might prove a greater obstacle to Russia’s renewal than Western sanctions have. Nor does it make clear how Russia intends to establish itself as an international peer to countries with far larger and more dynamic economies.