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Russia/Ukraine
Also on Tuesday, Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky said he and France’s President Emmanuel Macron have continued to discuss the possibility thatWestern troops might be deployed to Ukraine to protect any peace deal his government might sign with Russia – though Zelensky tied this possibility with a request for more clarity on when Ukraine can join the European Union and NATO. This announcement came just before Zelensky welcomed German Defense Minister Oscar Pistorius for an official visit to Kyiv.
For now, the war grinds on. A Ukrainian security official said Tuesday that Ukrainian drones had carried outsuccessful overnight attacks on energy and military sites in central Russia. Russian officials say these attacks will “not go unanswered.”
Ukraine’s Air Defense Forces claimed it had shot down 58 Russian drones overnight, including near Kyiv.
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: a Quick Take to kick off your week.
Let's talk about Greenland. First time I ever encountered it was when I was playing Risk in school, and it was this big island between North America and Europe that connected you with Iceland. But it was part of North America, at least on the Risk map, and that's how you got your five armies if you owned the whole thing. So you always threw a couple up there, a lot of big, big territory. And now we're visiting, and Donald Trump Jr. taking Air Trump One last week and landing in Nuuk, the capital of Greenland. Landed for a few hours, did some social media stuff, and then got back to Mar-a-Lago, where he's probably more comfortable. What's happening? Why do the Americans say that they are going to buy it, incoming President Trump, and what does it mean for American alliances and the future of the global order and all of that?
Well, first, let's recognize that as much as it sounds crazy, Trump is not the first president to offer to buy Greenland. He's actually the third. The first was Andrew Johnson. His Secretary of State, William Seward, who was down for Alaska, also offered 5.5 million to buy Greenland. This was back in 1868. The timing is interesting, of course. There's no historic claim on Greenland. The US troops did briefly occupy it in World War II for defensive purposes, but it's not as if the United States has any reason to believe that this should be American. It's not like, say, what the Russians say about Crimea.
And the Greenlandic government, which is itself, it represents all of 55,000 people, despite the size, is led by a separatist political party. They want independence. Independence is popular in Greenland. They've had a few polls, and people generally say that they'd like to be Greenlanders and not part of Denmark. And they are clearly leveraging all of this spotlight from Trump to advance having an independence referendum during parliamentary elections coming up real soon, like in April. And frankly, given that Denmark is a tiny country and spends about $500 million a year on Greenland, that if the Americans came over the top and said, "Well, we'd make you an ally. We'd put troops on the ground and we'd pay you more, not taking it over, Greenland would be an independent state." I think it would be much more likely that Greenland would actually vote for independence. And then, Trump would say, "We've got a new ally, and we've got everything we wanted. And we have these basing rights for the Arctic," and all of that.
It's pretty significant in terms of talking about the Nordics. Denmark has had Greenland as part of its territory since 1830. And Greenland is autonomous, they have their own parliament, which means they are right now in charge of their own domestic affairs, but not foreign or security affairs. So in that regard, also much like Crimea under Ukraine. But they have moved more towards an independence movement over the past decades. In part, self-determination is what people generally are aiming for around the world, with better understanding of others, post-colonial, being able to achieve it for themselves. Also, because there's a difficult history with Denmark. A lot of forced integration, taking Greenlanders from their homes, from their families, to put them in Danish schools and make them more Danish. Even forced birth control to reduce the Greenland explosion of population. Those things are not happening now, but that is a history that was exploitative and makes a lot of Greenlanders feel about the Danes the way that a lot of Native Americans feel about the United States. So, it's understandable why there would be an independence movement.
Now, the Danes, in addition to all the European leaders, are squashing any idea that Greenland is for sale, but that is very different from Greenland might well go independent. And there's no question that Greenland is important, particularly in terms of national security. Russia has put billions of dollars into Arctic infrastructure, including its Northern Fleet, and they're the only country in the world that's really actively trying to seize the Arctic's economic and strategic potential. That's going to become much more important as the ice cap melts, with transit routes, with exploitation of resources. The United States did have some troops on the ground, a meaningful number, in Greenland, something like 10,000. It's now down to 200. They've reduced that. They could certainly expand it with a new relationship with an independent Greenland.
Of course, they could also expand it with a new relationship with Denmark, of which Greenland is a part, Trump not all that interested in that because it doesn't make spectacular headlines, and also because he likes real estate. Let's face it, you look at him personally, and he loves putting his names on pieces of property that are iconic and that have a large visual footprint in the minds of people. And historically, he almost lost his economic empire a few times by holding on to iconic real estate for too long. So is that a factor in how Trump thinks about Greenland? You'd have to imagine it plays a role. So I think we are going to be talking about this actually a lot more over the coming months, and it's going to have a lot more to do with what 55,000 Greenlanders decide to vote for. And then how the Americans negotiate with them.
President-elect Donald Trump promised on the campaign trail to end the war in Ukraine “on Day One” of his administration. His supporters have long argued Trump should be taken seriously but not literally, and his team has since rolled back that expectation and insists on a 100-day ceasefire timeline instead.
That goal is still plenty ambitious, and the incoming president is already laying the groundwork for a halt to fighting. Trump will likely speak directly with Russian President Vladimir Putin in the coming days, and he’s already beginning to detail what he’ll ask of Ukraine.
In April 2024, Ukraine, under Biden administration pressure, lowered its conscription age from 27 to 25 to bring more soldiers to the frontlines. Incoming National Security Advisor Mike Waltz told ABC News on Sunday, that Trump wants the age lowered to 18. “If Ukrainians have asked the whole world to be all in for democracy, we need them to be all in for democracy,” said Waltz.
Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky has resisted pressure from Washington by insisting that if his country is to remain economically viable, it can’t sacrifice so many of its young men. He also warns there aren’t enough weapons for the Ukrainian troops already in the field.
Which comes first: the soldiers or the weapons? This debate will continue once Trump is inaugurated next Monday, but Zelensky knows that the new US president will have the leverage to get most of what he wants.
In a wide-ranging conversation on GZERO World with Ian Bremmer, Francis Fukuyama warns that the United States is losing its ability to lead globally as political polarization and a lack of bipartisan consensus undermine its long-term influence. He argues that America’s retreat from the liberal world order it once championed creates a dangerous power vacuum, inviting instability and the resurgence of the law of the jungle in international relations.
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Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced Saturday that his troops had captured two North Korean soldiers in the Kursk region and released a video of them describing their experience fighting for Russia. Zelensky said, “This was not an easy task: Russian forces and other North Korean military personnel usually execute their wounded to erase any evidence of North Korea’s involvement in the war against Ukraine.”
The two soldiers are now receiving medical attention in Kyiv. Video of interviews with them shows one with a facial wound and one with a broken leg. One claimed he had believed his unit was going to Russia for training, not to fight Ukrainians, and showed that he had been issued false Russian documents.
Ukrainian forces fighting the North Koreans have described them as highly motivated and professional, but their outdated tactics and habit of committing suicide to avoid capture have led to high casualties. A North Korean diary published by Ukraine’s military described using soldiers as bait to draw in drones that other troops could then shoot down, a risky tactic that, if used widely, has likely contributed to between 1,000 and 4,000 casualties out of the roughly 12,000 who were originally deployed.
That attrition rate is simply not sustainable, and though Pyongyang has over 1.2 million military men, there are few highly indoctrinated and capable special forces. That might not be a big issue if incoming US President Donald Trump ends the war promptly as he has promised, but we’re watching for signs of impatience from Pyongyang.The rise of a leaderless world: Why 2025 marks a turning point, with Francis Fukuyama
Listen: On the GZERO World Podcast, we’re taking a look at some of the top geopolitical risks of 2025. This looks to be the year that the G-Zero wins. As longtime listeners will know, a G-Zero world is an era when no one power or group of powers is both willing and able to drive a global agenda and maintain international order. We’ve been living with this lack of international leadership for nearly a decade now. But in 2025, the problem will get a lot worse. We are heading back to the law of the jungle. A world where the strongest do what they can while the weakest are condemned to suffer what they must. And the former—whether states, companies, or individuals—can't be trusted to act in the interest of those they have power over. It's not a sustainable trajectory. But it’s the one we’re on. Joining Ian Bremmer to peer into this cloudy crystal ball is renowned Stanford political scientist Francis Fukuyama.
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An aging, visibly infirm president is about to hand off power to an authoritarian-minded successor with a mandate to restore “order” and “sovereignty.”
Sound familiar? Da. It’s New Year’s Eve 1999, and a bloated, barely intelligible Boris Yeltsin is handing the Kremlin over to a shifty young spook named Vladimir Putin. “Take care of Russia,” he famously said before staggering out of the room.
When Vladimir Vladimirovich first took power 25 years ago, the world was a different place. Cell phones weren’t smart yet. Lou Bega was burning up the charts with “Mambo Number Five.” The most feared hacking group in the world wasn’t called “Fancy Bear” or “Salt Typhoon” but “Napster.”
It was also a world in which the US was at the pinnacle of its post-Cold War triumphalism. The disputed elections, disastrous wars, and crippling financial crises of the 21st century were still – just barely – in the future.
History had ended, or at least been paused. Uncle Sam had won the Cold War. Free markets, free trade, and liberal democracy were on the march globally, gloriously, and inevitably. So too, it seemed, was NATO, which began expanding eastward in the 1990s.
Putin did not like this world. From his perspective it was a world that treated Russia either as an afterthought or as a charity case. He resented the high-handed moralizing from the West about “democracy.” He dreamed of a “multipolar” world where the US couldn’t boss Russia around or humiliate the Kremlin and its friends.
Now, five US presidents, three Russian invasions, and countless predictions of his demise later, Putin is still standing. And as a result, he has lasted long enough to witness the return of Donald Trump to the White House – this time not with an asterisk but with a mandate.
In a way, Trump’s return means Putin has finally won. Not because of the silly notion that Trump is a “Russian agent” – but because it closes the door, finally and fully, on the post-Cold War era that Putin confronted when he first came to power.
Trumpism is, at its core, a rebuke to all the pieties of that era: that globalism would trump nationalism, that free trade and open societies had an inherent appeal, and that there were international “norms” that the US was responsible for policing.
Trump, whether you like him or not, isn’t interested in a high-handed foreign policy based on abstract “values.” He doesn’t care whether Russia is a democracy or an empire. He questions the net benefit of decades-old US alliances like NATO. He has already blown apart what Robert Lighthizer, his first-term trade czar, calls the “free trade theology” that held sway in Washington for decades.
His worldview is a zero-sum, mercantilist, hyper-nationalistic one. Putin, in many ways, can relate. When Trump talks about using force to take over the Panama Canal, Greenland, or Canada because these things would be in America’s national interest as a hemispheric power, for example, he is speaking a political language from before the “end of history.” This is a language Putin speaks fluently. Panama isn’t quite Crimea, but you get the idea.
At his annual marathon press conference a few weeks ago, Putin reflected on the past quarter century, telling BBC’s journalist Steve Rosenberg that he was proud to have “pulled Russia back from the abyss,” after inheriting a deeply indebted, politically fragmented, and listless country from Yeltsin.
Perhaps that’s true, but Russia today is a country locked in a costly conflict of Putin’s choosing, with a shrinking and aging population, a war-warped economy, and a flagging technological base. Shorn of its traditional partners in Europe, Moscow is increasingly dependent either on rogue pariahs like North Korea and Iran, or a superpower China that dwarfs Russia in economic and military capacity.
Over the past 25 years, Putin outlasted the “post-Cold War” world that he resented. But it’s less obvious that he has “taken care of Russia” well enough for it to thrive and prosper over the next quarter century of whatever comes next.