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The volunteer US military & America's shame post-Afghanistan
For Elliot Ackerman, leaving no man behind was part of his code of honor when he was first a US marine and later a CIA officer. But the US military principle was not followed when American troops departed Afghanistan a year ago.
"There was no process to get our allies out," he tells Ian Bremmer on GZERO World.
Ackerman laments how US forces were forced to turn their back on Afghans they'd cultivated personal relationships with for 20 years — when they most needed help.
He also shares his thoughts on whether an all-volunteer military is what America needs amid deeply dysfunctional domestic politics.
Watch the GZERO World episode: The fallout from US Afghanistan withdrawal: a Marine's perspective
Geopolitical fallout over US exit from Afghanistan less than feared
When the US completed its withdrawal from Afghanistan on Aug. 30, 2021, it put an end to a 20-year conflict that had claimed tens of thousands of lives.
But the messy scenes of departure — including a suicide bombing that killed 13 American troops and 170 others — heightened fears that it would allow Afghanistan to become a haven once again for international terrorists and undermine US security partnerships with other countries.
On the first anniversary of the pullout, we asked Eurasia Group senior analyst Ali Wyne what the consequences have been for Afghanistan and the rest of the world.
Have the Taliban shown themselves able to govern and bring stability?
Many Afghans welcomed the end of the 20-year war between the US and the Taliban and the relative stability that followed. But new challenges have arisen over the past year, for it is much easier to rebel than to govern.
The Taliban had a simple raison d’être for two decades: to expel US-led forces from Afghanistan. Now, however, it is tasked with securing diplomatic recognition, cultivating unofficial diplomatic ties with wary governments, and unlocking billions in central bank reserves, to name but a few objectives. It must also contain ISIS-K, the Islamic State’s Afghanistan-based branch, which bitterly opposes the Taliban. Many Afghans who possess the kind of bureaucratic know-how that will be essential to managing these challenges have either fled or been marginalized during the past year.
There are also divisions within the Taliban, as there are in any other government. Some officials fear, for example, that the adoption of draconian policies on education for girls and workforce participation for women will make it harder for Afghanistan to secure the foreign aid that it urgently needs. For now, though, Taliban leader Hibatullah Akhundzada and other ideological hardliners within the organization have the upper hand.
Can economic hardship and the rollback in human rights undermine stability?
With the Taliban’s resumption of power, Afghanistan experienced an abrupt cutoff of over $8 billion in annual international aid, equivalent to about 40% of GDP. Exacerbating that shock is an ongoing drought as well as economic headwinds resulting from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
The humanitarian situation is dire, with the UN World Food Program estimating that roughly half of the Afghan population is experiencing food insecurity and that a staggering 95% do not have enough to eat. Severe malnutrition, in turn, has increased Afghans’ susceptibility to many diseases and strained an already overwhelmed healthcare system. Many humanitarian and human rights organizations are accordingly urging a relaxation of international sanctions on the Taliban.
Meanwhile, the Taliban’s restrictions on women who seek to participate in the workforce will not only compound Afghanistan’s short-term economic difficulties; they will also limit the country’s medium- to long-run growth potential. One watchpoint worth monitoring is whether ISIS-K attempts to boost its ranks with Afghans who are disillusioned by Taliban rule.
Does the US strike against Ayman al-Zawahiri signal Afghanistan is again becoming a haven for international terrorists?
That the Taliban was harboring al-Qaida’s leader belies its pledge to prevent Afghanistan from reemerging as a safe haven for terrorism. A UN report published shortly before the strike warned that the two organizations have a “close relationship” and concluded that al-Qaida has “increased freedom of action” in Afghanistan under Taliban rule.
US Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Colin Kahl testified late last year that ISIS-K might be able to attack the US homeland within six to 12 months and that al-Qaida might be able to do so within one to two years. Confronting a grinding Russia-Ukraine war as well as escalating tensions in the Taiwan Strait, the US has a strong incentive to ensure that they do not develop this capability.
Does the strike’s success suggest the US can contain the terrorism risk without a presence in the country?
The US’s ability to gather intelligence and conduct remote military operations has improved significantly over the past two decades. Even as the strike highlights the continued Taliban-al-Qaida nexus, it spotlights this ability as well. Barring another large-scale terrorist attack on the US that is conclusively attributed to organizations operating inside Afghanistan, though, it is highly unlikely that the US would deploy even a small contingent of troops to the country. The real question, then, is not whether the US can contain the terrorism risk in Afghanistan without boots on the ground, but how best it can contain that risk without them.
Has the US withdrawal affected perceptions about its reliability as a security partner?
The impact appears to have been smaller than many observers had feared at the time of the US withdrawal. The Biden administration has mobilized the West against Russian aggression, and both NATO and the EU are newly invigorated; the former is poised to admit two new members, Finland and Sweden, and the latter has granted membership candidate status to Moldova and Ukraine. Similarly, in managing a resurgent China, the US has successfully bolstered existing groupings such as the Quad and launched new partnerships and initiatives (for example, Partners in the Blue Pacific and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework).
Even if one believes that the US withdrawal undercut perceptions of US reliability, it is worth remembering that when the US was bogged down in Afghanistan, many of the US’s European and Asian friends questioned whether it was able to engage with them consistently on issues that were of more pressing concern to them than counterterrorism.
The US’s withdrawal affirms not only that military power can only go so far in achieving political outcomes, but also that narrow missions can easily morph into nebulous undertakings. America’s NATO allies criticized it for not consulting with them more closely as it prepared to depart, and some observers feared that the decision would inflict permanent damage on perceptions of US reliability. One year on, though, that anxiety appears overstated.
The fallout from US Afghanistan withdrawal: a Marine's perspective
Almost one year ago, US forces departed Afghanistan after two decades of war. Their enemy was the Taliban, who didn't wait for all American soldiers to leave before taking over the country.
One year later, Afghanistan is in shambles. The country's economy has tanked, food shortages abound and women and girls face new restrictions on their freedoms. Still, most Americans believe President Joe Biden made the right call by ending this "forever war."
On GZERO World, Ian Bremmer speaks to former US marine and CIA officer Elliot Ackerman, whose new book "The Fifth Act," details the chaotic American withdrawal from Afghanistan. Ackerman believes the US military could have done a much better job at leaving the country, not to mention leaving so many Afghan allies behind.
Then, GZERO World speaks to Fawzia Koofi, who served as a member of Afghan Parliament from 2005 until 2021, about the grim new reality for women and girls in her country. A country she had to flee after the Taliban takeover.
The Graphic Truth: Displaced inside Afghanistan
Afghanistan has been mired in war since the Soviet Union invaded the country in the late 1970s. In the post-Soviet era, the vying for influence between different clans and terror groups caused mass migration throughout the landlocked country. This trend continued under the Taliban’s oppressive rule, and the subsequent US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, which saw millions of Afghans caught in the crossfire of war. But it’s not just conflict that has led to the internal displacement of Afghans. In recent decades, natural disasters – many linked to climate change – have pummeled the country, causing hundreds of thousands to flee. We look at the numbers of internally displaced Afghans since 2008.
The Graphic Truth: What Afghan women lost
For years, Afghanistan has ranked as one of the world’s worst places to be a woman. But over the past two decades — with the Taliban out of power and a US-backed government calling the shots — things had started to improve. Literacy rates for girls went up, and women were allowed to pursue higher education and more career opportunities — including serving in parliament. In many parts of the country, they also had greater autonomy to travel independently. But that’s all changed since the Taliban returned to power one year ago amid the US’ chaotic withdrawal. Afghan women and girls, many of whom weren’t alive when the Taliban last ruled, are now watching their hard-fought freedoms disappear.
A fighter is seen at the Taliban flag-raising ceremony in Kabul.
The Taliban’s one-year report card in Afghanistan
A year ago, the Taliban won their war in Afghanistan. On Aug. 15, 2021, as they entered Kabul in a lightning advance that shocked the world, images of a botched US exit permanently scarred America’s legacy in its longest war — a mission US commanders now admit they lost track of years ago.
But where does Afghanistan stand a year after the Taliban took over?
That’s reflected in how the Taliban are doing. Contrary to the hopes of optimists, no “Taliban 2.0” has emerged. The regime hasn’t really reformed, and is as hardline as it was when it ruled the country from 1996 to 2001.
There is no constitution. Religious policing is back with a vengeance. The media is muzzled. And the recent US killing of al-Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in a Kabul enclave that houses senior members of the Haqqani Network — whose boss is the current interior minister — has confirmed the skeptics who thought the Taliban could or would never disassociate from international terrorism.
Financially, things are as bad as they can get. The economy has essentially collapsed under the weight of international isolation, sanctions, and aid cuts. It was so hooked to the war that six months after the American withdrawal, GDP fell by a third. Now, Afghanistan is near universal poverty and starvation.
Women and girls have had it the worst. Millions of them have found themselves out of school, out of jobs, and out of public life altogether. The Taliban’s supreme leader vetoed a government edict to let them back to class in March, a political development that underscores serious schisms within the regime’s conservative and moderate — by Taliban standards — elements.
On Sunday, on the eve of the re-establishment of the “Islamic Emirate,” a few brave women marched in a rare protest in Kabul. They were beaten and scared off by automatic gunfire.
On the one hand, some stability has come. The Taliban takeover did end the war. Overall, violence has abated across Afghanistan, opening up vast swaths of the hinterland to some development and jobs. Moreover, the Taliban seem to have improved upon the taxation system of the previous regime, and even controlled corruption.
On the other, the Taliban are now fighting their own insurgencies. There’s been a recent uptick in clashes between the Taliban and ISIS-K, the even more hardcore Islamists who own the Islamic State franchise in the region. The Taliban’s other internal enemy is the ragtag but determined group of nationalists that form the National Resistance Front. The fighting continues to add to the hundreds of thousands of Afghans who have been internally displaced or been forced to flee their homeland.
“The Taliban have managed to keep major armed challengers to their rule at bay until now, but at the same time have struggled to consolidate politically,” says Asfandyar Mir, a senior expert at the US Institute of Peace in Washington, DC. “There are internal political problems, tenuous ties with the international community, and a range of security threats to the region festering in the country.”
One year into their rule, Mir adds, the Taliban are drifting, “and their troubles continue to mount.”
The regime continues to disappoint not just Afghans, but even its few friends abroad. The fact that no country, not even the Taliban’s most erstwhile ally, has recognized their government underscores this skepticism.
Pakistan, which for the last two decades has burnt many bridges with Washington to protect Taliban leadership and provide safe haven to its fighters, is now being attacked regularly by insurgents associated with Kabul.
Other nations willing to talk to the group, like Uzbekistan and China, have also been left in the lurch. They were promised safer borders, but militants who threaten them and other countries continue to move, organize, arm, and recruit across Afghanistan.
“The Taliban have disappointed different people for different reasons,” says Torek Farhadi, a former Afghan finance ministry and World Bank official based in Geneva.
“They have disappointed all Afghans by preventing their teenage daughters from going to school. They have disappointed the Pakistanis because no pressure was exerted on the Pakistani Taliban. They’ve disappointed the Iranians because they have not been able to hit harder on ISIS and attacks on our Shiite community continue. They’ve disappointed the West because of their human rights record, and they’ve disappointed Islamic countries by shaming the image of Islam.”
So, is there any hope for things to get better? Not much, at least in the near term.
Though they control more of Afghanistan now than the first time they were in charge, it’s unclear whether the Taliban’s inability to deliver locally and internationally is a problem of capacity, will or both. Regardless, it’s left little space for Taliban optimists both home and abroad.
“The Taliban remain deeply wedded to their jihadi precepts, which gives a certain clerical class and the fighters within the movement immense power over decision-making,” assesses Mir. “That makes it exceedingly difficult for [them] to take steps which can help consolidate their rule, work with the international community, and prioritize state-building.”
Still, the regime continues to seek legitimacy. The Taliban’s younger leadership is making moves: putting out feelers for the West and trying to engage democratic partners, like India. Meanwhile, they’re also negotiating to gain access to the billions of dollars in former Afghan government funds that were frozen by Washington last year.
But getting that cash or international recognition will remain unlikely as long as the Taliban continue to adhere to suppress women, attack minorities, and aid terrorism. Unfortunately, it’ll be a tall order for the Taliban to make progress. After all, the group belongs to two limiting and regressive schools: tribalism and jihad.
Change isn’t rewarded, but bellicosity is.
Talks with Taliban won’t legitimize them (US already did that)
Want the Taliban to form a more inclusive Afghan government? Talk to them. Otherwise, don't complain about millions of starving Afghans.
That's the advice of Hina Khar, Pakistan's former foreign minister, to Western nations who say they don't want to "enable" the regime.
Khar told Ian Bremmer in a GZERO World interview at the 2022 Munich Security Conference that dialogue with the Taliban won't legitimize their human rights abuses and oppression of women. The US already did that - by inviting the group to the negotiating table in Doha.
What's more, she said, the Americans have not really exited Afghanistan because they're still holding onto the Afghan government's cash reserves.
Watch the GZERO World episode: As democracy erodes: Pakistan’s Hina Khar on “supremely dangerous” global trends
US has set the stage for Afghanistan’s humanitarian disaster, says Hina Khar
Afghans are starving. Not just because the Taliban are now in charge, according to Pakistan's former top diplomat.
“Of course, people are talking about the starving Afghan people who need our help,” Hina Khar told Ian Bremmer in a GZERO World interview at the 2022 Munich Security Conference. “But that's the white man's burden — not accepting what you did wrong in creating the situation that is starving the Afghans right now.”
Khar questioned whether democracies have propagated international values across the board for all nationalities, and whether the US would have invaded Afghanistan if as many American or European lives had been on the line.
Military interventions like the US-led war in Afghanistan, she added, cast a “deep shadow on the entire democratic value system.”
Watch the GZERO World episode: As democracy erodes: Pakistan’s Hina Khar on “supremely dangerous” global trends