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A permanent Security Council seat for Africa?
Guterres offered few specifics on how Africa should be represented. That appears to be a question for the African Union. For now, the 15-member Security Council consists of five permanent members with veto power – China, France, Russia, the US, and the UK – and 10 nonpermanent seats allocated regionally, including three seats for African states, two for Asia-Pacific, two for Latin America and the Caribbean, two for Western Europe and other states; and one for Eastern Europe.
UNSC permanent members have a veto over votes of the Council. Sierra Leone President Julius Maada Bio told the Council on Monday that Africa should have two permanent seats and added that “Africa wants theveto abolished. However, if UN member states wish to retain the veto, it must be extended to all new permanent members as a matter of justice.”
Guterres said in January that all five current permanent members favored greater African representation, though they will certainly haggle over the details of reform. But for now, the number of voices in favor, at least in principle, continues to grow.FILE PHOTO: Lieutenant General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, deputy head of the military council and head of paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), greets his supporters as he arrives at a meeting in Aprag village, 60 kilometers away from Khartoum, Sudan, June 22, 2019.
Sudan’s warring parties resume peace talks
Six months into the civil war in Sudan – which has killed 9,000 people and displaced over 5 million – the armed forces and their paramilitary enemies in the Rapid Support Forces have resumed peace talks in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
Representatives from the United States, Saudi Arabia, and the African Union’s Intergovernmental Authority on Development are moderating the talks, and they set modest expectations. “The talks will not address broader political issues,” according to the US State Department, and instead are focused on setting up cease-fires, humanitarian corridors, and confidence-building measures that will eventually lead to “permanent cessation of hostilities.”
Neither side seems prepared to make concessions that would end the war, but a temporary pause in the fighting likely serves both of their military interests. Six months of war has taken a toll on their armies without scoring a decisive blow, and the conflict may now shift to lower intensity. Their interest in a pause has more to do with rearming and reorganizing for another push than bringing relief and organizing a permanent peace.
Eurasia Group Africa analyst Connor Vasey says that while a temporary arrangement may emerge from Jeddah, the war will drag on. “So far, there is limited – if any – reason to believe that either side has hit a wall in terms of fighting spirit,” he says. “Inasmuch as some frontlines may be solidifying and forcing the two ‘big men’ to rethink their aspirations in the conflict, both will see continued fighting as a way to gain leverage in any mediated talks.”
Africa's economy could rival China or India, says WTO chief Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala
The African continent has a population of 1.4 billion people, but it imports more than 90% of its medicines and 90% of its vaccines. WTO Director General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala says the time has come to open up the continent to globalization and encourage businesses to invest in African countries.
On GZERO World with Ian Bremmer, Okonjo-Iweala makes the case for decentralizing and diversifying global trade to open up new markets, bring Global South countries into the mainstream of the world economy, and reduce reliance on any one country for crucial goods and services.
Africa hasn’t yet globalized, but when it does fully integrate into the world economy, it could create a domestic market of over a billion people that rivals that of China and India.
“Africa has about 3% of world trade, and that’s too small,” Okonjo-Iweala says. “When, not if, that experiment really gets going of Africans integrating better with themselves and trading, that is automatically very attractive for trade for the world.”
Watch the full interview: World trade at risk without globalization, warns WTO chief Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala
Catch GZERO World with Ian Bremmer every week at gzeromedia.com/gzeroworld or on US public television. Check local listings.
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People pose with soldiers as they celebrate in support of the putschists in a street of Libreville, Gabon.
Another day, another coup in Africa
Just hours after being declared the winner of a fraught presidential election that the opposition says was plagued by irregularities, Ali Bongo Ondimba, the president of the central African state of Gabon, was ousted in a military coup – the seventh on the African continent in just two years.
Gen. Brice Clotaire Oligui Nguema, Bongo’s cousin who’s closely linked to the ruling regime, says he is now the president of a transitional government.
Some key background. Bongo, 64, came to power in 2009 after the death of his father, Omar Bongo Ondimba, who ruled the country for more than four decades. The dynasty has been accused of corruption and self-enrichment while many Gabonese are impoverished, with unemployment hovering at nearly 22%.
The oil-rich country is a member of OPEC, the cartel of oil-producing nations, but profits are overwhelmingly reaped by the elite. (Nine members of the Bongo family are currently under investigation in France for embezzlement or corruption.)
Holed up in his residence, Bongo was filmed on Wednesday asking for help, and UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres called for the restoration of the constitutional order, while the African Union also condemned the coup.
African leaders are indeed worried. This comes just weeks after a coup in the West African state of Niger that’s threatened to further destabilize the entire continent (more on that here). And some analysts say that failure to hold those junta leaders accountable has sent a powerful message to wannabe putschists throughout the continent.Viewpoint: Is China the only reason the US cares about Africa?
Heads of state and/or government from 49 African countries are currently breaking bread at the US-Africa Leaders Summit at the White House. It’s only the second such summit in history, the last one hosted by President Obama in 2014.
It’s no secret that many African nations have long felt jilted by Uncle Sam. But the Biden administration is trying to cast the conference as a reset in US relations with the world’s fastest-growing continent, announcing a $55 billion investment in Africa over the next three years and a presidential visit next year.
Still, some African experts are skeptical that Washington’s approach to Africa is really changing. To them, it can often seem that Washington is more focused on keeping Beijing – which in recent years has outpaced the US in foreign direct investment to Africa – away from the continent than on creating new opportunities for growth independent of China’s activities there.
To make sense of the Biden administration’s Africa policy, we had a chat with Amaka Anku, Eurasia Group’s lead Africa analyst.
GZERO: A White House official said this week that the US is “the partner of choice” for African states – which was broadly considered to be a dig at China. How is this sort of thing perceived by African leaders?
I don't think it's particularly controversial. I mean, he's a US official – what else is he going to say?
What's more controversial is when they go after China directly and say “the Chinese are using a debt trap” – rhetoric that we saw from former President Trump. A lot of African policy makers really chafed at that. It was very paternalistic. It was very much like “hey, you guys, you must be so stupid” for entering into this sort of arrangement with the Chinese.
Biden hasn’t really done that. His rhetoric has been all great and pretty, but it’s … hollow. So the problem isn't really what they're saying. It's what they're not doing. The Biden administration is saying all the right things but they’re not really doing things differently.
Ok, so what are Africa’s biggest investment needs right now?
Infrastructure in all of its forms. China has put a lot of money into transport infrastructure – roads and rails – which has been very helpful in terms of connectivity and economic growth.
Why isn’t the US government giving more money to Africa then?
Well, it's not important enough. It’s just not a priority. And that’s why a lot of the rhetoric sounds hollow.
But it's not just about the government, because there are two levels to this relationship. There's the government – and China has done well on this front – but it’s also about relationships in the private sector, and the US is substantially a private sector led economy. If the American private sector doesn’t see Africa in terms of economic opportunity then it’s not going to put its money there.
Has Biden’s approach to engaging Africa differed from his predecessors?
Every time the US wants to talk about Africa they always start with value promotion. It’s always about open and liberal societies. But this misses the point. The biggest constraint on mature, competitive, electoral party politics across Africa today is lack of state capacity and low economic outcomes.
So if you look at Biden’s sub-Saharan Africa strategy, the first points are about open and liberal societies, and democratic governance – and then eventually you get to post-pandemic development. That’s where you should start!
Government officials like to bring up “democratic backsliding” because there was a coup in places like Mali or Burkina Faso. But those coups happened because those states could not guarantee security for their citizens. It's not because people want authoritarianism.
What has China’s Africa policy been like?
China doesn't do value promotion. China will come to an African state and say “what do you want?” and then will help them finance it. There are also problems with this approach.
Do African governments feel that they are being used as pawns in the greater China-US rivalry?
African countries don’t feel like Washington is generally interested in the region beyond its China strategy. Biden is trying to pivot away from that, saying his strategy is solely about the relationship with Africa. But there’s still a broad feeling that the US only cares about projecting its values and influence.
To be fair, every country’s foreign policy is about projecting values and interests, but it’s about how you do it. And the question for Biden is: Do you think African economic transformation supports that goal? For example, can the US get ahead in its battle with China by having new export markets in Africa? Or is it just going to be about countering Chinese influence here?
So you still think it's the latter?
Yeah, right now it still feels rhetorical. I think they have a lot of work to do to show if it's not.
Ethiopian government representative Redwan Hussien and Tigray delegate Getachew Reda pass documents during the signing of the AU-led negotiations to resolve the conflict in northern Ethiopia
Just like that: Is Ethiopia’s war over?
For two years, it was one of the world’s most gruesome conflicts. Hundreds of thousands displaced, millions at risk of famine, and a rapidly shifting frontline that drew in neighboring countries and saw allegations of war crimes by both sides.
And then suddenly, last week, Ethiopia’s civil war, which pitted the federal government against fighters from the northern region of Tigray, seemed to end. Both sides agreed to a peace framework at talks in South Africa.
Why? How? And what are the prospects for peace in Africa’s second most populous nation, a country that until recently was one of the world’s fastest growing economies?
First a refresher on how we got here: Tigray is home to 7 million of Ethiopia’s 120 million people. For decades the Tigrayan Popular Liberation Front, a political party, was top dog in Ethiopia’s dictatorship. But in 2018, a democratic popular revolution swept current Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed to power. Two years later, a dispute with the TPLF over the timing and legality of local elections turned ugly. The Tigrayans felt their autonomy was threatened, while Abiy saw a challenge to federal authority from an ethnic group accustomed to having more power. War broke out and quickly drew in troops from neighboring Eritrea who fought alongside Ethiopian forces.
Peace: why now? The Ethiopian federal government has been struggling with an economic downturn, soaring inflation, the worst drought in 40 years, and the increasing costs of waging a war against a well-armed adversary fighting on its home turf.
But it was the Tigrayans – exhausted by nearly two years of siege and bombardment, running low on food and munitions, and reeling from recent Ethiopian battlefield gains – who were desperate to stop the war, say analysts.
Growing pressure from an international community that saw the limits of its ability to influence Addis Ababa also played a role, according to Connor Vasey, an Ethiopia analyst with Eurasia Group
“In the end,” Vasey says, “time was on Addis Ababa’s side but not on Tigray’s.”
So what’s in the deal?
Given Addis Ababa’s advantages, the deal is a sweet one for PM Abiy. The Tigrayans must give up their heavy weapons, recognize the authority of the federal government again, and hold fresh elections under Ethiopian national laws. In exchange, the federal government would relax its siege of the region, allowing desperately needed aid and services to resume.
“The deal was a huge diplomatic and political victory for the federal government,” says William Davison, Ethiopia senior analyst at International Crisis Group. “It allows the prime minister to tell the world that the war is over and that financial assistance to his country should resume in a rapid and substantial way.”
What’s the catch? The biggest initial sticking point, analysts say, will be the terms of Tigrayan disarmament. Eritrean troops remain in Tigray, but that country, ominously, is not party to the peace deal at all. So long as those troops – as well as those from neighboring regions of Ethiopia, which are also nibbling away at Tigrayan territory – stick around, Tigrayans won’t feel secure enough to give up their heavy weapons.
But in that case, the federal government's siege could remain partially or wholly in place, with devastating consequences for ordinary Tigrayans.
“One of the main fruits of this agreement,” says Davison, “would be relief for the Tigrayan population.” But if the disarmament talks fall through, “that may not actually be forthcoming.”
Human rights watchdogs, meanwhile, worry about accountability for crimes committed by both sides during the fighting. The current accord, says Amnesty International, “fails to offer a clear roadmap” for justice and “overlooks rampant impunity in the country.”
What to watch next: Military leaders from the two sides are currently negotiating disarmament terms in Nairobi, Kenya. By Friday evening, analysts say, it will be clear whether the fledgling peace has a chance. But given the uncertainty about Tigrayan security, and the lingering Eritrean wildcard, a durable end to the war could be a long shot yet.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni walk during their meeting in Entebbe.
Russia and the West battle it out in Africa
Russia’s brutal military offensive may be taking place in Europe, but the battle to shore up support for its cause is now playing out in … Africa.
Russia’s top diplomat, Sergey Lavrov, is currently on a tour to reassure African allies of Moscow’s commitment to alleviating the global food crisis.
But Lavrov is not to be outdone by French President Emmanuel Macron, who is also on a three-nation tour in Central and West Africa. Washington, meanwhile, has sent an envoy to Ethiopia and Egypt.
Russia, the EU, and US have long tried to court developing countries in bids to expand their respective spheres of influence. But as war rages on in Europe, why the intense focus on Africa now?
Who’s going where?
Lavrov started his African tour in Egypt, where he sought to assure a jittery President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi that Russia is taking the global grain shortage seriously. (Egypt is the world’s largest wheat importer.) Russia’s top diplomat doubled down on the Kremlin’s talking point that a Western-backed Ukraine is responsible for the blockade in the Black Sea that’s pummeling import-reliant Cairo. (The Egyptians, who have strong security ties with the US but rely on Russia for grain, have so far refused to pick a side in the war.)
This week's itinerary for Lavrov also had stops in Uganda, the Republic of Congo, and Ethiopia. The latter could be a tougher sell because Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed is seeking a rapprochement with the US after Washington imposed sanctions on Ethiopian officials over the brutal war in Tigray.
The French president is visiting Cameroon, Guinea-Bissau, and Benin to reiterate France’s postcolonial commitment to African prosperity and security. Food supply issues will be on the agenda, too.
Meanwhile, the US special envoy to the Horn of Africa is holding a series of talks in Ethiopia and Egypt to discuss the ongoing Grand Ethiopian Dam dispute that has pitted Addis Ababa against Khartoum and Cairo. Washington says it will also discuss ways to mitigate the global food crisis.
Why Africa?
Moscow has been boosting its investment in African countries for years to gain a strategic foothold on a continent where it once yielded great influence during the Cold War. As part of this effort, it’s been sending mercenaries to support counterinsurgencies in West Africa and Libya, and flooding some African states with weapons.
What does Russia get out of it? Metals, diamonds, gold, and other commodities. Indeed, Russia has been leveraging relations with weak and corrupt African governments to secure lucrative mining deals. (Moscow uses some of the metals it extracts to make weapons that it then sells … back to Africa.) What’s more, Russia’s trade with African states has doubled since 2015 to around $20 billion a year, and it has signed arms deals with more than 20 African states.
Crucially, while the European Union remains Africa’s largest trade partner, many African countries have long resented the bloc’s strings-attached approach to cooperation. (The EU, for instance, has previously conditioned aid and investment on Africa cracking down on migration to the bloc.)
The war in Ukraine is also being waged on the diplomatic front. Though its enforcement powers are limited, the United Nations is a powerful arbiter of international norms, and the 55-member African Union is the largest voting bloc in the UN. Indeed, it was a boon for the Kremlin that 17 African states refrained from taking a side when Russia’s aggression in Ukraine came up for a vote at the UN in March.
The view from Africa. For many African states, relations with Russia offer an appealing alternative to China, the EU, and the US, which have historically had the resources to make inroads throughout the continent.
Beijing, for its part, has promised Africa prosperity and innovation … but in the process saddled dozens of African countries with debt. And though many states – particularly in sub-Saharan Africa – rely on Western aid, they also have come to resent Europe’s imperialist legacy and Washington’s preachiness on human rights.
Russia, on the other hand, has managed to foster a lot of goodwill among numerous African states by not lecturing them about human rights or burdening them with shady loans. Indeed, some African states believe Russia is cultivating a partnership of equals.
Still, Eurasia Group Africa expert Tochi Eni-Kalu says that although the Russians have had some success with their recent diplomatic outreach, there are limits to how far this will take them.
“Russia has few dependable allies in Africa,” he says, adding that “most African states would detest the idea of being seen as being too close to Russia, even if their nonaligned orientation might see them vote in line with Russia (or abstain) on certain resolutions.” Plainly, they don’t see themselves as having to make a binary choice between Russia and the West.
To be sure, Putin knows Russia is no match for Beijing’s financial prowess or Washington’s military might.
“Though Russia is a key arms exporter to numerous African states, the Kremlin lacks the resources that the US, EU, or China can draw on in negotiating political concessions on the global stage,” Eni-Kalu says, noting that this is especially true for Africa's biggest economies.
So what’s Russia trying to do then? As we’ve written before, Moscow is seeking “discrete pressure points where, with minimal expenditure, it can win friends and influence people in ways that directly benefit the Russian state or affiliated cronies.”
After years of deprioritizing the continent, the US is (sort of) interested again. The Biden administration recently announced that it will host more than 50 African leaders at a US-Africa summit this December. The event, according to the White House, will focus on deepening economic engagement and tackling the global food crisis. Washington has also doled out cash to help the continent weather the food crisis.
Still, “Western engagement with Africa has been more rhetoric than action for several years now,” Eni-Kalu says, noting that there is little indication that the current geopolitical situation will result in any new concrete commitments from the West.