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US, China talk tough on nukes and banks
National Security Council arms control official Pranay Vaddiraised a lot of eyebrows recently by saying the US may need to expand its nuclear arsenal. Citing the expansion and diversification of nuclear arsenals by Russia, China, and North Korea, Vaddi toldthe annual meeting of the Arms Control Association that "more nuclear weapons are required to deter our adversaries.”
In response, an unnamed Chinese embassy representative told Russia’s state-affiliated Tass news agency that Washington is "undermining nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regimes and should stop doing it.” The representative criticized the U.S. for “clinging” to a first-use nuclear policy, withdrawing from arms control treaties and enhancing NATO's nuclear capabilities.
Get ‘em back at the bank. But while China is worried about a potential future war, Western countries are trying to curb Beijing’s support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Sources say the US expects G7 nationsto deliver a stern warning to small Chinese banks to stop providing financial assistance to Russia to wage war on Ukraine. “Our concern is that China is increasingly the factory of the Russian war machine,” said Daleep Singh, US deputy national security adviser for international economics, dubbing Beijing “the arsenal of autocracy.”
Observers don’t expect immediate punitive actions, such as restricting access to the SWIFT messaging system or cutting off access to the dollar. And by targeting smaller institutions instead of larger ones, the G7 seeks to curb support for Russia without causing major disruptions to the global economy. We’ll be watching for the statement – and the fallout - at the upcoming G7 summit in Italy June 13-15.Medieval Italy, the Peruzzis & the world's first bank run
Bank runs. Market volatility. Panic in the streets. When I say we’ve been here before, I don’t just mean 2008 or 1929. One of the earliest recorded bank runs dates back to the 14th century. Italian city-states like Florence and Venice sat at the crossroads of trade routes between Asia and Europe and were financial hubs. In the early 1300s, the “Peruzzi” family quickly became one of the most powerful and wealthy in Florence, through a highly profitable textile trade that focused on imported English wool.
As their wealth grew, so did their banking network, extending throughout Europe and even to England’s King Edward the Third. King Edward at the time was embroiled in a series of expensive wars with France, which the Peruzzi's increasingly bankrolled. Unfortunately, King Edward’s appetite for battle and glory was bigger than his purse, and when he failed to pay his debts in 1345, the Peruzzi bank took a massive financial hit.
Word soon got back to Florence about the deadbeat English king. Depositors panicked, rushing to withdraw their florins before the Bank of Peruzzi ran out of funds. A bank-run ensued and, soon after, the House of Peruzzi was ruined.
The reason you’ve probably never heard of the Peruzzi's until now has quite a bit to do with the Florentine family that rose to power soon after their fall. The House of Medici [meh·duh·chee] became one of the wealthiest and most powerful families in Renaissance Europe in part by learning from the Peruzzi’s mistakes. Where the Peruzzi's focused heavily on speculative investments and individual clients (ahem, Edward the Third, ahem), the Medicis diversified their portfolio across a range of industries and regions, which protected them from risk and market volatility.
Fast-forward to today and the same pitfalls that the Peruzzi’s faced exist for modern banks that rely on overextended credit and speculation. I mean, what is crypto if not today’s version of English wool? And whether you’re the House of Peruzzi or Silicon Valley Bank, one thing is clear. Stay the heck away from the King of England.
Watch the GZERO World episode: The banking crisis, AI & Ukraine: Larry Summers weighs in
Is your money safe? Larry Summers on the banking crisis
Banks, in many ways, are the backbone of the economy, but when Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank recently failed, it raised some tough questions about the stability and regulation of financial institutions. On GZERO World, Ian Bremmer and former US Treasury Secretary Larry Summers dive deep into the crisis and explore the complex factors that led to the banking turmoil.
Summers explains that the failures of these banks were caused by a combination of factors, including an increasingly digital world with high interest rates, risky investments, and long-term bonds that decreased in value as interest rates rose.
This led to depositors becoming alarmed about the security of their money and quickly moving it to other banks that offered higher returns. The banks' inability to manage these withdrawals sparked fears of a bank run and ultimately led to government intervention.
Summers also criticizes the management of Silicon Valley Bank for their "incompetence" and the Federal Reserve's regulation for not “stopping the accident that was waiting to happen.”
“In many ways, the financial system is like an anesthesiologist," Summers remarks, "nobody much notices a job that they're doing until something screws up."
Watch the GZERO World episode: The banking crisis, AI & Ukraine: Larry Summers weighs in
Silicon Valley Bank collapse: Not 2008 all over again
Ian Bremmer shares his insights on global politics this week on World In :60.
With the Silicon Valley Bank collapse, is it 2008 all over again?
There's one very clear way that it's not, which is that it's not a big enough crisis for people to come together. And remember, after 2008, everyone understood that we needed to do everything possible to get the markets functioning, get trust in the system again, and avoid a great depression. Nobody's saying that right now. And it's not just because the US political system is more divided, it's also because people feel like it's fine to go after the "woke" banks. It's fine to go after the Trump era deregulation around the medium size banks. And everyone can point at their favorite villain while you don't really need to do a hell of a lot beyond the bazooka that Secretary Yellen threw at SVB and Signature Bank this weekend. So no, in that regard, it's very much not 2008 all over again. In some ways I'm happy about that and other ways I'm not.
As China reopens to tourism, is COVID finally behind us?
Well yeah, in the sense that we can travel everywhere. I mean, the fact that you haven't been able to go to China for three years now. First because of COVID, then because of zero-COVID policies is a real problem. I mean, engaging with Chinese policy leaders, corporate leaders on a Zoom, you're just not getting a lot of information. And Munich Security Conference was the first time I met with a senior Chinese delegation face-to-face, aside from China's then ambassador, now foreign minister to Washington in three years. So I mean, just my level of understanding of what the hell is going on in China is significantly less than I need it to be. And now that we can all start going to China again, that's a really big deal. So I think that makes COVID behind us. Of course, long COVID isn't behind us. And this is a permanent disease that, in terms of COVID's reality, people are still going to die from this thing, but in terms of treating it like a pandemic, yeah, I think it's pretty clear that that we are over and done with and I'm glad to say it.
Will the AUKUS deal shift the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region?
No, I don't think so. I mean, it's a big deal for the Americans to be sharing advanced nuclear technology and hardware with the Australians, something the Americans wouldn't have done before. That is in part a growing concern about China. By the way, it's also potentially an intelligence risk because Australian level of security around their intelligence and information and their susceptibility to espionage from Beijing is a lot higher than that of the United Kingdom, than that of the United States. So there is a risk on board with that, but no, I think the important thing is that the Americans are continuing to focus on what is really a pivot towards Asia, more military equipment, more economic engagement, and of course, more concern of American allies and partners all across the region that they need the Americans from the security perspective, even as China becomes the critical economic partner. So that I think is important incrementally, strategically, but I wouldn't say AUKUS is the big mover, this week's San Diego meeting notwithstanding.
- SVB collapse: Don’t say the B-word ›
- Yellen brings bazooka to stop SVB contagion ›
- China-US tensions over COVID origins & Russia's war ›
- COVID ain't over ›
- Hard Numbers: Colombia's grim record, Ukraine reconstruction planning, Chinese beach tourists, India's strong arm ›
- What We’re Watching: Battle for Bakhmut, Xi’s diplomatic muscle, AUKUS sub deal ›
- Who does Washington blame for the Silicon Valley Bank collapse? - GZERO Media ›
- Ian Explains: Banking turmoil and the panic pandemic - GZERO Media ›
SVB collapse: What happened and why it matters
Wondering about all the fuss over the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank? To get a handle on what happened and why it matters, we talked to Celeste Tambaro, managing director of Eurasia Group’s financial institutions practice. This interview has been edited for length and clarity.
GZERO: How did SVB get into trouble?
Celeste Tambaro: Although SVB was not a widely recognized name among US banks up until last week, the bank has been around for about 40 years and has built an important niche servicing investors and entrepreneurs in the emerging technology space. As you can imagine, given SVB’s positioning in the market, it experienced significant growth during the investment boom in private technology companies that occurred in the wake of the pandemic. This investment surge was fueled, in part, by continued low-interest rates and easy financial conditions during the late-2020/early-2021 period that made capital cheap and left the VC-funded start-up world flush with cash. This cash flowed into SVB in the form of deposits, or in banker’s terms, its funding base, which reached nearly $190 billion at its height. As a result, the bank was left with a lot of excess liquidity earning very low yields. In an effort to earn higher returns on this liquidity, SVB invested in a portfolio of around $120 billion longer duration U.S. Treasury bonds and fixed-rate mortgage securities. Ultimately, SVB was sitting on a highly concentrated bet on tech start-ups and a portfolio that was vulnerable if interest rates rose quickly.
And we all know what happened next. Russia invaded Ukraine, hyper-charging pandemic-driven global inflation, leading the Fed and Central Banks around the world to hike rates fairly aggressively in order to get ahead of the inflation curve. As a result, financial conditions have tightened, capital has become more expensive, and the growth outlook has become cloudier. This environment has weighed on investor sentiment in the tech space, so cash has not been flowing as freely in the start-up community, nor into SVB as new deposits. In addition to the negative impact that rising rates had on SVB’s deposit base, they also led to a decline in the value of SVB’s longer-duration portfolio as bond prices fell.
As deposit withdrawals picked up pace in February and early March, SVB’s management decided to shore up its liquidity and sell down $21 billion of its longer-dated securities portfolio. The problem was that any sale would be at a loss given the sharp move in interest rates. The sale took place and then things got worse. On Wednesday, management reported a realized loss of $1.8 billion on the sale – it was also attempting to raise an additional $2.25 billion of capital to bolster its balance sheet. But time was not on the bank’s side. SVB was quickly losing the confidence of the bond rating agencies, the market, and its key customers, and last Thursday the capital raise fell through. High-profile VC investors were sounding the alarm on the health of the bank, and liquidity concerns quickly shift to concerns that the SVB was insolvent. By Friday morning, a final frenzy to withdraw deposits, a so-called run-on-the-bank, occurred. Last-ditch attempts to sell the bank fell through, and by Friday afternoon SVB as we knew it was gone. That old familiar lesson yet again: Banks can go to zero if not run properly and the market and customers lose confidence.
What happened next?
By Friday afternoon, regulators intervened to stabilize the situation. The FDIC placed SVB into receivership, taking charge of the bank and its assets. Insured depositors, those with deposit balances up to $250,000, were to have full access to their deposits as of Monday morning. At the time, the question remained what would happen to those clients of the bank with uninsured deposits. This set off a panic among the tech start-up community that feared it would be unable to support the ongoing operations of their businesses without access to their deposits – would they be able to meet payroll or pay suppliers? The concern in the tech sector reached a fever pitch, while fears of spreading contagion among other smaller or regional banking institutions persisted.
Over the weekend, in response to a building crisis, the Biden Administration, the FDIC, and the Federal Reserve moved to contain the fallout. First, financial regulators in the US set up a backstop to protect all depositors, both insured and uninsured, of SVB and Signature Bank. The latter was also taken over by regulators in NY on Friday as it suffered its own battle with rapid deposit withdrawals. This move protects all depositors of both banks, but not bondholders or equity investors. As per regulatory guidelines, any losses to the Deposit Insurance Fund to support uninsured depositors will be recovered by a special assessment of the banks. These measures should help stem the risk of new runs on uninsured deposits at other banks while mitigating risks of spillovers to the real economy.
Separately, the Fed announced that it was creating a separate Bank Term Funding Program to ensure adequate liquidity to banks. This program offers banks loans of up to one year against high-quality, liquid assets (typically US Treasuries or mortgage bonds), with collateral valued at part. This is important as banks typically were required to take a haircut on collateral when they approach the Fed discount window. This new facility, which comes with better terms and less stigma, enables banks to raise liquidity to meet depositor demands without selling off bond holdings at a loss – as SVB did last week.
And finally, on Monday, the FDIC transferred SVB assets to a new bridge bank, Silicon Valley Bank, N.A. The FDIC named Tim Mayopoulus, former head of Fannie Mae, as the CEO of the bridge bank as SVB’s senior management was removed once regulators intervened.
Where do we go from here?
Well, there are clearly ongoing ripple effects from the SVB failure. First, banks in the US and the world took a hit last week on the sudden shock of a large U.S. player imploding almost overnight. However, since the Global Financial Crisis, large banks in the US have been subject to strict capital requirements, which are regulatory standards requiring banks to maintain adequate levels of liquid capital, assets they can sell easily, relative to their holdings. These requirements, which are particularly stringent for larger banks considered “too big to fail,” are meant to keep banks solvent and to keep the financial system healthy. Large banks in the U.S. are recognized as well-capitalized and are regularly stress tested to ensure they are meeting regulatory standards. This prevents a situation like SVB’s blow-up from infecting the entire system. However, U.S. legislation allows for smaller, often regional or community banks, considered less critical to the system based on the size of consolidated assets, to face less stringent requirements. This “tailored” approach to regulation has been called into question in the past and will likely draw attention again given the events of last week, especially if volatility among bank stock, particularly regional players, persists.
Considering the sector more broadly speaking, banks are experiencing pressure on deposits as customers are looking for higher yields in a rising interest rate environment. This is leading certain banks to increase yields they pay on deposits. Another way of putting this is banks are facing increasing pressure on funding costs. At the same time, banks that increased exposure to longer-duration bonds during the pandemic are also subject to the impact of rising interest rates on their portfolios. If banks sell a portion of these portfolios before the underlying securities reach maturity, they will realize losses on these exposures. Both higher funding costs and lower valuation on bond portfolios will weigh on the outlook for bank earnings.
Are there spillover risks to global banks and the global economy?
In terms of global macro, on balance, Eurasia Group expects that in the absence of further material financial stress, the Fed will go ahead and raise rates by 25 basis points at its next meeting on March 22. But the tightening of financial and credit conditions could prove sharp and disruptive, and the financial stability risks will not go unnoticed by central banks around the world. This might temper the appetite for continuing to tighten rapidly. The next watchpoint in this regard will be the European Central Bank, which meets on March 16.
Civil War 2.0, Big Brother vs. Big Tech, and Banking Troubles in China: Your Questions, Answered
Happy Friday, everyone!
It’s still summer so you know what that means…
You ask, I answer.
Note: This is the third installment of a five-part summer mailbag series responding to reader questions. You can find the first part here, the second part here, and the fourth part here. Some of the questions that follow have been slightly edited for clarity. If you have questions you want answered, ask them in the comments section below or follow me on Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn and look out for future AMAs.
Trump supporters protest outside the US Capitol on January 6, 2021.Alex Edelman/AFP via Getty Images
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Are Barbara Walter's fears about a civil war in the United States overblown? (Logan B)
For now, they are. In large part because the military and judiciary remain politically independent and committed to upholding the rule of law. But people shouldn’t believe “this can’t happen here.” The U.S. is by far the most politically divided and dysfunctionalof advanced industrial democracies, and it’s hard to be optimistic about the trajectory over the coming years. The 2020 election and its aftermath—Jan. 6, a delegitimized national election, a historically divided country—evidently was not a big enough crisis to bring about structural change to address the dysfunction in the country. Americans are more polarized than ever, and a recent SPLC study found domestic support for "participating in a political revolution even if it is violent in its ends" is historically high among young people—roughly 40% across the political spectrum. I’ve grown increasingly concerned that the 2024 election will bring unprecedented political violence on both sides of the aisle and risk a constitutional crisis, irrespective of who wins them.
What are the greatest opportunities for the United States right now?(Joe B)
The U.S. has the most favorable demographics of any major economy, the most entrepreneurial and dynamic economy, the best universities, unrivaled innovation clusters, and deep capital markets. We are at the global frontier of science and technology. As such, the U.S. is the best placed nation to lead the way in developing solutions for the world’s most pressing challenges (pandemics, climate change, poverty, etc.). Yet our rates of innovation and social mobility have been slowing for the last half century. We need to invest more in research and development for basic science and technology, expand access to higher education, and increase skilled immigration. Only then will we be able to live up to our full potential.
How do we reconcile economic development with environmental pressures? Can we enrich the poor of our planet without destroying whatever ecological balance there might be? (Jeffrey D)
We can, but not as quickly as we may like to. It’s true that globalization and the creation of a global middle class came at an enormous cost for the climate. That’s now changing as economic growth becomes more and more decoupled from CO2 emissions… but the change is too slow to avoid enormous ecological damage (as we increasingly see every day). Longer term, though, we are heading toward a world of inexpensive and sustainable energy—which is incredible to think about. Add to that more sustainable population dynamics (rather than the population “bomb” we feared in the 70s), and there’s reason for real hope.
Do you think that it is possible for the international community to stop CO2 emissions in time to avoid +2.5ºC global warming? (Ana C)
Not given present trends in nationalism. By revealed preference, it’s clear that too many people in industrialized countries believe foreigners—especially those who don’t look like them—aren’t really people. That means there’s an absence of resource transfers from rich to poor countries for climate mitigation and adaptation, which all but guarantees we won’t get the kind of sustainable transformation we need from India and other developing countries—countries that aren’t responsible for getting us to 1.2ºC but which will comprise the lion’s share of emissions from 2ºC to 2.5ºC.
Do you foresee massive sovereign defaults coming? (Rishon B)
In developing countries, yes. High indebtedness, rising interest rates, and stronger political demands from angry populations on the back of the pandemic and the fallout from the Russian invasion of Ukraine have created unsustainable fiscal environments. We’ve seen this boil over in Sri Lanka already. Even bigger developing countries are going to experience similar episodes over the coming few years.
How long before we will stop using fiat currencies? (Davide L)
I can’t see it happening in the next 10 years, for several reasons I discussed here. But the world is changing quickly. Are national governments going to be the most powerful actors in the world in a generation? Probably. But not necessarily. If that fundamentally changes, fiat currencies could be under threat faster than people think.
What do you think of the Biden administration's Latin America strategy? Do you think the United States is paying close enough attention to its own backyard? (Paul V)
Well, it’s not much of a strategy, really. There’s no political pathway for a domestic compromise on immigration, which puts enormous strain on Mexico and Northern Triangle countries. Plus, there’s a number of “rogue regimes” the Americans don’t want to talk to (Venezuela, Cuba), which causes frictions with others that are more ideologically aligned (Mexico, Argentina). And U.S. public sector investment in and aid to Latin America remains too limited to move the needle. It’s probably been the most significant hole in foreign policy for the Biden administration.
Is there a banking crisis in China? (Gary H)
There’s no national crisis at this point, though some rural banks have gone under. The Chinese government has proven itself able and willing to patch problems with fiscal support whenever necessary, and I don’t see that changing in the near term. The catch is that support is only a band-aid. It prevents crisis now by creating bigger economic bubbles and postponing the pain of adjustment down the road, both for individual savers and for corporates. Eventually, though, something’s got to give.
We seem to be at a tipping point all over the world with the rise of authoritarians: Trumpists in the U.S., Bolsonaro, Erdogan, Putin, Orban, Xi Jinping. Do you think the trend will stick and maybe even get more pervasive and entrenched, or do you think this is a temporary phenomenon and we'll swing back toward more democratically led countries?(Donna R)
There are a couple of big exceptions to that trend—namely, an increasingly powerful and cohesive European Union and consolidated democracies in Japan and Germany, the world’s third and fourth largest economies. But yes, overall this is a challenge and one that’s likely to get worse before it gets better given slowing global economic growth and growing inequality both within and between countries.
Are tech companies a bigger geopolitical force than countries? Will they become such a force in the future? (Natan K)
In the digital space, they are. After Jan. 6, while Congress, the courts, or law enforcement were powerless to respond, Big Tech swiftly and unilaterally de-platformed Trump. When Russian hackers attacked U.S. government agencies and hundreds of private companies back in 2020, it was Microsoft, not the NSA or the U.S. Cyber Command, that identified and neutralized the threat. As I wrote here, tech companies were able to do these things because they own and control a growing share of the infrastructure that societies, economies, and governments worldwide run on. And as more and more activities to the digital space, their ability to exert geopolitical power will only grow.
If the Ukraine war fragments the global system into relatively isolated spheres of influence, will the West have even less leverage over Russia in the future? What does that portend? (Gautam J)
The opposite is happening so far. The West is becoming stronger, more focused, and more aligned. NATO is expanding and has a newfound sense of purpose. Europe is becoming more integrated, and even the Poles and Hungarians are more engaged. Relations between the EU and the United Kingdom have improved. America has regained credibility and leadership on the global stage. And Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand have been brought into alignment with the U.S. and Europe, paving the way for a much more global security architecture. All of these developments give the West more, not less, leverage over Russia (and China). No, Russia isn’t about to become North Korea—its natural resources are too important to keep off the global market, and developing countries including China and India will continue to do business with it. But that just means Russia will survive, not that it will thrive. The fact is that most of Russia’s economic potential—from advanced manufacturing to skilled human capital—was heavily dependent on integration with the Western-dominated global economy. The same cannot be said of the West, for whom Russia barely figured as an economic partner. By the end of next year, Europe will have rid itself of its reliance on Russian energy entirely (one of the last remaining points of Russian leverage), while Russia will be starved of critical components, talented workers, economic growth, and global influence.
Best sandwich bread? And what sandwich do you think of when you think of this bread? (@Ya_Boy-yay)
An English muffin. Because a spicy breakfast sandwich with a runny egg after a heavy morning workout is the best sandwich.
Would Moose run for President in 2024? (Victor V)
He really should. The great thing is—at 16—he’ll finally be age appropriate against Trump and Biden. I would be concerned about his genocidal tendencies against squirrels.
The 47th President of the United States?
If the war in Ukraine ends in a Ukrainian victory and borders are returned to either their pre-February 23 state or their pre-2014 state, what's next for Russia? (George H)
I suspect this isn’t going to happen (however much I want it to), but that would actually be a better outcome for Russia in the long run than a victory on the ground followed by annexation or a drawn-out stalemate, because it’s the only way I could see the country eventually re-joining the G7 and the global economy. As long as it continues to illegally occupy Ukrainian territory, Russia will remain effectively cut off from the West, and ordinary Russians will pay the price.
If Biden doesn’t run, who do you think should for the Dems? (Karim T)
Forget about what if Biden doesn’t run. If Biden does run, I still want a bunch of people to run for the Democratic nomination. It should be an open primary—he’s going to be way too old to be an effective general candidate or president. There’s lots of credible potential candidates out there, just as there were in 2020. To name a few, Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo is impressive, as is Colorado Gov. Jared Polis. I suspect we’ll see a big slate of candidates.
Will America go to war with China over Taiwan? (Oluwaseun A)
While the U.S. maintains an official policy of “strategic ambiguity” on this question, Biden has said on three separate occasions that he would. But it’s very unlikely that China would make a move in the near term, although the risk of accidents and miscalculation has gone up a notch with the recent military escalation that followed Pelosi’s visit. Given the current balance of power and economic interdependence between the U.S. and China, and having just witnessed the Western response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Xi Jinping knows that an attack on Taiwan would risk devastating economic damage, sweeping diplomatic isolation, and a humiliating military defeat against a still-superior U.S.—all of which would threaten Xi’s and the Communist Party’s standing. There’s no reason for him to take that risk when he can wait for the balance of power to swing more in his favor (or for a major political crisis in the U.S. that distracts Americans, or for a U.S. president who's unwilling to fight for Taiwan), allowing him to change the political map without firing a shot. Longer term, as China’s economic and military influence grows and as they work to close the semiconductor gap with the West, the potential for a fight goes up.
After decades of globalization and labour/supply chain arbitrage, corporate America finds itself all-in on communist China. I call it commercial kompromat. How much do you feel this ties DC's hands on China policy, particularly should China advance on Taiwan? (G Stockus)
Significantly. But we need to recognize the “kompromat” cuts both ways—the private sector (and much of the government sector) in China has same interdependencies with the West. They have just as little or even less of an interest in unraveling those links than we do. The key question is whether you consider this threat of mutually assured destruction a stabilizing or destabilizing force. For me, it’s the former. After all, you don’t tend to fight against those you share strong common interests with…
What is the worst band of all time? (Mark M)
I’m not going to say Nickelback, even though you want me to say Nickelback. Personally, I can’t stand Journey. Oh my god, how I want all those people to just stop believin’…
Of the big issues out there that you've talked about, what are you most likely wrong about? (Daniel R)
Whether democracy is ultimately a stronger and more durable political system than authoritarianism. I’ve long believed (and hoped) it is, but changes in the role of technology are now challenging this. Do new technologies diffuse power and make it harder for autocrats to control information and communication, or do they bolster them and give them a new means to exert absolute power over their citizens? I’m not so sure anymore.
What personal failure taught you the most? (Allison L)
There are so many. The most interesting ones are those where I beat my head against the same wall a bunch not realizing I was approaching an issue in the wrong way: the seven times I was rejected after applying to the Council on Foreign Relations, the dozens of articles I submitted to the New York Times only to receive a polite “no thank you.” It took me a while to realize I didn’t have any of the connections (at the time) that would’ve led to success in these endeavors. It was important for me to be forced to understand that skill alone is almost never enough. It takes hard work, obviously, but also an immense amount of luck—from the genetic lottery to where and when you’re born, how and by whom you’re raised, what resources and connections you inherit, etc.
🔔 And if you haven't already, don't forget to subscribe to my free newsletter, GZERO Daily by Ian Bremmer, to get new posts delivered to your inbox.
Hard Numbers: Marcos’ tax bill, Russian cash in Swiss banks, Cubans sentenced, Mali vs French media
3.9 billion: Philippine presidential frontrunner Ferdinand Marcos Jr. owes a whopping $3.9 billion in unpaid taxes from the estate of his dad, the late dictator. Marcos, of course, says this is fake news, but his rivals hope it'll hurt his chances in the May 9 election.
213 billion: That’s the amount in dollars of Russian wealth stashed away in Switzerland’s banks, according to the Swiss Bankers Association. The revelation is a surprise move from famously neutral Switzerland, which has long prided itself on bank secrecy.
30: A total 28 Cubans have been sentenced to up to 30 years in prison for joining rare anti-government protests last summer. The Castro brothers may be gone, but the regime is cracking down on dissent as hard as ever.
71: Mali says it’ll suspend French state-funded stations RFI radio and France 24 for reporting what it calls “false allegations” by the UN and Human Rights Watch that Malian soldiers had killed 71 civilians since December. Relations between Bamako and Paris have cratered since the 2020 coup in Mali and the subsequent withdrawal of French troops.Turkey's inflation, Chinese loans, Nigerian oil spill, deadly cocaine
49: Turkey recorded an annual inflation rate of almost 49%, a 20-year-high, on Thursday. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who has said soaring inflation would be temporary, continues to prioritize exports and remains opposed to interest rate hikes. Turkey’s Central Bank meets on Feb. 17 to discuss interest rates but is not expected to change course.
3 billion: President Imran Khan is visiting China, hoping to secure $3 billion in Chinese loans to help shore up Pakistan’s dwindling foreign reserves. But some analysts say Beijing might be reluctant to cough up because of Islamabad’s failure to make good on earlier loans.
50,000: An oil production vessel carrying 50,000 barrels exploded off the Nigerian coast on Thursday, causing a massive oil spill. The fate of the 10 crew members is not yet known. It is unclear how much oil was spilled or what the environmental impact will be.
20: At least 20 Argentinians died – and dozens were hospitalized – after ingesting cocaine tainted by a poisonous substance. Authorities say it could be a result of turf wars between rival drug traffickers. The Triple Frontier, a junction Argentina shares with Paraguay and Brazil, is one of the world’s most active drug trafficking corridors.CORRECTION: An earlier version of this article said that Argentina shares a border with Panama rather than Paraguay. We regret the error.