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Xi Jinping during the China-Central Asia Summit in Xi'an.
Will China end Russia’s war?
China can end the war in Ukraine. Xi Jinping is the one major world leader that both Russia’s Vladimir Putin and Ukraine’s Volodymyr Zelensky would gladly meet with. And China is the one country that has both the carrots and the sticks that can persuade Putin and Zelensky to accept the tough-to-swallow compromises needed to make peace.
China has leverage with Russia. Europe’s post-invasion refusal to buy Russian oil and gas sharply increases China’s importance as an energy buyer. In fact, China bought a record amount of Russian energy over the first half of this year, thanks in large part to the steeply discounted price the war has forced Russia to offer.
But China has more energy suppliers than Russia has alternative high-volume buyers. A Chinese decision to reduce those imports would hurt Russia far more than China. China is also a major supplier of computer chips and other products Russia badly needs and can’t buy elsewhere. These facts give Xi real leverage with Putin if he wants to use it.
Xi can tell his friend Putin that he must accept a peace deal that brings Russia a modest amount of Ukrainian land that he can use to declare “victory” in return for letting the rest of Ukraine go. Even if that means the remainder of Ukraine one day joins NATO and the EU.
Putin, of course, will oppose any such suggestion. But if Xi privately advises his friend that refusal means China will publicly distance itself from Russia’s invasion and apply heavy economic pressure on his government, Putin will have to listen. With China on board, Putin looks much more powerful. Were Xi to publicly back away, Putin would be far more isolated.
Xi can then promise that a peace deal with Ukraine will bring China and Russia economically and politically closer than ever before … and that China will pay to rebuild and modernize Russia’s war-depleted military.
From Xi’s point of view, pushing Putin toward peace isn’t a betrayal. It’s a credible plan to save Russia from a disastrous war before much more damage is done. He’s giving Putin the “off ramp” the Russian president can’t (or won’t) create for himself.
And if Putin isn’t ready to cut this deal now, wait through a few more months of military frustration with continuing Western support for Ukraine.
China has leverage with Ukraine. Xi can assure Zelensky that if Ukraine will make the hard choice to surrender the Donbas region and Crimea, that China can stop the war, invest billions in the country’s reconstruction, and free Ukraine to join Western clubs. (Let Ukraine and the West argue over when and how.)
Ukraine gets peace, a European security guarantee, underwritten by Chinese infrastructure investment, and a new lease on life as an independent nation with powerful friends and allies.
Xi can use this plan to divide Europe from the United States, an outcome that expands China’s global influence. Most European leaders would surely cheer an end to the war and reconstruction of Ukraine that Europe doesn’t have to pay for.
US officials would not look happily on China’s ability to make new friends and extend its influence in Europe, but Washington would be hard-pressed to block a peace plan that everyone else favors.
China can use this plan to enhance its reputation as a leader and peacemaker around the world. The Americans could not have made this deal, Xi can fairly claim. Only China has the power and the will to stop this terrible war, ending the pressure the war creates on food and energy supplies and prices for poor countries and stopping the killing of innocents.
That’s a huge propaganda win for Beijing. At a time of frustratingly slow economic growth at home, Xi can use that win.
Xi has already shown he wants to play peacemaker. He brokered a minor deal between Saudi Arabia and Iran this spring, and he has already offered a sketch of a Ukraine peace plan, though its current form lacks the detail needed to make it credible. Xi has even been understanding in response to a Russian strike on Ukrainian cities last week that destroyed a facility that contained grain reportedly destined for export to China and damaged a Chinese consulate building.
Obviously, as with any plan to end a war, several hundred devils lurk in the details. But Xi has real leverage, even with Putin, if he wants to use it. What’s stopping him?
Xi’s “peace” plan for Ukraine: China “wins”
When Xi Jinping, on his first trip to Moscow since Russia invaded Ukraine, continues his meetings with Vladimir Putin on Tuesday, expect China's leader to talk a big game on "peace." It won’t be the type of peace that Ukraine — or the West — wants.
Yet, as far as Beijing is concerned, that’s beside the point.
Indeed, geopolitical success is in the eye of the beholder. That was definitely the case in the recent Middle East détente brokered by China, which re-established Iran-Saudi diplomatic ties broken since 2016. For Xi, whether the deal will result in anything meaningful in the long run matters less than clinching the photo-op.
The upshot is to be perceived as the decisive external player that achieved what America could not by getting the Iranians and Saudis to at least be on speaking terms again.
Similarly, this approach also means spinning the optics of its newfound role as a global peacemaker to a huge yet often overlooked audience by the US and its allies: the so-called "Global South" group of countries. Although only a few dozen refused to condemn the invasion at the UN, many more nations have no beef with Russia or Ukraine and have spent over a year waiting for someone to come up with a plan to end a war that they're paying for with economic ruin.
China's recent peace initiatives are thus "in line with aspirations by the silent majority in the rest of the world — countries that are not directly involved in conflicts" in Europe or the Middle East, says Zha Daojiong, a professor at Peking University's School of International Studies.
But that’s only part of a story that’s also about China’s broader role in the world, including its “complicated” relationship with Russia, its existential rivalry with America, and its year-long ghosting of Ukraine.
First, though, why has it taken Beijing so long to start playing global peacemaker? For one thing, until recently it was bad political timing at home.
Xi "was too busy putting out fires domestically at a crucial time for China and himself," says Brian Wong, a geopolitical strategist and co-founder of the Oxford Political Review. With the 20th Communist Party Congress and zero-COVID over, Xi feels he can pay more attention to foreign policy.
For another, China perhaps saw brokering the Iran-Saudi deal as low-hanging fruit that could serve as a dry run for its much more ambitious peace initiative in Ukraine. Wong believes that China seized the moment by leveraging Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's deep hatred of US President Joe Biden along with Beijing’s longstanding ties with Tehran to offer a Middle Eastern olive branch that few saw coming.
The Iran-Saudi deal had clear tangible benefits for China in the form of stable oil prices. What Xi would get from sealing peace in Ukraine is more symbolic but no less important: rehabilitate China's global image tarnished by COVID.
Meanwhile, China’s recent global diplomacy overtures are both strategic and tactical. After all, Xi has long wanted China to have a bigger role in the world. (He once pitched his country as the globalist leader countering an isolationist US under the Trump administration.) But the pandemic put all of that on the back burner.
Now, though, "China has sort of said: Okay, we're done with COVID. We are reengaging with the world. We're sending our leader back out there," explains Neysun Mahboubi, a research scholar at the University of Pennsylvania's Center for the Study of Contemporary China.
In that regard, he adds, China's strategy is not new. Yet, it comes across in a sharper way than it would have in 2019 because the geopolitical landscape has become more polarized — in no small part due to what China watchers refer to as Beijing’s “pro-Russia neutrality.”
At the same time, Mahboubi thinks the recent China-led peace initiatives are also a tactical response to the growing US-China rivalry. Xi, he believes, feels pressured by America to show that "China is a player on the world stage that can act in ways that the US cannot entirely anticipate or control."
And then there's Russia, China's rather unpredictable friend with benefits. The war in Ukraine — which initially caught Xi flat-footed — tested the limits of the bilateral partnership. But a year on, it has brought the two countries closer together by making them more dependent on each other (especially Russia on Chinese imports).
Beijing and Moscow have been forced to team up to push back together against the Western unity that the Russian invasion accomplished. And although the good personal vibes between Xi and Putin certainly help, the main driver is the mutual conviction that the US-led global security alliance is an existential threat to Russia and China.
"The closer America and Europe move towards one another, at least in the eyes of China, the more incentive there is on the part of China to want to absorb Russia into its orbit," says Wong.
Still, by pursuing peace in Ukraine, China might bite off more than it can chew. For Mahboubi, “the degree of difficulty is not even in the same ballpark” as the Iran-Saudi accord.
First, Beijing can hardly claim to be an honest broker — as it could between the Iranian and the Saudis — because it has provided diplomatic cover for Russia at the expense of Ukraine. Second, China's 12-point plan is a nonstarter for NATO since it doesn't call for Russia to withdraw from any occupied territories (which would have been a red line for Putin anyway).
Third, the two sides have little incentive to back down in the short term. Russia and China have high hopes for cracks in Western unity against the Kremlin widening in the coming months. Ukraine, for its part, is gearing up for its much-touted spring counteroffensive.
Still, if China is somehow able to figure that out and offer something that is acceptable to both sides, "that would obviously be incredibly impressive [...] and China would deserve all the plaudits," Mahboubi says. "I just think it's unlikely."
Also, what about dealing with Ukraine, which has been an afterthought for China? This week, Xi has reportedly scheduled a call with President Volodymyr Zelensky, which would be his first since the war began.
The thing is, Xi knows that Zelensky can't afford not to pick up the phone because only China has enough leverage over Russia to get Putin to back down. Indeed, Zelensky has been careful to avoid publicly criticizing China, has repeatedly asked China to get involved and said that he's open to Chinese support.
"I think Ukraine and Zelensky are more receptive toward China than many of us expect," says Wong. All these public statements are "a clear sign that the Ukrainians [...] genuinely want Chinese assistance because they see China as the only possible mediator."
Finally, Chinese success would box in the US — and possibly create a rift in Europe. If the Europeans suspected America was sabotaging the peace talks by urging Ukraine not to talk to Russia via China, the hand-wringing in Paris and Berlin could have real consequences for NATO unity.
At the end of the day, one unique thing China can offer as a mediator is an uber-pragmatic assessment: Let's not cry over spilled milk.
China "would urge Russia and Ukraine to consider leaving aside the question of who wronged whom for the moment — leave it to the future generations of their peoples — and give priority to stopping the conflict, which is debilitating to both sides," says Zha.
The upshot: Put yourself in China's shoes. No one believes you can broker peace in Ukraine, so no one will be surprised if you can't pull it off. But if you do, you can claim all the credit — and blame others if things go south.
Unlike with arming Russia, there’s no downside to playing peacemaker. Whatever happens, China can't lose. But how it ultimately wins might determine the trajectory and outcome of the war.
Chinese President Xi Jinping arrives for a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin at the Kremlin in Moscow.
What’s in China's Ukraine peace plan?
As the world marked one year of war in Ukraine on Friday, China's President Xi Jinping – positioning himself as mediator-in-chief – presented a peace plan for the war-torn country. Beijing, maintaining its self-described neutral status, released a 12-point document calling for both Russia and Ukraine to end hostilities and move towards the negotiating table in hopes of “reach[ing] a comprehensive ceasefire.” To date, Beijing’s support of Russia has mostly been rhetorical and symbolic.
Xi urged the West to stop “unilateral sanctions” and called for “abandoning the Cold War mentality,” likely a reference to the US-led NATO alliance. What's more, the plan also cautioned against expanding the NATO bloc, though most of the principles were presented in general terms. Crucially, in what’s widely perceived as a veiled threat to Moscow, Beijing issued a warning against the use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine.
So, what was the reaction? Ukraine’s top diplomat in China called the paper “a good sign,” while also reiterating Kyiv’s long-held view that Russia should immediately withdraw from Ukrainian territory, a position echoed by President Volodymyr Zelensky on Thursday in a video marking the anniversary of the war: “We are strong. We are ready for anything,” Zelensky said.
While the light-on-detail Chinese plan is unlikely to be endorsed by the US or EU, particularly after Washington recently warned that Beijing might send heavy weapons to Russia and a new German report found that Russia is in negotiations to buy Chinese drones – the overtures may play very well in the Global South. Indeed, much of the developing world has benefited from Russian and Chinese investment and isn’t on board with the conflict – a fact that was reiterated Thursday when many African and several Asian states abstained from a UN resolution calling for Russian troops to leave Ukraine.
Xi also plans to meet with Vladimir Putin in Russia in the months ahead. We’ll be watching to see whether he applies more pressure for the Kremlin to back down as Beijing seeks to help stabilize the global economy and its domestic economic performance after years of stagnation linked to its zero-COVID policy.
China's Ukraine gambit
Ever since Russia invaded Ukraine almost a year ago, China has strived to keep a low profile in the war by remaining officially neutral yet refusing to condemn Russian aggression. But over the past few days, top US and European officials say they see signs that China plans to intervene by supplying lethal aid — weapons and ammo — directly to the Kremlin.
The Chinese deny this, publicly at least, and accuse the US of meddling in the “no-limits” partnership between Beijing and Moscow. The relationship remains "rock solid," top diplomat Wang Yi told Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on Wednesday before meeting Vladimir Putin in Moscow.
To be clear, so far the accusation comes only from Western governments. But the fact that US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, British PM Rishi Sunak, and NATO chief Jens Stoltenberg have all blown the whistle suggests that something is in the works.
If true, sending arms to Russia would come at a potentially big cost to China. At a minimum, it would put Beijing — and the Chinese economy, the world’s second-largest — at risk of tougher and more expansive Western sanctions.
It certainly would not endear China to the European partners it has been working so hard to woo as Beijing recovers from the economic wreckage of zero-COVID. Finally, it would also throw a wrench into the already fraught US-China relationship just as both sides are working to deflate balloon-gate.
Yet driving a wedge between Ukraine’s allies might be part of the point. If some European members of NATO start to believe that China could get involved directly in a way that significantly bolsters Russian capabilities, they might think twice about giving Ukraine open-ended military support. The alliance also faces a split if some Europeans fear that upcoming US secondary sanctions against China will hurt them too.
Meanwhile, China says it will soon present its own proposal to end the conflict. Watch out for a few tidbits in Xi Jinping’s planned speech to mark the one-year anniversary of the war on Friday. So far we only know that Xi’s plan might call for an end to military assistance for either side.
"If that’s delivered as an ultimatum — China will help Russia unless the US and its allies stop aiding Ukraine — then we will be forced to conclude that the Chinese have decided to play chicken with NATO,” says Anna Ashton, Eurasia Group's top China analyst.
Why is China doing this? For Ashton, China is seeking to draw a contrast between its motives and those of the US by presenting itself as the only major power offering an off-ramp that might not be palatable to Ukraine or its Western friends "but that the developing world would like to see.”
China’s peace narrative, she explains, resonates in Global South countries that have not taken sides in the conflict yet continue to pay the price for it in high energy and food costs.
What's more, this is perhaps the opportunity China’s strongman leader was waiting for to boost his country's diplomacy game. After all, at last year's 20th Communist Party Congress, Xi already flagged that he wants China — which last entered a major conflict outside its borders in the Korean War — to play a more active role in global security. (On Tuesday, Beijing followed up by publishing the first concept paper for Xi’s much-touted Global Security Initiative.)
Just a decade ago, the idea of China suddenly reversing a longstanding foreign policy of neutrality in foreign conflicts would have been almost impossible. But that was before Xi became the most powerful Chinese leader since Mao Zedong.
Indeed, intervening to help Russia in Ukraine would be the most striking example to date of “Maximum Xi,” Eurasia Group’s No. 2 top geopolitical risk for 2023. The notion basically means that China’s leader has unfettered power to pursue whatever policies he wants with almost zero constraints and challenging views.
But with more power come "more surprising decisions, more impunity, more opportunity to make mistakes, which is likely a factor here," Ashton says.
Thought bubble: What if the mere threat of arming Russia puts China in a position to actually affect the outcome of the war? Imagine a Russian military suddenly recharged by vast amounts of Chinese-made weapons. That might scare some governments into settling for peace before things get very ugly for Ukraine.
And China has a plan for that.