Trending Now
We have updated our Privacy Policy and Terms of Use for Eurasia Group and its affiliates, including GZERO Media, to clarify the types of data we collect, how we collect it, how we use data and with whom we share data. By using our website you consent to our Terms and Conditions and Privacy Policy, including the transfer of your personal data to the United States from your country of residence, and our use of cookies described in our Cookie Policy.
{{ subpage.title }}
An employee checks filled capsules inside a Cadila Pharmaceutical company manufacturing unit at Dholka town on the outskirts of Ahmedabad, India, April 12, 2025.
Pharma manufacturers face tariff uncertainty
Donald Trump’s administration announced that it is opening investigations into pharmaceutical and semiconductor supply chains, which will likely result in tariffs that will hurt suppliers in Europe, India, and Canada.
The move shows that, despite stiff political and market resistance, Trump still believes tariffs will benefit his country in the long term by rebalancing trade and boosting manufacturing jobs.
The pharma announcement caused headaches for Canadian producers of generic drugs and pharma ingredients, who are warning of dangerous disruptions to supply chains if the US administration acts erratically.
Trump said last week that pharma tariffs would bring a manufacturing boom to the United States: “They will leave other places because they have to sell — most of their product is sold here, and they’re going to be opening up their plants all over the place.”
But, as with other of Trump’s tariffs, the move could boost prices for consumers while offering uncertain benefits for US industry. Trump’s unpredictability itself is a major liability. Because of strict permitting controls, pharma facilities take years to build, and Trump’s frequent reversals may convince companies it’s unwise to make long-term investments.
Collage of Ian Bremmer, Donald Trump, and other world leaders.
American backsliding, Trump-Xi standoff, Iran bombing, and more: Your questions, answered
If you feel like you're drowning in the 24-hour news tsunami lately, you're not alone. Headlines are moving at the speed of light, massively consequential policies are being announced (then rolled back) via social media, and longstanding global alliances seem to shift with each passing day. It's hard enough just trying to keep up, let alone separate the signal from the noise.
Because a weekly long-form column often can't do justice to everything happening simultaneously across our increasingly chaotic world, I invited readers to ask their most pressing questions on all things political and geopolitical. You wanted to know about everything from the contents of Donald Trump’s heart to the risk of a Taiwan invasion to the future of the dollar and, yes, whether I'd ride Moose like a moose jockey given the opportunity.
Below is the first batch of answers, with questions lightly edited for clarity. If you have something you’d like to ask me, submit your questions here and I’ll take as many as I can in the upcoming weeks.
Let's dive in.
How well do you think the outside world truly understands the goals and motivations of the Trump administration?
Not particularly well, since it's unclear for people in the United States, too. President Trump individually concentrates so much more decision-making authority than any other president in modern US history, which is why the on-again-off-again tariff policy has been so chaotic. Past administrations have not necessarily been more transparent – Trump certainly speaks his mind constantly – but they have been far more process and consensus-driven.
Still, there is an underlying driver helping explain Trump’s actions: the use and abuse of power to bring about the president’s favored outcomes in one-on-one settings and, relatedly, to eliminate any checks on his authority domestically (vis-à-vis Congress and the courts) and internationally (multilateral frameworks, standards, commitments, treaties, agreements, etc.). That – Trump’s will to power – more than any concrete policy agenda is the unifying thread. Remember, Trump was a Democrat before he was a Republican. Ultimately, he’s driven not by ideology but by the search for maximum leverage he can use to crush opponents and score “wins.”
Are you concerned at all about the possibility of regime change in the US? On a daily basis, the Trump administration is doing stuff right out of a totalitarian playbook, and everybody seems to be folding their cards because they either don't understand the stakes or they hope it's somehow going to pass. As a scared European from a country with a totalitarian past, I personally doubt it will.
I’m less concerned than some because of the decentralized nature of America’s federal government (with many critical functions, including election administration, delegated to state and local authorities) as well as our professionalized, independent military. Trump’s authoritarian impulses also remain constrained by the president’s own lack of discipline and interest in the business of governance. This was the case during his first term and is still true now, as both Signalgate and Liberation Day made clear.
On the other hand, President Trump is far less constrained politically than last time, having consolidated control of the GOP, surrounded himself with yes men who encourage his most destructive whims, and asserted absolute power over the entire federal government. He’s also less constrained by markets/the private sector and the reelection imperative, and he faces a Democratic Party in absolute disarray.
The upshot is Trump won’t be as effective as many fear in undoing checks and balances, largely because his authoritarianism will continue to be tempered by his policymaking incompetence. But I admit that the risk of serious, structural damage to the US rule of law and democratic institutions is growing. I’m more concerned about this than I thought I’d be three months ago.
While globalization has been a boon for the US consumer, it has assisted in the relative decline of US manufacturing over the past 40 years. What policies would you recommend, if any, to (re)grow US manufacturing?
Not Trump’s present tariff policy, which will hurt rather than help US manufacturing. A majority of America’s goods imports are intermediate inputs, capital equipment, and raw materials that US manufacturers rely on to produce other goods, both for domestic consumption and for export. By making these imports more expensive, tariffs harm US producers and exporters (in addition to consumers via higher prices). Add to that the massive uncertainty about what tariff changes tomorrow may bring, and there are also no incentives for companies to build new factories in America.
Globalization is not principally responsible for the decline of US manufacturing over the past half-century. Productivity improvements and automation have reduced the need for manufacturing workers everywhere (even China is now seeing deindustrialization!). In fact, as a very rich country at the productivity frontier, America produces more value-added in manufacturing output today than ever before; it just takes fewer workers than it did after World War 2 to do that. That’s obviously sad for the individuals and communities that have lost jobs. In the aggregate, though, the decline in US manufacturing employment has been offset by an increase in higher-paying service-sector jobs (the average service worker gets paid more than the average manufacturing worker). If you wanted to increase manufacturing jobs, you’d have to either shift people out of those better-paying (often more comfortable) service jobs or grow the population (tough given the administration’s crackdown on immigration).
Now, there are strategic and national security reasons to protect and reshore select industries like semiconductors or batteries. But if you want to boost manufacturing in these core industries, the way to do it is through smart industrial policy: targeted subsidies, tax credits, state and local incentives, direct investments … like the Biden administration’s bipartisan CHIPS Act, which was followed by a manufacturing investment boom.
So maybe start by not undermining good programs for political reasons. Don't beat up on friends and adversaries simultaneously when what you need is to coordinate and trade more with allies. And focus on the broader ecosystem needed to foster investment and build a domestic manufacturing base. That means bolstering the scientific, research, and educational institutions that have made the US a magnet for world-class talent and innovation. Building better infrastructure to increase manufacturing productivity. And ensuring a stable, predictable business environment anchored in the rule of law.
Who blinks first, Xi or Trump? How could they de-escalate their trade tiff given their personal distaste for losing face?
Trump already has, with the unilateral exemption granted to electronic products like semiconductors and smartphones (even if it turns out to be temporary). The question is how many times he needs to blink before there's a climbdown. As they say, a wink is as good as a nod to a blind man, and at least since Covid, Xi has been convinced that China is facing a bipartisan strategy of containment from a hardline United States. Even with the latest exclusions, Trump’s tariffs are so high as to essentially amount to a trade embargo. Combine that with the concerted US efforts to crush Chinese tariff circumvention through third countries, and we’re already seeing the unmanaged decoupling of the most important geopolitical relationship in the world.
Given the deep structural mistrust between the two sides and Beijing’s political ability to “fight until the end,” I don’t see how you can put the toothpaste back in the tube. At most you can get a truce, and only as a result of a direct meeting between Xi and Trump. But Xi has little interest in negotiating directly with Trump at this stage, as it would be a sign of weakness and he doesn’t see the US president as a credible interlocutor.
In the current context, what is keeping China from invading Taiwan? What conditions are they waiting to have in place before "pulling the trigger," so to speak?
I see this scenario as extremely unlikely in the near term. Sure, Trump has basically broadcast that he doesn’t care about territorial integrity, and you could plausibly extend his treatment of Ukraine to Taiwan. But his cabinet is also full of China hawks, and if there’s one US ally every Republican in Washington wants to defend, it’s Taiwan against China. Beijing knows a full-scale invasion would risk direct war with the United States, which would be incredibly destructive to the Chinese economy at a time when they can hardly afford it.
Radical uncertainty about Trump’s response function makes Chinese leaders even more cautious than they normally would be. Beijing would rather wait to invade until the military balance more decisively favors China, its economy is on more solid footing, and the US is led by a more predictable president. But expect them to test US resolve and probe Trump’s response with incremental escalations across the board, none of which should be big enough to lead to a crisis on their own. The risk, however, is that as the US-China relationship breaks down, any accident or miscalculation could escalate into a military crisis given the lack of any conflict resolution channels.
Isn't it possible that Trump's creepy Russia obsession has to do with trying to get Russia as an ally against China?
In part, though there are plenty of other explanations (from his affinity for strongmen, transactional nature, and dislike for Vladimir Putin’s European and “woke” enemies, to his belief that the US shouldn’t waste resources on a war that isn’t core to American interests and Ukraine can’t win). At times, Trump seems more interested in cutting deals with both Putin and Xi Jinping to carve the world into spheres of influence.
But in any case, it’s unrealistic to think Trump could pull off a “reverse Nixon” given Russia and China’s shared interest in a post-American international order and deep commercial, energy, and technological ties. These are not the same countries that Henry Kissinger drove a wedge between 50 years ago (nor are they likely to change anytime soon). There’s nothing that the president of a democratic United States, even one as weakly constrained and authoritarian-minded as Trump, can credibly offer Putin that remotely competes with the kind of long-term strategic alignment he shares with Xi.
In fact, a Trump-brokered ceasefire in Ukraine and/or a US normalization of relations with Russia might actually strengthen Sino-Russian ties by allowing Beijing to fully embrace its “no limits” friendship with Moscow without risking US sanctions or jeopardizing its relations with Europe.
Given Trump's historically aggressive approach towards Iran and desire to distract from the tariff disaster, how high are your odds that the US and/or Israel will bomb Iran within the next 6 weeks?
Reasonably low since Trump doesn't want a war and is fully committed to trying engagement first, despite Israeli opposition. The difference in the American and Israeli positions is interesting: Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has consistently demanded a verifiable end to Iran’s entire nuclear program, whereas Trump seems to have lowered the bar to no weaponization. This is a condition that the Iranians, who have always maintained they have no intention to build a bomb, could potentially live with given their present historical weakness. The odds of an agreement are higher than they have been in a decade.
The Israelis might try to derail the negotiation effort diplomatically and even engage in some low-level provocations to spoil the Iranians’ mood, but they won't directly launch major strikes that could blow back in their face. Publicly sabotaging Trump would be far too risky.
What is the likelihood of the dollar losing its reserve currency status?
Dollar dominance is being eroded by Trump’s unpredictability and policy mix, which have caused a loss of confidence in the US government – and, accordingly, prompted investors to reprice the safety premium commanded by dollar assets.
But losing reserve currency status? That doesn't look imminent given the lack of viable alternatives. The yuan is not, in fact, convertible; China has to resort to draconian capital controls to prevent capital flight, and the country lacks the investor protections, institutional quality, and business environment required to internationalize its currency. The euro is the currency of a still-too-fragmented economic area mired in slow growth and high debt, with shallow capital markets and no banking, fiscal, or political union, where nativist parties could well gain power in the next five years and destabilize domestic politics. And cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin are highly volatile, speculative assets with zero intrinsic or legislated value (unlike, say, the dollar, which is backed by America’s current and future wealth – and by the US government’s ability to tax it).
You can’t replace something with nothing, so the dollar’s special status is safe … for now. But Trump’s destruction of America’s reputational capital will cost the country dearly in the years to come. After all, every reserve currency that came before the dollar was dominant until it wasn’t. Investors have historically wanted to hold greenbacks because America’s economic, political, and institutional fundamentals inspired trust. Lose those fundamentals and you lose that trust.
Do you find that your Boston accent helps you come across as authentic?
It’s the first time I've ever considered that. I’d like to think it’s mostly down to being honest with people and not taking myself too seriously. But sure, why not? Can’t hurt.
What is Moose's favorite toy? And was it made in China?
Presently, a squeaky watermelon (it used to be a small bouncy orange ball, but he can't see as well as he used to so he's adapted). No idea where it was made.
U.S. President Donald Trump speaks to the media on board Air Force One on the way to West Palm Beach, Florida, U.S., April 13, 2025.
The art of the repeal? Trump scraps China tech tariffs - for now
When it comes to tariffs, US President Donald Trump is proving more, er, flexible than some thought. Case in point: late Friday, US Customs quietly published a list of tariff exemptions, and buried in the jargon was code 8517.13.00.00. If you know your customs codes, that’s the digital alias of… the smartphone.
Trump’s new 145% tariffs on Chinese goods will now (mostly) spare the devices, as well as laptops, memory chips, solar cells, and semiconductors.
Why the walkback? Eighty percent of iPhones sold in the US are manufactured in China. The full weight of the tariff would have sent sticker pricessoaring north of $2,000, torched Apple’s margins, and further spooked Wall Street.
What’s China’s reaction? On Sunday, Beijing acknowledged the “small step” butcalled on Washington to go further, drop the rest and return to a “path of mutual respect.”
That seems unlikely in the near term. Trump on Sunday pointed out that Chinese tech is still subject to a previous 20% tariff, and that more levies and penalties on Chinese electronics and semiconductors are coming. “NOBODY is getting off the hook,” he warned.
The president earlier said he’d give more details on the evolving US approach to the critical Chinese semiconductor industry on Monday. Keep an eye out for that -- it'll be the next big news in the US-China trade war.
Canada’s Prime Minister Mark Carney during Carney's Liberal Party election campaign tour, in Brampton, Ontario, Canada April 10, 2025.
Canada celebrates tariff reprieve
On Wednesday, Prime Minister Mark Carneycalled Donald Trump’s 90-day pause on reciprocal tariffs “a welcome reprieve for the global economy.”
It was indeed a welcome reprieve for Canada, which appeared to be at risk of being hit with an additional10% US tariff. As things stand, Canada is subject only to the 25% tariff on goods that are not compliant with existing free trade agreements, and a 10% rate on noncompliant energy and potash exports.
Still, Carney continued to distance Canada from the US, writing in an implicit swipe at Trump that the country must “continue to deepen its relationships with trading partners that share our values, including the free and open exchange of goods, services, and ideas.”
And, on Wednesday night, a 25% Canadian tariff on certain US vehicles and auto parts went into effect, mirroring an earlier Trump levy on the Canadian car industry.
Looking ahead: Carney says Canada’s prime minister, whoever it is after the federal election on April 28, will continue to negotiate with Trump on trade and security.
Map of the US-Canada border.
The Captain Canuck effect: How a new nationalism is helping Canada
But that special relationship is now being tested by Donald Trump’s tariffs and his unprecedented threats to annex Canada by “economic force.”
As a result, nationalism is surging in Canada. And Canadians aren’t just booing the “Star Spangled Banner” at hockey matches, they’re avoiding US products, canceling travel plans, and ditching retirement homes. Even the 1970s comic-book character Captain Canuck is back!
Could this pushback, combined with Americans’ fears about the political climate at home, lead to new opportunities for Canada?
Canadians are already buying fewer American products. Instead, they are buying Canadian where possible. Sales of made-in-Canada goods were up 10% last month at Canadian grocers, and some local businesses in the country reported an overall sales jump of as much as 35%.
Meanwhile, US retailers are complaining about falling revenue from Canada, which buys about $350 billion a year in consumer products from American companies.
Canadians are canceling US travel plans. So far this year, the average number of travelers entering the US from Canada by car has dropped by nearly 15% — from 92,983 per day to 79,407 — compared to last year. In February, cross-border return car trips from Canada into the US fell 23%. In March, the Globe and Mail reported on some American tour operators reporting an 85% decline in bookings, and summer flight bookings to the US are down over 70%.
That sharp drop could hit the US tourism sector hard – Canadian visits translate to roughly $20 billion a year – and it could cost the American economy over $4 billion this year alone. According to travel lobbying groups, Canadian tourism supports 140,000 US jobs.
Even some snowbirds — the 1 million or so Canadian retirees who spend the winter in warmer locations south of the border – are looking for new perches: Rebookings have declined for next year, and some regular visitors are even selling their US homes.
But the drop in US visits is not only about patriotism. There are also growing concerns about the safety of crossing the border as the US expands its use of existing powers to search travelers’ devices and detain people on suspicion of links to illegal activity.
Jamie Liew, a law professor at the University of Ottawa and a migration expert, says the US was always allowed to screen at the border, but the practice has now broadened.
“Before, the US was doing this by targeting certain racialized communities ... What’s different is that it’s now being applied in broad strokes and to a greater number of people no matter who you are.” This, she notes, makes the risk and concern “serious.”
Brain gain for Canada? Since Trump’s return to the White House, American interest in applying for Canadian citizenship has grown, based on increased traffic to websites that provide this information.
Some Canadian provinces and institutions hope to take advantage of these trends as they seek to reverse the long-maligned north-to-south “brain drain.”
And they may have a willing audience: American researchers and public intellectuals, concerned by the political environment or the Trump administration’s cuts in research funding, are looking to leave.
In a recent poll by Nature magazine, for example, 75% of the 1,608 science researchers surveyed said they would consider leaving the US in response to Trump disrupting the science community. One recruiter noted a 63% jump in immigration inquiries from US physicians since he returned to the Oval Office.
There have already been a few notable defections. In late March, Jason Stanley, a Yale University professor and fascism scholar who has sharply criticized the Trump administration, made headlines when he announced he was leaving the US to join the University of Toronto.
Asked by NPRabout his decision, Stanley highlighted the administration’s moves to shutter DEI initiatives and to cut funding for universities over perceptions of antisemitism:
“I have Black Jewish children, and the attacks on DEI are attacks on Black people. … And they’re creating mass popular anger against Jewish people by … setting us up and saying we’re the excuse for taking down democracy. Personally, I’m not going to risk my kids’ safety for a political point.”
Meanwhile, Jen Gunter, a renowned Canadian gynecologistborn in Winnipeg, is returning to Canada after decades in the US, citing “rank misogyny” and the political climate.
Some Canadian institutions are rolling out the red carpet. The University Health Network in Toronto wants to attract at least 100 young scientists from the US. Still, there are questions about whether the Canadian government is adequately funding the sciences: Last year fewer than 1 in 5 scientists were approved for Canadian federal research funding.
Hold your horses, Americans. Canada has begun to retreat from its pro-immigration stance amid a housing crisis.
“I don’t think a mass migration is possible,” says Liew. “It’s only possible for people who might have status in Canada already, such as temporary permanent residence, citizenship, or dual citizenship, for example.”
And while Canada may stand to gain from American migrants, Liew wonders about the costs of those moves, for both countries.
“We have a lot of different expertise and diverse skills within our own borders,” she says. “Why is it that those experts can’t stay in the United States to maybe resist or provide some expertise within their own communities, to educate people about what is actually happening in their government?”
Orania town sign in front of local shopping centre is pictured in whites-only town of Orania, South Africa, April 1, 2025.
Hard Numbers: South African separatists appeal to Trump, India passes controversial Muslim charity bill, Russia knocks on Jehovah’s Witnesses, Portugal probes massive IT scam, Deadly school strike in Gaza
3,000: The 3,000 residents of Orania, an all-white separatist enclave in South Africa, are calling on Donald Trump to help their cause. Representatives of Orania, which formed in opposition to the end of apartheid 30 years ago and already enjoys some local autonomy, recently visited Washington, DC, to drum up support. In February, the Trump administration blasted the current South African government for what it said was discrimination against white South Africans.
14 billion: On Thursday, India’s parliament passed a controversial law on the governance of lands donated to Muslim charities. The organizations, known as waqfs (or awqāf, if you’re a stickler for the original Arabic grammar), control a million acres of territory worth more than $14 billion. The new law permits non-Muslims to join the management boards that manage these properties. Supporters say the law promotes inclusivity and transparency, but opponents say it weakens the rights of India’s Muslim minority at a time when government-backed Hindu nationalist groups are trying to seize and destroy mosques they argue are located atop earlier Hindu temples.
6: In the United States, door-knocking Jehovah’s Witnesses can be seen as a blessing or a nuisance, but in Russia, they are “extremists.” A Russian court in the city of Chelyabinsk on Thursday sentenced a Jehovah’s Witness to six years in prison for organizing group activities. Since banning the group in 2017, Russia has jailed hundreds of Jehovah’s Witnesses, a community of about 175,000 people who are viewed with suspicion because of their dissidence from the Russian Orthodox Church and their ties to the US.
75: On Thursday, Portuguese anti-corruption investigators carried out 75 separate raids in three cities, targeting the Bank of Portugal as well as private accounting firms, homes, and other public institutions. They allege a massive, eight-year corruption scheme amounting to nearly $20 million in IT service contracts.
27: An Israeli airstrike hit a school in northern Gaza on Thursday, killing at least 27 Palestinians, according to the Hamas-run health ministry. The attack was part of the IDF’s latest military operation in Gaza, one that leading government officials have pledged to expand.
Trump and Khamenei staring at eachother across an Iranian flag.
Will Trump’s Iran strategy actually prevent war?
The United States is ramping up its “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran.
In a letter sent to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in early March, President Donald Trump gave Tehran an ultimatum: reach a new nuclear deal with the US within two months or face direct military action – “bombing the likes of which they have never seen before,” as he told NBC News’ Kristen Welker on Sunday.
The letter proposed mediation by the United Arab Emirates (whose emissaries delivered the missive in question) and expressed Trump’s preference for a diplomatic solution. “I would rather have a peace deal than the other option, but the other option will solve the problem,” the president said.
In the three weeks it took the Iranian leadership to figure out how to respond, the US turned up the temperature.
First came intense airstrikes (of Signalgate fame) against Iran’s last remaining functional ally in the region, the Houthis in Yemen, starting on March 15 and continuing to this day. Then, the US issued its first-ever sanctions against Chinese entities for buying Iranian crude oil, including a “teapot” refinery in Shandong and an import and storage terminal in Guangzhou. And in recent days, the US military deployed a fleet of B-2 stealth bombers – capable of carrying the 30,000-lb. bunker-busting bombs needed to blast through Iran’s hardened enrichment sites – to its Diego Garcia base in the Indian Ocean, in range of both Yemen and Iran. This move was “not unrelated” to Trump’s ultimatum, according to a senior US official.
Iran finally rejected direct negotiations with the US in a formal response to Trump’s letter delivered last Thursday via Oman, its preferred mediator. President Masoud Pezeshkian stated on Sunday that although the Islamic Republic won’t speak directly with the Trump administration while maximum pressure is in place, Tehran is willing to engage with Washington indirectly through the Omanis.
Whether Trump’s two-month deadline was to strike a deal or to begin negotiations remains unclear. Either way, there’s no chance that two sides that deeply mistrust each other – especially after Trump unilaterally withdrew from the original nuclear deal in 2018 – could reach an agreement over issues as complex as Iran’s nuclear program and support for regional proxies in just a couple, or a few, months (let alone a single one).
But does that mean that Trump’s ultimatum is doomed to end in confrontation? Not necessarily. In fact, his “escalate to de-escalate” strategy could be the best hope to avoid a crisis this year.
A ticking time bomb
While US intelligence assesses that Iran is not building a nuclear weapon, it has become a threshold nuclear state with enough 60% enriched uranium to produce six nuclear weapons (if enriched to 90%) and the ability to “dash to a bomb” in about six months (though weaponizing a device would probably take it 1-2 years).
European governments have long made it clear that unless Iran reins in its enrichment activities by this summer, they will “snap back” the UN sanctions that were lifted as part of the 2015 nuclear deal before the agreement expires in October and they can no longer do so.
Iran has vowed to respond to snapback sanctions by withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Given the precedent set by North Korea – whose NPT exit in 2003 was followed by ever-greater steps toward weaponization – and the already advanced state of Tehran’s nuclear program, NPT withdrawal could be the action-forcing event Israel needs to convince Trump to support a joint strike on Iran’s underground nuclear facilities.
Which means that the US and Iran were likely headed for a collision later this year even if Trump hadn’t issued his ultimatum.
Strange bedfellows
And yet, both Trump and Iran’s leadership would much prefer to avoid a military confrontation in the near term.
Trump’s political coalition includes both traditional Republican war hawks and “America First” isolationists who are averse to US involvement in new forever wars. Whereas cabinet officials like Secretary of State Marco Rubio, National Security Advisor Mike Waltz, and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth advocate for a more combative approach toward the Islamic Republic, none of these prominent national security hawks are in charge of the Iran file – Middle East Special Envoy Steve Witkoff, a Washington outsider and a restrainer, is.
Most importantly, Trump ran as a peacemaker and has repeatedly stated his preference for a deal, believing that bombing Iran could mire the US in an unpopular war that’d divert precious resources from his domestic priorities and endanger his friends in the Gulf for little political upside. The solidly MAGA Vice President JD Vance echoed this concern when, in the leaked Signal group chat, he flagged the risk to oil prices from striking the Houthis for the sake of “bailing out” the Europeans.
For its part, Iran is historically vulnerable and eager to negotiate a deal that brings sanctions relief to its battered economy. While capitulating to Trump’s demands is politically dangerous for Khamenei and would weaken the regime’s domestic position, neither he nor other hardliners would welcome a military showdown with the US and Israel.
Take it or leave it
The threat of a crisis later this year creates an opening for Trump to pressure Tehran into offering concessions that allow the US president to claim progress and avoid triggering snapback sanctions.
Last year’s effective destruction of Iran’s regional proxy network – Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Bashar al Assad’s regime in Syria – dealt a blow to the country’s conventional deterrence and heightened the importance of its nuclear program. Iran will therefore resist making any meaningful concessions on this front. If there’s one piece of the nuclear file it could cede ground on, it’s its stockpile of 60% enriched uranium, which Tehran could conceivably agree to freeze.
Where Iran could potentially offer more is in backing away from its proxies, at least temporarily. Though it doesn’t have operational control over the Houthis (unlike the decimated Hezbollah), the Islamic Republic could deprive them of the bulk of the weapons systems and intelligence they rely on to attack Red Sea shipping lanes. It could also instruct Shia militias in Iraq to refrain from targeting US troops.
The regime would find these choices politically and ideologically unpalatable. But with its so-called Axis of Resistance already in shambles and little Tehran can do to rebuild it in the near term, its strategic value is nowhere near what it was a year ago. A chance at avoiding a snapback and US bombing could accordingly be seen as a worthwhile trade.
Less for less
While a breakthrough agreement is highly unlikely to be reached before the summer (or at all), the two sides’ mutual desire to avoid escalation suggests that Trump would be receptive to the relatively minor concessions Tehran could be willing to make – the most it can conceivably offer under the circumstances.
But those concessions would need to come soon, before snapback is triggered. And even this best-case scenario wouldn’t buy Iran any sanctions relief. Instead, they’d get to kick the can on snapback sanctions and possible US military action while negotiations on a more comprehensive – and aspirational – deal are underway.
If, however, Iran’s modest concessions fall short of what Trump deems acceptable, the risk of military escalation this year will rise sharply – either when Trump’s ultimatum comes to a head or when snapback gets triggered, Iran exits the NPT, and Israel considers a strike (whether solo or joint with the US).
Iran has not yet made the decision to build a nuclear weapon. And unless it’s attacked, it remains unlikely to do so, knowing full well that any overt steps toward weaponization would invite certain, immediate, and devastating retaliation. But nothing would make the Islamic Republic dash for a bomb more than getting bombed.
Sen. Cory Booker (D-NJ) speaks during a marathon address from the US Senate floor on Tuesday, April 1, 2025.
Hard Numbers: Booker sets record for longest Senate speech, Israel expands latest Gaza offensive, Netanyahu and Orbán defy the ICC, Oz universities cut off Confucius, Argentina’s poverty plunges
25+: The Democrats may not have the White House or a majority in Congress, but one thing they do have, still, is words. Lots and lots of words. Words for days, even, as Democratic Sen. Cory Booker showed by taking to the podium on Monday with a broadside against Donald Trump that lasted more than 25 hours. The veteran lawmaker from New Jersey, a former football player, had vowed to stay up there as long as he was “physically able.” Before yielding the floor on Tuesday night, Booker broke the record for the longest Senate floor speech, surpassing one set in 1957 by the late Sen. Strom Thurmond, who filibustered against civil rights.
42: The first stage of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire, brokered in January, officially lasted 42 days. The deal now looks to be far in the rearview mirror, as Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz announced on Wednesday that he would expand his army’s latest military offensive in Gaza. The two sides are still negotiating another ceasefire deal via mediators but haven’t yet reached an agreement.
5: Benjamin Netanyahuleaves Wednesday on a five-day visit to Hungary. It’s the Israeli PM’s second trip abroad since the International Criminal Court last year issued an arrest warrant for him over alleged war crimes in Gaza. In February, he visited the US. Hungary is an ICC member, but the country’s proudly “illiberal” PM Viktor Orban says he won’t honor the court’s warrant. In recent years, the right-winger Netanyahu has cultivated controversial ties with populist nationalist parties in Europe, including some with histories of overt antisemitism.
6: In recent years, half a dozen Australian universities have closed the Chinese-funded Confucius Institutes on their campuses. The CIs educate students about Chinese language, history, and culture. The moves come amid broader tensions between Australia and China, and they reflect fears that Beijing has used the institutes to spread pro-Chinese propaganda and cultivate possible intelligence assets.
38: Argentina’s poverty rate plunged from 53% to 38% last year. Analysts credit “anarcho-capitalist” president Javier Milei, who drastically slashed government spending to put the mismanaged economy on a more stable footing. After an initial bout of pain, those measures brought inflation down from nearly 300% to 70%, easing poverty as people’s spending power increased.