Trending Now
We have updated our Privacy Policy and Terms of Use for Eurasia Group and its affiliates, including GZERO Media, to clarify the types of data we collect, how we collect it, how we use data and with whom we share data. By using our website you consent to our Terms and Conditions and Privacy Policy, including the transfer of your personal data to the United States from your country of residence, and our use of cookies described in our Cookie Policy.
{{ subpage.title }}
Can Taiwan defend itself from Chinese invasion?
Can Taiwan defend itself from a Chinese invasion? On GZERO World, Ian Bremmer sits down with Bonny Lin, director of the China Power Project at CSIS, to break down Beijing’s increasingly aggressive military maneuvers around the island and what it means for Taipei’s future. Since Taiwan’s pro-independence president William Lai took office in 2024, China has stepped up both the frequency and scale of its military operations, with daily air and naval incursions into Taiwan’s air defense zone.
It’s an alarming escalation, making the possibility of armed conflict feel closer than ever. China has made clear it’s deadly serious about using military force if it needs to: the People’s Liberation Army recently unveiled two mobile bridges that could be used for an amphibious invasion and is reportedly building a massive underground military facility near Beijing 10x the size of the Pentagon. But despite this pressure, Taiwan’s geographic separation gives it a strategic edge.
“Regardless of how capable you assess the Chinese military,” Lin says, “A Chinese amphibious invasion of Taiwan would be the most complex military operation we’ve seen in history, more complex than the Normandy invasion.”
GZERO World with Ian Bremmer, the award-winning weekly global affairs series, airs nationwide on US public television stations (check local listings).
New digital episodes of GZERO World are released every Monday on YouTube. Don't miss an episode: subscribe to GZERO's YouTube channel and turn on notifications (🔔).GZERO World with Ian Bremmer airs on US public television weekly - check local listings.
Could China invade Taiwan?
On GZERO World, Ian Bremmer asks the question keeping diplomats, military experts, and policymakers all over the world up at night: Could China and Taiwan be heading toward war? Tensions are high. The People’s Liberation Army has been staging louder and more frequent military drills around Taiwan and Chinese President Xi Jinping has ordered the PLA to be ready to seize the island by 2027. Diplomatic red lines are being tested, and the risk of miscalculation is growing. Bonny Lin, director of the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, joins Ian to break down the current conflict and whether war between China and Taiwan in the near-term is a realistic possibility.
Securing Taiwan is crucial for global stability—the island manufactures over 90% of the world’s most advanced semiconductors, and nearly half of all container ships pass through the Taiwan Strait. A Chinese invasion of Taiwan would upend the global economy, reshape alliances, and likely trigger the most deadly conflict in the Asia-Pacific since World War II. What are China’s goals and how far is Beijing willing to go to achieve them? And, crucially, if China attacked Taiwan, would the Trump administration step in to help defend it?
"The rate and pace of Chinese activities around Taiwan has been increasing quite a bit," Lin warns, "So lots and lots of developments that are showcasing that China's very dead serious about using military force if they need to."
GZERO World with Ian Bremmer, the award-winning weekly global affairs series, airs nationwide on US public television stations (check local listings).
New digital episodes of GZERO World are released every Monday on YouTube. Don't miss an episode: subscribe to GZERO's YouTube channel and turn on notifications (🔔).GZERO World with Ian Bremmer airs on US public television weekly - check local listings.
Taiwan's strategy for countering a Chinese invasion, with Bonny Lin of CSIS
On this week’s GZERO World Podcast, Ian Bremmer sits down with Bonny Lin, director of the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, for a look at one of the most dangerous flashpoints in the world: the Taiwan Strait. China has been conducting drills around Taiwan for years, but since the current pro-independence president, William Lai, took office in 2024, Beijing has been staging near-daily military exercises near the island–larger, louder, and more aggressive than ever before.
Lai has pledged to boost defense spending, strengthen ties with the US, and reduce Taiwan’s economic dependence on China. But Lai faces serious political headwinds at home. His party lost its majority in parliament, and he’ll have to navigate a deeply divided government to get anything done. Meanwhile, Chinese President Xi Jinping says reunification with Taiwan is a national priority and has made it clear Beijing won’t hesitate to take the island by force if necessary. The stakes are global: A war in the Strait would reshape the world economy, drag in major powers, potentially triggering the deadliest military conflict in the Asia-Pacific since World War II. So how far can China push, and how long can Taiwan hold out, before a crisis becomes inevitable?
Subscribe to the GZERO World Podcast on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Stitcher, or your preferred podcast platform, to receive new episodes as soon as they're published
Trump-Musk rift over Trump's "big, beautiful bill"
On Ian Bremmer’s World In 60 Seconds: Ian breaks down the rift between President Trump and Elon Musk over Trump’s “big beautiful bill”, Mexico’s democratic backslide, and South Korea's new leadership.
Ian's takeaways:
On Trump-Musk feud: “I think Elon is mad at a bunch of stuff right now. And as we know, he's not exactly stable in how he puts his views out as he has them.”
On Mexico’s judicial reform: “It’s really bad for democracy… and leads to a lot more corruption.”
On South Korea’s new leadership: “He (Lee Jae-myung) says he wants to govern as a centrist, but I suspect he’s going to govern more to the left.”
A carcass lies on a grassland in Oendor-Bayan county in central Mongolia, 03/29/2000
Mongolians are reeling as their herds starve
Mongolia’s government is scrambling as catastrophic weather is killing animals so quickly that a quarter of the national herd may starve. Thousands of families face destitution after losing nearly all their livestock, which drives 80% of the country’s agricultural output and 11% of GDP.
What’s the problem? A nasty weather phenomenon known as dzud or “disaster,” a combination of dry summers and harsh winter storms that create layers of ice on the ground. Arid conditions leave animals underfed going into winter, and then they can’t crack through the rock-hard ice to forage. The resulting images are heartbreaking: lifeless, emaciated sheep, yaks, camels, and horses stacked high on pickup trucks for disposal.
Dzuds are nothing new, but scientists say climate change has made them more frequent. Six of the last 10 years have seen the dzud phenomenon in Mongolia, and this winter saw the heaviest snowfall since 1975. The government predicts that nearly 15 million animals may die in a country with just 3.3 million people.
What can be done? International aid has been grossly inadequate, with even a modest $5.5 million appeal from the Red Cross in March going 80% unfulfilled. The ancient lifestyles of the steppe may need to change permanently, as overreliance on herding has accelerated desertification, which worsens the dzud. Ulaanbaatar aims to expand the rich minerals sector as a more stable and sustainable economic pillar.South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol speaking at the presidential office on TV at Seoul Railroad Station in Seoul. April 1, 2024
Viewpoint: South Korea’s president looks to legislative elections to kickstart his agenda
All 300 seats in South Korea's unicameral legislature will be up for grabs in the April 10 election, offering President Yoon Suk-yeol the opportunity to kickstart his agenda if his conservative People Power Party, or PPP, can gain control of the National Assembly. The center-left Democratic Party of Korea, aka DP, currently holds a majority of the seats in the chamber and has frustrated Yoon’s efforts to advance business-friendly policies since he took office in 2022.
Nonetheless, the PPP faces long odds in flipping the chamber, according to Eurasia Group expert Jeremy Chan. We asked him to explain.
Why the poor prospects for the PPP?
The conservative party would need to gain roughly three dozen seats to recapture the National Assembly, a tall order that will be made even more challenging by Yoon’s low approval rating, which hovers below 40%. While his name will not appear on the ballot, the election is widely seen as a referendum on Yoon’s administration.
For Yoon, failing to recapture the National Assembly would effectively render him a lame duck with more than half of his term in office remaining. It would put his agenda of cuts to taxes and government spending on life support and make him the first Korean president in decades to serve an entire five-year term without ever exerting control over the legislature. Attention would promptly shift to the race to succeed Yoon in the 2027 presidential election.
What are the main issues for voters?
The state of the economy is at the top of the list, particularly sluggish growth and worrying debt levels for households and corporations. A recent rebound in Korea’s export sector — largely driven by an uptick in global demand for Korean semiconductors — has provided a bit of a tailwind to the economy, but overall sentiment remains negative. Voters are likely to hold the ruling conservative party responsible for this situation, even as the opposition in the National Assembly has watered down many of Yoon’s business-friendly reforms, which are meant to stimulate growth.
Scandals and other allegations of impropriety are another top voter concern. Many left-leaning voters find Yoon’s leadership style imperious, particularly his attacks against critical media outlets. His wife, Kim Keon-hee, is also a lightning rod for public criticism, with Yoon postponing a trip to Germany and Denmark in February to keep her out of the spotlight; if left-leaning opposition parties hold onto the National Assembly, they are likely to open an investigation into allegations that Yoon’s wife received unreported gifts and committed other misdeeds. Meanwhile, the leader of the DP, Lee Jae-myung, continues to face his own corruption investigations, which has decreased support for the main center-left opposition party.
What can this election tell us about the state of Korean politics?
Polls suggest that the election will likely be decided by a narrower margin than the last legislative election in 2020; the top two candidates in roughly 60 single-member districts are polling within the margin of error. Tempers are also running high in Korea, where political polarization has worsened in recent years. Both Yoon and Lee — the runner-up in the 2022 contest — are divisive figures, which has increased support for splinter parties, most notably the newly formed Cho Kuk Innovation Party. Korean politics have traditionally been dominated by two major political parties, but this election may be a harbinger of a more pluralistic system to come. With 30 of the 300 seats in the National Assembly to be allocated to non-major parties, chances are high that neither the PPP nor the DP will secure an outright majority.
Will the election outcome change Korea’s relations with the US, Japan, China, or North Korea?
This election will not have a significant effect on Korea’s foreign policy. Regardless of the outcome, Yoon will retain wide latitude over Korea’s external relations, including in diplomacy, security, and trade. Yoon will continue to deepen Seoul’s ties with Washington and Tokyo — he will participate in a trilateral summit with US President Joe Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida on the sidelines of the NATO summit in Washington in July — while relations with Beijing and Pyongyang will remain strained. The US is on the verge of overtaking China as Korea’s top export market, and Korean firms are increasingly directing their investments away from China. By the time Yoon steps down in 2027, his successor will face a remarkably different external environment than the one Yoon inherited in 2022.
If the conservative party manages to pull off an upset, how will that change the political landscape in Korea?
A conservative victory in the legislative elections — not likely but also not unthinkable — would breathe new life into Yoon’s presidency. His administration would move quickly to enact a raft of business-friendly reforms, including lowering taxes on corporations and increasing government support for small- and medium-sized enterprises.
“Strategic” industries such as semiconductors, electric vehicles, batteries, biotech, and AI would likely benefit from greater policy attention. And Lee would come under increasing pressure to step down as head of the DP.
A PPP-controlled National Assembly would also put wind in the sails of the government’s recently announced “Corporate Value Up Program.” The program is designed to reduce the “Korea discount” whereby domestic firms have lower valuations than peer companies in Japan and Taiwan; it promises tax credits and other incentives to firms that “value up” their stock price through increased dividend payments, share buybacks, and improvements to their corporate governance.
South Korea's deputy foreign minister for political affairs, Chung Byung-won, Japan's Senior Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Takehiro Funakoshi, and China's Assistant Foreign Minister, Nong Rong, pose for photographs during their meeting in Seoul, South Korea, September 26, 2023.
To win back South Korea, China tries to chill out
Diplomats from China, South Korea, and Japan agreed to resume high-level trilateral meetings at the “earliest convenient time” in a signal that Beijing may be rethinking its aggressive foreign policy approach.
South Korea will host the meeting, likely in December, which will feature South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, and China’s second-in-command, Premiere Li Qiang. It follows the same format used in eight similar trilaterals between 2009 and 2019, before COVID-19 and tensions between Seoul and Beijing interrupted the program. At the time, Beijing was pursuing a maximalist foreign policy framework that often emphasized aggressive tactics against states perceived to be acting against China’s interests.
Seoul got a nasty taste of the approach when it announced it would buy advanced missile defense systems from the United States in 2016. Beijing objected to the powerful radars that could theoretically peek into Chinese airspace and retaliated economically after Seoul refused to back down.
It proved a serious misstep, according to Eurasia Group Korea expert Jeremy Chan. Virtually all aspects of Sino-South Korean relations soured, from the government and the private sector to the court of public opinion. And instead of knuckling under, South Korea reduced its exposure to Chinese pressure as its private sector increased trade with other countries and the Yoon administration pursued stronger relations with the US and Japan.
That last aspect, in particular, seemed to help Beijing wake up and smell the soju. After the historic summit between Yoon, Kishida, and US President Joe Biden at Camp David last month, “China actually reacted toward South Korea in a way many weren’t expecting, in that they extended an open hand,” says Chan, “They seem, if anything, like they want to halt the Korean tilt toward the US rather than bring out the stick again and accelerate that process.”
What’s more, Chinese President Xi Jinping told South Korean Prime Minister Han Duck-soo that — after skipping major fora like the G20 and UN General Assembly — he is “seriously considering” making a trip to Seoul.
“The fact he’s even mentioning this indicates there has been some acknowledgment up to the level of Xi that they’ve alienated Korea,” says Chan.
Fish and sashimi imported from Tokyo are displayed for sale at a market on August 24, 2023 in Hong Kong, China.
Fish fight: China vs Japan
Japan, along with many independent scientists and the International Atomic Energy Agency, have said the water is safe. Japan’s Prime Minister Kishida even publicly ate fish from the affected area. But China isn’t buying it. Beijing sharply protested the release, banned imports of Japanese fish, and urged others to follow its lead.
This conflict appears to go well beyond safety concerns. In fact, China has been accused of deliberately spreading misinformation about the health risks from this event, prompting vandalism and threats against Japanese people and companies in China.
But so far, China has been unable to persuade more of Japan’s neighbors to join in the outrage. At a meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in July, China called on member states to denounce Japan’s water discharge plan, but the joint communique that followed the meeting ignored the issue entirely. At another ASEAN meeting earlier this month, China’s Premier Li Qiang sharply criticized both Japan’s water plan and Kishida, but the issue was then dropped.
It appears that wariness of China’s growing influence has been a more important factor in the Great East Asian Fish Fight than the region’s traditional mistrust of Japan.