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Masih Alinejad lives in Brooklyn. Iran wants to kill her.
Iranian journalist and activist Masih Alinejad has long been in Tehran's crosshairs, accused of being an agent of the United States.
She denies it. "I'm not an American agent. I have agency," Alinejad tells Ian Bremmer on GZERO World.
But the regime has continued to look for ways to target her, even from her home in Brooklyn.
"In front of the eyes of free world, the Islamic Republic sent people here in New York to kill you, to assassinate you, to kidnap you. This is scary," she says. Alinejad has been living in safe houses, here in New York, for months.
"It seems that even America is not safe."
Watch the GZERO World episode: Iran v. the Islamic Republic: Fighting Iran’s gender apartheid regime
Iran's opposition in exile goes on offense
Next week, Ebrahim Raisi, a hardliner who is ideologically and personally close to Iran's 82 year-old supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, will be inaugurated as Iran's president. This power transition comes as the country experiences a fresh wave of protests that started in Iran's southwest over water shortages earlier this month and has since spilled over into dozens of provinces.
Some close observers of Iranian society and politics say that popular discontent there is now more widespread than it has been in years, making the Iranian regime more vulnerable than ever.
To unpack recent events, GZERO Media interviewed Ali Safavi, a longtime member of the National Council of Resistance of Iran — the main political opposition group to Iran's theocracy — whose leaders have lived in exile for decades. Safavi has taught at several American universities and has been an analyst for Western media outlets. He was also involved in the campaign to remove the Mujahedin-e Khalq movement — which the NCRI is closely linked to — from the lists of terrorist groups in the US (2012) and Europe (2009).
The MEK was formed in the 1960s by leftist-student groups to overthrow the American-backed Shah. While its supporters view it as a freedom movement advocating democratic reform in Iran, its detractors condemn the MEK's militaristic past. Indeed, many Iranians shunned the group for joining forces with Saddam Hussein against Tehran during the brutal Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988). (Meanwhile, accusations of cult-like tendencies plague the group today.)
This conversation with Ali Safavi has been edited for length and clarity.
GD: What do you make of the latest protests in Iran and what, if anything, makes them different from previous mass demonstrations?
AS: I think the recent protests have to be seen in the context of the developments of the past few months in Iran. Obviously what has happened is the continuation of four nationwide uprisings that erupted in Iran since 2017. And if anything, it goes to show that despite all the repressive measures that the regime has put in place, particularly since November 2019, that it cannot extinguish the flames of resistance and opposition to the regime.
Over the past year and a half, the most effective and closest ally of the Iranian regime has been the coronavirus. The regime has basically invested in the strategy of mass casualties — it is not providing the necessary assistance to the people. It seems that the Iranian people are emerging from the burden of the coronavirus and expressing their pent up anger and their demands for freedom and liberty.
The scope of the uprising this time is also different. Already there have been protests in 14 different provinces. And the interesting feature of all of these protests is the unanimity in the slogans that people express: "down with the dictator," "down with absolute rule of the clergy," and "down with Khamenei."
GD: Are those slogans new? Have they not been used before?
AS: Yes they have. But I think what is important is that, ostensibly, the protest in Khuzestan was over water shortage, but it quickly became political. The protest yesterday in Tehran was because of electricity cuts. So yes, people have different and specific grievances, but at the end of the day, the root cause of all of these calamities is the regime in Tehran. Today is the 13th or the 14th day of what began in Khuzestan in early July. And so it goes to show that the regime clearly cannot contain the protests; the regime is at its weakest and most fragile state in its 40-year history.
GD: Realistically, what role can the NCRI play in affecting change considering that your group is not actually in the country?
AS: While of course it is true that the leadership of the NCRI has been in exile, that is not to say that its network has been absent within the country. In every city that you see protests now, there have been hundreds of MEK members or sympathizers who have been executed by this regime in the past. And of course these people have families and many of them have children who are now grown up. And so the people that you see out in the streets, the fact that they repeat the very slogans that the MEK or the NCRI have been promoting for years goes to show the effectiveness of our movement.
GD: What do you think the Biden administration should be doing now vis-à-vis Iran policy?
AS: The Democratic Party and President Biden's platform during the election was that human rights and democracy will be front and center [in his administration]. He [Biden] should remain true to that pledge. And I think, for example, what happened in Khuzestan with eight people being killed, according to Amnesty International, required a decisive condemnation on the part of the administration. But what do we see? They are observing. Observation is not enough. You have to condemn Iran. Iranian people need to know that the Western world and particularly the United States stands with them in the real struggle for emancipation and freedom.
This whole JCPOA discussion is fruitless and helpless and is to the detriment of the Iranian people. Are they really going to lift the sanctions against Khamenei, the man who is responsible for, among other things, the 1988 massacre?
GD: What about the argument that these economic sanctions hurt ordinary Iranians?
AS: I think this is a false narrative that the pro-Iran lobby propagates in Western capitals. Remember, during Ahmadinejad's presidency Iran had $600 billion worth of oil revenues. Where did that money go? Why are 12 million Iranians hungry every night? Iran is a country with the second largest gas reserves in the world. Giving concessions to this regime has not improved the lives of average Iranians, and giving concession to this regime has not empowered the so-called moderates within this region.
GD: What's your response to detractors who say the NCRI, formerly designated a terror group by the US State Department, has a violent past, and that there isn't a constituency today in Iran that supports the group?
AS: When [former Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah] Khomeini declared a reign of terror in June 1981, basically eliminating the last vestiges of peaceful political activity, the MEK had no choice, but to defend itself. And of course, that right is recognized even by the Catholic Church, that whenever you have no other means of defending yourself, you can use whatever means are necessary. Nobody welcomes violence, but it is not we that dictate the form of this struggle. It is the enemy that does that.
We have always said to all of those who say we don't have any semblance of support inside Iran: Okay. Let's have a free election and see who the people of Iran will vote for. If they vote for us, fine. If they don't, that's also fine. We have been an opposition movement for 56 years. We're perfectly willing to be an opposition movement for another 56 years.
What We're Watching: Duterte's threat, West Africa's single currency, Raisi's hard line
Philippines' choice — jab or jail: As more countries get their hands on COVID vaccines, many are coming up with interesting schemes to convince skeptics to get the shot. But if you're in the Philippines, tough-talking President Rodrigo Duterte has the ultimate tough-love "incentive": he says he'll throw you in prison if you refuse your shot. A government spokesperson immediately sought to clarify Duterte's threatening comment, reassuring Filipinos that turning down a jab is not — yet — a criminal offense. This comes as the country's vaccination drive remains very slow, having fully inoculated only 2 percent of its population, in part due to high levels of vaccine hesitancy. Many Filipinos are turning down the Chinese shots provided by Duterte's pal President Xi Jinping because they perceive them as less effective and less trustworthy than the Pfizer and Moderna vaccines, which are scarce in the Philippines. Meanwhile, the Philippines continues to suffer one of Southeast Asia's worst COVID outbreaks.
West Africa plans single currency: The 15-member Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has agreed to roll out a single currency by 2027. ECOWAS leaders have agreed to the parameters of the plan, which would aim to "boost cross border trade and economic development" across the region, home to some of the poorest countries in the world. The plan has already been delayed three times, most recently because of pandemic-related disruptions. The currency, ECO, aims to replace the CFA Franc used in many former French colonies, allowing West African nations to gain economic independence from Paris, which still retains privileged access to government contracts in many of these states. But some problems persist. For example, Nigeria, Africa's largest economy whose central bank tightly manages foreign exchange policy, has reportedly been delaying the initiative. Meanwhile, ECOWAS is also not sure what to do about including problematic states like Mali, recently suspended from the regional bloc over a second coup.
Raisi speaks out: In his first press conference since "winning" Friday's pre-determined presidential vote, Iran's new President Ebrahim Raisi took a firm stance against the US, saying he was not interested in sitting down for a face-to-face with President Joe Biden. Raisi also said discussions on reducing Tehran's ballistic missile stockpile and over Iran's support for terror proxies like Hezbollah in Lebanon — major sticking points with Washington — were out of the question. Despite Raisi's combative stance, ongoing negotiations on resuming the 2015 nuclear deal, abandoned by the Trump administration in 2018, will continue because Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei calls the shots, and he continues to back this channel of communication — at least for now. Though Raisi talks a tough game, Khamenei is desperate for crippling economic sanctions to be lifted so Iran can resume selling oil to eager customers that have been blocked by the US from doing business with Tehran, although he also isn't willing to make too many concessions to the Americans.Iranian presidential candidate Ebrahim Raisi speaks during a campaign rally in Tehran.
This man will be Iran’s next president. Who is he?
Iranians will go to the polls on Friday to vote for president. While surprises are possible, it's very likely that Judiciary Chief Ebrahim Raisi will win, succeeding current President Hassan Rouhani, who is stepping down because of term limits.
Raisi is a true hardliner, and while Iranian presidents have a constrained role, he will leave an important mark on both foreign and domestic policy. Eurasia Group senior analyst Henry Rome explains who Raisi is, how he became the frontrunner, and what his election would mean for Iran.
Who is Raisi?
Raisi is ideologically very close to Khamenei, who has elevated Raisi to positions of national prominence throughout his career. Raisi has unimpeachable hardline credentials; he is well known in Iran as a participant in the 1988 "death commission," in which thousands of political prisoners were executed after summary trials. Yet Raisi is also a poor politician — uninspiring, uncharismatic, with only a tenuous grasp on issues facing average citizens. Rouhani beat him decisively in the 2017 election.
What does being the frontrunner mean in the Iranian context?
Iranian elections are historically neither free nor fair, but they are usually competitive and offer citizens real, if limited, choices. This year, the state took its electoral control to a new level. The Guardian Council, which vets candidates for national office and is closely aligned with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, disqualified several candidates who posed a potential challenge to Raisi, such as former parliament speaker Ali Larijani. The council's arbitrary disqualifications drew rebukes from across the political spectrum (and even half-hearted concern from Raisi himself). But Khamenei, who calls the shots at the end of the day, endorsed the council's actions.
Does Raisi have any competition?
Raisi has three competitors, including one moderate figure (six competitors were approved, but three have already dropped out; additional ones may pull out ahead of the race as well). Aside from Raisi, none of the remaining candidates has a national profile or base of support. With a lack of real options, most Iranians will likely sit out of the election. Only about 40 percent of Iranians have told pollsters they will vote, which would be the lowest turnout in the history of the country.
This will deprive Raisi of a real popular mandate and undermine the legitimacy of the election broadly.
Given the damage to its legitimacy, why is the state putting its thumb on the scale in favor of Raisi?
The state's intervention on behalf of Raisi is essentially a back-handed vote of confidence: It reflects a strong desire to elevate Raisi but real doubts about whether he could win on his own. Another electoral defeat would likely doom his career.
The broader context is quite important. Khamenei, who has led Iran since 1989, is 82, and concerns about succession have loomed large in the background of this campaign. Raisi is on a shortlist of people that Khamenei appears to be grooming for the top job, although he is not a shoo-in. Whether he succeeds Khamenei when the leader dies, Raisi is presumably a safe pair of hands during a potentially tumultuous leadership transition.
What would Raisi's election mean for the nuclear deal and relations with the US?
Khamenei is the ultimate decision-maker on issues like the nuclear agreement, but Raisi has publicly supported the deal and has pledged to get the US sanctions removed as quickly as possible. Raisi wants to benefit from the economic boost of a deal while blaming his predecessor for negotiating the uncomfortable and unpopular compromises that will make it possible. So if the parties reach a deal before the presidential inauguration in August, Raisi would likely honor it.
If they don't, he will likely help bring it quickly to a conclusion. Yet despite a nuclear deal, US-Iran relations will probably worsen in the coming years, given Raisi's staunchly anti-American stance and toxic history.
Iran has experienced period violent protests, largely focused on economic issues. What can Raisi offer on the economy and what is the risk of future unrest?
Raisi is a firm believer in Khamenei's notion of a "resistance economy," in which Iran builds up domestic capacity and self-reliance at the expense of broader global integration, especially with the West. But this strategy has very significant limitations. Iran's industrial sector, including automotive and energy, needs foreign inputs and investment to grow in a sustainable way. A more closed economy would struggle to create jobs, combat corruption, and raise living standards. And it would ignore the desire of many Iranians for closer ties with the West and for access to Western consumer goods.
Could that spell trouble for him?
Unmet popular expectations would leave Raisi exposed to popular discontent, especially once the initial economic benefits of a return to the nuclear agreement wear off. If Raisi gets roughed up in the presidency, the whole state may suffer further dents to its credibility. If Raisi is president that would mean that for the first time in the Islamic Republic, the presidency, judiciary, parliament, much of the media, and the security and intelligence services would all be in the hands of hardliners.
If and when things go wrong, it will be more difficult to point fingers elsewhere.
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Iran's presidential race: A choiceless choice
The field has narrowed in Iran's highly-anticipated presidential elections set for next month. The powerful Guardian Council has given a handful of candidates the go-ahead to compete for the presidency. But critics of the regime say it's barely a competition at all. What's happened so far, and what does this tell us about the state of Iran's domestic politics?
The process. Iran's electoral process is tightly controlled by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who has been in power since 1989 and calls all the shots in Iran. (Though Iran's president is head of the executive branch, he still answers directly to the supreme leader, who has the final say on foreign and domestic policy.)
The Guardian Council — made up of 12 appointees, half of whom are clerics handpicked by Khamenei himself, while the other six are judges or lawyers tapped by the head of Iran's judiciary — ultimately decides who can run for president. Of the 592 Iranians who put their hats in the ring this cycle, the Guardian Council narrowed the list down to just seven.
Analysts say this list is the least ideologically diverse in history. Most of those on the ballot are deemed "hardliners" — a faction that asserts Islamic law over personal freedom inside Iran and opposes engagement with the West.
"Raisi vs Raisi." Since former parliamentary speaker Ali Larijani — a candidate with significant name recognition — didn't make the cut, it's all but certain that Ebraim Raisi, a conservative cleric and the country's top judge, will secure the presidency. (Since 2019, Raisi has led the judiciary that selects Guardian Council members who… select presidential candidates.)
For months, the supreme leader and relevant government institutions have been tacitly pushing Raisi's candidacy, leading observers to muse that the race can be summed up as "Raisi vs Raisi." The other candidates are no-hopers, they say, several of whom have run for the presidency in previous years and barely made an electoral dent.
There are several discernible takeaways from the Iranian leadership's brazen attempt to fix the outcome of the race.
Risk vs reward. It's clear that Khamenei wants to remove any hurdles that could stand in the way of Raisi clinching the job. Many say that's because Raisi — an uncompromising hardliner who, as Deputy Tehran prosecutor in the 1980s, signed off on the execution of thousands of political prisoners after the Iran-Iraq War — is being groomed to replace the all-powerful supreme leader.
Raisi already lost one presidential race in 2017, and losing a second time would undermine Khamenei's attempt to market him as a successor with popular appeal. With the stakes this high (after all, Khamenei is 82) that's not a risk the supreme leader seems willing to take.
But the strategy could backfire. Disillusionment with a perceived rigged election is likely to depress voter turnout. Low participation would be extremely embarrassing for Khamenei, whose regime's domestic credibility has suffered significantly in recent years amid a spiraling economic downturn imposed by crippling US sanctions. Popular boycott of the election would give hardliners full control of government but little mandate to govern.
And from the regime's perspective, the only thing worse than voter apathy is voter anger. Iranians have a tradition of mass mobilizations to express discontent with economic stagnation and lack of political representation. (After a disputed election in 2009, for example, the Green Movement took the streets in massive numbers, posing the biggest threat to the regime since the 1979 Islamic Revolution.) This sort of upheaval would be disastrous for Khamenei and his cronies — and even Raisi has called for more candidates to be allowed to run, saying he hoped this year's race would be more "competitive and participatory."
Nuclear deal in limbo. Less clear, however, is how this all might affect the recently-resumed talks in Vienna with six world powers. It surely doesn't make them any easier. The Biden administration, for its part, says that it will only lift economic sanctions if Iran stops enriching uranium in compliance with the accord, but hardliners say that after former president Trump abandoned the deal in 2018, Washington can't be trusted. Indeed, reviving the deal will be harder if Iran's current President Hassan Rouhani is replaced with an ideologically intransigent hardliner who campaigns actively against compromise.
What can we expect now? A Raisi triumph. But as Ahmad Zeidabadi, an Iranian journalist and former political prisoner told the Financial Times:"A victory of Raisi after the elimination of his rivals would be nothing but winning a running race with turtles."