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The end of the transatlantic relationship as we know it
Donald Trump’s second term is having considerably more impact on the global stage than his first. Trump may have been a largely transactional president last time around, when he was more constrained at home and faced relatively more powerful counterparts abroad. But the first two months of Trump 2.0 have shattered the illusion of continuity. No American ally faces a ruder awakening than Europe, whose relationship with the United States is now fundamentally damaged.
Core partners in Asia like Japan, South Korea, India, as well as Australia worry about being hit with tariffs and will do what they can to defuse conflict, but they also know their geostrategic position vis-à-vis China means Trump can’t afford to alienate them entirely. Accordingly, their relations with Washington should remain comparatively stable over the next four years.
America’s largest trade partners, Mexico and Canada, are facing more significant trade pressures from the Trump administration, but the imbalance of power is such that they have no credible strategy to push back. Everyone understands they’ll have to accept Trump’s terms eventually; the only question is whether capitulation comes before or after a costly fight. Riding an 85% job approval, Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum has enough domestic political space to yield to Trump’s demands to keep Mexico in his good graces, as she is already doing. By contrast, Canadian leaders have a political incentive to put up a bigger fight because Trump’s threats toward Canada’s economy and sovereignty have sharply inflamed nationalist sentiment north of the border in the run-up to the April 28 elections. However, I expect Ottawa will quietly fold shortly after the vote to ensure that ongoing relations with the US remain functional.
Most US allies have no choice but to absorb Trump’s demands and hope for a reset after he’s gone. But Europe is different. It possesses both the collective heft to resist Trump’s demands and the existential imperative to do so.
Three structural forces render the transatlantic rupture permanent.
First, the European Union has the trade competency and market size to punch back against the Trump administration’s aggressive tariff blitz. Unlike most other US trading partners who lack the economic leverage to go toe-to-toe against Washington and have little choice but to fold under pressure, Brussels’ defiance ensures a protracted trade war with no easy resolution.
Second, most Europeans view the Trump administration’s unilateral pursuit of rapprochement with Russia as a direct threat to their national security. While President Trump would still like to end the war in Ukraine as he promised on the campaign trail, he is prepared to do so on the Kremlin’s terms – and he’s even more interested in business deals with Moscow. He won’t be deterred by a collapse of the Ukraine peace talks, even though it’s Vladimir Putin who’s shown no interest in softening his maximalist demands. Nor will Trump care that the Europeans stridently oppose US normalization with their principal enemy. After all, the United States is protected by two oceans from Putin’s army, and Trump’s embrace of Euroskeptic movements reveals their shared aim: a fragmented and weakened Europe that is easier to dominate.
The president’s rhetoric – echoed by the Signal-gate private texts, Special Envoy Steve Witkoff’s recent interview with Tucker Carlson, Vice President JD Vance’s Munich speech, and so many other pieces of evidence – makes clear that the current administration sees Europeans not as allies but as “pathetic freeloaders” who shouldn’t be “bailed out” as a matter of principle. Even if Washington begrudgingly agrees to provide them with transactional security, Europeans now realize that relying on a hostile US for survival is strategic suicide.
Which brings us to the third and final driver of the definitive US-Europe break: common values … or lack thereof. From free trade and collective security to territorial integrity and the rule of law, Europe’s foundational principles are now anathema to Trump’s America. Just look at Trump’s repeated threats to annex Greenland, to say nothing of his willingness to recognize illegally annexed Ukrainian territories as Russian and support Israel’s annexation of parts of the West Bank and Gaza. For an EU built from the ashes of World War II, it's hard to compromise with a worldview in which borders are mere suggestions and might makes right.
After years of complacency, European leaders seem to have finally gotten the message that the United States under Trump is not just an unreliable friend but an actively hostile power. They understand they need to drastically increase Europe’s sovereign military, technological, and economic capabilities – not just to survive without America but also to defend their borders, economies, and democracies against it. Whether they can muster the political mettle to act on this realization, however, is Europe’s greatest test since 1945.
Recent moves – Germany’s historic debt brake reform and Brussels’ fiscal and financial maneuvers to boost defense spending – hint at urgency. Yet half measures won’t suffice. If Europeans refuse to commit troops to guarantee Ukraine’s post-ceasefire security absent an American backstop and continue to balk at seizing Russia’s frozen assets and overriding Hungary’s veto, it will confirm my view that the bloc lacks the nerve to survive in a jungle-ruled world where Trump and Putin refuse to play by any rules.
The irony is that Europe has the resources and capacity to stand up for itself, its values, and its fellow Europeans. What’s missing is the collective courage to act like it’s 1938, not 1989. For Ukraine’s sake and its own, that needs to change.
The economic waves of Trump 2.0: Insights from The Economist's Zanny Minton Beddoes
Listen: On the GZERO World Podcast with Ian Bremmer, we ask The Economist's editor-in-chief Zanny Minton Beddoes: Did Wall Street get President Trump wrong?
Candidate Trump promised to lower taxes and drastically reduce government regulation. This message resonated as much with Wall Street as it did with Main Street. After surviving, if not thriving, under President Trump's first term in office, the business community no longer feared Trump's unpredictability. They overlooked his fixation on tariffs and his promises of mass deportations.
However, the first months of Trump 2.0 have been a time of economic warfare and market volatility. President Trump slapped tariffs on America's largest trading partners and closest allies and began to make good on a promise to deport millions of illegal immigrants. So where is this all heading, and what does it mean for the rest of the world?
Is the US-Europe alliance permanently damaged?
Carl Bildt, former prime minister of Sweden and co-chair of the European Council on Foreign Relations, shares his perspective on European politics from Stockholm, Sweden.
Is the transatlantic relationship permanently damaged by what we have seen during the last 10 days or so?
Well, there is no question that the last 10 days or so have been the worst by far for the transatlantic relationship in, well, modern recorded history. You can go through all of the details if you want. It started with the shameful vote in the UN General Assembly on the same day that was three years after the war of aggression that Russia started, where the United States turned around, lined up with Russia, and with primarily a bunch of countries that you would not normally like to be seen in the company of, in order to try to defeat the Europeans, and defeat the Ukrainians, and defeat the Japanese, and defeat the Australians, defeat all of the friends who have criticized the Russians.
It was truly shameful. It was defeated, needless to say, but it left deep marks there. And then it was downhill from there, with that particular week ending with the ambush in the Oval Office, with all of the details associated with that, with sort of a childish dispute about dress codes, and respect for whatever, and total disregard for the important issues that are at stake at the moment. And to that was added, the vice president seriously insulting the allies, primarily the British and the French, and then cutting of aid to Ukraine, including intelligence cooperation, which is unheard of, unheard of when it comes to these particular issues.
So, is damage permanent? Well, one would hope that... well, hope springs eternal, that there would be a way back. But this will be remembered for a long time to come. And the reaction in Europe, well, you have to keep a straight face if you are a political leader. And they do, they hope for the best, but they're increasingly preparing for the worst. What we might be heading into is Mr. Trump, President Trump lining up with President Putin in a deal that is essentially on Russia's term over Ukraine, then trying to force Ukraine into that particular deal, a repetition of Munich 1938.
Will that work? I think it's unlikely to work because the Ukrainians are determined to stand up for their country. And they have the support of the Europeans. Czechoslovakia in 1938 didn't have much support. So, whether it will work or not is debatable, but that is the direction in which things are heading at the moment. Can this be stopped or can the trajectory of things be changed? Let's hope. There's a flurry of meetings in Europe. There will be a lot of contacts across the Atlantic. There is a strong support for Ukraine in Europe, but then deep apprehensions of where we are heading. Further four years with President Trump. After that, (possibly) four to eight years with JD Vance. Well, well, there's a lot of thinking that needs to be done on this side of the Atlantic.
Why Trump won’t break the Putin-Xi alliance
Ian Bremmer shares his insights on global politics this week on World In :60.
Does Trump's relationship with Putin isolate or concern China?
I wouldn't say so. I think that Putin and Xi Jinping have one of the stronger relationships on the global stage today. I think they've met something like 81 times bilaterally since the two have been in power. They're both leaders for life, they run dictatorships, and they support each other all the time at the United Nations. There's a lot of technology and trade, and China needs to buy Russian energy. The Americans certainly don't. So, for lots of reasons, this relationship is much more stable and strong than anything that Trump is likely to build with Putin. Especially because Trump is a one more term president, 78 years old, with checks and balances in the US, even if they're getting weaker, they exist. That's not true in Russia. It's not true in China. So, I don't think Beijing is very worried about that.
What does the resignation of Iran's Vice President Zarif signal about tensions in the country?
Well, given the fact that the finance minister was also just impeached this weekend, also a would-be reformist, a moderate, in the context of the Iranian political spectrum, it means the supreme leader and the conservatives do not trust these guys to engage with the Americans or the West. It's a harder line Iranian policy as they move towards greater levels of stockpiling, of enriched uranium, and as their military strategy has fallen apart for the region. If anyone is going to talk to the Americans, and if anyone is going to try to forestall attacks from Israel, and maybe by the US as well, it's not going to be the people that got the original Iranian nuclear deal done, the JCPOA. So, that's what it looks like in reform. Nascent under a lot of trouble. The Iranian president under a lot of pressure right now at home.
What's next for the Israel-Hamas ceasefire as the first phase comes to an end?
Well, I think what everyone is waiting for is the Egypt deal, which is being penned and is being sent over in advance of an Arab League summit to Trump in the coming hours, if not day. Originally, it was a few hundred pages long. The Saudis told the Egyptians, "Maybe you want to have an executive summary that's a little glossier for Trump? He's not reading a couple hundred pages." That's been worked on all weekend. And it certainly isn't the Americans owning Gaza. It certainly isn't the Palestinians being forced out or all voluntarily leaving. Whether or not Trump is prepared to sign off on that, or at least allow it to go forward and not veto it, as long as it hits that hurdle, I think you'll have pretty much all of the Arab states signing off on it in the Arab summit. That's where we are right now, and I'll talk to you all real soon.
Can Europe broker a Ukraine ceasefire?
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: A Quick Take to kick off your week. The big news, everything around Russia, Ukraine, the United States, and Europe. The Europeans now with the ball in their court, a big summit, a coalition of the willing in London this week. And Zelensky very warmly embraced, quite literally, by UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer and by everyone in attendance. It was very different visuals, very different takeaways than the meeting between Zelensky, Trump, and Vance in the Oval Office, which couldn't have gone much worse if everyone tried.
Where we are right now, certainly this coalition of the willing had everyone that mattered in Europe. I mean, not the countries, not the leaders that have been skeptical, that have been more aligned with the Russians, or more, say, in a minimal position, like the Hungarians, like the Slovaks, but everybody else was there. So, you've got the Brits, you've got the French, you've got the Italians, and the Germans. You also have EU leadership, Ursula von der Leyen, Kaja Kallas, and also you have all of the frontline leaders that have the most at stake from a national security perspective: the Nordics, the Balts, the Poles. You even have Canada, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, who doesn't spend very much on defense, but nonetheless going there to show he's aligned with the Ukrainians, whether or not the Americans, who the Canadians rely on completely economically, are not.
Does it matter? Does it matter? If you're asking does it matter in the sense that can the Europeans go it alone without the Americans? I'm still skeptical, though they're putting a lot more on the table now than they were a week ago, and they should have been doing that years ago. And that's going to remain a very big question, and I'm probably going to remain pretty skeptical. But very interesting that the Europeans do now have a level of ownership. Remember that Trump, both when he was running for president and once he became president, said that the United States was going to end this war, that he, Trump, would be responsible for the ceasefire, that he's going to do it himself with the Ukrainians, with the Russians, he could do it in 24 hours. That's obviously an exaggeration, but nonetheless, even as he realized it was going to take longer, he was the dominant actor. That's now changed. Keir Starmer has now told Trump that the Europeans, this coalition of the willing, is coming up with a ceasefire plan, and they are going to present it to the United States, and Trump is expecting it.
So for now, the Europeans don't just have a seat at the table, but they actually are in the driver's seat, in terms of the ceasefire on the back of the Ukrainian-US relationship having functionally blown up, and the Americans saying they're not going to do anything particularly more for the Ukrainians. They're not even prepared to sign the critical minerals deal that Zelensky now says he is prepared to sign. But if the Europeans are the ones that are going to be coughing up the money and providing the troops, then certainly they're the ones that are responsible for the terms of the ceasefire.
Now, that's interesting. And we're hearing certainly that there's going to be a lot more engagement, that potentially Starmer, Macron, and Zelensky will all three come together to the White House to meet Trump maybe later this week, maybe next week. Certainly Zelensky should not be attending meetings like that by himself anymore, I think he understands that, the Europeans understand that as well.
What they should do now, the Europeans, is present a UN Security Council resolution with the plan once Trump has seen it and is prepared to move forward. A simple thing, deciding nothing, just saying that the Security Council supports the path to peace as outlined from the UK summit. This will force Russian amendments, which the UK and France will veto, and then Russia will be forced to veto the resolution. And that's useful in a couple of different ways. First of all, it costs the French and the UK nothing, and they win a fair amount. The news will be all about how their Russian veto was used for the first time since 1989, and it places the Americans on the same side as the Europeans on the ceasefire issue, which is what the Europeans, the Ukrainians desperately need, and frankly, the Democrats and the Republicans in Congress as well.
The UK and France can then show Trump that they indeed don't need to be invited to the table, because they're at the table, they have the ceasefire plan and they're the ones that are driving it. Now, having a ceasefire plan is different from being able to implement the ceasefire and support the Ukrainians, and that is where there's still an awful lot that still needs to be accomplished.
Specifically the one piece of good news, surprising news, is that the Germans are now talking about 800 billion Euro package, outside of their debt break, that would support defense spending and infrastructure spending. They weren't talking about anything remotely like this even a few days ago. It would have to be done well before the end of the month because when the new chancellor comes in, then you are going to have the far left and the far right with the ability to block any constitutional majority. They don't have that capacity now, which means the debt break can be overridden by a vote in the Bundestag. That's really important, and would lead to German leadership in helping to finance this war.
You also have the 300 billion Euros that are frozen, the Russian sovereign assets that are mostly in the hands of the Europeans, the Belgians, as it turns out, and some others as opposed to the Americans, the Japanese. So, that could also be used to support Ukraine to buy more weapons, also to build up Ukraine's military industrial complex. In other words, while this situation is difficult and urgent, I would not yet say that it has fallen apart for the Ukrainians or the Europeans. They are still, as it were, in the game.
Now, the big question overlooking all of this is the United States and Russia, because they still want to do a deal, and that deal is not mostly about Ukraine, that deal mostly is about rapprochement between the United States and Russia over the heads of their NATO allies. This is what Trump is interested in, this is what Putin is interested. And frankly, it's a little easier to do that deal if you don't have a ceasefire, because the Russians don't really want one, than it is to do that deal if a ceasefire is a part of it. That's what has to be watched very carefully because of course, Trump and Putin are talking about where they're going to meet in person, Saudi Arabia maybe in May, Trump would even be willing to go to Moscow. This could include things like the United States taking unilateral sanctions off of Russia while the Europeans would still have them on. Could lead to a lot of business, a much bigger critical minerals deal than the one that was going to be signed between the Americans and the Ukrainians, and now, at least, is off the table.
Also note that the US Defense Department has at least temporarily suspended offensive cyberattacks against the Russians, which is quite something, again, in the context of nothing having been agreed to between the Americans and the Russians, but clearly Trump much more willing to be on Putin's good side right now than he is with Zelensky. So ultimately, that is a very big challenge for the Europeans, but they will be in far better shape if they're able to move on the ceasefire in the near-term, which looks likely, and on support for Ukraine in the medium-term, which looks like more of a challenge.
So, that's it for now. I'll talk to you all real soon.
Playing cards depicting President Donald Trump on display in West Palm Beach, Florida, late last year.
Opinion: The US president plays a Trump card on Ukraine
On the 2016 campaign trail, Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton was fond of repeating the truism: When someone shows you who they are, believe them. In a particular clip from August 2016, Clinton underscored her assessment of then-adversary and Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump by saying, “There is no new Donald Trump.”
Europe has been forced to confront this lesson once again in recent weeks. As the Trump 2.0 administration unveiled its foreign policy priorities, European leaders initially adopted a wait-and-see approach. They even held their breath for a window of opportunity around Ukraine. When Trump adjusted his ambitions to allow for a six-month timeframe to reach an agreement, after promising repeatedly on the campaign trail to end the war on his first day in office, European capitals felt buoyed that he was perhaps pursuing pragmatism.
All their cautious confidence has now left the room – only to be replaced by a rolling panic.
A period marked by Vice President JD Vance chastising Europe at the Munich Security Conference, high-level meetings between US and Russian delegations in Saudi Arabia, and Trump declaring Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky a “dictator” on Truth Social has riled European allies and left them looking for solid ground. A televised White House meeting between Zelensky and Trump on Friday devolved from cordial to transparently contentious in just 45 minutes.
With no apparent points of leverage, Vladimir Putin has managed to bring the US significantly closer to Russia’s preferred position. At this weekend’s summit in London, European leaders were forced to face a familiar and devastating fact: Even an isolated Russia is capable of strategically shifting the conversation as long as Putin leads. No amount of economic pain, coordinated sanctions, or falling of Syria’s Assad regime has changed this.
A set of votes at the United Nations last week measured just how much things have changed. Three years ago, a March 2022 UN General Assembly resolution deploring Russian aggression against Ukraine in violation of the UN Charter was overwhelmingly adopted. The US joined 141 others in favor, while Russia found itself in the company of only four states. Last week, in an about-face, the US sided with Russia (and against its European allies) in two resolutions to mark the third anniversary of the conflict.
These votes reflect not only the gulf that has opened across the Atlantic; they also raise questions about the geopolitical landscape moving forward. After the March 2022 resolution, analysts began speaking fervently of a Global North-South world order. Russia and its near partners (those who stood against) – Belarus, North Korea, and Syria – and its sympathizers (the abstainers) – South Africa, China, India, and Bolivia against the US and Europe. Now, a question with long-term implications is emerging: How entrenched will the US pivot on Russia-Ukraine prove to be, and what does it mean for the future world order?
In the near term, European leaders are wrestling with how to manage the US president. Projects such asHarvard Law School’s Program on Negotiation categorize business negotiation styles from collaborative (I win – you win) on one end of the spectrum to avoidant (I lose – you lose) on the other. Negotiations are frequently circumstance-dependent, meaning that adopting a flexible approach responsive to the business at hand – and one’s adversary – is often advantageous.
Trump is, however, a predictable negotiator. His worldview always leads him to adopt a competitive (I win – you lose) approach in which heanchors a negotiation by “naming a price” early in the process, effectively bounding subsequent rounds. This is what is meant when his foreign policy is described as “transactional.”
With Colombia, for example, Trump threatened 25% tariffs that would escalate to 50% if it did not accept migrant flights. There was no win in these “negotiations.” Colombian President Gustavo Petro gave Trump what he wanted, and Trump backed off. Canada and Mexico were left in similar positions after Trump announced 25% tariffs. Each quickly made concessions to give Trump the win and reduce the economic pain at home. Both now face the hard news that their compromises were not enough, and levies are set to go ahead this week after the brief reprieve.
European allies would do well to remember that there is no new Trump. And there is evidence that some European leaders are beginning to update their model of him, accordingly. As part of a joint press conference last week held with Trump, French President Emmanuel Macron indicated that he and Europe were ready to help guarantee Ukraine’s security by sending troops to Ukraine. Not to be outdone, UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer preempted his own visit to the White House by announcing that British troops would also be available when needed.
Zelensky, who had a front line to Trump during his first administration, is also keenly aware of who he is. Anticipating a Trump 2.0 presidency, Zelensky’s team purportedly devised the idea for the US-Ukraine mineral deal, which the two were meant to sign in Washington on Friday.
In the closing minutes of their fruitless meeting,Trump warned Zelensky, “You’ve got to be more thankful because, let me tell you, you don’t have the cards. With us, you have the cards, but without us, you don’t have any cards.”
Trump prefers to hold all the cards, shuffle them at will, and throw down a new hand to the world’s surprise. Yet, even when the substance shifts – as it has dramatically over the last weeks in Europe – the process remains the same: Trump will be looking for the win.
Lindsay Newman is a geopolitical risk expert and columnist for GZERO.
Trump's Ukraine peace plan confuses Europe leaders
What is the European reaction to what President Trump is trying to achieve in terms of peace?
Well, confusion. A lot of people, and there are quite a number of European leaders here, today, don't really understand what President Trump is up to. He wants peace, that's fine. But peace can be, well, that could be the complete capitulation of Ukraine, that is the Putin definition of peace. Or it can be the victory of Ukraine, that's another definition of peace. So exactly how President Trump intends to pursue this? And without Europe, obviously, neither Putin nor Trump wants Europe around the table.
But how do you do it without Ukraine on the table? Because a lot of the things that are going to be necessary to agree with are things that have to be agreed with Ukraine, with President Zelensky. So a lot of question marks. The desire for peace is clearly here, no question about that. This war has to come to end. But the peace has to be just, it has to be stable. It has to be something that is not just a pause for Russia to recalibrate and restart the war.
So a lot of things to discuss between the European leaders and between the European leaders and President Zelensky, is happening in Kyiv here today. But also eventually, across the Atlantic, President Macron is in Washington today, Prime Minister Starmer is heading into Washington on Thursday.
Germany's close election limits its ability to lead Europe
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: Lots going on the German elections. Probably the most important though, everything around Europe and Russia and Ukraine and the United States kind of dominating the headlines right now. Germany went pretty much the way we all expected. The polls have been very, very steady over the course of the past couple of months. The big question was whether or not you could have a two-party or a three-party coalition that really depended on whether or not parties that were small would get over the 5% hurdle that allows them representation in Germany's parliament, in which case it would be harder to put together a government. You'd need three parties or whether they would stay out. The latter turned out to be the case. Didn't find that out until three A.M. in Germany. Very unusual how close in that regard the election was for those smaller parties, and that means you're going to get a grand coalition, a two-party coalition center-right and center-left.
They don't agree on a lot of policies. It is hard to get good outcomes politically from that kind of a coalition, but it's not unusual in Germany. The other big news, the Alternative für Deutschland performing about as well as they were expected to over the course of the past couple months, they came in a solid second. They won across former East Germany and they got single digits across former West Germany. But that's better than they performed last time around, even though their popularity has been high for a while now, certainly if you think about their trajectory over the some 12 years since they were founded, this is now a party that has a solid shot of being number one in 2029 next German elections, especially if the Germans are unable to turn their economy around. Though on migration, most of the German political spectrum has aligned with where AfD, more or less is just as we've seen across many countries in Europe, like in Italy and in the UK and France and elsewhere.
Okay. So that's the near-term outcome. Still a grand coalition is going to have a hard time spending a huge amount of money on defense or on Ukraine aid or on German growth. And there is some urgency in seeing if you can at least pass more German defense spending outside of their hard fast debt break while the present Scholz-led three-party coalition is in place. Why? Because there is a constitutional majority blocking capacity among the hard left and hard right parties, Die Linke and the AfD in Germany, which means that unless you get one of them on your side, you're not going to be able to do that spending. So the big takeaway here is Germany is probably going to have a really hard time really stepping up as a leader on doing far more in Europe for Europe than even you've seen under Scholz. It's going to be a more powerful government, but not the kind of power that they really need.
So here's a situation where Friedrich Merz, who will be the next German chancellor coming out immediately and saying that they can no longer count on the United States, that even NATO's existence as we look forward to the June NATO summit is open to question that Germany and Europe are going to have to have European defense without the United States, independent of the US claiming that American intervention in Germany's election in favor of the AfD considered by the other German parties to be a neo-Nazi party is as striking and dangerous in intervention and unacceptable as Moscow interventions into Germany's democracy. In other words, the German leadership, the next German chancellor, understanding that the US is an ally, believes that Trump and his administration is an adversary, is an enemy. And that is a truly shocking thing to hear from the incoming German government. Having said all of that, saying it is one thing, taking action to ensure that the Europeans are capable of defending themselves is quite another, and they're nowhere remotely close to that.
Macron in the United States today will be meeting with Trump shortly, meeting with him by himself. Kier Starmer from the UK later this week, same. Are their positions coordinated? More than they have been. But can they do enough? Can they put enough on the table in terms of financing, in terms of boots on the ground in Ukraine absent an American backstop? No, they can't. And I think as a consequence, the baseline expectation is that the US effort at rapprochement with Putin is going ahead. That the US effort of cutting a deal with Putin on Ukraine over the heads of the Ukrainians and the Europeans is largely going ahead. And this of course bodes very badly for the future of Ukraine and Zelensky, but also really does undermine the existence, the strength of NATO as the world's most important collective security agreement. I don't see Trump as wanting to end all military cooperation in Europe.
He just met with the Polish president. It was a very short meeting, supposed to be an hour was 10 minutes. But the important thing for the Poles was announced, which is the US is still committed to maintaining American troops on the ground in Poland. Why? Because Poland is not only very friendly to the US, but it's also moving towards 5% of GDP spend on defense in this year. And it's also said that they're not sending any troops to Ukraine in a post-ceasefire environment. Why not? Well, number one, because they need troops on the ground in Poland. But number two, because the Russians have said that they won't accept any European troops, and right now that's Trump's position. So Poland doesn't want to undermine their important defense protector, the Americans and President Trump. All of this is to say that there's probably going to be more division inside Europe as a consequence of these policies that Trump is putting forward. It's going to be very hard for him to maintain strong unity of Europe, even as they are facing more existential challenges economically in terms of their competitiveness, their growth, and most importantly in terms of their national security. So that's where we are right now. Enormous amount of news coming down the pike this week. Haven't even talked about the latest on Israel and Gaza and China and everything else. But if this is the big news, might as well cover it. Talk to you all real soon.