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Ten thousand protesters gather in front of Duesseldorf Central Station to march against the AfD's upcoming afternoon rally in Duesseldorf, Germany, on Feb. 15, 2025.
Viewpoint: Far right surges to prominence ahead of German elections
Amid a deep economic crisis and renewed migration concerns, the far-right party Alternative for Germany, or AfD, is poised to double its vote share in this weekend’s general elections. As a series of random attacks by Middle Eastern or Afghan migrants have increased the appeal of the party’s harsh anti-migration stance, its gains have caught the eye of officials in US President Donald Trump’s administration. In highly unusual interventions, presidential adviser Elon Musk has urged Germans to “move past” the guilt associated with World War II and vote for the extremist AfD, while Vice President JD Vance criticized the refusal of mainstream political leaders to work with the party.
Eurasia Group expert Jan Techau says the AfD has no path to government at present, but its increasing strength is transforming German politics. We sat down with him to learn more.
What are the main issues in these elections?
Two issues stand out. The first is the economy. With terms like “de-industrialization” being bandied around, this is no cyclical adjustment but a profound economic crisis caused by a decline in productivity, high energy prices, and high taxation. Every single party has acknowledged this, even the ones that don’t typically run on economic platforms. The second is migration, which had faded into the background a little, but has been revived in the last couple of months by a series of horrific incidents. In the last one, a rejected Afghan asylum seeker, who, for whatever reason still had a residence permit, drove a car into a crowd.
The war in Ukraine also preoccupies voters, but to a lesser extent at present. The issue is expected to gain prominence during the government formation talks after the elections, especially given US President Donald Trump’s recent outreach to Russia’s Vladimir Putin to start ceasefire talks.
What has been the impact of Vance’s and Musk’s interventions in favor of the AfD?
The AfD’s strong polling is mainly the result of the recent attacks that have stoked concerns over uncontrolled migration, not these interventions by external players. Still, their comments help the AfD by normalizing it and giving it more visibility and air time. Vance’s speech at the Munich Security Conference sent a clear signal to the foreign policy establishment assembled there: The new US government seeks friendship with far-right nationalists in Europe and considers them its real allies. This has not yet translated into better polling for the AfD but has clearly strengthened its confidence.
How do you expect the AfD to perform in the elections?
The party appears on track to win 21% or 22% of the vote, doubling its share from the last elections and finishing second behind the center-right Christian Democrats, or CDU, which is polling at about 30%. The AfD won’t be able to enter government given the aversion of mainstream parties to working with it, but it will lead the opposition, allowing it to partially set the agenda from the political fringes. The AfD’s strategy will be to adopt an obstructionist stance to make the government look bad and improve the party’s position even further ahead of the 2029 elections.
The CDU recently took a risk by accepting AdF support for a proposed bill of harsh migration measures, which was rejected by parliament. Does that mean the gambit failed?
I think it's too early to make a final judgment on whether this move was strategically successful. The aim was to create more space for centrist parties to advance stricter migration policies without being accused of pandering to the far right. What we can say is that the move has not affected the CDU’s comfortable lead in the polls despite the harsh criticism received from other mainstream parties. So, we’ll see if the next government, which the CDU is expected to lead, can advance stricter migration policies. It's interesting to note that the Christian Democrats are one of the few center-right parties that remain competitive in Europe. In most other countries they have been eclipsed by formations advocating more radical policies on migration. CDU leader Friedrich Merz is trying to avoid this fate.
So, do you expect the CDU to rule in coalition with other parties, and if so, what does that mean for governance?
Yes, we expect the CDU to form a coalition with the Social Democrats and, if necessary, another party as well. Single-party majorities or minority governments are very uncommon in the German system. Of course, coalition means compromise, which could lead to an indecisive reform agenda that is not sufficient to address the issues we see at the moment. But maybe this time will be different and the mainstream parties can rise to the occasion. They know that the AfD is waiting in the wings and eager to capitalize on any governmental dysfunction in the 2029 elections.
When will we get some indication about the cohesion and strength of the next government?
The post-election coalition talks that will start shortly after the elections will give us an idea about what the next government wants to do and what – beyond the parties’ campaign rhetoric – is really possible. The war in Ukraine will also start to have an impact at this point, as the new government will have to contemplate the policy implications of Trump’s push to broker a cease-fire and get European countries to assume more responsibility for Ukraine’s security. The German mindset is very domestically focused, and the government will very likely be faced early on with requests to shoulder a massive new military exposure.
Edited by Jonathan House, senior editor at Eurasia Group.
Germany’s Friedrich Merz in front of poker table.
Germany’s Friedrich Merz and a bold political gamble
Italy’s Fratelli d’Italia, Poland’s Law and Justice, and Germany’s Alternative for Germany (AfD) parties have so far remained outside the bloc, but the European Conservatives and Reformists group, which includes Italy’s Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, published a letter last month warning Europe’s center-right establishment to work more closely with the Patriots to obstruct left-wing migration, green, and other “woke” policies. Part of the goal, argued the letter’s authors, is to build durable new ties with US President Donald Trump.
This is the backdrop for a clever political maneuver from Friedrich Merz, leader of the traditional center-right Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and the prohibitive favorite to become Germany’s next chancellor following a general election on Feb. 23. Merz has wrestled for weeks with the question of how to peel voter support away from the anti-immigrant AfD — without appearing to cooperate with a party that many Germans consider openly fascist.
During a late January parliamentary vote on toughening Germany’s asylum and refugee policy, Merz’s CDU accepted support from the AfD for a tougher border approach without publicly seeking it. For the first time in the country’s postwar history, a non-binding motion passed the Bundestag with the help of the far right, shattering a decades-old taboo. In response, the AfD’s many critics among political officials, the media, and the public turned the rhetoric up to 11. Merz stood accused of tearing down the political firewall that separates Germany’s center right from the far right and throwing open the “gates of Hell.” Protests, some of them violent, erupted across the country. The measure was narrowly defeated.
Then came the political jiu-jitsu from Merz. The political veteran refused to apologize. He argued that he had not sought support from the AfD and that the political firewall that continues to leave the nativist party in the isolation ward remains fully intact, vowing to never form a coalition with it. But, argued Merz, the new immigration restrictions were the correct policy for Germany. They remain the right policy, even when supported by the wrong people.
Next came a polling surprise. Not only did this dust-up fail to damage Merz’s pre-election popularity ratings, but the display of political backbone strengthened his party’s position in pre-election polling. We shouldn’t be surprised. Merz is widely viewed as a capable technocrat but not an exciting politician. His move on migrant policy, and the willingness to take hits for perceived cooperation with the AfD, is seen as a major political gamble on the eve of an election he’s already favored to win.
By both defying political consensus and then reaffirming that direct cooperation with the AfD remains out of bounds, Merz has presented himself as a more forceful leader than current Chancellor Olaf Scholz. By breaking the taboo on tougher migration and asylum rules, he has also boosted the credibility of political arguments that equivocation on these policies by Scholz and his government has done more to boost the AfD than Merz’s party has done or will do.
Migration has been the primary fuel for the AfD’s surge over the past decade as the number of asylum-seekers has overwhelmed a German system designed for much smaller numbers of people. The CDU/CSU can now feel vindicated in their migration policy strategy and can open more space for tougher policies backed by centrist parties, robbing the AfD of its go-to campaign topic. In fact, it was Christian Lindner — leader of the pro-business Free Democrats and the man whose dismissal as finance minister in November collapsed Scholz’s coalition government — who made the argument most forcefully: “Democracy must deliver so that people don’t look for an alternative to democracy.”
If the CDU/CSU wins on Feb. 23 and Merz becomes the next chancellor, highly likely outcomes, he may have scored a political win that other center-right parties in Europe have consistently missed. In France and Britain, traditional conservatives have taken a migration beating. Following last July’s second-round parliamentary elections in France, Le Pen’s populist-nationalist National Rally won more than 37% of votes to just 5.4% for the traditional center-right Les Republicans. In the UK, the Conservative Party, which held power for 14 years before losing to Labour late last year, finished third place (!) in a poll published last week. Nigel Farage’s UK Reform Party, the most hardline anti-immigration choice on offer, has pushed past Labour to take the lead, though within the poll’s margin of error.
Has Merz changed the political rules on how Europe’s center-right handles the always emotive topic of immigration? Time will tell. If so, Merz’s bold political gamble might be remembered as a game-changer well beyond Germany.