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Scandals and hope at the UN: Is it worth it?
What good is the United Nations in 2024?
With wars raging, AI disrupting, inequality growing, and climate change accelerating, UN Secretary-General António Guterres says that “a powder keg risks engulfing the world.”
That’s one reason why the GZERO team is paying close attention to a giant gabfest, where leaders like President Joe Biden and Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, policymakers, diplomats, and influencers from 193 countries have gathered this week to try to solve some of the world’s most intractable problems.
It’s why you saw Ian Bremmer’sexclusive interview with Guterres on our PBS TV program GZERO World or, as we reported today in our morning newsletter, we have Iran’s Vice President for Strategic Affairs Mohammad Javad Zarif on the show denying that Iran was involved in the assassination attempts on former President Donald Trump, while admitting that US election hacking came from someone in his country. Watch the clip here and tune in next week for the full interview on GZERO World with Ian Bremmer.
It’s also why we hosted and broadcast a series of key livestreams with world leaders covering everything from governing AI to the conflicts in Europe, Lebanon, Gaza, and Ukraine.
I have been incredibly proud of the work the team has done sorting through the global noise to get at the clear political signals while highlighting the issues in an insightful, nonpartisan way.
But the question remains: Why bother paying attention to the UN?
It’s easy to be cynical about the UN. As Brett Stephens once described it, “The U.N. is a never-ending scandal disguised as an everlasting hope. The hope is that dialogue can overcome distrust, and collective security can be made to work in the interests of humanity. Reality says otherwise.”
Scandals, failures, hypocrisies, and disappointments fly around the UN as prominently as the flags around its New York City headquarters, and Stephens waved many of them, from the failure to stop the genocide in Rwanda and the massacre in Srebrenica, to corruption in the oil-for-food program in Iraq. That was back in 2018.
Today there are even more, from the outrage surrounding allegations that some UNRWA workers worked with Hamas during the Oct. 7 massacres, to the obstructive dysfunctions of the five permanent members that have veto powers, which has proven to be a tragic obstacle to real global action in key conflicts, like Sudan. It’s hard to take the UN seriously when Iran gets a turn chairing its Human Rights Council Social Forum.
Even reading through the main agenda of the 79th General Assembly session, it’s understandable why some critics experience high-speed eye-rolling that rivals the backspin on a Roger Federer backhand. For example, one goal says: “Achieving global nuclear disarmament is the highest disarmament priority of the United Nations.” How’s that going? Just yesterday, Russian leader Vladimir Putin announced that he was alerting his nuclear doctrine to lower the threshold needed to justify the use of nuclear weapons, a major escalation in the war in Ukraine.
Meanwhile, less than 20% of the famed 17 Sustainable Development Goals are on track to be completed by 2030.
“The Secretariat Building in New York has 38 stories. If you lost 10 stories today it wouldn’t make a bit of difference,” quipped John Bolton, the US ambassador to the UN under former President George W. Bush. Many critics today still think he’s right.
But is he?
Only pointing out the UN’s failures to solve complex global problems is like describing Ted Williams as a guy who failed to get a hit 60% of the time, instead of noting that a baseball player hitting .400 is one of the greatest feats in sports. It’s like dismissing venture capital investors as losers because at least 80% of their investments go bust, instead of focusing on the ones that succeed and more than make up for the other losses. In very hard challenges, a low success rate can still be a major victory.
Back in 1973, Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber coined the term “wicked problem” to describe political, environmental, or security challenges that are uniquely difficult to solve and may have no single right answer. That’s where the UN is needed most, to pull in global voices that often disagree or are at war with each other and make a genuine attempt to solve wicked problems. That takes time.
The fact is, there are many UN successes, notably the World Food Programme, which helps over 80 million people, delivering food, medicines, and vaccines to countries in crisis. There are peace treaties and accords establishing norms and conventions, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, its most famous document.
This past week, there was a major success in global governance on AI with the Global Digital Compact, which was signed by most major countries except Russia. They agreed to everything from global standards on accessibility, use, and design, to the establishment of an international scientific panel, which will — like the IPCC does for climate — create a measuring tool and a road map for how AI governance might unfold. There is literally no other place in the world where this could happen.
Is there a need for UN reform? Of course. That is why, for example, there is a strong push to create two permanent seats for Africa on the Security Council. In this video that I urge you to check out, Ian Bremmer argues that despite the challenges facing the world’s largest multilateral organization, the UN is more relevant than ever.
But the institution is only as good as the members make it through their financial contributions, attendance, and support. One of the key challenges is making all the work that is happening — and there is a lot — understandable and relevant to the wider public in order to overcome the massive trust deficit the UN faces.
Reestablishing trust takes radical transparency, and that’s why GZERO has made such an effort to pull back the curtain and give people a chance to see, hear, and debate the real policies and ideas that are being pitched. You should be able to judge for yourself if the UN is useful or not. We hope our coverage gives you the tools to do just that.
Hard Numbers: Polish razor wire, Ecuadoran cop killers, drug deal of the century, Cairo’s COP crackdown
3: To head off a potential migrant crisis, Polish authorities are laying three rows of razor wire fencing along the border with the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad. The issue isn’t Russians fleeing the draft but Kaliningrad airport’s welcoming of flights from the Middle East and Africa, which Poland fears may carry refugees and asylum-seekers. Last year, a Poland-Belarus border crisis erupted when Minsk pulled a similar move.
5: At least five Ecuadoran police officers were killed Tuesday as gangs reacted violently to government plans to transfer prisoners among the country’s notoriously overcrowded prisons. In response, President Guillermo Lasso declared a state of emergency in two Ecuadoran provinces as his government struggles to stamp out powerful drug gangs running product to the US and Europe.
10 billion: Speaking of drugs, two of America’s largest pharmacy chains, CVS and Walgreens, reached a tentative deal to pay $10 billion in damages for their role in fomenting the US opioid crisis. The money would go to state governments and Native American tribal authorities. Opioid deaths in the US rose 15% last year, breaking 100,000.
67: Local human rights groups say the government of Egyptian strongman Abdel Fattah el-Sissi has arrested at least 67 climate activists recently, as Cairo prepares to host the United Nations’ COP27 climate summit next week. Climate activism star Greta Thunberg has already announced she’ll boycott the summit over Egypt’s abysmal human rights record.
Pelosi’s Taiwan trip is a gift to China
Between the passage of the Inflation Reduction Act and the CHIPS Act, the successful assassination of al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahri without collateral damage, a blockbuster jobs report that laid to rest any talk ofrecession, a sharp decline in inflation expectations on the back of 57 straight days of falling gas prices, and solidly red state Kansas voting down abortion restrictions, the Biden administration has had an exceptional couple of weeks.
But there is one bit of very bad news raining on Biden’s parade: House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan has increased tensions between the U.S. and China to their highest point since the Tiananmen Square massacre.
The political status of Taiwan has long been a central sticking point in U.S.-China relations. While de facto an independent and self-governing entity that considers itself a sovereign state, Taiwan is considered by mainland China and by the international community—including the United States—as a part of “one China.” Beijing claims it as a province of China and seeks to eventually achieve reunification, peacefully if possible but by force if necessary. For its part, Washington’s position is one of “strategic ambiguity”: guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the United States acknowledges China’s claims on Taiwan (i.e., the “One-China” principle) at the same time as it opposes both unilateral unification and Taiwanese independence—all the while lending economic and military support to enable Taiwan to defend itself from coercion.
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Nancy Pelosi meets with Taiwan's President Tsai Ing-wen in Taipei on August 3.Chien Chih-Hung/Office of the President via Getty Images
Under President Xi Jinping, China has turned more assertive about reunification, which Xi considers one of the primary goals of his rule and a necessary condition for the country’s “rejuvenation.” As China’s economic and military capabilities have grown and the balance of power has moved in Beijing’s favor, Chinese intimidation of Taipei and incursions into the Taiwan Strait have become increasingly commonplace, heightening the risk of confrontation.
However, ever since watching the Russian invasion of Ukraine galvanize a once“brain dead” transatlantic alliance overnight, Xi had adopted a more cautious stance on Taiwan, fearing that any move toward coercive reunification would be met with strong and united opposition from America and its allies—potentially risking a humiliating military defeat, devastating economic sanctions, and sweeping diplomatic isolation. This was a risk Xi was not willing to take in the run-up to the 20th Party Congress, where he’s set to secure a norm-defying third term in power.
House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan last week upended that calculus.
Despite clear and consistent Chinese warnings as well as opposition from both President Biden and American allies, the soon-to-be-retired 82-year-old congresswoman unilaterally made a highly consequential foreign policy decision for personal reasons, without U.S. strategic goals in mind. Knowing that Biden opposed the move and had no interest in a near-term conflict over Taiwan, Xi Jinping suddenly found himself able to shift the status quo in his favor with minimal risk of retaliation.
And that’s exactly what he did. So far, China has blocked food imports from and suspended sand exports to Taiwan. They launched cyberattacks on Taiwanese infrastructure. They conducted unprecedented live-fire military drills effectively surrounding Taiwan. They launched missiles over Taiwanese territory. They flew aircraft into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone and crossed the median line. Many of these exercises are likely to continue for at least the next month. And on Wednesday, China withdrew an earlier promise not to deploy troops to Taiwan following an eventual reunification.
Chinese military helicopters perform drills near Taiwan. Hector Retamal/AFP via Getty Images
Pelosi’s unnecessary provocation gave Xi cover to engage in meaningful yet carefully calculated escalation, chipping away at Taiwan’s sovereignty and increasing its presence in the Taiwan Strait with virtually no consequences. While this crisis is very unlikely to lead to war between the U.S. and China, it increases the odds of accidents and miscalculation and further erodes whatever guardrails exist to prevent direct military conflict.
Importantly, the crisis highlights America’s structural credibility deficit on the global stage, weakening the United States and emboldening China. In the eyes of U.S. friends and foes alike, domestic political division and dysfunction cast doubt on America’s long-term commitments and strategic orientation. Beijing will seek to exploit these vulnerabilities going forward, waiting for the U.S. to make additional unforced errors that allow China to change the status quo in Taiwan with minimal risk of retaliation.
Unfortunately for the United States—and Taiwan—there may be plenty such opportunities in the near future. Should Republicans take the House in November’s midterm elections (as expected), for example, the new Republican House Speaker would likely lead a larger and more rhetorically provocative congressional delegation to Taiwan than Pelosi did, prompting China to escalate further without risking a significant response from President Biden. A potential constitutional crisis after the 2024 presidential election would also encourage China to act while the U.S. is consumed by infighting.
As is too often the case these days, the greatest threat to American interests is American dysfunction.
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Analysis: Pelosi's Taiwan visit increases U.S.-China tensions but won't lead to war
House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, the most powerful member of the United States Congress, has now returned from a trip to Asia, which included a stopover in Taiwan. The fallout from that visit has only just begun.
When media reports first appeared that she wanted to go, China’s government began issuing warnings of grave consequences. The U.S., Chinese officials insisted, was playing with fire. What’s more, Joe Biden, the embattled U.S. president and leader of Pelosi’s Democratic Party, made clear through surrogates and leaks to the media that he thought a stop in Taiwan was an unnecessarily provocative and poorly timed idea. His administration is trying to cool rising tensions with China, and Biden knew Pelosi’s trip would do the opposite.
Pelosi decided to go because she knows she is nearing the end of her political career and wants to be remembered as a leader unafraid to stand up for a determined democracy trapped in the shadow of a giant authoritarian bully.
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Nancy Pelosi meets with Taiwan's President Tsai Ing-wen in Taipei on August 3.Chien Chih-Hung/Office of The President via Getty Images
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Pelosi’s supporters point out there is precedent for such a visit. A quarter century ago, then-House Speaker Newt Gingrich ignored shrill warnings from Beijing and went to Taipei.
But much has changed in 25 years. America’s global military power remains unrivaled, but China’s own military might, at least in its immediate neighborhood, is now far greater than it was. In the 1990s, China had to accept that threats to directly confront the United States Navy wouldn’t add much muscle to its negotiating leverage. Today, the balance of force is far less clear.
And the timing is far more sensitive, because China is weeks away from a historic party congress at which President Xi Jinping, architect of China’s aggressive foreign policy, will choreograph his own coronation for a third term that breaks with modern China’s history of institutional rule. This is not a time when China’s leader will shrug off an American act of assertiveness that he’s already denounced.
The most important thing that Pelosi’s stopover in Taiwan has accomplished is to once again underline the unsustainable absurdity of the U.S.-China agreement on Taiwan. China’s government continues to pretend it has the right to force 23 million citizens of democratic Taiwan to accept the right of China’s Communist Party to impose a police state on them. Washington goes on pretending that it cares as much about Taiwan’s future as China does. The official policy of the United States is to recognize that there is only “One China” in theory but to leave open the possibility it will fight a war to prevent Beijing from using force to create “One China” in practice.
President Biden has added to the confusion by insisting on three separate occasions that America would fight China to protect Taiwan, a statement studiously avoided by past presidents. Despite his clear declarations, representatives of his White House have tried to protect America’s strategic ambiguity by insisting that Biden has not changed U.S. policy.
Meanwhile, China’s foreign minister described Pelosi’s Taiwan visit as "manic, irresponsible and highly irrational” before China responded to it by firing ballistic missiles into the sea, a show of frustrated fury worthy of a North Korean strongman.
The greatest worry is that Pelosi’s visit has set new precedents. China’s live-fire military exercises in waters Taiwan considers to be within its territory will make still-greater provocations in the future much more likely. Xi is now more likely to use the Party Congress to set new redlines on Taiwan that future American officials will be tempted to test.
The U.S. and China are not on the verge of war. Both governments recognize that in today’s globalized world, there is no Berlin Wall to protect one side’s security and prosperity from the other’s potential turmoil. Both live with the threat of mutually assured economic destruction.
But Pelosi’s provocative trip allows China’s military to rehearse for a future war, pushes China’s leaders to save face by drawing new Taiwan redlines, and raises new doubts about the long-term stability of Taiwan’s economy. Beijing’s belligerent response, in turn, encourages China hawks in Washington to continue to push hard on Taiwan—without a credible plan of response if push one day comes to shove.
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Hard Numbers: Thais come clean on Pegasus, Salvadoran emergency extended, Tunisian pol questioned, Chinese boycott mortgages
30: Thailand admitted using the Israeli-made Pegasus spyware to track phones in cases related to drugs or “national security.” The government reportedly also deployed Pegasus to spy on 30 activists linked to the ongoing youth-led mass protests against coup-leader-turned PM Prayuth Chan-ocha, which triggered a political earthquake by questioning the role of the monarchy.
46,000: El Salvador has extended the state of emergency it imposed in March to deal with rising gang violence. Over 46,000 people have been arrested so far under the controversial decree, which tough-on-crime President Nayib Bukele claims is necessary for public safety — but human rights groups argue has led to countless arbitrary detentions where dozens have died.
9: Tunisian opposition leader Rached Ghannouchi was released after more than nine hours of questioning in a corruption and money-laundering probe just days ahead of President Kais Saied's constitutional referendum on Monday. Ghannouchi, head of the moderate Islamist Ennahdha party, is a vocal critic of Saied and warns a majority "yes" vote will turn Tunisia into a dictatorship.
91: Some Chinese homebuyers have stopped paying their mortgages in at least 91 cities because developers have run out of cash to finish the projects. The revolt is exacerbating China's real-estate slump, which last year caught global attention when the Evergrande debt crisis threatened to infect the wider financial system.Hard Numbers: No Sri Lanka-IMF deal, Polish border fence, all-male Taliban party, Argentina’s farm crisis
10: On Thursday, Sri Lanka ended 10 days of talks with the IMF without agreeing on a bailout package to get the bankrupt island nation out of its worst-ever economic, social, and political crisis. Who else could help? India might find an opening to win Sri Lankan hearts and minds by offering the cash China now seems unwilling to provide.
115: Poland has completed its 115-mile fence along the border with Belarus inspired by last year’s border crisis. In late 2021, Belarusian strongman President Alexander Lukashenko triggered the crisis by pushing non-EU migrants into Poland as payback for earlier EU sanctions against Minsk.
3,000: On Thursday, the Taliban hosted the first big meeting of Islamic scholars and tribal elders since the group took over Afghanistan last summer. It was — unsurprisingly for the Taliban — an all-male gathering of 3,000 where men "represented" women.
24: Argentinian farmers are threatening to halt all exports for 24 hours if President Alberto Fernández doesn't do something about the crippling shortages of fuel and fertilizer. We've seen many national commodity export bans since Russia invaded Ukraine, aggravating the global food crisis, but this would be a rare one driven by a sector group against a government.This comes to you from the Signal newsletter team of GZERO Media. Subscribe for your free daily Signal today.
World on fire, meet politics: A conversation with Andrew Revkin
On Monday, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) released an extremely important, if grim, report on the state of climate science. You can watch my Quick Take on it below and on GZERO Media:
Today I’m joined by Andrew Revkin, director of the Initiative on Communication and Sustainability at Columbia University's Climate School and fellow Bulletin writer. A journalist by trade, Andy has been covering climate change and sustainability issues longer than almost anyone else. We had a lively conversation over email. A (lightly edited) transcript follows.
Ian Bremmer
What’s new in this latest report?
Andrew Revkin
I laid out quite a few observations in a post on Monday and a live stream today, but here are some key points. The 42-page summary and more than 3,000 pages of detail powerfully advance the picture of a human-disrupted climate compared to where the basic science of climate change was when the last such assessment was published in 2013. Models and methods have improved. Many years of additional observations of past and current ocean, climate and land conditions have accumulated. New concepts have moved into the foreground—particularly “compound” threats like simultaneous heat and drought. Contrary to what was believed a decade ago, the report notes that every incremental step to avoid new heat-trapping emissions is a step toward slowing overall long-term warming. (As you’ve noted, that doesn’t mean it’s likely we’ll come close to the Paris targets.) At the same time, there’s much more locked-in change coming with sea levels. But as with warming, ambitious emissions curbs would make a big difference in coastal disruption by 2100.
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What’s not new is that the Working Group I report, on its own, is completely insufficient for policy makers or anyone looking for ways to reduce risk or slow warming.
What’s your read as an informed climate observer and political analyst?
Ian Bremmer
My first, positive takeaway is that there is finally overwhelming consensus on the science of climate change. Sure, ‘settled science’ is an oxymoron, but we’re at a point where there’s virtually nobody serious out there denying that climate change exists, that it is largely man-made, and that it is a “code red” threat. The second good news in my view is that the science has gotten better, in the sense of increased precision and lower uncertainty around model projections. That’s useful insofar as it lets us plan only for the things that might plausibly happen.
Where there is disagreement, certainly at least from me and the climate practice at Eurasia Group, is on whether the world can realistically limit global warming to 1.5 degrees C above pre-industrial levels. The IPCC report is, in our view, overly optimistic about this scenario, given recent history and political realities. Or perhaps they’re not overly optimistic and the claim is a tactical one, a way to stave off complacency. There is certainly a lot of political capital that’s been invested in the 1.5-degree goal. Either way, I think it’s foolish to aim for an impossible target. Our best-case scenario puts global warming at 2.5 degrees C. That’s a significant reduction, but it paints a picture of a world that is still radically more dangerous than today’s.
Andrew Revkin
I’ve long pointed to what I call a "reality gap" when looking at IPCC and other scenarios aiming to eliminate the "emissions gap" between nations’ climate pledges and the temperature thresholds they pledged to avoid under the Paris Agreement. That’s one reason I have little confidence the world will limit warming anywhere near those targets. So I’m pretty aligned with the Eurasia Group’s assessment. But that’s a journalist’s view. What is the core of your analysis?
Ian Bremmer
For starters, 1.5 degrees C is predicated on all nations doing their part. The US and the EU are (more or less) on track—the challenge is convincing China, India, Brazil, Nigeria, Indonesia and other large low- and middle-income countries to follow suit. But they look at industrialized countries and see that not only are they responsible for the vast majority of historical emissions, on the back of which they grew rich, but also that they still emit far more carbon per capita than they do. The hypocrisy is glaring. At the end of the day, though, the climate doesn’t care about equity and fairness. Only total emissions count. Yes, rich countries should bear the largest cost for carbon reduction, but it’s also clear that a decarbonization drive that doesn’t include China and India is doomed. I’m not hopeful that these countries will be able and willing to participate in this transformation at the level and speed required without substantial help.
Which brings me to my second reason for pessimism. The US and the EU have the resources and the capacity to help developing countries decarbonize quickly. To compensate them for the foregone development gains of burning coal a few more decades. To mobilize the vast power of their financial markets, central banks, regulatory agencies, and business communities in service of a global green transition. What they don’t have is the political space to do so. In the US, political dysfunction, polarization, and—frankly—lack of broad-based popular support constrain the ability of the Biden administration to do as much as it’d want to, not just domestically but also in terms of leading the world. The EU fares a little better but is also hamstrung by internal divisions, and in any case lacks the scale to make the move by itself.
But let’s step away from decarbonization for a second. In your work, you’ve been urging for paying much more attention to what we can do to reduce climate vulnerability on the ground, beyond just cutting emissions. Now, you’re not saying that emission cuts don’t matter. It’s just all the focus and coverage has always been on mitigation, when the real low-hanging fruit lies in preparedness. But the two are not mutually exclusive and we should absolutely be doing both. Do I get that right?
Andrew Revkin
There is no ethical or practical way to cut climate risk—which is the core reason there is an IPCC to begin with—without aggressive work to cut both exposure and vulnerability to climate hazards now (alleviating poverty, promoting access to safe housing and land, restricting dangerous development patterns) and to cut heat-trapping emissions to stop worsening the hazards themselves going forward (extreme heat, flooding, sea rise, etc.).
But building a dual narrative remains a grand challenge. Through most of my 34 years (and counting) of climate reporting, I (like most of my peers) was captured by a narrative that put the change in the climate system, global warming, in the foreground. That was partly because I came at this first as a science writer, and climate change science is an incredibly interesting and consequential body of science. It was partly because the global warming issue grew around existing templates for pollution problems where the solution was at the source—smokestacks and tailpipes. We didn’t address smog with gas masks. And it was partly because giant powerful companies were an easy enemy. Environmental groups raised money and grew big around those framings, and journalists like me thrived, too. Of course, it’s vastly more complicated than that. As I wrote on Monday, “China’s Communist elite hasn’t vaulted that vast country to the top of the global emitters list because of fossil-industry lies.”
Many political and cultural factors have sustained a hyperfocus on cutting climate-heating emissions at the source rather than cutting distributed climate risks. Doing so ignores well established science showing that the rise in losses and damage from climate-related hazards in recent years is still mainly from growing exposure and pockets of deep vulnerability on the ground, not some change in the hazard itself.
Ian Bremmer
Even if the world suddenly found the will to engage in aggressive mitigation starting tomorrow, that wouldn’t help the tens of millions of people who would continue to be exposed to sometimes deadly climate disruption until those emissions cuts materially reduced climate hazards. That would take, what, 15-20 years at least? Or is it the next 30-40 years of hazards that are already locked in? Psychologically and politically, I think it makes a world of difference.
Andrew Revkin
I keep pointing out that no significant climate-resilience gains come from cutting climate-heating emissions for decades—and, yes, that can be a buzzkill. But that’s where I think the dual focus—cutting emissions now as a legacy benefit and cutting vulnerability now as a real-time win—can boost overall buy-in.
I first reported on efforts to point out the possible strategic benefit of stressing adaptation in a 2006 New York Times story. I centered in part on "Americans and Climate Change," a book put together by Dan Abbassi that posited that adaptation may help people focus on the reality of what is coming—and that may motivate them to cut emissions to limit the chances of bigger changes to come. The approach was largely ignored by environmental groups, which kept focusing tightly on emissions. That is changing. But it won’t be easy. It’s hard to push both messages. It took Al Gore from 2002, when he called adaptation “laziness”, until 2013 to admit that he “was wrong in not immediately grasping the moral imperative of pursuing both policies simultaneously, in spite of the difficulty that poses.” Sadly, he doesn’t make this point publicly much even now.
Ian Bremmer
I wonder whether the same hurdles facing mitigation policies in terms of incentives, vested interests, status quo bias and coordination failures don’t also preclude progress on adaptation. On the one hand, adaptation is a local public good, not a global one. There’s no global coordination problem to overcome. No free rider problem. And more limited geopolitics. When it comes to managing vulnerability, it’s every community for itself. But there’s a risk to that, no? Self-reliance is great for rich communities or for those that are not very exposed to climate hazards, but what happens to poor communities that can’t afford to reduce their vulnerability, even when the popular backing and political will are there? Incidentally, these tend to be—both within and across countries – the communities that are most exposed to climate hazards, i.e., the ones that need adaptation the most. In that sense, the challenges are similar to those ailing mitigation.
Why are you hopeful that we can overcome inertia and coordination failures more easily when it comes to cutting vulnerability than to cutting emissions?
Andrew Revkin
I’m hopeful when I look at Bangladesh and the Netherlands, which have demonstrated (in poor and prosperous contexts) that enormous progress can come in cutting vulnerability to worst-case hazards, often as much through more social cohesion, connectedness and coordination as through massive infrastructure investments. But this will be extremely hard. There are many reasons, one being that scientists largely still debate how to measure community resilience or adaptive capacity. Development banks and others are loath to invest in something that isn’t easily quantified. By the way, that bias is one big reason the vast majority of climate-related development assistance flowing from rich to poor countries is going to low-carbon energy projects instead of resilience and adaptation work.
In the end, one simple way to distill this side of the work is to focus on any steps that move people out of poverty and also toward agency or political representation. It’s important not to be too climate-centric in all of this. The challenges in climate risk reduction are largely the same facing other hazards—a reality I’ve unfortunately gotten to know covering earthquakes and tsunamis.
I’m incredibly grateful for the decades of thankless, largely voluntary work thousands of climate scientists and other experts have put into the six climate assessments and special reports from this pioneering experiment in science advice at global scale. Still, I sometimes muse, even after three decades zoomed in on global warming, whether the world would be better off with an IPRR, an Intergovernmental Panel on Risk Reduction. But that’s for another day.
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An interview With Anne-Marie Slaughter: a “President Biden's” US foreign policy
An extended conversation with Anne-Marie Slaughter, a former top State Department official under President Obama and the CEO of the think tank New America. Slaughter spoke with Ian Bremmer about how a "President Biden" could reshape US foreign policy.