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In global elections, incumbents are in trouble
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: Hi everybody. Ian Bremmer here and a Quick Take to kick off your week. Lots going on especially big elections. We have the France results. We have the UK results. We have the Iran results. We have a lot of uncertainty of course, here in the United States. My big takeaway is this is a horrible time to be an incumbent.
It's really challenging and what a huge reason for it that people aren't talking about, because it's already way in the rearview mirror is the pandemic. If I'm talking to you right now, your life was really changed by the pandemic in ways that you never would have expected before, right? I mean, we all had to deal with social distancing and masking and vaccine and not only that, but of course, the global economy seized up and people also stopped moving around for like a couple of years. An enormous amount, trillions and trillions of dollars were spent and that got us through an incredibly difficult time. But on the back of that, you suddenly have no more money that's being thrown at everyone, and you've got inflation that comes from, all of a sudden, the supply chains moving and demand moving. You know that these are costs that people are paying, that people no longer have those checks that were coming in during the pandemic, and those savings have been deployed already if you're working or even middle class. And people are moving again, people are moving not just from city to city, but also around the world. So migration is really picking up. And you really don't want to be the leader who's holding the bag when that happens. That's absolutely a big piece of what happened in France. It's a big piece of what happened in the United Kingdom, South Africa, India.
Lots of these elections are people that are unhappy with their existing leadership because it is such an unprecedented environment, and they're having a hard time dealing with that. There are other issues, too, don't get me wrong. And certainly in the UK, the fact that this also comes on the back of Brexit and a level of perceived incompetence on the part of successive conservative prime ministers who were not elected by the population but were selected by the party. The Labor Party did just as well in 2024 as they did in 2019. I think they picked from 33% to 34% total population. It was hardly a landslide, but the Conservative Party imploded because people were unhappy with them. And that is very much the story. It's that the existing incumbents are not doing well.
Macron is not doing well. He's lost so many seats in France and the far right has doubled their number in the parliament and the far left and the left coalition that is not Macron's centrist have also done far better, far better than anyone expected.In fact, they came in number one. Percentage wise, it's Macron in the center that is falling apart in France. That's the big lesson. It's not that the far right is doing well or badly. Some of the far left is doing well or badly. It’s that the incumbent, whoever they are, are really getting hit. Now that leads to a big question here in the United States.
November is coming up. Our elections are way too long. They're way too expensive. But, you know, four months, it's now starting to really be silly season in the United States. And, even if Biden was an incredibly robust and reasonably popular candidate, he would have a hard time in this environment. And of course, that's not the case. He's by far the oldest person that's run for the position in the United States. And he's showing that age, he is showing it more and more every day. I worry about that, of course, for him and for all of those that support him, certainly doesn't seem as if he's about to step down. But of course, that's what he has to say if he's intending to continue to fight until the moment that he changes.
On the other hand, Trump is also historically unpopular in the United States. If this was another candidate on the Republican side, this would be an easy call. This would be a Republican landslide. And Biden or anyone that the Democrats would put up would have a really hard time. And that's because, you know, immigration issues, inflation issues, anti-incumbency very strong in this environment. But because Trump himself is so extraordinarily unpopular and polarizing, it's actually still pretty close. And most of the polls show that that we're talking about a small number of swing states and a very small number of voters. And if you're Biden, you can convince yourself in that environment, “hey, I'm the guy that's going to be, you know, as useful as anybody else. It's too dangerous this late in the race to bring in another candidate.” I would agree with that. I would, if I really believe that what we saw at the debate was a one-off event and not a condition as former speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi said. I don't believe that, certainly don't believe that on the bases of conversations that I've had with the CEOs, the heads of state, the heads of the multilaterals, the senators, the members of the House that have been engaged with Biden regularly and routinely.
Now, that's different from what the people inside the Biden staff are saying. They are on message. They are very loyal, and they are all saying Biden can do it. If you've seen the schedule, he's so robust, he's so active, he's with it. But anyone outside that who is not like being paid to be completely on message is saying Biden has a serious problem. And in that regard, the likelihood that this doesn't go away, that his principal vulnerability gets worse, I think is very high. So if I were in a room advising him personally and he was willing to listen to me, I would tell him to step down. Having said that, I would have said it a year ago. But, you know, it is what it is.
We'll see what happens this week at the NATO summit with all of these world leaders coming in that are very concerned about what's happening in the United States and going forward, we've got the Republican convention real soon. We’ve got the Democratic convention, and everyone is going to be laser-focused on what's happening in the United States.
So much for that. I'll talk to you all real soon.
Presidential candidate Masoud Pezeshkian speaks during a campaign event in Tehran, Iran, June 19, 2024.
What are the chances of a “reformist” leading Iran?
Iranians head to the polls on Friday to vote in a surprisingly competitive election that could see a reformist and more West-friendly candidate assume the presidency. The election season began in June when the Guardian Council approved six candidates in the wake of President Ebrahim Raisi’s death, but now only four remain, with three front-runners: conservative hardliners Saeed Jalili and Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf and reformist Masoud Pezeshkian.
The regime now wants Qalibaf or Jalili to bow out so as not to split the conservative vote, which would benefit Pezeshkian, who appears to be leading. But neither man is willing to step down. The polls favor Jalili, while Qalibaf, a former military officer, has the backing of the influential IRGC, highlighting the deepening factionalism within the conservative regime.
The divided conservative vote could very well result in Friday’s election failing to produce a clear winner, which would lead to a runoff, likely between Pezeshkian and a conservative.
What could most impact the vote? High voter turnout is key to Pezeshkian prevailing, but amid rising voter apathy, turnout is expected to be about 50%. In past elections, conservative voters have gone to the polls in mass numbers to rally behind their candidate, whereas reformist and disillusioned Iranians, Pezeshkian’s voter base, usually stay home in protest.
What would a Pezeshkian-led Iran look like? Likely not very different. Eurasia Group Iran expert Gregory Brew says that even if Pezeshkian wins, “The parliament, judiciary, military, and other parts of the regime will still be dominated by hard-liners — in that sense, Friday's election or next week’s runoff won’t change much.”
The Iranian flag flutters in front of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) organisation's headquarters in Vienna, Austria, June 5, 2023.
Might Iran go soft on the West?
Iran’s Guardian Council approved six candidates – five hardliner conservatives and one seemingly safe reformist – earlier this month to run in a June 28 snap election to replace President Ebrahim Raisi, who was killed in a plane crash last month. The council’s inclusion of reformist Masoud Pezeshkian surprised many, but even more shockingly, he has proven an unlikely but fierce competitor against prominent right-wing opponents. Pezeshkian is drawing support from younger voters and disillusioned Iranians who, in years past, boycotted elections. Meanwhile, the conservative vote is being split among the five other candidates.
On the campaign trail, Pezeshkian has shared his intention of improving relations with the US – namely by reviving the 2015 nuclear deal – and softening Iran’s hijab law, both of which would constitute dramatic shifts in policy. Although his growing popularity worries leaders in Iran’s far-right government, even a reformist president is unlikely to bring about much change within the country’s hard-right government – especially a budding friendship with the US.
“If the challenge of winning the election seems large,” says Eurasia Group’s Iran expert, Gregory Brew, “the even greater challenge would be governing effectively as a reformist president – a challenge previous Iranian presidents, such as Mohammed Khatami and Hasan Rouhani, have largely failed to overcome.”
So could the US have a new friend in Iran? Short answer: probably not.
Pezeshkian faces a tough battle to beat hardline conservatives (and also Iran’s most dedicated voters), and the greatest opposition does not come from the people, but the Iranian government.
Trump trial: How would a conviction hurt his reelection bid?
Ian Bremmer shares his insights on global politics this week on World In :60.
How would a conviction in his hush money trial impact Trump in the 2024 election?
At least a little bit at the margins. And certainly that's the reason why Biden and the White House campaign are now working to pay attention to it, to get people down there in front of the courthouse where the media is located and talk about Trump as a criminal. Of course, could backfire on them, especially if it's a hung jury. But if he's convicted, while Republicans aren't going anywhere, there are a lot of independents that have consistently said that they are less willing to vote for Trump. Of course, this conviction comes in the lowest stake of the cases that are being presently pursued against the former president. This isn't the case on the insurrection and this isn't the case even on the classified documents being obscured, mishandled. And so as a consequence, I suspect at the end of the day, if you get a conviction, it's not going to matter much. But in a very, very close election, which is all about swing states and turnouts, it could hurt with getting independents to turn out for Trump.
Is Iran's emergency presidential election really about who will eventually succeed as supreme leader?
A little bit. This is my week of “a little bit” answers, in the sense that it's going to reveal who the Iranian supreme leader wants, what kind of a character he wants as president, an important position in terms of consensus policy execution going forward, how much of a hardliner, how close to the IRGC, how close to the Basij? In other words, you know, just how much are you going to see someone who has the ability to play to the audience, the masses a little bit, is a bit of a technocrat, or is someone that is truly going to be a theocratic dictator on every issue with very little wavering, to the extent that it's the latter of the next Supreme leader is likely to follow those steps. So that is certainly worth watching.
How will Mexico's presidential election reshape its relations with the United States?
Almost not at all. Claudia Sheinbaum, overwhelmingly likely to win. Not likely to get a supermajority, which means that López Obrador is going to have a hard time seriously changing the Constitution, undermining checks and balances in the country before he leaves. But he's still going to have an awful lot of influence, slightly more technocratic government, more focused on renewables and transition energy, but overwhelmingly focused on making sure that the relationship with the US is better. The one thing that I would say is important about Sheinbaum is, López Obrador traveled almost nowhere, didn't go to the G20 meetings, didn't go to UNGA, United Nations high level week, didn't go to the COP summits, just didn't travel, traveled around Mexico. Sheinbaum will go everywhere and will travel to the United States a lot, will travel to Canada, too. And I think that ultimately matters. So Mexico is going to have a higher priority at the presidential level on foreign policy, and especially in a relationship that can be tricky if Trump wins, for example, come next January. That's going to be at the margins, useful for the Mexicans.
- Optimism about Mexico's political and economic future ›
- Why Mexico is a key issue in the 2024 US election ›
- This man will be Iran’s next president. Who is he? ›
- Graphic Truth: How will Trump's hush money trial end? ›
- What the Trump trial circus is missing ›
- Trump has been found guilty. Will voters care? - GZERO Media ›
- Ian Bremmer on Trump's guilty verdict - GZERO Media ›
An Iranian man walks past campaign posters for the parliamentary election in Tehran, Iran, February 27, 2024.
Iranian election turnout could set new record low
Iranians will go to the polls on March 1 to vote for a new parliament, which will serve for a four-year term. They will also vote for members of the Assembly of Experts, a body of clerics that is tasked with selecting a new Supreme Leader and serves a six-year term. However, given that the Islamic regime now carefully manages election outcomes to protect its grip on power, voter participation is expected to plumb new record lows. We asked Eurasia Group analyst Greg Brew to explain the significance of this week’s polls.
What is the position of parliament in the Iranian system?
Iran’s constitution delineates legislative powers to the parliament, which also oversees the budget and cabinet appointments. However, parliament’s power is constricted by Iran’s powerful executive branch, particularly the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, as well as the Guardian Council, a small group of clerics and senior figures who sign off on all legislation and determine who is eligible to run for office. Given these restrictions, parliament is regarded by many Iranians as a rubber-stamp committee with little real control over government policy, a feeling that has only grown more pronounced since 2020, when elections were stage-managed by the Guardian Council to ensure hardliners dominated parliament. Authorities also carefully controlled the 2021 presidential election to ensure Ebrahim Raisi, an arch conservative with close ties to Khamenei and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), was elected. (The next presidential election will be in 2025, when Raisi is expected to run for reelection.)
What steps is the regime taking to control the election outcome?
As with 2020, the Guardian Council has taken a heavy hand in vetting candidates: Out of the thousands of applications, many were disqualified from running for office, including most prominent reformists and moderates. This ensures the new parliament will remain dominated by hardliners with a strong affiliation with Khamenei, the IRGC, and the conservative clerical faction.
Is the sense of public alienation toward the regime growing?
Dissatisfaction with the regime is currently very high, owing to a variety of factors that include a weak economy, high inflation, widespread corruption, and ongoing and intensifying political repression. The fact that elections are now carefully managed by authorities has produced a broad view that they are sham affairs: as a result, participation in elections has dropped from over 70% to roughly 50%. It is expected to be even lower this year, perhaps the lowest on record. While the regime likely retains the support of some of the population, most Iranians view the Islamic Republic as an illegitimate government.
So, is there a chance of unrest around the vote?
Despite this widespread dissatisfaction, the circumstances don’t seem conducive to the kind of public protest that occurred in 2022, when thousands took to the streets following the death of Mahsa Amini at the hands of the morality police. The force of the government crackdown in response to those protests and the ongoing efforts to suppress new displays of discontent, as well as the generally bleak outlook for political reform, means most Iranians are averse to taking to the streets. Instead, citizens will express their dissatisfaction by staying at home and not participating in elections.
How worried is the regime about its legitimacy?
The Islamic Republic has held power for more than forty years. It possesses a large and sophisticated security apparatus and a toolkit of repressive measures that it uses to suppress public dissatisfaction. It is a government has proven, time and again, that it is willing to kill its own people in large numbers in order to remain in power.
That said, the regime has reasons to be worried about its position. Its credibility on a number of important issues, from the economy to terrorism, water scarcity and inflation, is in serious question. It is defined by self-dealing, with more and more of the nation’s wealth flowing to a small elite, particularly senior officers in the IRGC. Millions of Iranians are trying to leave the country, particularly educated members of the middle class.
What are the prospects for political change in the mid-to-long term?
The regime is confident it can hold on to power. It’s fixated on a potential succession crisis, given that Khamenei is eighty-four and in poor health, and the reason for stage-managed elections has been to ensure there’s a smooth transition from the current leader to a Khamenei 2.0. That’s why reformists and moderates have been squeezed out, with even former president Hasan Rouhani denied the opportunity to run for a seat on the Assembly of Experts. There’s virtually no chance the regime permits any reforms or positive political changes, at least not until after succession.
But this policy comes with its own dangers. The Iranian public appears unwilling to resume protests for the moment, but that could change. By refusing to reform, the regime has further undermined its legitimacy, and the transition to a new, similarly conservative Supreme Leader will only harden public dissatisfaction. Iran may be quiet, but it’s a powder keg that could go off at any time.
Edited by Jonathan House, Senior Editor at Eurasia Group
Iran makes trouble as nuclear talks drag on
Iran was involved in two naval incidents in the Gulf of Oman in recent days. The US, UK, and Israel have blamed Iran for a drone attack that killed two European nationals. Iran has rejected the accusations. Iran is also suspected in the "potential hijack" of a tanker off the coast of the United Arab Emirates.
These provocations are happening just as Iran inaugurates a new president, Ebrahim Raisi, and as talks continue over the possible US re-entry into the 2015 Iran nuclear deal. What's the connection between these events? We asked Henry Rome, Eurasia Group's deputy head of research and a director covering global macro politics and the Middle East.
WS: Iran was involved in two naval incidents in the Gulf of Oman in recent days that have provoked anger and concern in Israel, the UK and US. This is happening at a time when negotiations over the revival of the 2015 nuclear deal is reaching a critical point. Are these two facts related? If so, how?
HR: The attack on the Israeli-linked ship appeared to be the latest salvo in the decades-long shadow war between Israel and Iran, which will proceed whether there's a nuclear deal or not. The second incident is murkier, but it appears that Iranian forces tried and failed to hijack the ship. This could've been aimed at somehow building leverage in the talks, or as a reminder to Iran's neighbors of its capabilities, or something else altogether. We just don't know at this stage.
WS: We know there are differences of opinion inside Iran's leadership over the nuclear deal. Are those opposed to the deal trying to provoke a response from the US, Israel, or UK that will kill the agreement?
HR: I don't buy the idea that there's a rogue faction within the Iranian state creating hostilities to undermine diplomacy. On matters of strategic importance, like the nuclear deal, the state acts as a unitary actor. And, as of now, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei remains publicly supportive of the agreement, with conditions. Now, is it possible these incidents create circumstances that end up making a revival of the deal impossible? Yes, absolutely.
WS: How might that happen?
HR: If a ship linked to the US is attacked, or if an American crew member on a ship is killed, the political space for the negotiations in Washington will evaporate, at least in the near term. It will be very challenging for the Biden administration to proceed with sanctions relief in the immediate aftermath of such an incident.
WS: Does Iran's new president change the dynamic here? Beyond his public statements, where do his interests really lie?
HR: On the nuclear issue, Raisi seeks refuge in the statements of [Supreme Leader Ali] Khamenei, and he and his team have refrained from going beyond vague comments. So, there's a lot we don't know at this point. But Raisi probably does have a real political interest in sanctions relief to give the economy some breathing room early in his term. Of course, the only way to get sanctions relief is to negotiate over the nuclear program.
WS: In one sentence, will there be a return to the nuclear deal? Why or why not?
HR: Yes, I think so; the path to a deal was never going to be easy or immediate, but the logic is compelling for both sides to get to yes eventually.Iran's new President Ebrahim Raisi receives the endorsement decree for his presidency from Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, in Tehran, Iran August 3, 2021.
What We’re Watching: Iranian inauguration, Taliban go urban, Belarusian activist dead, China’s hog hotels
Raisi won't have it easy: The newly "elected" president of Iran, Ibrahim Raisi, was officially endorsed by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on Tuesday. In his inaugural address, the 60-year-old hardliner pledged to get US sanctions removed and to respond to rising socioeconomic grievances within Iran, but he warned that he wouldn't lash Iran's prosperity or survival to "the will of foreigners." In Iran, the president's role focuses mainly on domestic policy, but with the economy reeling one of Raisi's big early challenges will be to continue complicated talks with the Biden administration to renegotiate the 2015 nuclear deal, which would lead to the US lifting some of the harshest sanctions. Both sides say they want a new deal, and have gone through half a dozen rounds of negotiations already, but they remain at odds over who should make what concessions first. Raisi also pledged to restore Iranians' flagging trust in their government and to improve the economic situation, but in ways that are in line with "revolutionary principles." He'll have his hands full with that. And don't forget that the likely imminent (re)takeover of neighboring Afghanistan by the Taliban — whom Tehran don't like at all — will also occur on Raisi's watch. Good luck, Mr. President, you'll need it.
Taliban capture key city: After taking over most of rural Afghanistan, the Taliban are now closing in on Afghan cities. This week, an Afghan general told residents to evacuate Lashkar Gah, the capital of southern Helmand province, after the Taliban seized most of the urban area. This is a big blow for the government because it promised to defend provincial capitals. (Helmand witnessed back in 2009 one of the US/NATO military's most successful campaigns against the Taliban, although NATO forces always failed to stop the Taliban from using the province's poppy fields to fuel their lucrative opium trade.) Meanwhile, the Biden administration now says it'll expand US visa eligibility for Afghans fleeing the Taliban takeover. But, but, but… they'll need to apply outside the country, and Washington doesn't intend to help them get out. Afghanistan's neighbors could step in, but the last thing they want is a refugee crisis on their borders.
Belarus targets dissidents: Two days after a Belarusian sprinter sought refuge in Poland because she feared for her life after criticizing her country's government at the Tokyo Olympics, a prominent Belarusian dissident in exile has turned up dead in Ukraine. People close to Vitaly Shishov, head of a Kyiv-based NGO that helps Belarusians escape persecution, believe his death by hanging was carried out by hitmen sent by strongman President Alexander Lukashenko. Shishov is one of many young Belarusians who left the country a year ago following the regime's crackdown on mass street protests after Lukashenko's victory in the August 2020 presidential election, which outside observers say was rigged. If it's true that Lukashenko had Shishov killed, the Belarusian leader is clearly upping the ante on targeting his opponents abroad, just months after grounding an EU-bound flight to arrest an anti-government journalist. And there's not much Brussels can — or will — do about it.
China's pig hotels: If you're a Chinese pig, you're in luck. The state plans to house about 10,000 of you in a luxury condo with 24-hour security, veterinarians on call, gourmet meals, and health monitoring. This doesn't mean they don't want to eat you anymore (they do!), but rather, that they aim to keep you safe from all sorts of viruses — especially the devastating African swine flu, which wiped out half of all Chinese hogs in 2018. So say goodbye to eating scraps on a family farm, you now live in the lap of luxury. The catch is that you'll still be expected to get plump and juicy for char siu.
Iran's opposition in exile goes on offense
Next week, Ebrahim Raisi, a hardliner who is ideologically and personally close to Iran's 82 year-old supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, will be inaugurated as Iran's president. This power transition comes as the country experiences a fresh wave of protests that started in Iran's southwest over water shortages earlier this month and has since spilled over into dozens of provinces.
Some close observers of Iranian society and politics say that popular discontent there is now more widespread than it has been in years, making the Iranian regime more vulnerable than ever.
To unpack recent events, GZERO Media interviewed Ali Safavi, a longtime member of the National Council of Resistance of Iran — the main political opposition group to Iran's theocracy — whose leaders have lived in exile for decades. Safavi has taught at several American universities and has been an analyst for Western media outlets. He was also involved in the campaign to remove the Mujahedin-e Khalq movement — which the NCRI is closely linked to — from the lists of terrorist groups in the US (2012) and Europe (2009).
The MEK was formed in the 1960s by leftist-student groups to overthrow the American-backed Shah. While its supporters view it as a freedom movement advocating democratic reform in Iran, its detractors condemn the MEK's militaristic past. Indeed, many Iranians shunned the group for joining forces with Saddam Hussein against Tehran during the brutal Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988). (Meanwhile, accusations of cult-like tendencies plague the group today.)
This conversation with Ali Safavi has been edited for length and clarity.
GD: What do you make of the latest protests in Iran and what, if anything, makes them different from previous mass demonstrations?
AS: I think the recent protests have to be seen in the context of the developments of the past few months in Iran. Obviously what has happened is the continuation of four nationwide uprisings that erupted in Iran since 2017. And if anything, it goes to show that despite all the repressive measures that the regime has put in place, particularly since November 2019, that it cannot extinguish the flames of resistance and opposition to the regime.
Over the past year and a half, the most effective and closest ally of the Iranian regime has been the coronavirus. The regime has basically invested in the strategy of mass casualties — it is not providing the necessary assistance to the people. It seems that the Iranian people are emerging from the burden of the coronavirus and expressing their pent up anger and their demands for freedom and liberty.
The scope of the uprising this time is also different. Already there have been protests in 14 different provinces. And the interesting feature of all of these protests is the unanimity in the slogans that people express: "down with the dictator," "down with absolute rule of the clergy," and "down with Khamenei."
GD: Are those slogans new? Have they not been used before?
AS: Yes they have. But I think what is important is that, ostensibly, the protest in Khuzestan was over water shortage, but it quickly became political. The protest yesterday in Tehran was because of electricity cuts. So yes, people have different and specific grievances, but at the end of the day, the root cause of all of these calamities is the regime in Tehran. Today is the 13th or the 14th day of what began in Khuzestan in early July. And so it goes to show that the regime clearly cannot contain the protests; the regime is at its weakest and most fragile state in its 40-year history.
GD: Realistically, what role can the NCRI play in affecting change considering that your group is not actually in the country?
AS: While of course it is true that the leadership of the NCRI has been in exile, that is not to say that its network has been absent within the country. In every city that you see protests now, there have been hundreds of MEK members or sympathizers who have been executed by this regime in the past. And of course these people have families and many of them have children who are now grown up. And so the people that you see out in the streets, the fact that they repeat the very slogans that the MEK or the NCRI have been promoting for years goes to show the effectiveness of our movement.
GD: What do you think the Biden administration should be doing now vis-à-vis Iran policy?
AS: The Democratic Party and President Biden's platform during the election was that human rights and democracy will be front and center [in his administration]. He [Biden] should remain true to that pledge. And I think, for example, what happened in Khuzestan with eight people being killed, according to Amnesty International, required a decisive condemnation on the part of the administration. But what do we see? They are observing. Observation is not enough. You have to condemn Iran. Iranian people need to know that the Western world and particularly the United States stands with them in the real struggle for emancipation and freedom.
This whole JCPOA discussion is fruitless and helpless and is to the detriment of the Iranian people. Are they really going to lift the sanctions against Khamenei, the man who is responsible for, among other things, the 1988 massacre?
GD: What about the argument that these economic sanctions hurt ordinary Iranians?
AS: I think this is a false narrative that the pro-Iran lobby propagates in Western capitals. Remember, during Ahmadinejad's presidency Iran had $600 billion worth of oil revenues. Where did that money go? Why are 12 million Iranians hungry every night? Iran is a country with the second largest gas reserves in the world. Giving concessions to this regime has not improved the lives of average Iranians, and giving concession to this regime has not empowered the so-called moderates within this region.
GD: What's your response to detractors who say the NCRI, formerly designated a terror group by the US State Department, has a violent past, and that there isn't a constituency today in Iran that supports the group?
AS: When [former Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah] Khomeini declared a reign of terror in June 1981, basically eliminating the last vestiges of peaceful political activity, the MEK had no choice, but to defend itself. And of course, that right is recognized even by the Catholic Church, that whenever you have no other means of defending yourself, you can use whatever means are necessary. Nobody welcomes violence, but it is not we that dictate the form of this struggle. It is the enemy that does that.
We have always said to all of those who say we don't have any semblance of support inside Iran: Okay. Let's have a free election and see who the people of Iran will vote for. If they vote for us, fine. If they don't, that's also fine. We have been an opposition movement for 56 years. We're perfectly willing to be an opposition movement for another 56 years.