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A U.S. soldier watches as a statue of Iraq's President Saddam Hussein fall in central Baghdad, Iraq, in April 2003.
Was Iraq a success or failure?
On a visit to Iraq in the spring of 2021, I was chatting with a group of Iraqi and western friends – all current or former advisors to the Iraqi, US, or UK governments – when the conversation turned to whether the 2003 US-led war to depose Saddam Hussein’s regime had been worthwhile. The dogmatism, divisiveness, and emotion that characterized the debate in the run-up to the war were still evident. For some, ending the murderous brutality and atrocities of Saddam’s rule superseded any other concern. Others were more equivocal, pointing to the corruption, violence, and misrule of the US-bequeathed, post-2003 political order and the toll it has taken on the country.
On the 20th anniversary of the war, the question of whether Iraq is better or worse off and whether the cost in coalition lives and money was worth it is, almost inevitably, being revisited. But it is a feckless one. The reality of Iraq’s experience since 2003 cannot be captured by a simplistic dichotomy; the country is — as it always was — more complicated than that.
Some things are undoubtedly better. Representative politics has been entrenched. Elections — former President George Bush’s measure of democracy and freedom — are genuine contests that are seen as important to political legitimacy. Power has been transferred peacefully across seven successive governments.
The Iraqi media is one of the freest in the Middle East, with rival viewpoints on full display, and criticism of the political elite — unthinkable and deadly in Saddam’s era — is now common. And, after a disappointing first decade and a half, there are signs of economic stirrings underpinned by oil production that is now almost 50% above immediate pre-war highs.
Still, Iraq has fallen far short of the hopes and promises of the war’s proponents. While the country never became a failed state, it has flirted with it at times, especially during the 2005-2008 civil war and at the height of the Islamic State threat, when large swathes in the northwest of the country were beyond Baghdad’s control. Iraqi society still bears the scars of ethnosectarian violence and the divisions it bred.
Development and reconstruction have been slow and stunted. Corruption is endemic, and state services are shoddy at best. Islamist Shia militias act with impunity, answering to their own leaders and increasingly dominating government and state institutions. Meanwhile, the Kurdish region, beloved by its amply rewarded and vocal cheerleaders in the West, is increasingly divided between two warlord factions running what has long amounted to personal fiefdoms.
Washington (and London) bear a lot of responsibility for the outcome. The ignorance and hubris that guided pre-conflict planning and all that followed made for an occupation that was insufficiently resourced and lacked the most basic understanding of the country (or even its language). Hunkered down and detached in the heavily protected Green Zone, the US-led endeavor rested on feet of clay from the get-go, and Washington’s aversion to state building, combined with the disbanding of the Iraqi army and evisceration of the civil service, left Iraq without the tools for effective governance and administration.
Worse still, US post-war policy quickly fell prey to domestic political imperatives and the growing popular disaffection with the occupation at home, leaving the imperial timetable at odds with, and largely dismissive of, conditions on the ground in Iraq.
But the most corrosive aspect of US policy was the ethnosectarian political system it enshrined, dominated by a narrow coterie of identity-based parties that have ruled ever since. Bereft of any real understanding of Iraq or its society, and impatient for signs of “progress,” Washington officials took their cue from their nominal allies in the pre-war Iraqi opposition, turning a blind eye to their failings, and never quite realizing — or at least acknowledging — that, beyond ousting Saddam, their agendas were not the same.
Occupation on the cheap and on the run was never going to establish the foundations for the stable, prosperous Iraq that proponents of the war envisaged, but the kleptocratic, militia-dominated state that has emerged 20 years later is not wholly Washington’s fault.
The zenith of US imperial power, when its ambassadors chose governments, dictated laws, and forced through constitutions, is a distant memory. If the US built the exclusive political fortress that was and remains the Green Zone, the factions that it empowered have manned the ramparts to ensure their exclusive access and control would never be challenged. Power and privilege are what matters to this parasitic elite, not freedom and democracy, and they have taken full advantage of what they inherited to that end.
Iraq’s ethnosectarian factions have fractured over time, and newer faces and groups have come to the fore, but the underlying players and the political equation have remained largely unaltered. The current prime minister, Mohammed Shi’a Sudani, is the first since 2003 not to have been in exile, but most major party leaders such as Nouri al-Maliki, Hadi al-Amiri, Masoud Barzani, or Ammar Hakim are either remnants of the former opposition or their offspring.
Elections determine the relative balance of power among the main players, but successive Iraqi coalition governments have been broad affairs, no matter who leads them, allowing the oligarchy to protect their exclusive power while feeding from the trough. Political opposition, even within the protected confines of the elite, is still regarded as an existential threat. Meanwhile, the real opposition to the corrupt system is brutally repressed, as the government’s deadly response to the 2019-2020 demonstrations starkly illustrated.
Change in the near term is unlikely. Every new Iraqi government talks about reform, but the preservation of the system will remain the number one priority for Iraq’s leaders and their various regional and international benefactors. After over 40 years of war, sanctions, deprivation, and domestic violence, the majority of the population is exhausted, increasingly detached from politics, and largely resigned to the state of affairs.
There are pockets of opposition activism on the “Iraqi street,” especially in the Shia-majority center and south, the heartland of real power in Iraq. But it is disorganized, unfunded, and largely powerless relative to the leviathan that is the US-bequeathed Iraqi state. Good men do not last long in Iraq, either neutralized or co-opted, and the seeds of systemic change are few and far between.
Maybe this was always the most likely outcome. The flourishing liberal democracy that US neo-conservatives imagined would catalyze regional change was never in the cards. A poor vegetable vendor in Tunisia did more to bring about a democratic revolution in the Middle East than the US adventure in Iraq ever did, and the eventual outcome was greater authoritarianism across the region.
Thus, Iraq will likely remain a mismanaged, kleptocratic, violent, and underdeveloped state governed by a political elite that is consumed with self-interest and sustained by oil revenue, the force of arms, and regional and international powers that see the country through the narrow focus of their national security priorities.
Not the worst outcome that could have been imagined in 2003 or since, but certainly less than the Iraqi people deserve.
Raad Alkadiri is the managing director of Energy, Climate & Resources for Eurasia Group. He served as assistant private secretary to the UK Special Representative in Iraq from 2003-2004.
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Supporters of Iraqi leader Moqtada al-Sadr swim as they protest inside the Republican Palace in the Green Zone, in Baghdad.
What We're Watching: Deadly clashes in Iraq, China-Russia military drills, Colombia-Venezuela restore ties
Iraq’s deepening political crisis
Hundreds of Iraqi protesters stormed the government palace and took to the streets Monday after popular Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, whose bloc won the most seats in parliamentary elections last fall, announced he was stepping back from politics. At least 30 people were killed and more than 380 were injured in clashes between al-Sadr supporters, Iran-aligned groups, and Iraqi security forces. Moreover, al-Sadr announced he was starting a hunger strike until the violence stops. It's the the worst violence Baghdad has seen in years, most of which is concentrated around the heavily fortified Green Zone, which houses foreign embassies and government buildings. For almost a year, Iran-aligned parties have prevented al-Sadr from forming a new government, prompting his 73 lawmakers to resign en masse this summer in protest, which in turn led to sectarian clashes. Al-Sadr — who has long railed against Iran’s influence over Iraqi social and political life— retains widespread influence over some institutions and has proved adept at whipping his supporters into a frenzy. (Last month, hundreds of his supporters breached Baghdad’s Green Zone and occupied parliament.) The Supreme Court will decide on Tuesday whether parliament will be dissolved and new elections called – though the constitution says the legislature must agree to dissolve itself. That’s unlikely given that parliament is now dominated by a pro-Iran bloc, which became the biggest parliamentary faction by default after al-Sadr withdrew. Iraq’s military announced a nationwide curfew as the situation continues to deteriorate.
Updated on Aug. 30.
China, Russia hold joint drills
China and Russia kicked off on Monday joint military exercises in Russia’s far east. The week-long exercise occurs every four years, though this year the geopolitical landscape is ... quite different. In 2018, Russia had about 300,000 troops participate in the drills, though only 50,000 are expected to take part this year given that up to 75% of Russian troops are busy fighting the war in Ukraine, causing some observers to say this is merely an act of political theatre. In pushing through with the drills despite Russia's ongoing invasion of Ukraine and China's stepped-up war games around Taiwan, Beijing and Moscow likely want to show they're doing business as usual under the friendship "without limits" agreement signed between Russia’s President Vladimir Putin and China’s Xi Jinping earlier this year. What's more, the drills, known as the Vostok exercises, which means “east,” are a good opportunity for Moscow to demonstrate it still has strong military ties with other former Soviet republics and crucial non-aligned countries, like India. Other friendly nations like Laos, Nicaragua, and Syria will join the drills, too. This development comes as Moscow is keen to flex its military muscle given that Ukraine on Monday began a counteroffensive to take back territory from Russian forces in the south.
Colombia-Venezuela ties back on
Colombia and Venezuela have reestablished full diplomatic relations after three years. Gustavo Petro, Colombia’s new leftist president, previously vowed to restore ties with Venezuela's strongman President Nicolás Maduro, who’s long been accused by the West of using an iron fist to quash dissent. Indeed, Colombia’s previous conservative president, Iván Duque, joined the ranks of dozens of countries — including the US, UK and EU — in rejecting Maduro's sham reelection in 2018 — and recognizing then-Speaker Juan Guiado as the country’s legitimate president. Maduro, for his part, severed ties with Bogota in 2019 after the Venezuelan opposition tried to cross over from Colombia to deliver truckloads of food and medicine. (Since 2017, more than 90% of Venezuelans have been living below the poverty line.) Bogotá and Caracas have agreed to reopen the 1,200-mile land border in hopes of boosting economic ties. Colombia’s economy minister says that bilateral trade could reach $1.2 billion this year and grow to a whopping $4.5 billion by 2026, in large part due to Venezuela's natural gas exports. That would be a massive boon for Venezuela, whose economy has been in dire straits since the US imposed crippling economic sanctions in 2015, giving rise to a devastating refugee crisis.
Supporters of Iraqi Shi'ite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr storm the parliament building in Baghdad, Iraq.
What We're Watching: Iraqis storm parliament, US nears landmark climate deal, Senegal set to vote
Anti-Iran protesters storm Iraq’s parliament
Hundreds of Iraqi protesters breached Baghdad’s heavily fortified Green Zone on Wednesday and stormed the parliament. The demonstrators – supporters of Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, whose bloc won the most seats in parliamentary elections last fall – chanted anti-Iran slogans as they rummaged through paperwork and took selfies. Crucially, they rallied against the candidacy of Mohammed al-Sudani, a former minister backed by a pro-Iran alliance, to become the next PM. For almost a year, Tehran-aligned parties have prevented al-Sadr from forming a new government, prompting the cleric’s 73 lawmakers to resign en masse last month in protest, and plunging the crisis-ridden country further into political and social turmoil. As a result, the pro-Iran bloc became the biggest parliamentary faction … by default. The demonstrators have since disbursed, but temperatures are rising in a country where joblessness and popular disillusionment are sky-high. What’s more, al-Sadr has proven adept at whipping his supporters into a frenzy in recent months, suggesting that instability in Iraq is likely to get much worse.
A historic US climate breakthrough?
Democrats appear to have forged a landmark deal to combat climate change. The $369 billion investment and tax package has been greeted ecstatically by climate activists in the US and around the globe, but it’s being condemned by Republicans who warn it will further fuel inflation. Key to the breakthrough: plans to use tax incentives, rather than relying more heavily on government spending, to boost wind, solar, geothermal, battery, and other clean energy industries. Why is this potentially such a big deal? Given the size of its economy and the scale of its carbon emissions, there can be no global breakthrough in the fight against climate change without active leadership and major investment from the United States. Based on past voting patterns of US lawmakers, it’s clear there can be no climate leadership and major investment unless Democrats hold the White House and have majorities in both houses of Congress. November’s US midterm elections will likely give Republicans control of at least one house of Congress, and President Biden’s abysmal approval ratings give the GOP an excellent shot in 2024. The breakthrough came when Senator Joe Manchin (D-WV) appeared to drop previous opposition to the scale of this plan. He says his fears that the package will further stoke inflation have been addressed. There’s still a wildcard: Senator Kyrsten Sinema (D-AZ), the other Democrat who sometimes bucks her party on big legislation, hasn’t yet made her position clear.
Will Senegal fall to Africa's third-term curse?
Senegalese voters head to the polls Sunday for a parliamentary election amid a recent uptick in violent anti-government protests in West Africa's most stable democracy. The vote is seen as a referendum on the future of President Macky Sall, who might run for a third term in 2024 despite being constitutionally limited to two. The recent turmoil was triggered by the constitutional council's decision to bar the entire main opposition candidate list from Sunday’s vote on a technicality. The nixed legislative roster includes Ousmane Sonko, a popular politician who came in third in the 2019 presidential election. (In 2021, Senegal was rocked by “apocalyptic” protests when Sonko was briefly arrested on trumped-up rape charges.) Although Sall has only hinted at his intentions for 2024, the opposition fears he will succumb to Africa's "third-term curse," which sees leaders violate term limits to remain in power. The recent track record is mixed: Alassane Ouattara pulled it off in the Ivory Coast in 2020, but a year later Alpha Condé was ousted in a coup in Guinea. Low turnout on Sunday would be seen as a protest vote against Sall.A man reacts during a rally to support the National Defense Force and to condemn the expansion of the Tigray People Liberation Front fighters into Amhara and Afar regional territories at the Meskel Square in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia August 8, 2021.
What We're Watching: Everyone vs Ethiopian PM, Brazil ditches Huawei, (more) trouble in Sudan, Argentina's midterms, Iraqi powder keg
Opposition forces unite in Ethiopia's civil war. The Tigray People's Liberation Front, which has been locked in a brutal year-long civil war against Ethiopian government forces, has now teamed up with another powerful militant outfit that wants to oust Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. The TPLF, now in alliance with the Oromo Liberation Army — which claims to represent Ethiopia's largest ethnic group — have swept towards the capital Addis Ababa in recent days, prompting the embattled Abiy to call on civilians to take up arms in defense of the city. The Tigray-Oromo alliance, called the United Front of Ethiopian Federalist Forces, has called for Abiy's immediate ouster, either by negotiation or by force, and for the prosecution of government officials for war crimes. The UN says all sides in the conflict have committed abuses. The US, which has threatened to suspend Ethiopia's trade preferences over the government's alleged war crimes, is currently trying to broker a cease-fire. When Abiy came to power after popular protests in 2018, he was hailed for liberalizing what was formerly an extremely repressive government (controlled, as it happens, by the TPLF). Now it's looking like he may have unleashed the very forces that could tear the country apart and drive him from office — or worse.
Is China shut out of Brazil's 5G comp? Earlier this year, Brazil's President Jair Bolsonaro set an ambitious deadline to roll out 5G broadband – which provides much faster internet connections — by July 2022. In recent days, telecom firms have been vying to get a piece of the pie as the tender process heats up. Indeed, it's a lucrative prospect for telecom companies in a country where more than three-quarters of the population (or roughly 190 million people) are connected to the World Wide Web. But the process has not been smooth sailing because, well: China. Bolsonaro has been under a lot of pressure from China skeptics within his own government, and Washington, to exclude tech giant Huawei from the bidding wars. Bolsonaro ultimately caved, as Beijing has evidently been locked out of the process for now. Claro, a Mexican-Brazilian venture, and Spain's Telefonica seem to have walked away big winners from the 5G auction after putting up the most cash for spectrum rights. But this is all very awkward because Huawei has been a major tech provider in Brazil for decades, and local cell phone operators also rely on Huawei's tech. What's more, excluding Huawei, by far the most cost-effective supplier of 5G equipment in the country, will increase the project's overall cost, which is now expected to exceed $7 billion. Many remain skeptical that this massive task can be pulled off in just nine months. But whenever it does happen, it will be great news for Brazilians, many of whom live in remote areas with shoddy internet access.
Sudan on the brink. Two weeks after a military coup in Sudan, the country's security situation continues to deteriorate. On Sunday, soldiers responded to pro-democracy protests in Khartoum by tear-gassing and arresting more than 100 teachers who refuse to return to work until the transitional civilian-military government is restored. (The intervention drew comparisons to the harsh crackdown against protesters that eventually led to the ousting of longtime despot Omar al-Bashir in 2019.) Meanwhile, civilian PM Abdalla Hamdok remains under house arrest, and the internet is still shut down. Arab League mediators have arrived in the capital to try to mediate between junta leader Gen. Abdel-Fattah Burhan and the pro-civilian forces, but Burhan refuses to even call the power grab a coup. The country's largest union, which played a pivotal role in the 2019 protest movement, has called a two-day national strike — the opening salvo of a campaign of civil disobedience to force the military back to the negotiating table. Since the generals show no signs of backing down, the odds of more bloodshed are growing by the day.
Argentina votes, ruling party in trouble. Argentines go to the polls this coming Sunday to vote in the country's midterm legislative elections, with the ruling leftwing coalition of President Alberto Fernández bracing for heavy losses in both houses of parliament. The result will likely reflect the outcome of last September's primary elections, where the president's allies got clobbered by the center-right opposition. Since then, Fernández has caved to pressure from his powerful VP, former president Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (no relation), to double down on social spending and government intervention in the economy to curb skyrocketing inflation. But it hasn't worked: Fernández has capped prices on a whopping 1,432 products, yet annual inflation remains over 50 percent. Without a senate majority, it'll be very hard for the president to get much done in the second half of his term at the worst possible time: economists fear Argentina may stiff the IMF on part of the $45 billion it owes early next year. Another default could lead to a run on banks like in 2001, when the country suffered one of its worst financial crises ever. With presidential elections not on the horizon for another two years, buckle up for a lot of political instability until then.
Iraqi PM's narrow escape. Iraq's PM Mustafa al-Kadhimi is lucky to be alive after a barrage of explosives was fired at his compound inside a high-security zone, injuring several security personnel. The brazen attack was carried out by pro-Iran militias, who have been violently calling for a recount since their parties did poorly in the recent parliamentary elections. On Friday, the militias tried to breach the fortified area known as the "Green Zone," which includes the PM's compound and Western embassies. Pro-Iran factions are particularly worried that Shia Muslim cleric Muqtada al-Sadr — whose party won the biggest share of votes and is trying to form a government — will try to temper Tehran's growing influence over the oil-rich country. (Al-Sadr has called for way less foreign interference in Iraq from Iran and the West). Even before the recent unrest, things weren't going well in Iraq, where power supplies are scarce and the economy is in shambles. What's more, Iraqis have little faith in the political elite's ability to fix things, as was reflected in the record-low election turnout. We're watching to see if this latest round of violence begets… more violence.
What We're Watching: A powder keg in Iraq
Iraqi PM's narrow escape. Iraq's PM Mustafa al-Kadhimi is lucky to be alive after a barrage of explosives was fired at his compound inside a high-security zone, injuring several security personnel. The brazen attack was carried out by pro-Iran militias, who have been violently calling for a recount since their parties did poorly in the recent parliamentary elections. On Friday, the militias tried to breach the fortified area known as the "Green Zone," which includes the PM's compound and Western embassies. Pro-Iran factions are particularly worried that Shia Muslim cleric Muqtada al-Sadr — whose party won the biggest share of votes and is trying to form a government — will try to temper Tehran's growing influence over the oil-rich country. (Al-Sadr has called for way less foreign interference in Iraq from Iran and the West). Even before the recent unrest, things weren't going well in Iraq, where power supplies are scarce and the economy is in shambles. What's more, Iraqis have little faith in the political elite's ability to fix things, as was reflected in the record-low election turnout. We're watching to see if this latest round of violence begets… more violence.
Men walk near election campaign posters ahead of the parliamentary election in Mosul, Iraq.
Iraq has elections this weekend — will anybody show up?
Iraq will hold on Sunday its fifth election since the US-led invasion toppled Saddam Hussein in 2003, and the first since a widespread protest movement in 2019 ousted the government in place at that time. Over 900 candidates are vying for 329 parliamentary seats against a backdrop of still-elevated economic, social, and security tensions in the oil-rich country. Eurasia Group analyst Sofia Meranto explains what's at stake in the vote.
Why are the elections being held a year early?
Frustrated with rampant corruption, the power of violent militia groups, lack of economic opportunity and poor public services, the protesters in 2019 called for an overhaul of the country's political system. They demanded changes to allow for more representation of smaller political forces and early elections. Prime Minister Mustafa Kadhimi was appointed in April of the following year with a mandate to address some of these demands, including an early vote. First scheduled for June 2021, the elections were delayed to October to give authorities more time to complete the preparations. Muqtada al Sadr, an influential religious and political figure, initially said he would not participate, raising the risk of another postponement, but he later changed his mind, ensuring elections go forward.
Will they be free and fair?
Though fraud has often plagued Iraqi elections, efforts to bolster monitoring practices by a large cohort of local and international bodies will probably minimize the problem this time around. More concerning is the pervasive climate of fear created by the intimidation and killing of protesters and political activists by the militias that have emerged in Iraq over the past decade. That has cast a shadow over the electoral process. Widespread disillusionment with the inability of the ruling elite to improve living conditions and rein in the militias will suppress participation in Sunday's vote, likely continuing a trend of low participation — the turnout in 2018 was about 44 percent.
If that's the case, do these elections even matter?
Yes. For one thing, election turnout will provide a useful metric of the level of the public's dissatisfaction. But more importantly, the elections will be critical to determine whether Iraq's political system can continue to evolve to meet the demands of its citizens — that is, whether it gives more power to reformers or further entrenches the defenders of the status quo. That will be important to addressing concerns in the political and economic spheres, as well as to continuing the fight against COVID.
What's the expected outcome?
Iraqi elections typically yield a complicated coalition-building process among Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish parties. The allocation of resources and power along sectarian lines adds layers of complexity, but according to an unwritten rule, the next government will likely be led by a Shia prime minister, a Kurdish president, and a Sunni Arab parliamentary speaker. It's the dynamics of competition among the various factions within these three blocs that makes a tilt toward pragmatism likely following this weekend's elections. That would favor the selection of a more moderate candidate such as Kadhimi as PM, and his reappointment would be positive for reforms. If some independent or small groups manage to win seats, that could also help advance changes to the political system. Still, the power of the traditional Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish elites is unlikely to be greatly challenged.
What are Iraq's neighbors and the US watching out for?
They are all be hoping for an outcome that shores up stability in Iraq, while protecting their own interests. Iran remains invested in keeping Iraq in its orbit and not heavily influenced by the US. In turn, Gulf countries (especially Saudi Arabia), Jordan, and Egypt are focused on strengthening their own ties with Baghdad and pushing back against Iranian influence. The US has been seeking to promote reformists, and it backed the current Iraqi government as it tried to pull Iraq closer to its Arab neighbors. Also important to the US will be the new government's stance on the presence of US forces in Iraq, which some parties have opposed. China, meanwhile, is interested in expanding its energy investments in and trade with Iraq, and will be on the lookout for political openings to do so.