Trending Now

We have updated our Privacy Policy and Terms of Use for Eurasia Group and its affiliates, including GZERO Media, to clarify the types of data we collect, how we collect it, how we use data and with whom we share data. By using our website you consent to our Terms and Conditions and Privacy Policy, including the transfer of your personal data to the United States from your country of residence, and our use of cookies described in our Cookie Policy.
kurds
People in Damascus celebrate after the Kurdish-led and U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) agreed to integrate into Syria's new state institutions.
Syrian government inks key deal with the Kurds
In a big step toward trying to unify post-Assad Syria, the government reached an agreement with the SDF, a US-backed Kurdish militia that has controlled large swathes of northeast Syria for nearly a decade.
President Ahmad al-Sharaa and SDF leader Mazloum Abdi inked the deal on Monday.
What was agreed: The SDF will integrate “civilian and military institutions” into the Syrian state by year’s end. This includes border controls and, importantly, oil fields, that before the war generated a fifth of Syria’s official government revenue.
The eight-point pact also guarantees the political rights of all Syrians, regardless of background, facilitates the return of Kurdish refugees, and recognizes the Kurds as “an indigenous community.”
The Syrian context: Last weekend, sectarian violence exploded in western Syria when Assadist holdouts from the Alawite community attacked a state checkpoint. Some government forces, dominated by al-Sharaa’s HTS jihadist militia, responded with a rampage of sectarian reprisals that left more than 1,000 Alawites and Christians dead.
The SDF deal, with its broader language about rights and citizenship in the new Syria, is a positive step. But implementing will not be easy in a context where the fledgling post-Assad state is still trying to solidify control, bolster stability, and navigate ferocious sectarian and ethnic crosscurrents. It will require good faith from both sides, and firm external support.
The Turkish angle: Ankara, a backer of the new Syrian government, has long disliked the SDF, which is linked to Kurdish PKK militants in Turkey. But with the PKK now laying down arms after 40 years of conflict, a bigger settlement between Kurds, Turkey, and the new Syria could be afoot.President of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, photographed at the Presidential palace in Athens, Greece, on December 7, 2023.
Is Turkey on a roll these days?
With so much of the world in geopolitical flux these days, it’s hard to pick clear winners or losers. But one leader who could be pretty happy about how things are going at the moment is Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
The Turkish president has been in power for more than 20 years. Now he’s angling to stick around even beyond his current term limits, which expire in 2028. Luckily for him, a number of things are suddenly going right at once.
“He has more of a chance to realize his foreign policy, security, and economic objectives than he’s had in well over a decade,” says Emre Peker, Eurasia Group’s top Turkey expert.
Let’s take a look at the hit parade:
First, the Assad regime in Syria is gone. Erdogan had worked towards this for years, hoping that Bashar Assad’s fall and the end of the Syrian civil war would hasten the return of millions of Syrian refugees living in Turkey – so far more than 80,000 have returned – while also opening up opportunities for Turkish economic and strategic influence in the country.
Ankara has already laid the groundwork for a military partnership with the new Syrian government of Ahmad al-Sharaa, whose HTS militia overthrew Assad back in December with Turkish help.
Second, the Kurdish problem may be nearing a resolution. The main Kurdish militant group, the PKK, has suggested it is willing to lay down its arms after 40 years of armed struggle against the Turkish state. (See more here.) If so, it would bring to an end a once-intractable conflict that has left tens of thousands dead.
Third, a possible ceasefire in Ukraine could be a boon, opening up reconstruction opportunities in Ukraine for Turkey’s world-class construction firms. Erdogan, who has good ties with Russia but has also positioned Turkey as a potential peacemaker in the war, has taken care to show support recently for Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, even as Washington distances itself from Kyiv.
And if the Trump Administration really does reduce its defense commitments to Europe – as the EU now vividly fears – Turkey could benefit both as a supplier of arms to the EU and as a critical interlocutor between the continent and Russia, with whom Erdogan has cultivated friendly relations, to the chagrin of its NATO allies.
Lastly, the economy is perking up. True, inflation is still at 39%, but that’s the lowest level in nearly two years, and the central bank has been cautiously cutting rates to keep up the economic momentum: Turkey’s GDP grew 3.2% last year, beating expectations.
But there are huge caveats to all of this, says Peker.
First, Syria could just as easily blow up as glow up. The country is a sectarian patchwork ravaged by decades of dictatorship and years of civil war. The new government of jihadist-turned-statesman al-Sharaa has yet to prove that it can achieve stability. On Friday, violence exploded between government forces and the Alawite minority that the Assads themselves hailed from.
“If that spirals out of control,” says Peker, “it will encourage other militias to try to secure more autonomy for themselves, which could create instability on Turkey's border – in which case Erdogan’s dreams of economically benefiting from the new Syria would go down the drain.”
Second, the Kurdish solution will require a careful compromise. Erdogan’s Islamist AK party is supported by the far-right MHP party. But even together they don’t have the votes that Erdogan needs to change the constitution or call early elections – the only two ways he can get around the 2028 term limit.
The support of Kurdish parties could get Erdogan over the line, but it’s a narrow path: Erdogan will need to grant the Kurds just enough autonomy and cultural rights to seal the end of the conflict, but without giving them so much that his nationalist partners in the MHP balk.
Third, Trump’s realignment won’t necessarily help Erdogan.
Turkey can in principle benefit from Europe’s new plans to Trump-proof itself by spending more than $800 billion on defense, but European governments may prefer to keep that spending – and the resulting jobs – in the EU rather than give Turkey a piece of the action.
And if Washington really does fold up its European security umbrella and go home, Ankara could be in big trouble. Turkey’s Incirlik airbase is home to dozens of American nuclear weapons and thousands of US troops.
“Turkey is a massive beneficiary of the American security umbrella,” says Peker. “If that were to deteriorate, that would be detrimental to Turkey regardless of how robust its defense industry is becoming.”
In all, it’s more of a mixed bag for Erdogan than it may at first appear. Although a lot of things are coming up aces for Erdogan these days, says Peker, “it’s hardly a given that Turkey really comes out of this strengthened, victorious, and able to throw its weight around however it wants.”
Syrian Kurds gather with flags as Turkey's jailed militant leader Abdullah Ocalan calls on his Kurdistan Workers Party to lay down its arms last week in Hasakah, Syria.
Kurdish rebels declare ceasefire, but what’s the quid pro quo?
So why stop fighting? Perhaps, freedom. Last October, staunch Turkish nationalist Devlet Bahceliinvited Ocalan to come to parliament and “declare that he has laid down his arms” – and intimated that his life sentence could be lifted. This weekend, Bahceli, whose party is the largest partner in Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s coalition,welcomed Ocalan’s call for disbanding the PKK, calling it a “valuable and important” statement.
The move also comes as Erdogan seeks support for constitutional changes that would allow him to run for a third term in 2028, and the backing of the pro-Kurdish DEM party could be key. In the past two months, DEM Party representativeshave paid three visits to Ocalan, the first since members of the party’s predecessor, the Peoples’ Democratic Party, met with him in April 2015. Ocalan’s nephew, Omer Ocalan, a member of the Turkish Parliament, also visited and shared a message from his uncle on social media.
Will the ceasefire hold? It’s not clear, and a similar agreement in 2013 failed to endure. The deal must also first be accepted by Turkey and is complicated by the fact that the PKK is still classified as a terrorist organization by that country, the US, and the EU. We’re watching for Erdogan’s next move – and whether Ocalan’s liberation follows.
A demonstrator holds a picture of jailed Kurdish militant leader Abdullah Ocalan during a rally in Diyarbakir, Turkey, February 27, 2025.
Is the PKK’s war with Turkey suddenly … over?
For 40 years, the guerrillas of the Kurdistan Workers Party, known by its Turkish
initials PKK, have waged war against the Turkish state in a conflict that’s left more than 40,000 dead.
On Thursday, the group’s jailed leader, Abdullah Ocalan, made a startling demand: The PKK should disarm and dissolve itself.
The background: Kurds, one of the world’s largest stateless ethnic groups, comprise about a fifth of Turkey’s population and are concentrated mainly in the Southeast along the Syrian, Iraqi, and Iranian frontiers.
Formed in the 1980s, the Marxist-influenced PKK initially sought Kurdish secession but later moderated to greater autonomy. The PKK has attacked both military and civilian targets and is considered a terrorist organization by Turkey, the EU, and the US.
Ocalan’s call comes after talks between him, the Turkish government, and Turkey’s main pro-Kurdish political party. It is unclear what concessions, if any, the PKK will get in exchange for dissolving.
Meanwhile, across the border … Kurdish militias tied to the PKK are active in northern Syria, where they fight ISIS with US support and have carved out autonomous areas that Turkey views with extreme suspicion. Turkish troops and proxies have clashed with the Syrian Kurdish groups, which seek autonomy within the new Syria.
We’ll be watching to see what the terms of any PKK-Ankara deal are, and how it may affect the balance of power in northern Syria.
Kurdish fighters from the People's Protection Units (YPG) take part in a military parade as they celebrate victory over the Islamic state, in Qamishli, Syria March 28, 2019.
Will Turkey attack Syria’s Kurds?
Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan threatened this week to launch attacks against Kurdish-led forces in northeastern Syria. During an interview broadcast late Tuesday, he said that if the US-backed paramilitary People’s Protection Units (usually known by their Kurdish initialism YPG) fail to lay down their arms and expel foreign fighters, Turkey “will do what’s necessary,” including “a military operation.”
Wait, aren’t the YPG and Turkey both US allies? Yes, but that hasn’t stopped Turkey from attacking the Kurds in the past, as Fidan pointed out. “This is what our national security requires,” he said.
Ankara has a longstanding internal conflict with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party on its side of the border, which is also considered a terrorist group by the US and Turkey’s European allies.
Attacking the YPG is unlikely to trigger a significant US response, and Turkey would also like to bolster the newly friendly regime in Damascus led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham.
Washington is slowly warming to HTS as well. The Biden administration moved to lift some restrictions on humanitarian aid sent to Syria on Monday, though it stopped short of fully lifting sanctions. We’re watching for HTS to play nice in the short term as it seeks to get out from under the restrictions imposed on the regime of Bashar Assad.
Syrians living in Turkey, holding a picture of Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan, celebrate after Syrian rebels announced that they have ousted President Bashar al-Assad in Syria, in Istanbul, Turkey, December 8, 2024.
Four reasons why Turkey is excited about the fall of Assad.
No one is sure what the end of the Assad regime in Syria will bring, but few in the region are happier about it than Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. For years, Erdogan, whose Islamist AKP party has governed Turkey since 2003, had sought the ouster of Assad, a secular despot backed by Shia Iran, a regional rival.
In the end, the jihadist militants of Hayat Tahrir el-Sham, or HTS, a group supported in part by Turkey, led the campaign that ended the 54 year reign of the Assads.
But why was Erdogan in particular so interested in seeing that happen?
Here are four big reasons:
- The refugee problem. Nearly 4 million Syrian refugees have arrived in Turkey since the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011. Ankara has gotten some 9 billion Euros from the EU to support them and keep them from traveling onward to Europe, but their presence in Turkey has generated a social backlash. With Assad out of power, Erdogan sees an opportunity to send them home.
- The regional power play. The Sunni Islamist government of Erdogan has always seen Shia revolutionary Iran as a regional rival. Assad, supported by Tehran, was the keystone of Iran’s arc of regional power, enabling Iran to project power via proxy groups into neighboring Lebanon, Iraq, and the Palestinian territories. With that keystone removed, the arc has fallen, and now a Turkey-friendly Sunni Islamist group is in a position to pick up the pieces in Syria. That, says Emre Peker, lead Turkey analyst at Eurasia Group, gives Ankara a chance to “engage in a massive way in the reconstruction of Syria and expand influence and clout throughout the region.”
- The Kurdish complication. For decades, Ankara has faced separatist militancy from Kurdish groups based in southeastern Turkey and is hostile to Syrian Kurdish groups that have carved out autonomous zones of their own during the Syrian civil war. The post-Assad uncertainty has already given Erdogan an opportunity to move more forcefully against the Syrian Kurds. Still, he will have to maneuver carefully in order to avoid a spat with the US, which has backed Syrian Kurds as proxies in the fight against the Islamic State. Incoming US president Donald Trump has called for “staying out of” Syria, which Erdogan would welcome, but it remains to be seen whether that plays out.
- And lastly, the domestic angle. Turkey is in the grip of a huge cost of living crisis, with inflation near 50%. “At a time when everyone is upset about inflation,” says Peker, “the Syria situation is a godsend because now Erdogan can strut his stuff and be the global leader he always wants to be, and people will love him for it in Turkey.”
What could go wrong? Lots. Much of the upside for Erdogan depends on HTS being able to establish order, bring rivals and competing factions to heel, and above all, shape a society that most Syrians will want to live in – or go back to.
But if minority groups feel threatened by HTS rule, there could be a fresh exodus of refugees. Even worse, if HTS’s attempt to hold power collapses altogether, the country could plunge back into chaos and open civil war altogether.
HTS leader Ahmed Al-Shara, aka Abu Muhammad Al-Golani, overlooks Damascus, Syria, after the overthrow of Bashar Assad on Dec. 8, 2024.
What’s next for Syria: HTS appoints PM, Kurds caught in the crossfire, Israel makes a move
HTS appoints PM for Syria’s transitional government
The Shura Council of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, or HTS, has appointed Mohammed al-Bashir as interim prime minister of its proposed 18-month transitional government of Syria.
Who is Mohammed Bashir? Born in 1983 in a village in Jabal Zawiya, an area of Idlib province, Bashir graduated from Aleppo University in 2007 with a bachelor's in electrical engineering, and from Idlib University with a degree in Sharia and Law in 2021. He also worked as an engineer for a gas plant affiliated with the Syrian Gas Company. Bashir is proficient in English and has been conducting press conferences for the SSE for the past year, as well as speaking with the media during the recent HTS campaign. It is not known if he is a hardliner or more moderate in his views.
What were Bashir’s previous roles with HTS? Bashir served for a year as head of the HTS-linked Syrian Salvation Government, or SSG, in Idlib in northwestern Syria, as well as Minister of Development and Humanitarian Affairs for the SSG under his predecessor there, Ali Keda. Before that, he was the director of Islamic Education at the SSG’s Ministry of Awqaf for two and a half years. According to his SSG profile, in Idlib Bashir focused on modernizing government processes using technology, encouraging investment, strengthening the economy, and “meeting the humanitarian needs” of displaced persons.
Concern for the Kurds
Will Syria’s Kurdish minority face renewed persecution – and possibly lose its autonomy - under an HTS government? While many cheer the ouster of Bashar Assad, there is concern about how they will be treated under the new Turkish-backed regime.
Who are the Kurds? Syria’s 2.5 million Kurds, primarily Sunni Muslims, comprise about 15% of Syria’s population. A third live in the Taurus Mountains near Aleppo, another third along the Turkish border in the Jazirah, around 10% near Jarabulus northeast of Aleppo with the remainder residing on the outskirts of Damascus. The Kurds were nomadic until the end of the Ottoman Empire when their population was divided across several nation-states. The Syrian government began stripping the Kurds of their Syrian nationality in 1962 and has conducted a systematic campaign of ethnic cleansing designed to erase their culture and identity.
In neighboring Turkey, Kurds comprise about 18% of the population and have been severely oppressed by successive governments, including the current administration of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Armed resistance by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party has resulted in over 40,000 deaths since the 1980s.
What is the Kurds’ geopolitical significance? The US supported the Kurds – and relied on them – in its fight against the Islamic State in the 2010s, and according to senior government officials, will continue to do so under the new regime. However, since the defeat of ISIS in 2019, the diminished US presence left many Kurds at the mercy of Turkish troops. Now, Turkey has announced that it will be reopening its border with Syria, to facilitate the return of Syrian refugees. An estimated 3 million refugees are currently living in Turkey – and facilitating their return could also provide an opportunity for Erdogan to eliminate the Kurdish presence on the border.
Israel’s buffer raises Egypt’s ire
On Sunday, Israel seized Syrian land near the Golan Heights, citing security concerns as Assad’s forces vacate the area and the new HTS government takes shape. Israel claims that its 1974 Separation of Forces Agreement with Syria is no longer in force with Assad’s ouster, creating a power vacuum in the area. Israel has sent tanks over the border into the buffer zone with Syria, calling the move temporary, limited, and aimed at ensuring Israel’s security. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said the move is necessary and that Israel “will not allow any hostile force to establish itself on our border.”
What is Egypt saying? In response, Egypt has denounced the move as an opportunistic land grab, accusing Israel of exploiting the situation “to occupy more Syrian territories” and calling on the UN Security Council to take “a firm position towards the Israeli aggression on Syria.”
Egypt considers Israel’s control over the Golan Heights, which it captured from Syria in the 1967 Six-Day War, an occupation. Israel annexed the Heights in 1981, a move that has only been recognized by the US.
Rebel forces seized Mengh Airbase and the city of Tel Rifaat in the Aleppo countryside on December 1, 2024, following clashes with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Syrian regime forces.
Syrian rebels clash with Kurds as Assad’s backers spring into action
In case anyone has forgotten just how complicated Syria’s civil war always was, the recent drama around Aleppo escalated on Monday as the Syrian National Army, a group backed by Turkey, attacked US-backed Kurdish groups near the city.
Meanwhile, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, or HTS, the formerly al-Qaida-linked Islamist group at the forefront of the recent rebel offensive in Aleppo, has reportedly ordered Kurdish militias to leave the area altogether and go eastward to Rojava, a de facto autonomous Kurdish area in northeastern Syria.
Aren’t the Kurds against the Assad regime, too? Yes, but that’s not the beef. HTS works with the Turkish proxies and relies on Ankara for political support in high-level negotiations to end the war. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is angling for an advantageous position on the war’s aftermath and said his “greatest wish” was “for the instability that has been going on for 13 years to end.”
For Turkey, that means both weakening Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and cutting the Kurds down to size, as it has long-standing problems with Kurdish separatists at home.
Don’t forget, Turkey is also a US ally — a NATO member, in fact — so urging its proxies to fight US proxies in a theatre where Russian forces also actively operate causes headaches in Washington. Russian warplanes bombed rebel-held areas of Aleppo on Monday, not far from where Turkish F-16s shot down a Russian Su-24 that strayed over the border in 2015. Quite an explosive position for a lame-duck US president.
Speaking of proxies… Iran-backed militias crossed into Syria from Iraq to help shore up Assad’s counterattack as well. Assad will be glad for that help as the Lebanon-based Iranian proxy group Hezbollah, once a major pillar of support for Assad’s regime, said Monday it would not deploy fighters to Syria right now. The group is still regrouping after getting mauled by Israel and is warily watching as last week’s ceasefire in that conflict appears to be breaking down already.
Where is the US in all this? Washington had reportedly held talks before the Aleppo offensive with the UAE about lifting sanctions on Syria in exchange for Assad distancing himself from Iran and Russia. That seems unlikely now that Assad’s back is against the wall and he needs all the help he can get. Beyond milquetoast calls for de-escalation, Washington has thus far kept its cards close to its vest.