Trending Now
We have updated our Privacy Policy and Terms of Use for Eurasia Group and its affiliates, including GZERO Media, to clarify the types of data we collect, how we collect it, how we use data and with whom we share data. By using our website you consent to our Terms and Conditions and Privacy Policy, including the transfer of your personal data to the United States from your country of residence, and our use of cookies described in our Cookie Policy.
{{ subpage.title }}
Iran's outgoing VP Mohammad Javad Zarif speaks during a news conference in Tehran back in 2019.
Iranian VP resigns as hardliners flex muscle
A prominent reformist, Zarif previously served as foreign minister and was instrumental in negotiating Iran’s 2015 nuclear deal with the United States, which earned him threats of bodily harm at the time from hardliners. Since taking office, he was reportedly targeted because his American-born children hold US passports, which hardliners claim disqualifies Zarif from holding public office under Iranian law. In his resignation letter, Zarif said he had “faced the most horrible insults, slander, and threats against myself and my family,” and that it was recommended that he “return to the university.”
How will this impact Pezeshkian, who entered office promising to improve the economy and pursue sanctions relief through improved engagement with the West? According to Eurasia analyst Greg Brew, these departures are signs that Pezeshkian is failing in both respects. “Pezeshkian himself admitted that though he wants to negotiate, the leader’s stance makes it impossible to do so. In other words, he’s admitting publicly that he can’t pursue any policy that goes against Khamenei.”
Ultimately this means he has limited power, Brew explains. “Pezeshkian exercises power fitfully, and without support from the leader he’s essentially a lame duck.”
A supporter of Iranian President-elect Masoud Pezeshkian is holding up an electoral poster while participating in a ceremony with Pezeshkian's presence at the Khomeini (Iran's Late Leader) shrine in southern Tehran, Iran, on July 6, 2024. Former reformist Member of Parliament, Masoud Pezeshkian, is being elected as the new President of Iran.
Will President-elect Pezeshkian reform Iran?
Iran’s incoming president is 69-year-old heart surgeon and former Health Minister Masoud Pezeshkian, a moderate who has called for “constructive interaction with the world.”
Pezeshkian defeated hardline conservative Saeed Jalili in Friday’s runoff election, which saw a historically low turnout of just under 50%, though the second round attracted more voters than the first. He promised to ease Iran’s compulsory hijab laws and internet censorship, as well as revive talks over the 2015 nuclear deal to lift crippling economic sanctions.
Global Reaction. A number of world leaders, including those of China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and India formally congratulated Pezeshkian. The US State Department remains skeptical, however, stating that Iran’s elections were “not free or fair” and that Washington has “no expectation these elections will lead to fundamental change in Iran’s direction or more respect for the human rights of its citizens.”
Could Pezeshkian bring real reform? His room to maneuver is limited by the conservative Iranian establishment, which invests all true power in the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Guardian Council, and ultimately Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
On foreign policy, Eurasia Group Middle East Analyst Gregory Brew foresees little change. “Iran’s strategic stance and its approach to the Israel-Hamas conflict is unlikely to shift as a result of this election. Pezeshkian will pursue nuclear negotiations with the US, though substantive progress is unlikely before the US election.”Iranian women queue to vote at a polling station in a snap presidential election to choose a successor to Ebrahim Raisi following his death in a helicopter crash, in Tehran, Iran June 28, 2024.
Iranian majority votes to ignore election, leading to runoff
Low voter turnout was expected, and many believed Pezeshkianwould come in first but fail to win the 50% majority needed to prevail outright. Experts like Eurasia Group analyst Gregory Brew anticipated that Pezeshkian would then meet either Jalili or Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf in a runoff.
“Events bore out this expectation,” says Brew, “but with a few interesting twists.” First, voter turnout was even lower than feared – at just 40%. Second, Jalili and Qalibaf combined only won 13 million votes, far less than the 19 million Raisi had in 2021.
Round two looms. If Jalili wins in the second round on July 5, he would simply be another ideological hardliner hostile to the West with “retrograde views on important social issues.” This, says Brew, will ensure “dissatisfaction with the regime increases among ordinary Iranians.”
Pezeshkian would be weak and be easy for the regime to undermine, Brew explains, but “the Supreme Leader has always distrusted and feared the reformists and it’s hard to see him tolerating a reformist president, especially with a succession so close.”
In fact, neither candidate is ideal for the regime’s leadership. “While Jalili is ideologically suitable,” says Brew, “he doesn't appear to have much support from inside the regime.”
Still, one of them will prevail. “I'd say that the odds favor Jalili right now, especially as turnout is going to be even lower next week than it was for Friday's election,” says Brew, noting that if voters do align with Pezeshkian, it would just be to prevent a Jalili government.
The Iranian flag flutters in front of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) organisation's headquarters in Vienna, Austria, June 5, 2023.
Might Iran go soft on the West?
Iran’s Guardian Council approved six candidates – five hardliner conservatives and one seemingly safe reformist – earlier this month to run in a June 28 snap election to replace President Ebrahim Raisi, who was killed in a plane crash last month. The council’s inclusion of reformist Masoud Pezeshkian surprised many, but even more shockingly, he has proven an unlikely but fierce competitor against prominent right-wing opponents. Pezeshkian is drawing support from younger voters and disillusioned Iranians who, in years past, boycotted elections. Meanwhile, the conservative vote is being split among the five other candidates.
On the campaign trail, Pezeshkian has shared his intention of improving relations with the US – namely by reviving the 2015 nuclear deal – and softening Iran’s hijab law, both of which would constitute dramatic shifts in policy. Although his growing popularity worries leaders in Iran’s far-right government, even a reformist president is unlikely to bring about much change within the country’s hard-right government – especially a budding friendship with the US.
“If the challenge of winning the election seems large,” says Eurasia Group’s Iran expert, Gregory Brew, “the even greater challenge would be governing effectively as a reformist president – a challenge previous Iranian presidents, such as Mohammed Khatami and Hasan Rouhani, have largely failed to overcome.”
So could the US have a new friend in Iran? Short answer: probably not.
Pezeshkian faces a tough battle to beat hardline conservatives (and also Iran’s most dedicated voters), and the greatest opposition does not come from the people, but the Iranian government.