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Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman chairs the inaugural session of the Shura Council in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on September 10, 2025.
Could Saudi Arabia join the Abraham Accords?
The vibes are good between the United States and Saudi Arabia right now.
Negotiations have advanced on a mutual defense pact, one that would involve military and intelligence cooperation. The two oil-producing nations agreed on scuttling a deal that would have introduced internationally-mandated emissions targets for shipping. There are discussions, even, of holding a National Football League game in Riyadh.
But how far can the two nations go together? Could Saudi Arabia go so far as to join the Abraham Accords, the US-brokered normalization of ties between Arab states and Israel?
As the ceasefire in Gaza holds – albeit tenuously – the United States is already eyeing its next Middle East mission: having Saudi Arabia join Bahrain, Morocco, and the UAE as a signatory of the Accords and normalizing ties with Israel. This would authorize business relations, tourism between the two countries, and enable official diplomatic links. Riyadh has never recognized the Jewish state, and until three years ago, it wouldn’t even let commercial Israeli planes fly over its airspace. But its ever-closer relationship with Washington, as well as its thawing ties with Israel, suggest joining the Accords may be a real possibility.
How did the US and Saudi get so close? Saudi Arabia has been a major US partner in the Middle East ever since the Kingdom was founded in 1932. The relationship has largely centered on oil, with US firms helping the Saudi government explore the fossil fuel in the 1930s. More recently, it has shifted toward defense equipment.
There have been some major points of tension along the way, most notably from the 1973 oil embargo, the 9/11 attacks – 15 of the 19 hijackers that day were from from Saudi – the 2015 US-brokered nuclear deal with the Kingdom’s main regional rival Iran, and, most recently, when Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi was murdered in 2018 at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. A US report later found that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman (MBS) greenlit the hit. During the 2020 US presidential campaign, former President Joe Biden suggested that Saudi should be a “pariah” state.
When US President Donald Trump returned to office, though, the tensions between the two countries dissipated. Just like in his first term, the US leader’s first major foreign visit of his second term was to the Gulf state, where he was greeted with a sea of opulent displays from his Saudi counterparts – rather different from Biden’s awkward fist-bump with MBS in 2022. The Crown Prince is set to pay a visit to Washington next month, too, his first since 2018.
Can the US transfer this goodwill to Saudi-Israel relations? The Kingdom has long said that it won’t normalize relations with Israel until the Jewish state recognizes a Palestinian state, a move that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu appears unlikely to make.
Yet there are signs that the longstanding tensions between the two countries are easing. Just before the Israel-Hamas war began more than two years ago, MBS said his country was moving “closer” each day toward a deal with Israel. Though those negotiations stalled in the wake of Israel’s response to the Hamas attacks of Oct. 7, 2023, the two sides reportedly coordinated to fend off Iranian bombs that were sent toward Israel during the 12-day Israel-Iran war in June.
“The Crown Prince has made a strategic decision to move in the direction of recognizing Israel,” Hussein Ibish, a senior resident fellow at the Arab Gulf States Initiative in Washington, told GZERO.
What’s more, the Saudis stand to benefit from normalizing ties with Israel, much as the current signatories of the Abraham Accords have. They would gain access to Israeli tech and security products, open links to Israeli investors and technology companies, and boost its tourism by opening its country up to Israeli visitors. And this isn’t to mention a preferable security agreement with the United States, which would likely be part of any peace deal with Israel.
Not so fast. There remain several risks for the Saudis in joining the Abraham Accords, per Ibish. For one thing, the Kingdom is a larger and more politically-complex state than the current signatories, making it harder to bring the various internal factions on board for a controversial deal with Israel. Further, the war in Gaza has heightened the Saudi public’s skepticism of Israel. Finally, Riyadh would risk its position as a leader of both the Arab and Muslim world if it normalized ties with the Jewish state, due to widespread opposition to such a move among the Arab public.
“You’ve got Saudi Arabia keenly protecting those interests,” said Ibish. “They would be compromised to some extent by recognition [of Israel].”
With Israel refusing to consider a two-state solution with the Palestinians, Ibish believes it’s unlikely that Saudi Arabia will normalize ties with the Jewish state. Nonetheless, Trump remains hopeful.
“I think that they’re going to all go in very soon,” the US leader told Fox News on Friday. “Wouldn’t it be nice?”
Top 10 game changers of 2023
Whether you win or lose, in politics it is still how you play the game that matters. This year, several global players not only played the game, but they changed it in significant and surprising ways. Join us as we revisit some of the most pivotal moments, figures, and trends of the year in geopolitics.
1. Welcome to the AI era

The intelligence may be artificial, but the political stakes are real. Geeks have quietly been developing AI for years, but it wasn’t until the release of ChatGPT late last year that everyone became fully aware of and spooked by the technology’s immense power. It promises to make our societies more efficient, while also threatening to eliminate jobs and undermine trust in institutions, elections, and media (deepfakes anyone?). Throughout 2023, the most powerful governments in the world began racing to find regulatory balances for AI that decrease risks without stifling innovation. The game has changed: 2023 was just the start.
2. The Mugshot

You would think that a twice-impeached former president facing multiple indictments would have almost no shot at the White House. But Donald Trump, the first ex-president to be criminally indicted in US history, remains an enigma in American politics. Rather than undermining his 2024 campaign, Trump’s legal woes seem to have given him major momentum. His mugshot from Georgia played a particularly big role in bolstering his campaign – helping the former president raise millions. Trump ends 2023 far ahead of the remaining GOP contenders – without even participating in presidential debates – and he’s also leading President Joe Biden in the polls.
3. Russian trenches

In 2023, Ukraine launched a counteroffensive it hoped would score major gains against Russian invaders and persuade American and European backers that their military and financial investments could help Ukraine win the war. But Russia’s ability to entrench its troops behind heavily fortified barriers frustrated Ukraine’s plans, and Russian forces still occupy 18% of Ukraine’s territory. The war grinds on, and Vladimir Putin is now more confident than ever that Russia can outlast Western support for Ukraine.
4. Modi’s moment

During the pandemic, and then as Western sanctions against Russia pushed global food and fuel prices higher, the world’s wealthy democracies and developing countries of the Global South grew further apart on important issues. No one did more to bridge that gap in 2023 than India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi. By improving India’s relationship with the G7 and through his leadership of the G20 this year, Modi brokered practical compromises on issues like climate policy and debt. Even controversies over the murder of an activist in Canada and a suspected plot against another in the US didn’t much dent Modi's standing with Western powers that increasingly see him as an important ally against China.
5. American Unions – strong again?

US unions flexed in 2023. Striking autoworkers won concessions from Big Auto and even drew a US president to the picket lines for the first time. Actors and writers' guilds shut down Hollywood for months, and the Teamsters reached a deal with UPS to avoid crippling 6% of the US economy. Overall, nearly half a million workers went on strike this year, nearly eight times as many as in 2021. Non-union employment is still expanding faster, yes, but organized labor has muscled its way back into the political conversation, and popular support for unions is near highs not seen since the 1960s.
6. Hamas

Until the evening of Oct. 6, 2023, an increasingly right-wing Israel looked like it was able to contain Hamas in the Gaza Strip, deepen its illegal occupation of the West Bank with impunity, and still move towards normalizing ties with the Arab world’s most formidable powers. The plight and aspirations of the Palestinians, meanwhile, had fallen almost entirely out of the global spotlight. You already know what happened next.
7. MBS

A few years back, Jamal Khashoggi’s brutal murder was seemingly all anyone talked about when they mentioned Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, aka MBS. But the oil-rich kingdom’s investments in popular sports – primarily soccer and golf – have shifted the conversation away from his acts of impunity and his country’s record of human rights abuses. The Saudi soccer league snatched up some of the world’s top players in 2023 after roping in superstar Cristiano Ronaldo, disrupting the status quo in a sport long dominated by Europe. Critics say MBS is “sportswashing” to distract from various other controversies, but he doesn’t seem to care as long as it helps the kingdom increase its GDP and become a top tourist destination.
8. Power Barbie

In the decades since 1945, when Ruth Handler first decided to make a doll that encouraged pursuits beyond motherhood, Barbie had strayed from its feminist origins. But director Greta Gerwig rediscovered them with “Barbie,” a global cinematic sensation in which Barbie pushes Ken aside and pursues her own ambitions. Speaking of ambitions, the film made Gerwig the first woman to direct a film surpassing $1 billion at the box office worldwide.
9. Giorgia Meloni

Meloni was a relative unknown on the international stage when Italian voters put her far-right Fratelli d’Italia Party in power late last year, triggering anxieties about the EU’s third-largest economy becoming something like Hungary on steroids: isolated and a thorn in Brussels’ side. Instead, Meloni’s eager embrace of the EU and Ukraine ingratiated her with EU leaders — who in turn have been more open to listening to her ideas on tightening migration policy. It’s a new, electable model for far-right leaders in a Western Europe increasingly invested in the EU but worried about immigration.
10. China owes big

China’s booming economy defined the geopolitical trajectory of the 2010s, but 2023 looks like the year the world began to wonder and worry whether the engine was finally running out of steam. Beijing’s efforts to rein in a staggering debt-to-GDP ratio of 272% have caused knock-on effects ranging from the property market, where two-thirds of Chinese household wealth is invested, to low youth employment, right down to the balance sheets of local governments. It constrained economic growth in 2023, causing global concern about the health of the world’s second-largest economy, — and even seemed to force Xi Jinping to take a more conciliatory approach in relations with the US.
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Representatives from more than 40 countries, including China, India, and the U.S., pose for a group picture as they attend talks in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
Ukraine War: Any closer to peace after Jeddah talks?
The Ukraine diplomatic sweepstakes continued this weekend as representatives from more than 40 countries gathered in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, to try to forge a path toward peace negotiations between Russia and Ukraine. While Russia wasn’t invited, Volodymyr Zelensky said he hoped the talks would lead to a summit later this year and an endorsement of his 10-point formula for peace.
His plan demands that Russia hand over occupied Ukrainian territory – a clear nonstarter for Moscow – and calls for Russian troops to leave Ukraine before peace talks begin, something the Kremlin does not seem inclined to do.
The Jeddah talks followed a June summit in Copenhagen, but how was this one different?
First, after balking at the Danes’ invite last time, China agreed to attend. That was a big win for Ukraine, which knows that Beijing has Putin’s ear, and for the Saudis, who wanted the conference to be viewed by the West and Russia alike as a serious diplomatic forum.
Given that China continues to buy copious amounts of Russian oil and gas, helping the Russian economy stay afloat despite Western sanctions, having Beijing be part of a broader peace push is crucial. And as we’ve written before, China is the one country that has both the carrots and the sticks needed to persuade Putin and Zelensky to swallow compromise.
What’s more, a number of so-called non-aligned countries – including India, Brazil, and South Africa – that have so far refused to acquiesce to Western demands that they ditch relations with the Kremlin, also participated. Though they attended the summit in Copenhagen, the contours of this event were different given that it was hosted by a country with close ties to the Kremlin.
Did anything concrete come from the talks?
The Ukrainian delegation reportedly said Zelensky’s proposals were supported by several in attendance.
Meanwhile, China’s special envoy for Eurasian affairs, Li Hui, noted that the participants had “many disagreements,” adding “we have heard different positions, but it is important that our principles are shared.” Beijing also reportedly expressed enthusiasm for a third round of talks.
Moscow, meanwhile, has referred to the peace talks as “doomed.”
We’ll be watching to see what Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who is trying to rehabilitate his image after years of very bad PR and boost his profile as a legitimate international interlocutor, does next. He had a lot riding on this summit, and while Ukraine and Russia seem too far apart to imagine any significant progress, China’s involvement offers a glimmer of hope.MBS: A Barbie girl living in a Saudi world
A movie about building a dream world to explore fourth-wave feminism?
MBS will be first in line for tickets.
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Syria'n President Bashar Assad
Once frozen out, Bashar Assad is back in
Over the past decade, few Arab leaders have been willing to go anywhere near Syrian dictator Bashar Assad. Sure, he managed to hold on to a few friends – like Iran and Russia – but for the most part, the Syrian president, broadly dubbed “The Butcher” for waging a war on his own people, has been considered persona non grata by regional bigwigs.
But Assad is now being embraced by many who had once vowed to continue treating him as a pariah. In recent weeks, Assad enjoyed the royal treatment when he attended an Arab League summit in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, for the first time in over a decade, while a top Syrian official also rubbed shoulders with international diplomats at a World Health Organization summit in Geneva last week.
In a big win for Assad, the Syrians have also been invited to attend the COP28 climate summit in Abu Dhabi later this year, giving renewed meaning to what many have called the Age of Impunity.
To be clear, this development is not so much a reflection of collective amnesia as it is of Realpolitik. Grappling with changes at home and abroad, many Arab states are now betting that embracing Assad will better serve their respective political and economic aims. But at what cost?
Recap: Assad was never supposed to rule. The second son of Syria’s longtime despotic leader, Hafez Assad, Bashar was summoned back from the UK in 1994 after his elder brother – the rightful heir – was killed in a car crash. Bashar, who trained as an ophthalmologist, ultimately took over as head of the government and military when his father died in 2000.
But the younger Assad failed to amass the widespread loyalty enjoyed by his father, and he exploited sectarian tensions to solidify his rule. In true authoritarian style, Bashar Assad, who belongs to the Alawi ethnoreligious minority, elevated loyalists from his clan and purged those deemed disloyal.
Then in 2011, he launched a brutal crackdown against mostly peaceful protesters encouraged by the Arab Spring. What started as violent suppression morphed into a civil war that to date has killed more than 500,000 people and displaced around 13 million – half of which remain in Syria.
Images of heaps of dead children frothing at the mouth from sarin gas poisoning have become a symbol of Assad’s depravity after he used chemical weapons hundreds of times during the war.
In an alliance led by the US, Gulf states poured millions of dollars into propping up Syrian opposition forces. So why are some of them now bucking their own investment?
Riyadh’s change of heart. One of the most consequential shifts paving the way to normalization with Assad has come from Saudi Arabia. While the Saudis were once one of the most vociferous anti-Assad choruses – they didn’t much appreciate Assad accusing them of birthing ISIS – the de facto Saudi leader Mohammed bin Salman recently kissed Assad’s cheeks as greeted him at the Arab summit on Saudi home turf.
There are several reasons for this change of heart, which is likely linked to the belief that regional instability undermines Riyadh’s grand economic ambitions of diversifying the economy away from hydrocarbons. Regional de-escalation, according to the Saudis, is key to luring the investment needed to get new industries off the ground and also helps explain why the kingdom recently (sort of) patched things up with archnemesis Iran.
Consider that upon assuming the role of defense minister (2015) and crown prince (2017), MBS adopted a pugnacious approach to foreign policy, as demonstrated by having launched a war in Yemen, ordered the slaying of a prominent journalist, and conducted a blockade of Qatar. But it now appears that the de facto Saudi leader has reasoned that this approach hasn’t necessarily yielded great results and that de-escalating tensions across the region will better serve his political and economic ambitions.
The recent devastating earthquake in southern Turkey and northern Syria provided the Saudis a reasonable opening to formally begin engaging with Assad on humanitarian grounds.
For Riyadh, it is also about asserting itself as a regional – and global – leader capable of fixing intractable issues that others can’t.
“Saudi Arabia wants to steal the thunder from the UEA and Turkey over who’s the mediator here and who's taking the lead on addressing the core issues in the Middle East,” says Qutaiba Idlbi, a senior fellow and Syria project manager at the Atlantic Council. For MBS, it is as much about sending a message to regional competitors – and to the US – about Saudi’s diplomatic bonafides as it is about stabilizing Syria itself.
Once Riyadh, arguably the most influential player in the Arab world, jumped on board, several states appeared more comfortable backing Assad’s reintegration into the Arab League, a largely toothless but symbolic regional bloc. Meanwhile, others, like the Jordanians, say that while they are open to the idea they want to see tangible concessions from Assad first.
Returning refugees. Syria’s civil war has given rise to one of the world’s largest refugee crises. Around 3.6 million Syrians remain in Turkey, followed by hundreds of thousands in Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt. Turkey, in particular, has made no secret of the fact that it wants to return millions of refugees back to Syria, a populist message so resonant with voters that even Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, the mild-mannered opposition figure who just ran and narrowly lost to populist President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, recently joined the chorus of those calling for Syrians to be repatriated.
Jordan and Egypt, both facing deep economic pressures at home, have also emphasized the need to strengthen Syria’s economy to facilitate refugee returns from neighboring countries.
Beating the drug habit. Blocked off from financial markets and searching for alternative revenue streams, Syria has emerged as the Middle East’s foremost narcostate. The regime’s star product, captagon, a speed-like amphetamine, has been funneled throughout Lebanon, Jordan, the Gulf, and beyond. Consider that more than 250 million captagon pills have been seized around the world so far this year. Meanwhile, a UK government report revealed that the Syrian drug trade is worth roughly three times that of all the Mexican cartels combined.
And the ripple effects are reverberating throughout the region. In Jordan, for instance, drug-related crimes are now the most common offenses and are causing what authorities have labeled a youth epidemic. This is such a high-stakes issue that Jordan last month launched air strikes inside … Syria, targeting a high-profile drug smuggler.
The Assad regime, for its part, recently pledged to crack down on the drug scheme, but it’s hard to take it at its word given that Assad cronies run the trade and make a mint from the stuff to the tune of more than $5.7 billion in 2021. The US, for its part, recently sanctioned two of Bashar Assad’s cousins for involvement in drug trafficking.
But at the end of the day, there’s no greater unifying force than a mutual aversion to democracy. “Ending the Arab Spring and the democracy movement’s aspirations in the Arab world” is a common theme for many Arab states in reaching out to Syria, Idlbi says. He points out that “Syria remains the only open chapter where rebels or revolutionaries still have a say in what's happening and have geopolitical support.”
Rebuilding Syria. Many analysts have claimed that Arab states are also vying for lucrative building contracts in war-ravaged Syria, but Idlbi isn’t convinced.
“There’s no appetite to invest money without a vision of return,” Idlbi says. What’s more, he adds, many governments still don’t trust Assad and fear that if they do step in to build up the country’s water, power, and agriculture systems, Assad could turn around and nationalize these companies once the country is in a more stable position.
Other interested parties. Syria is a crucial part of Iran’s “axis of resistance” against Israel and the US, used as a hub to manufacture and transfer advanced military equipment to Hezbollah in Lebanon and other proxies. Indeed, Riyadh’s acceptance of Assad as Syria’s rightful leader signals at least a tacit acceptance on the part of Arab states of Tehran’s presence there and of its role as a key regional actor more broadly.
For Russia, any move that reinforces the region’s new security structure, whereby Arab states appear to be prioritizing political pragmatism over sectarian struggle (and in the process further diluting US influence in the region) is arguably a win.
But not everyone is on board with Assad. In the Arab world, Qatar and Kuwait have rejected bilateral ties with Syria, while the EU and US also appear committed to the ongoing isolation of Assad. Still, it is notable that a US official recently urged Arab states to “get something for that engagement,” a rare acknowledgment that Assad’s reintegration into regional affairs is essentially a done deal.
So what does that tell us about the US’ commitment to Syria? For Washington, which still has troops in the rebel-held northeast, “the current situation in Syria is the solution,” Idlbi says, referring to the fact that while Assad continues to rule over much of the country, the northeast and northwest are controlled by anti-regime opposition forces. And as the Biden administration focuses its attention across the Pacific, “Washington seems to be going with a sort of ‘you touch it you own it’ approach.”
In the meantime, Assad’s fortune is no doubt sending a clear message to other dictators and autocrats around the world that if you stick it out long enough, good things might just come your way.



