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Israel strikes: Why Hezbollah remains silent
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: A quick take to kick off your week. We are talking about the Middle East and the significant escalation in Lebanon primarily that has so far culminated with the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah, and most of Hezbollah's senior leadership, with virtually no response by Hezbollah against Israel. Lots of things to think about here.
First is the fact that Israel's asymmetric military and intelligence capabilities really matter. For a long time, people have talked about the potential of existential threats against Israel. It certainly does not appear that way today, and in fact, it shows just how asleep at the switch the Israeli defense forces and more important leadership were back on October 7th in terms of border security, in terms of ignoring intelligence, in terms of most of the IDF being redeployed to the West Bank as opposed to Gaza, that allowed Hamas to pull off this spectacular and horrific terrorist attack against the Israeli citizens, killing over 1,000.
In today's environment, the ability of the Israel military to strike their enemies with virtual impunity, and with virtually no capacity for them to strike back effectively against Israel, is what's really dramatic here, and that's led to a few things in the region. First, it's led to the ability of Prime Minister Netanyahu to gain a lot of popularity. He was blamed for the October 7th attacks, for them happening on his watch, for him not being capable of defending Israel back then. Today, it's a very different story. It's being able to destroy Hamas, irrespective of the civilian consequences for the Palestinians there, it's his ability to take on and decapitate Hezbollah and Israel post-October 7th has taken virtually no hits as a consequence. That's led Netanyahu's former adversary, political opponent, Gideon Sa'ar, former Minister of Defense, to join Netanyahu's government, join his cabinet and their New Hope Party.
It means that if there were new elections today, a good chance... There's always a of coalition formation because it's a very fragmented political party system, but much easier to imagine that Israel's Prime Minister would be able to win a new election today, as opposed to the absolute thumping he would've taken over the course of the last year. It's a very different environment, and the fact is that the Israeli population supports these wars, and I say that really across almost the entire political spectrum. They support the war in Gaza, they support the attacks against Hezbollah, they support getting their citizens back into their homes in the north, there's some 60,000 that have been evacuated, and they do not support a two-state solution for the Palestinians, virtually none of them.
That is, of course, very, very different from pretty much everyone else in the world who does support territorial integrity and self-determination for the Palestinians, but they don't have the ability or the willingness to make that happen, and certainly none of Israel's friends are prepared to truly cut off Israel. We've seen the Brits stop with a few of the weapons systems, we've seen some targeted sanctions, tiny, from the Europeans and the Americans against Israel. But the military aid, the weapons sales, the trade, that all continues as it has. And by the way, that's also true in terms of the Abraham Accords, the Gulf states that have been working with the Israelis and others in the Arab world, they're very unhappy about what's happening on the ground in the Middle East, but they're also not prepared to change their relationship with Israel.
So where else does this go? Does this mean all-out war with Hezbollah? I don't think so, and I say I don't think so because I don't think Hezbollah has that capability. They do have men that are far better trained than Hamas; they have about 10 times the numbers of missiles and delivery systems than Hamas ever had, though a lot of them have been destroyed clearly, and certainly their leadership is gone. But even if they were to launch everything they had against Israel, it's hard to see them doing much damage. They could kill some Israelis, no question, but probably not that many, and they certainly couldn't do any real damage to the Israeli defense forces or the Israeli government. Meanwhile, Hezbollah would be utterly destroyed and the Lebanese economy would be in shambles. So it's hard to imagine any Hezbollah leadership, even a more hardline, hard as that is to imagine, leader of Hezbollah than Nasrallah taking those steps against Israel.
That then leads the bigger question, which is, okay, so the Axis of Resistance has been engaging in attacks, Red Sea, we'll see more of that from the Houthis, potshots at Americans, British military in the region, not very effective, some missiles against Israel, not very effective. What about Iran, might the Iranians do anything. Answer here, no. I spent an hour last week with the Iranian Vice President, Javad Zarif, and he made it very clear that his country, his government, is not going to fall into the, as he called it, Israeli trap, that they want nothing more than Iran to engage in what would be ineffective strikes against Israel that would bring the Americans into the war against Iran, that they are not going to take that bait.
And you'll remember, lest you think this is just propaganda, that back in the Trump administration when Qasem Soleimani, the head of the Iranian defense forces, was assassinated, so not so different than Israel taking out Hassan Nasrallah, the Iranian response was virtually nothing. Rhetoric, but no efforts to go after the Americans because they just didn't have the capabilities, and that's what we're seeing with the Iranians vis-a-vis Israel today. Now, the bigger question is whether Bibi Netanyahu, on a roll in the region, decides that he's going to go after Iran directly, and there, I think it's a question of their capabilities. The bunker that Nasrallah was in was comparatively easy to hit when you had intelligence that he was there. Yes, bunker-buster bombs, but limited and available to the Israelis.
The incredibly deep underground nuclear program, for example, at Fordow of Iran, under meters and meters of granite reinforced, the Americans are the only ones with the clear capabilities to destroy that. Israel could clearly set back Iran's program, but those kind of strikes would likely only redouble the efforts of the Iranians to build a full nuclear weapons capability, and a glancing blow by Israel, that would antagonize the United States and others and potentially lead to blow-back that Israel hasn't had to face so far, but might, that they wouldn't like; that's a risk that I think is greater than Israel would want to take, especially for not destroying the Iranian nuclear program, but only a limited amount of damage.
So I think you'd still see espionage, you'll still see sabotage, you'll still see willingness for the Israelis to go after members of the IRGC that they find in Syria, Iraq, other places, absolutely. But direct strikes on Iran, specifically the nuclear program, which is the target that the Israelis are most interested in, that seems like a bigger stretch to me. Not impossible, more likely today than it was a week ago, but still, I think that the escalation that we have been seeing in the war in the Middle East may be close to having played itself out now, simply because Israeli military capabilities are so much greater than that of their adversaries, and their ability to now focus on defense and security makes it more challenging for them to do anything, their enemies to do anything against them.
So anyway, that's where we are right now. I hope everyone's doing well, and I'll talk to you all real soon.
Diplomats from Saudi Arabia, China and Iran at a summit in Beijing.
Is China’s Saudi-Iran diplomatic deal for real?
“Welcome to the post-America moment in the Middle East,” one commentator wrote after the surprising news broke last week that China had mediated a diplomatic breakthrough between two forever enemies: Iran and Saudi Arabia. Others hailed the exciting prospect of peace between two countries that have long been locked in regional proxy wars.
But are these hot takes jumping the gun? Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the country’s de facto decision maker known as MBS, once said Iran’s supreme leader “makes Hitler look good.” So why has he bought into this rapprochement – and why now?
First, what’s actually in the deal? Last Friday, Saudi Arabia and Iran announced that they had agreed to restore full diplomatic ties within two months after China stepped in to mediate a deal. While the announcement was light on details, Riyadh and Tehran have broadly committed to reopening diplomatic missions in each other's capitals, as well as to activate security arrangements, though it is unclear exactly how they would stamp out proxy wars in places like Yemen, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq, where they have divergent interests.
While the two states have long been divided over competing visions of Islam and vied for regional dominance, diplomatic relations were severed entirely in 2016 after the execution of a Shiite cleric in Saudi Arabia prompted Iranian protesters to storm the Saudi mission in Tehran.
If diplomatic breakthroughs come and go, why is this one such a big deal? First, whether in the schoolyard or at the negotiating table in Geneva, it’s always a feat when two sides that seemingly hate each other say they’re willing to patch things up.
What’s more, when it comes to moderating Mideast rivalries and inserting oneself in the region’s affairs – whether wanted or unwanted – the US has almost always played the part. This time, however, China, which is in the increasingly rare position of having warm ties with both Riyadh and Tehran, stepped in at the eleventh hour to see negotiations, previously led by Iraq and Oman, over the finish line.
Who wants what? China isn’t necessarily interested in taking up the mantle of Mideast security guarantor, says Simon Henderson, an expert on Gulf and energy policy at The Washington Institute. “I think that China is focused on displacing the US rather than being embroiled in managing Gulf schisms,” he says.
Moreover, for Iran, the perks of such a détente are more or less clear. Having faced a recent popular uprising at home – which it initially blamed on the Saudis for orchestrating (not true!) – combined with a deepening currency crisis and having very few friends to turn to, a cold peace with the richest Gulf state could eventually give its economy some breathing room.
Less clear, however, is why the Saudis – who have long enjoyed a very complicated partnership with the US while sounding the alarm on Iran’s menacing nuclear ambitions – are willing to back the deal in good faith with few security guarantees.
Deteriorating Saudi-US ties: Desperate times call for desperate measures. Riyadh has long perceived Tehran – and its regional proxies in Yemen, Lebanon, and elsewhere – to be its biggest security threat. This view was fortified in 2019 when Iranian-backed groups in Yemen fired missiles on Saudi oil infrastructure, temporarily knocking out a whopping 5% of global oil supplies.
Riyadh was furious that its friend in the White House – former President Donald Trump – first said that the US was “locked and loaded” to respond to the attack, but then proceeded to do … nothing. The Kingdom’s view that it could not rely on the US to have its back was reinforced in 2020, when then-presidential candidate Joe Biden vowed to make Riyadh a “pariah.”
“Whether or not this latest move was intended as a middle finger to the Biden administration I don't know,” says Aaron David Miller, a senior fellow and Middle East policy expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “but I do think that MBS has a very low opinion of and regard for Biden.”
Indeed, as a result of deteriorating relations with Washington, the wily and pragmatic Saudi crown prince has sought to deepen ties with other dominant global players – like China and Russia – as well as pursue politically expedient rapprochements with rivals (first Qatar and now Iran) on its own terms without the US leading the way.
It is possible that Riyad’s game plan here is to pressure the Biden administration into committing to security guarantees for the Saudis and providing them with what they have long been asking for, Henderson says, including, “guaranteed access to US weapons systems, no role for Congress in approving [weapons sales], and nuclear technology without signing additional protocol.” Chances? “Each is ... a stretch,” he says.
Why now? Stability is key to economic expansion. For the Saudis, long focused on diversifying their economy away from hydrocarbons, a dying breed, de-escalating regional tensions (combined, of course, with addressing its serious reputation issues) is key to luring the investment needed to get new industries off the ground. What’s more, Riyadh has benefited from high oil prices over the past year and is likely keen to use this cash influx to boost the non-petroleum economy – like its nascent mining sector – in the near term.
Ambiguity is the point. The Iran-Saudi row is so bitter and protracted that it’s hard to believe Riyadh has much faith this new deal will yield significant changes in Iranian behavior.
After getting the cold shoulder from Biden, Riyadh’s message to Washington appears clear: We have other friends in high places. While that may be true, China is hardly in a position to provide the security guarantees that Washington does, including, ironically, protecting the passages that allow Saudi to export its oil to … China.
In this way, Miller says, from the Saudi perspective, the deal can be seen more as a “hedge” against Iran. “Getting the Chinese to broker what amounts right now to a stylized ceasefire – it's more a transactional arrangement than it is anything else” – might help the Saudis by “preempting or ameliorating a crisis,” he says.
Washington’s poker face. The Biden administration welcomed the recent announcement, saying that reconciliation is always a good thing. It also embraced the idea that this could finally lead to a resolution of the devastating Yemen civil war, something Iran and Saudi Arabia both seem open to.
Still, Miller’s take? Washington’s stance is overwhelmingly “passive aggressive,” he says. “When your presumptive partner is drawn into an agreement with your preeminent international rival and your preeminent regional rival, you can't be happy about that."
Can Saudi Arabia and Iran really be friends?
Few rivalries in the world today are as bitter and bloody as the struggle between Iran and Saudi Arabia. For more than forty years, they have vied for sectarian and strategic influence across the Middle East, waging proxy wars that have wreaked havoc in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and elsewhere.
But now it appears the two old foes might be looking for ways to patch things up.
After initially denying a Financial Timesscoop about secret bilateral talks held in Iraq last month, the foreign ministries of both countries now acknowledge that yes, Tehran and Riyadh are gingerly exploring a detente.
In fact, Saudi Crown Prince Mohamed Bin Salman, the kingdom's de facto ruler, recently called for "good and special relations with Iran".
That's a hell of a change of heart since 2018, when he said that Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei "makes Hitler look good."
So why might they be looking to make nice now?
Washington is one reason. In a dangerous world, the Saudis are worried about the Biden administration. "Saudi Arabia can no longer expect the same backing that they had under Trump," says Ahmed Al-Omran, editor of the (very good) Riyadh Bureau newsletter. Since coming to office, Smokin' Joe has cut support for Saudi Arabia's ruinous military campaign against Iran-backed rebels in Yemen, chided Riyadh over its lousy human rights record, and launched a full-bore diplomatic effort to revive the Iran nuclear deal — something the Saudis always opposed.
Given Biden's broader push to reduce American involvement in the Middle East, the Saudis might be keen to find a better modus vivendi with their main regional rivals. The Saudi overtures to Tehran come amid fresh thaws with Syria and Turkey as well.
Meanwhile, from Iran's perspective, easing tensions with the Saudis is one way to mollify Riyadh's opposition to a revived nuclear accord. What's more, al-Omran says, it could open the way to broader economic ties with the Arab world after a new deal is done. (Israel's misgivings about a new nuclear deal, of course, may be harder to overcome.)
Rivalries are expensive. Nobody knows for sure how much Iran spends on its proxies and government allies in Lebanon, Iraq, Gaza, and Yemen, to say nothing of the massive support for Syria's Bashar al-Assad — but it's expensive. Most estimates come to about $15 billion a year.
That's no small amount for an economy crippled by US sanctions, and many Iranians know it. Back in 2018, during mass protests over corruption and the economy, some marchers called out Tehran for spending on foreign proxies rather than Iranian needs: "No Gaza, No Lebanon, No Syria," they chanted, "My Life for Iran!"
Saudi Arabia, for its part, might also like to spend less money on defense as it looks to modernize its economy as part of the Crown Prince's grand plan to wean the country off of oil revenues. In fact, Riyadh has already been cutting its defense spending for several years. This year, arms outlays are set to drop nearly 4 percent. Better relations with Iran would ease the pressure to buy more guns.
And green economies are bad for black gold. Is it a stretch to say global warming is part of this story too? Maybe. Neither country has openly put climate change at the center of its policy. But both can certainly see the writing on the wall elsewhere: as governments around the world cut carbon emissions, the salad days for oil exporters are coming to an end. Saudi Arabia and Iran each stand to lose around 40 percent of their revenue by the year 2030. That means new priorities have to be set: and sectarian hate is expensive.
Still, let's not get carried away. These are cautious and preliminary talks between two bitter rivals who have detested each other for more than forty years. There is a ton of baggage in the relationship — religious, strategic, economic — that won't be easy to get past. Any progress will be halting and fragile.
But every path to detente starts somewhere. Perhaps this one begins in Baghdad?