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Trump foreign policy in a MAGA, MAGA world
As Trump prepares to return to the White House, his foreign policy picks are already showing just how radically his presidency could reshape geopolitics. New York Times Correspondent David Sanger joins Ian Bremmer on GZERO World to discuss just what a Trump 2.0 foreign policy could look like for some of the key geopolitical flashpoints today. From the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East to the increasingly strained US-China relationship, the only thing we can say for sure is that the Trump sequel will look far different from the original.
And that uncertainty, Sanger tells Bremmer, is why Trump won the election. "If you voted for Donald Trump in the 2024 election, it was probably with a thought that these institutions need to be blown up." One of the biggest questions, however, is just how Trump will approach the Ukraine war, and if he'll follow through on his campaign pledge to end the conflict in "24 hours." "Trump would love to come in as the man who ended the Ukraine war" Sanger says, "But the only way I can imagine in my limited way for how you do that in 24 hours is you have a call of Vladimir Putin and you say, Vlad, what do you need?"
GZERO World with Ian Bremmer, the award-winning weekly global affairs series, airs nationwide on US public television stations (check local listings).
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How Trump 2.0 could reshape US foreign policy, with the New York Times' David Sanger
Listen: On January 20, 2025, Donald Trump will re-assume the most powerful office in the world amidst the global backdrop of two major wars, comparatively weaker US allies, more aggressive rogue states, and a more complex and competitive international architecture. On the GZERO World Podcast, Ian Bremmer sits down with New York Times national security and White House correspondent David Sanger to talk about what US foreign policy might look like under Trump 2.0.
"It's a Donald Trump administration," Sanger tells Bremmer, which means that ideological consistency is not the currency of the moment. Loyalty is the currency of the moment." Some of Trump's picks so far show how important loyalty is to him and also that he's no longer going to defer to any "adults" in the room. He wants a cabinet that empowers him rather than reining him in. Moreover, Sanger notes that Trump will be taking the reins of the world’s most powerful office with the full support of the Senate, House, and a deeply conservative Supreme Court. Oh, and those moderating guardrails—like Mattis and Kelly—from the first Trump term? Gone. In short order, the entire world will know what Trump unleashed looks like. Whether or not that's a good thing...only time will tell.
Subscribe to the GZERO World Podcast on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Stitcher, or your preferred podcast platform, to receive new episodes as soon as they're published.
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The challenges of peacekeeping amid rising global conflicts
In a GZERO Global Stage discussion at the 7th annual Paris Peace Forum, Dr. Comfort Ero, President and CEO of the International Crisis Group, shed light on the increasing elusiveness of global peace amid rising conflicts worldwide. She pointed out a "crisis of peacemaking," noting that comprehensive peace processes and settlements have become rare, with the last significant one being in Colombia in 2016.
"We are in the era of big power rivalry and a multipolar world where there are more actors piling in... competing interests, competing visions," Dr. Ero explained. She emphasized that traditional tools for nudging conflicting parties to the negotiation table, such as sanctions, are no longer effective, and the United Nations Security Council is becoming increasingly dysfunctional.
Highlighting the complex situation in Sudan, Dr. Ero described it as a significant crisis that lacks the media attention given to conflicts like those in Ukraine and Gaza. "We're talking, by the way, 20 years on from Darfur when we said never again. And here we are, and Sudan is on the verge of collapse," she warned. The conflict has led to millions being displaced and a dire humanitarian situation, with neighboring countries like South Sudan and Chad bearing the brunt of refugee inflows.
On the topic of United Nations Security Council reform, Dr. Ero was skeptical about the permanent five members relinquishing their veto power or extending it to others. "The P5 will jealously guard the veto power and will make sure that that is not watered down," she observed, raising questions about the Council's influence in the future.
This conversation was presented by GZERO in partnership with Microsoft at the 7th annual Paris Peace Forum. The Global Stage series convenes heads of state, business leaders, and technology experts from around the world for critical debates about the geopolitical and technological trends shaping our world.
Watch the full conversation at https://www.gzeromedia.com/global-stage, and watch out for more GZERO coverage of the Paris Peace Forum this week.
Global economy at risk if Middle East conflict expands, says World Bank's Ayhan Kose
While the global economy shows signs of growth and decreasing inflation, the near future involves risks, including the escalation in the Middle East impacting oil prices, strained China-US relations, and an increasingly challenging tariff and trade environment, said Ayhan Kose, World Bank Deputy Chief Economist. He discussed the geopolitical tensions influencing the global economy with GZERO's Tony Maciulis at the IMF and World Bank Annual Meetings in Washington, DC, in a GZERO Global Stage interview. Kose also addressed the other major economic gathering happening this week: Russia’s 16th annual BRICS Summit in Kazan, Russia, largely seen as a counterweight to Western-led order. While acknowledging the widening economic and geopolitical divide, Kose emphasized the need for international cooperation. He expressed concern about “the increase in the number of protectionist measures and consequences of that for global trade.” Kose also emphasized the "urgent and important" need for World Bank member nations to continue to support development in poorer countries, a more difficult conversation today as many face their own economic headwinds and the world awaits the results of the 2024 US presidential election.
Israel's next move
And secondly, the US Treasury Department has announced additional sanctions against tankers that have shut off their transponders and are helping the Iranians to illegally export significant amounts of sanction-breaking oil. Prices can go up on the back of that. An unusual thing for the Americans to do a few weeks before the election, but shows just how concerned they are about potential escalation in the region. So let me give you some context here. First point. On the one hand, the Americans have sent THAAD systems to Israel before. So it's not like there aren't any American soldiers on the ground operating in Israel. This is not such a game-changer. In fact, such a decision was made not only years ago, but also after October 7th. But it is notable that it comes a year later on the back of potential significant escalation, both in the Northern front that we're already seeing and with Iran that we might be.
Second point is that the oil prices continue to be a little bit under 80 bucks. OPEC has a lot of spare capacity they could put on the market. China continues to have pretty poor numbers in terms of demand. So this isn't likely to have the American move to hit more Iranian oil, isn't likely to have a lot of impact in terms of oil prices. But if the Americans could have stopped what is right now 1.5 million barrels of Iranian export if they could have taken that down and the Iranians are using that money to pay for the Axis of Resistance that's targeting not only Israel but targeting ships in the Middle East, targeting American and UK military assets, why did Biden wait? Why is it only being announced now? And why is it only being announced now in a way that seems to be a gimme for the Israeli Prime Minister and his government in return for not engaging in significant retaliatory escalation against the Iranians?
This is a US policy that continues to look very weak, that continues to be out of step with most of its allies at this point. You see even French President Macron saying that he doesn't want to provide any more military support for Israel. Of course, it's easy for him to say that. He doesn't provide much to begin with. If it was a significant export, I'm sure Macron wouldn't be saying that. But nonetheless, the Americans are on really one very isolated side at this point compared to the rest of the international community, whether you like the United States or you don't. And their ability to influence the Israeli government appears to be virtually zero. And that has been shown with the recent attacks by the Israeli Defense Forces against UN peacekeepers in Lebanon. And we've seen that on the back of those attacks that the United States, France, Spain, Italy, which is a strong right-wing government, but also has a thousand peacekeepers on the ground in Lebanon, all strongly condemning the Israelis for making these attacks.
But not prepared to actually do anything in response and certainly not making the Israelis feel like they need to stop. Now the Israeli perspective is these peacekeepers have not been capable of upholding Security Council resolution that required that Hezbollah pull back from the border area, a buffer zone, that they've been launching military strikes against Israel. And that also Hezbollah fighters are essentially using the presence of the peacekeepers as shields. And that they're operating not on the peacekeeper's bases but in proximity, which makes it harder for the Israelis to go after them. That certainly doesn't justify firing directly on the peacekeepers base, which has happened, and which now the IDF says a mistake. In return, the Israeli Prime Minister has called on the UN Secretary-General to withdraw the peacekeepers. I find it implausible that the Israeli Prime Minister doesn't realize that the Secretary-General has actually no authority over the peacekeepers.
They're sent there on the basis of the Security Council. So in other words, if the Israeli Prime Minister wants to make a demand, he's making it of the permanent members of the Security Council like the United States and China and France, the UK and Russia. He apparently doesn't want to make that statement. But again, the point here is the comparative impunity, and the major headlines, of course, are in the last 24 hours, around four Israeli soldiers that have been targeted and killed, as well as a large number of injuries on Israeli military bases by Hezbollah drones. Hezbollah is much more capable than Hamas has been, and there will be more significant Israeli casualties as this war continues. But most of the casualties, of course, even though it's not most of the headlines, will be among the Lebanese, among the Hezbollah fighters, and among the Lebanon civilian population, of which we've seen about 2,000 killed so far.
And that is because the military dominance in the region, again, both offense and defense and intelligence and surveillance, is overwhelmingly in the hands of Israel. So if there's going to be significant escalation in the war going forward, that escalation will be decided overwhelmingly by the Israeli government. And so that's what is particularly interesting to watch over the coming weeks. I am not expecting very much against Iran, frankly. The fact that the Israelis have already waited for a couple of weeks takes a lot of the urgency out of that. The fact that the Defense Minister Yoav Gallant has said, "It will be the time of our choosing and what we do, they'll know that it was us, but they won't know how we did it," implies something that is a much more targeted attack than lots and lots of bombs raining down against, you know, sort of a nuclear facility or against oil production.
It would not surprise me if it was a high-level assassination, for example, against the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, the IRGC. Especially because we already saw that when the Trump administration assassinated Qasem Soleimani, the Iranian response was virtually nothing. So there's precedent for that, and the Iranians have very little at this point that they can do that wouldn't hurt them a hell of a lot more than they can hurt Israel or Israel's allies. So that's where we are right now. A war that continues to escalate with a lot of suffering on the back of it. An incredibly ineffective US policy in the region, and everybody else pretty much sitting on the sidelines.
How October 7th changed Israel and the Middle East
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: A Quick Take to kick off your week. It is October 7th, and that means one year since Hamas perpetrated the worst terrorist attacks since 9/11. Almost 1,200 Israelis dead, mostly civilians, and still a hundred plus held hostage from that day a year ago. Not much progress on that latter front or on a ceasefire. Not much progress in the region since then. What it did do, of course, on October 7th, is it outraged and unified what had been a very divided Israeli population, divided with massive internal demonstrations on domestic political issues. And suddenly the only issue that mattered was responding to, redressing those attacks, whether you're on the left or the right in Israel and being able to defend the Israeli homeland and get the hostages back.
On the former, they've certainly been effective, hitting back as hard as possible. We've seen that Hamas today is a shell of what it was on October 7th a year ago. The leadership mostly dead. The weapons caches mostly destroyed. The tunnels mostly sealed. Hezbollah, the most powerful non-state military actor in the world, has been damaged critically, and they started rocket attacks against Israel a day after the October 7th terrorist attacks. Israel has now opened up a second front, really the primary front now in the war, and after a couple of weeks of that war, Hezbollah's leadership is dead. Their communication capacity was critically destroyed. The war is ongoing but is certainly not going well for Hezbollah. On the one hand, you've seen a major escalation from the rockets and the bombing happening in Gaza to a ground war across the entirety of that territory now to Lebanon and with significant shots fired missiles and the rest military operations with Iran's other proxies, the Houthis and Yemen, Shia militants in Syria and Iraq, and of course involving Iran itself.
On the other hand, the capacity of these proxy organizations to escalate in return is now far, far less capable, far less serious. Hamas cannot threaten Israel the way they could on October 7th. Hezbollah certainly far, far diminished in their ability to escalate even if they want to. Two big questions are remaining. First, Iran. They are a country that still has all sorts of capabilities to escalate if they wish, possibly not effectively against Israel itself, but against the West, against the world. If they wanted to, they could completely disrupt oil tanker traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, and as a consequence, ensure that much of the oil that comes out of the Middle East, not just Iran's one and a half million barrels a day of export but from the Gulf states is stuck in place. And that would mean oil prices towards $150, even in a depressed demand environment as we see now, and a global recession.
So Iran's capacity, if they want to escalate, is far, far greater than that of Hezbollah or Hamas or anyone else in the region. And they have shown themselves to be quite risk-averse in response to Israeli strikes against Iranian leaders across the region, military leaders, and also against Hamas leadership in Tehran. And that was true back in April, and that was true back a week ago. But still, we are awaiting what is almost certainly going to be an Israeli response, a military response, against Iran for the 180 ballistic missiles that they launched against Israel with no fatalities in Israel. One in the West Bank of a Palestinian, but nonetheless, certainly could have caused a lot of people to be killed. And we will see if that the Israeli response leads to further Iranian escalation. I am at this point hopeful, and I would even say optimistic, that it does not, but optimism feels like exactly the wrong word to describe any of this in the region.
Then the second big question remaining is about the devastation on the ground. In Gaza, for the last year, a million and a half Palestinians are now living on the back of humanitarian aid of on average 125-ish trucks coming in a day. That's compared to 800 to 1000 on average before October 7th. As well as all of those tunnels which have now been sealed, they brought a lot of arms and illicit goods in. They also brought things like food, luxury food stuffs, and other things that you could buy on the gray market in Gaza. Those are closed, and there's no Gaza economy. There's no local Gaza agriculture right now. So the 1.5 million Palestinians are living in an absolutely unimaginable condition on single-digit percentage calories, many of them, in terms of consumption from what they would have been living on before October 7th.
Then you have the West Bank, which has been indirectly involved in the fighting. There's been a lot of skirmishing, a lot of shooting, a lot of people getting killed. And then also Israeli settlers and the IDF taking and securing more land from the Palestinians there. Then of course, in Lebanon in the last two weeks, you have over a million Lebanese who have been displaced from that fighting. Far more will be displaced in all likelihood in the coming weeks. All of this from a humanitarian perspective unacceptable by any yardstick. The United States seen by most of the world as complicit in watching it and not providing the either restraint on Israel or the humanitarian support effectively to help ensure that the suffering is reduced. And of course, this is going to cause hatred and radicalization for generations. And antisemitism was already way too high and on an upswing before October 7th, certainly only greater in this environment a year later.
And of course, with all of this, we don't know what's going to happen with upcoming elections. Kamala Harris came out on "60 Minutes" and described the United States as the best friend of the Israeli people around the world, refused to say whether or not the US was an ally of Prime Minister Netanyahu himself. A very strained relationship between the United States and the Israeli Prime Minister today. While former President Trump came out publicly in the last few days and said that the Israeli government, the Israeli military, should actively take out Iran's nuclear capabilities. So frankly, I would say between Harris and Trump, their policies, their orientation specifically on the Middle East and the Israeli wars in Gaza, in Lebanon, and the fighting we're seeing with Iran, probably the biggest difference on foreign policy between those two candidates would be on this issue. And we will find out in a month plus who is going to lead the United States, but utterly critical as we think about the future of this conflict in the region.
So that is where we are a year after the October 7th terrorist attacks, and now very deep in expanding war that is affecting much of the region. And I will continue to talk about it and follow it for you. So I hope everyone's going well, and I'll talk to you all real soon.
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- Israel-Hamas war: Who is responsible for Gaza's enormous civilian death toll? ›
- Podcast: The State of the World in 2024 with Ian Bremmer - GZERO Media ›
Israel strikes: Why Hezbollah remains silent
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: A quick take to kick off your week. We are talking about the Middle East and the significant escalation in Lebanon primarily that has so far culminated with the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah, and most of Hezbollah's senior leadership, with virtually no response by Hezbollah against Israel. Lots of things to think about here.
First is the fact that Israel's asymmetric military and intelligence capabilities really matter. For a long time, people have talked about the potential of existential threats against Israel. It certainly does not appear that way today, and in fact, it shows just how asleep at the switch the Israeli defense forces and more important leadership were back on October 7th in terms of border security, in terms of ignoring intelligence, in terms of most of the IDF being redeployed to the West Bank as opposed to Gaza, that allowed Hamas to pull off this spectacular and horrific terrorist attack against the Israeli citizens, killing over 1,000.
In today's environment, the ability of the Israel military to strike their enemies with virtual impunity, and with virtually no capacity for them to strike back effectively against Israel, is what's really dramatic here, and that's led to a few things in the region. First, it's led to the ability of Prime Minister Netanyahu to gain a lot of popularity. He was blamed for the October 7th attacks, for them happening on his watch, for him not being capable of defending Israel back then. Today, it's a very different story. It's being able to destroy Hamas, irrespective of the civilian consequences for the Palestinians there, it's his ability to take on and decapitate Hezbollah and Israel post-October 7th has taken virtually no hits as a consequence. That's led Netanyahu's former adversary, political opponent, Gideon Sa'ar, former Minister of Defense, to join Netanyahu's government, join his cabinet and their New Hope Party.
It means that if there were new elections today, a good chance... There's always a of coalition formation because it's a very fragmented political party system, but much easier to imagine that Israel's Prime Minister would be able to win a new election today, as opposed to the absolute thumping he would've taken over the course of the last year. It's a very different environment, and the fact is that the Israeli population supports these wars, and I say that really across almost the entire political spectrum. They support the war in Gaza, they support the attacks against Hezbollah, they support getting their citizens back into their homes in the north, there's some 60,000 that have been evacuated, and they do not support a two-state solution for the Palestinians, virtually none of them.
That is, of course, very, very different from pretty much everyone else in the world who does support territorial integrity and self-determination for the Palestinians, but they don't have the ability or the willingness to make that happen, and certainly none of Israel's friends are prepared to truly cut off Israel. We've seen the Brits stop with a few of the weapons systems, we've seen some targeted sanctions, tiny, from the Europeans and the Americans against Israel. But the military aid, the weapons sales, the trade, that all continues as it has. And by the way, that's also true in terms of the Abraham Accords, the Gulf states that have been working with the Israelis and others in the Arab world, they're very unhappy about what's happening on the ground in the Middle East, but they're also not prepared to change their relationship with Israel.
So where else does this go? Does this mean all-out war with Hezbollah? I don't think so, and I say I don't think so because I don't think Hezbollah has that capability. They do have men that are far better trained than Hamas; they have about 10 times the numbers of missiles and delivery systems than Hamas ever had, though a lot of them have been destroyed clearly, and certainly their leadership is gone. But even if they were to launch everything they had against Israel, it's hard to see them doing much damage. They could kill some Israelis, no question, but probably not that many, and they certainly couldn't do any real damage to the Israeli defense forces or the Israeli government. Meanwhile, Hezbollah would be utterly destroyed and the Lebanese economy would be in shambles. So it's hard to imagine any Hezbollah leadership, even a more hardline, hard as that is to imagine, leader of Hezbollah than Nasrallah taking those steps against Israel.
That then leads the bigger question, which is, okay, so the Axis of Resistance has been engaging in attacks, Red Sea, we'll see more of that from the Houthis, potshots at Americans, British military in the region, not very effective, some missiles against Israel, not very effective. What about Iran, might the Iranians do anything. Answer here, no. I spent an hour last week with the Iranian Vice President, Javad Zarif, and he made it very clear that his country, his government, is not going to fall into the, as he called it, Israeli trap, that they want nothing more than Iran to engage in what would be ineffective strikes against Israel that would bring the Americans into the war against Iran, that they are not going to take that bait.
And you'll remember, lest you think this is just propaganda, that back in the Trump administration when Qasem Soleimani, the head of the Iranian defense forces, was assassinated, so not so different than Israel taking out Hassan Nasrallah, the Iranian response was virtually nothing. Rhetoric, but no efforts to go after the Americans because they just didn't have the capabilities, and that's what we're seeing with the Iranians vis-a-vis Israel today. Now, the bigger question is whether Bibi Netanyahu, on a roll in the region, decides that he's going to go after Iran directly, and there, I think it's a question of their capabilities. The bunker that Nasrallah was in was comparatively easy to hit when you had intelligence that he was there. Yes, bunker-buster bombs, but limited and available to the Israelis.
The incredibly deep underground nuclear program, for example, at Fordow of Iran, under meters and meters of granite reinforced, the Americans are the only ones with the clear capabilities to destroy that. Israel could clearly set back Iran's program, but those kind of strikes would likely only redouble the efforts of the Iranians to build a full nuclear weapons capability, and a glancing blow by Israel, that would antagonize the United States and others and potentially lead to blow-back that Israel hasn't had to face so far, but might, that they wouldn't like; that's a risk that I think is greater than Israel would want to take, especially for not destroying the Iranian nuclear program, but only a limited amount of damage.
So I think you'd still see espionage, you'll still see sabotage, you'll still see willingness for the Israelis to go after members of the IRGC that they find in Syria, Iraq, other places, absolutely. But direct strikes on Iran, specifically the nuclear program, which is the target that the Israelis are most interested in, that seems like a bigger stretch to me. Not impossible, more likely today than it was a week ago, but still, I think that the escalation that we have been seeing in the war in the Middle East may be close to having played itself out now, simply because Israeli military capabilities are so much greater than that of their adversaries, and their ability to now focus on defense and security makes it more challenging for them to do anything, their enemies to do anything against them.
So anyway, that's where we are right now. I hope everyone's doing well, and I'll talk to you all real soon.
A representation of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as Pro-Palestinian protesters rally against Israel's strikes in Gaza and Lebanon during demonstrations in New York City, on Sept. 26, 2024.
Palestine and Lebanon’s leaders address UNGA ahead of Netanyahu’s arrival
Abbas then laid out a 12-point policy for what is needed “immediately and on day one after the war ends.” The plan included a permanent cease-fire in Gaza, an end to the “military aggression by settlers in the West Bank and East Jerusalem,” humanitarian aid, and the return of displaced peoples. He called for Palestine to be given full membership to the UN, and disparaged the US for being “the only member in the Security Council that voted against granting the state of Palestine full membership.”
Later that evening, Lebanon’s Minister for Foreign Affairs Abdallah Bouhabib called on Israel to adopt an immediate cease-fire and halt its strikes within Lebanese borders, noting that the cause of the current conflict was Israel's ongoing occupation. "The shortest path for the return [of displaced Israelis in the North]," he said, "is a comprehensive, immediate cease-fire as stipulated in the US-Franco declaration yesterday ... as part of a comprehensive framework accompanied by clear international guarantees, transparency, and a definitive end to land, sea, and air incursions and breaches of Lebanese sovereignty."
Both speeches came as the US, France, and several Arab nations tried to use the tail end of the UN General Assembly to broker a temporary Israel to agree to a cease-fire with Lebanon.
Meanwhile, protesters began marching outside the UN security perimeter on Thursday in anticipation of Friday's appearance at UNGA by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who has instructed his military to keep fighting “with full force” in Lebanon. Netanyahu said on Thursday that "we will not stop until we achieve our goals, first and foremost returning the residents of the north safely to their homes."