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Is Trump's new approach to Putin effective?
On GZERO World with Ian Bremmer, Finnish President Alexander Stubb offers a cautiously optimistic outlook on US policy toward Ukraine under Trump’s leadership. Joining Bremmer on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, Stubb highlights his conversations with the Trump administration, emphasizing that the president’s messaging to Putin is firm and strategic. He believes Trump is focused on securing a deal and expresses confidence that any agreement will ultimately benefit Ukraine.
On the issue of territorial concessions, Stubb draws from Finland’s own history, recalling how his country lost 10% of its land to the Soviet Union but retained its independence. While acknowledging the importance of territory, he argues that Ukraine’s priority must be securing its sovereignty and long-term stability. He sees Ukraine’s recent counteroffensive as a strategically valuable, albeit risky, move that strengthens its negotiating position. Ultimately, he insists this is a long game, and ensuring Ukraine’s security beyond the immediate conflict is the primary goal.
Watch full episode: Europe's new future with Trump 2.0
GZERO World with Ian Bremmer, the award-winning weekly global affairs series, airs nationwide on US public television stations (check local listings).
New digital episodes of GZERO World are released every Monday on YouTube. Don't miss an episode: subscribe to GZERO's YouTube channel and turn on notifications (🔔).
Europe's new future with Trump 2.0
As Donald Trump returns to the White House, European leaders are reassessing their reliance on the United States for security and economic stability. In a wide-ranging conversation on GZERO World, Ian Bremmer sits with Finnish President Alexander Stubb on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum in Davos. They discuss the evolving role of Europe in an era of shifting alliances, economic uncertainty, and rising geopolitical risks. In other words, Europe's role in a Trump 2.0 era. Stubb expresses cautious optimism about Trump’s approach to Russia and Ukraine but underscores the need for Europe to take greater responsibility for its defense and technological leadership.
Stubb also acknowledges that Europe is facing a moment of reckoning. Leaders like Emmanuel Macron and NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte calling for increased defense spending and reduced reliance on U.S. security guarantees. Stubb agrees that Europe must strengthen its strategic position but remains wary of the region’s economic competitiveness, particularly in technology, where the US holds a clear advantage.
GZERO World with Ian Bremmer, the award-winning weekly global affairs series, airs nationwide on US public television stations (check local listings).
New digital episodes of GZERO World are released every Monday on YouTube. Don't miss an episode: subscribe to GZERO's YouTube channel and turn on notifications (🔔).
- Envisioning Europe's path forward with European Parliament President Roberta Metsola ›
- Trump will keep supporting Ukraine but demand more of NATO: report. ›
- Europe's reaction to US election win: Gloom and despair ›
- Meloni joins Trump at Mar-a-Lago — with Europe’s economy on the line ›
- Europe plans for Putin & Trump 2.0 ›
Is Europe ready to embrace Trump's return to power?
At the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, the spotlight was on President Trump’s virtual address, where he reiterated his stance that Europe has treated the US unfairly and that this dynamic will change. However, it was Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s speech that may have left a stronger impression. Zelensky warned that Europe can no longer afford to be an afterthought for its allies, questioning whether Trump sees NATO as necessary or respects EU institutions. His blunt message—Europe is on its own—was echoed by leaders across the continent, especially given that Trump didn’t mention Europe or Ukraine once in his inaugural address.
In response, European leaders are adopting a more pragmatic stance. French President Emmanuel Macron urged Europe to “wake up” and take greater responsibility for its own defense, while NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte agreed that Trump was right to push for higher defense spending. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, meanwhile, signaled that Europe has economic alternatives beyond the US Now, the real test begins: Will European nations follow through on defense spending, technological investment, and strategic independence? Or will they seek stability elsewhere, even with geopolitical rivals like China?
GZERO World with Ian Bremmer, the award-winning weekly global affairs series, airs nationwide on US public television stations (check local listings).
New digital episodes of GZERO World are released every Monday on YouTube. Don't miss an episode: subscribe to GZERO's YouTube channel and turn on notifications (🔔).
Trump's Davos address sets up big shifts in US strategy
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: A Quick Take to close out our week in Davos, Switzerland.
Want to talk about now President Trump's address; virtual, direct to everybody, collected yesterday, assembled yesterday, to hear his speech, and then to ask a few pre-planned questions. The speech itself, at the beginning, not all that surprising, "America's back open for business. Everything was horrible before. Everything's going to be great, now." Not a surprise, kind of exaggerated. You'd never think that the US was by far the strongest-performing economy in the advanced industrial world, coming out of the pandemic. But people roll their eyes a bit, they get on getting on. There was still a fair amount of news that was actually made, and some interesting thoughts about where the initial Trump administration is going to go.
First point, on OPEC, talks a lot about Saudi Arabia directly, Mohammed bin Salman. They're very close, they've worked together closely. Not only when he was president the first time, it was his first trip as president back in 2017, but since then. A lot of business with the family as well. And has been promised $600 billion to invest in the United States directly. That beats the $500 billion announcement that the AI giants have just made in what they're going to do, this Stargate project. He likes that. He said, "Why don't you up it to a trillion?" That's a round number. Good thing we're base-10 in this country. Anyway, the fact that Trump is interested in engaging very closely with the Saudis, not a surprise at all, there is going to be a very big push to try to ensure that Saudi Arabia moves on normalization of relations with Israel. Given the fact that there's no two-state solution on the table for the Palestinians, that's challenging, but I wouldn't count it out, frankly.
Secondly, a lot of talk about oil and the fact that Trump really doesn't like where oil prices are right now. Now, the Americans are going to try to pump more, but he knows that there's only so much that can be done in the near term, maybe another 500,000 barrels a day. OPEC, on the other hand, has over four million barrels that are off the market. Why? Because they're willing to ensure that prices are comparatively high. And if that means they lose a little bit of market share, they're happy to do that. Well, Trump doesn't like that one bit, and especially because he wants to hit Iran hard, and take more of their oil off the market. He doesn't want prices to go up, so he wants the Saudis to lean in. How are they going to react? We'll see. Something at least nominal in the near-term, that brings prices maybe down towards, let's say, $70, as opposed to roughly $80, where they've been, that would be interesting to see. I wouldn't put it past the Saudis at all to lean in on that.
Secondly, China. We are going to now see tariffs early on China, 10% across the board, February 1. Markets seem to like the fact that, on the first day, Trump didn't do anything, but a few days later, is that really much better? What was interesting about the conversation, Trump is trying to make it very clear, he doesn't have an ideological beef with China. He continues to speak broadly, more warmly about Xi Jinping, and specifically about China, than generally President Biden has. That's not all that different from the first term, but it's different from expectations over the past few months. And I do expect we're going to see a summit meeting relatively soon, even though there's been no announcements around it. Having said all of that, the fact that the US has a really tough take on China, not only bilaterally but also versus all these other countries, Trump wants to punish the Europeans to ensure that they coordinate with the US on China, wants to ensure the Mexicans, the Indians, the Vietnamese, and others don't allow Chinese goods into the US through their countries.
It's very hard for the US and China to maintain a stable relationship when Trump's going to respond to China, "Well, that's our business. Those are relations with other countries. You have nothing to say about it." They're really stuck on this, and I expect that, despite maybe a bit of a honeymoon, which I wasn't thinking we'd have a few weeks ago, the US-China relations are still going to get a lot more challenging over the coming months.
And then we have Russia. And I thought it was very interesting that when Trump was asked, "So, next year at Davos, if you were here, is the war going to be over between Russia and Ukraine?" Because, of course, he's been saying, "I can end the war in a day." Then he's saying, "100 days." Now, he's saying, "Actually, the Ukrainians are ready for a deal." And by the way, that's true. But you're going to have to ask the Russians. Well, that's very different from, "I can get the deal done very easily."
He also continues to lean into the fact that the Chinese can be useful here, and that's true. That's something that the Biden administration and Trump administration actually agree pretty strongly on, that China has a lot more direct leverage over Russia than the United States does. And there's only so much the US can do with additional sanctions to convince the Russians to stop. Now, Trump can say that Russia needs to end the war, and that this is hurting them, but Putin doesn't actually feel that way. Certainly isn't prepared to accept less than the territory that he's presently occupying. So that, to me, is very interesting.
I would say the place that Trump has moved the most in the last three months, moved specifically towards the position that the Europeans have, and they're a lot less panicked about it now than they were even a week ago, is on the Russia-Ukraine issue. No one here in Europe, not one European leader I spoke with, now believes that Trump is going to basically throw Zelenskyy under the bus. And that's absolutely not where they were even, let's say, in December. So, that's a big deal.
That doesn't mean that the Europeans are feeling comfortable about Trump because, of course, Trump does not like Europe. Does not like a consolidated Europe, doesn't think a strong Europe is good for the United States. He wants to deal with individual European countries, and he wants to deal, of course, preferably with more Europe-first types in those individual countries. So, it's not the British Prime Minister, it's not the German Chancellor. It's organizations like the Reform Party and AFD. And, of course, Giorgia Meloni from Italy. He also bitterly complains about all the regulations, all the taxes, how hard it is to do business in Europe, how hard it is to do business with Europe. And that is a big challenge for Europe, that understands they need to be more competitive, but isn't prepared to spend the money, isn't capable of coordinating to get the kind of industrial policy done that the Americans are now doing.
So, on defense, on Ukraine, existential threat from Russia, Europe's doing a lot more coordination with the United States. On the economy, which concerns the Europeans equally much, and technology, where the Americans are a clear leader and leaning in very heavily, and the regulations are only going to get more comfortable and aligned with the technology companies, those that remain, the regulations, that is, not the tech companies, the Europeans are in very serious trouble.
So, that's it from me. I hope you all guys are well, and I'll talk to you all from New York next week.
Swedish troops of the NATO Multinational Brigade Latvia arrive in Riga port, Latvia January 18, 2025.
Sweden deploys troops to Latvia
Sweden has sent 550 troops to Latvia, its firstmajor deployment since joining NATO in March, which ended its decades-long neutrality.
The Swedishmechanized infantry battalion arrived in Riga on Saturday, escorted by Swedish air force and naval units. Stationed near the town of Adazi, the Swedish forces joined a Canadian-led multinational brigade, part of NATO’s effort to counter the growing threat Russia represents in the region since Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
Why Latvia? The small Baltic nation joined NATO in 2004 as part of a wave of former Soviet republics and satellites including Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Those are now the states on the front line of a potential confrontation with Russia — and Latvia wants to be ready. It is feared that a lightning strike from the East could cross the country in just a few hours if defenders aren’t ready to fight.
Sweden’s armed forces said the mission will ensure stability and “marks Sweden’s largest commitment yet since joining NATO” last year. According toLieutenant Colonel Henrik Rosdahl, “It’s a historic day, but at the same time, it’s our new normal.”
Ian Bremmer on the forces behind the geopolitical recession
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: A Quick Take for you today. I want to talk to you about the geopolitical recession that we, the world, are now in. What is a geopolitical recession you ask?
Well, economic recessions you kind of understand. We have boom cycles and bust cycles. They happen frequently. So frequently that we even have solid measurements for when an advanced industrial economy is in a technical recession. That's two quarters in a row of negative growth. Or when the world is experiencing a recessionary year. They happen frequently in the United States since World War II, every seven to 10 years on average. And that means that we have been through many of those cycles, and we can recognize them and we know that we don't like them. We want to respond to them.
And whether you are an advanced industrial economy, a free market economy, or whether you are an authoritarian state and a state capitalist system, either way, you've got central bankers and finance ministers or treasury secretaries that are using monetary and fiscal tools to try to minimize the impact of a recession and get back towards effective more sustainable growth.
Okay, so that's the economic side. But I'm not an economist. I'm a political scientist. Are there cycles in geopolitics? And the answer is yes. But they're a lot longer. And because the cycles are longer, playing out over several generations, we don't live through a lot of them individually. And so, we don't recognize them as a pattern. But we are right now in a geopolitical recession.
What causes a geopolitical recession? Well, basically it's when the balance of power becomes misaligned, out of whack, with the rules of the road geopolitically. With how the world order is structured, the institutions, the architecture. So, for example, the global order that we have been living through both after World War II through the Cold War, and then through Soviet collapse, was all about a number of global institutions and architecture that the United States created with its allies, its friends, after World War II was over.
So, the world has just gone through this horrible cataclysm, a geopolitical depression, and now we've got a boom cycle. And the United States is creating the United Nations and the WTO and the IMF and all of these other global institutions with the idea being support for collective security, support for a multilateral free trade architecture, support for rule of law, promotion of human rights, promotion of democracy all over the world. Generally speaking, the United States created a whole bunch of global institutions that reflected what the United States thought about how the world should be run.
Then over time, the balance of power changes, but the institutions don't. At least not as much because they're sticky, because it takes a lot of political capital to change them. People kick the can down the road. Let somebody else do it. And when that gap grows too wide, then the geopolitical order starts to shake. It becomes much more unstable.
So, what happened here? Three big reasons why we are now in a geopolitical recession. Number one, when the Soviet Union collapsed, Russia was not integrated into the West, not into the EU, not into NATO. They're angry about it. They blame the United States. They are now a chaos actor on the global stage, at least insofar as the advanced industrial economies. The G7 are concerned, and their top allies are fellow chaos actors: North Korea and Iran. That's reason number one.
Reason number two, China was integrated into the global order, particularly the global economy on the notion that as they got wealthier, as they benefited from that, they would become responsible stakeholders. And what that means for Americans is that they're going to align with these US led global institutions and values and norms. They'll support rule of law. They'll become more politically liberalized. They'll become more economically free market in orientation. The Chinese have gotten much wealthier. They're now a technological peer to the United States, no one else is close, ahead in some areas, behind in others. But they absolutely have not aligned with the United States. And that is making a lot of Americans and a lot of American allies very concerned, and it's leading to confrontation between the two most powerful countries.
Number three, while those first two things were going on, lots of people in the West, and especially the United States, increasingly felt like their own leaders, their political leaders, their business leaders, their corporate leaders, their media leaders, their elites, were promoting globalism, were promoting a bunch of things for a global order that didn't help them. So, all of those ideas about collective security and promotion of democracy and promoting free trade, not interested, because the average American doesn't feel like they're benefiting from it.
And certainly that is a big reason why Trump won, not just once, but twice, and more decisively the second time around. And so now, not only do you have the Russians acting like rogues with allies, and the Chinese much more powerful, but not aligned with the US-led global system. But you have the Americans saying, "We're not very interested in promoting that global system anymore. In fact, we're more interested in the law of the jungle."
It's a worldview that's closer to the Chinese. Not multilateralism but just one-on-one relations where you are stronger and you tell the other country what you want to have done. It's very transactional, it's very pragmatic. Doesn't really matter what kind of values that country holds. If you're Trump, you'll do a deal with Russia or China or an ally, and you'll criticize and pressure anybody if they're not behaving the way you want to. The fact that there are common values doesn't really matter. The fact that you're part of the same infrastructure and architecture doesn't really matter. It's, "What are you doing for me now?"
So given all of that, we are now in a serious geopolitical recession. What I call a G-Zero world. Not a G7, not a G20, where there's an absence of global leadership. Now, what's very interesting about that G-Zero world, what's very interesting about this geopolitical recession that I believe that we're in is that the United States is in a particularly strong position right now. Particularly strong compared to its adversaries like China facing the worst economic conditions since the 90s, maybe even the 70s. Like Russia in a period of severe economic decline, and other decline, national security, political. And Iran, which has basically just lost their empire, their empire by proxy, the Axis of Resistance in the Middle East. The US is also much stronger relationally to its allies. America's technology capabilities becoming so dominant compared to what the Europeans, the Japanese, the South Koreans, the Canadians don't have. America's military capabilities. The strength of the US economy coming out of the pandemic compared to every other G7 democracy shows that the United States can get a lot more done in a geopolitical recession. Can ensure that its will is followed.
Also, the fact that Trump is consolidated so much more power this time around compared to 2017 when he was first president. Last time, he had all of these establishment Republicans that didn't really support him, all the way from Mike Pence, his vice president, to Mad Dog Mattis, to Mike Pompeo, to Nikki Haley, to Gary Cohn, and on and on and on. This time around, not at all. Everyone is aligned with Trump.
Also last time, the GOP, the Republican Party, didn't feel like they had to ride Trump's coattails. He wasn't as popular as a lot of they were in their own individual campaigns. This time around not at all. Trump's much more popular than them, they need him much more. And that's happening at a time when so many allied governments are very, very weak. And that's a problem, right? For them. If you're Canada and your government's imploding, or you're South Korea and your government's imploding, or you're Germany, your government's imploding, or France and your government's imploding. Or even countries like the United Kingdom and Japan where the establishment is very, very vulnerable, and very unpopular, Trump's ability to tell you, "This is what we want. And by the way, we are a lot more effective at playing the law of the jungle than either our allies or our adversaries."
It's going to be very hard for them not to kiss the ring, not to provide big wins for the Americans. So, lots of wins for Trump, and that's what we're going to see over the course of the coming year, and a lot of defense being played by a lot of those other countries around the world. But is that sustainable?
Because to get out of a geopolitical recession, you ultimately need to create new rules of the road. You need new global architecture, especially because our challenges, whether it's climate change or an arms race, nuclear weapons, whether it's AI and new disruptive technologies, for good and for bad, they all are global challenges and global opportunities. But we are increasingly fragmenting our responses to national and even local levels.
So, this is not a sustainable trajectory, and that is what we're going to spend an awful lot of time looking at over the coming year, over the coming administration, and going beyond. Because, of course, this is the first time that any of us have experienced a country, the United States, essentially unwinding, undoing its own order. These global institutions that Trump and others are saying are globalist and not useful for the Americans to align with are institutions the United States initially created to help run the world in America's own image, but the US no longer believes that that works for it. And that is a fantastically interesting, but also unnerving, unsettling, and unstable time for us all geopolitically.
So, that's what a geopolitical recession is. I hope you found this worthwhile, and I'll talk to you all real soon.
Why NATO launches a Baltic Sea operation
Carl Bildt, former prime minister of Sweden and co-chair of the European Council on Foreign Relations, shares his perspective on European politics from Stockholm, Sweden.
Why has NATO launched a new operation in the Baltic Sea?
Well the reason is to have better safety and security for the undersea infrastructure of different cables that we have in the Baltic Sea. There have been a number of incidents in the last few months when these cables have been damaged or cut by ships that have passed by dragging their anchors. They've often been associated with the part of what you call the 'shadow fleet' of earlier old rusty tankers transporting oil from Russia in violation of sanctions. So, the NATO operation is supposed to keep that under watch, prevent it, and secure the undersea infrastructure.
Are the sanctions against Russia by the EU and US really working?
Yes, they are. But of course it's a long-term effect. No question about that. They are degrading the strength of the Russian economy in a number of areas. Critical is the ability, which is a difficult one, to try to limit the gains in the profits that Russia is making off the oil exports, primarily to India and Russia. And I think the latest round of US sanctions and EU sanctions against the shadow of fleets of rusty old tankers, I think that will have an even more important effect than what we've seen so far.
Polish Minister for European Affairs Adam Szlapka speaks during the presentation of the program for the 2025 Poland's Presidency of the Council of the European Union in Warsaw, Poland, on Dec. 10, 2024.
Poland calls for security self-reliance for Europe
With Donald Trump set to take office as US president on Monday, Poland is beginning its six-month presidency of the European Union with a warning: This is “the right time to say loudly that it’s time [for Europe] to take responsibility for our future and our security,” Poland’s Europe minister, Adam Szłapka, told the Guardian on Wednesday. Poland holds the rotating presidency from Jan. 1 to June 30, 2025.
Poland has long warned that many fellow EU members underestimate the threat that Russia poses for Europe, and with Trump now promising to broker a ceasefire agreement in Ukraine, Poland’s government wants to be sure Europeans understand the longer-term risk.
Szłapka warned of “a very difficult time” ahead. And though Polish officials are careful not to criticize Trump directly, at least until his approach to Russia, Ukraine, and the future of NATO becomes clear, Poland continues to insist that Europe can’t outsource its security to the United States indefinitely.
In fact, Poland’s defense minister has welcomed the incoming US president’s call for NATO member states to spend 5% of their GDP on defense. Poland is already NATO’s biggest defense spender – with 4.12% of GDP in 2024 and an expected jump to 4.7% this year.
It’s a reminder that while many Europeans are casting a wary eye toward Washington, Poland’s attention remains firmly focused on the Kremlin.