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How Ukraine feels about negotiating with Russia
What would Ukraine be willing to offer Russia to bring an end to the war? It’s a question that’s been asked over and over, but now seems closer to reality than any point since the fighting began. As the White House negotiates with the Kremlin for a ceasefire deal, would Kyiv be willing to cede territory to get Moscow to the negotiating table? On GZERO World, Ian Bremmer sat down with former Ukrainian foreign minister Dmytro Kuleba for a sober assessment of the war—and what it will take to end it. According to Kuleba, who resigned last September amid a cabinet shuffle, Ukraine is ready to compromise, but not if it means giving away the rights to what millions of Ukrainians see as historically, legally theirs. A nation that abandons its dream, he warns, is “determined to lose.” It will also take more than concessions from Ukraine to achieve a meaningful ceasefire. According to the foreign minister, the Trump administration needs to start getting tough on Putin to make it clear to him Russia can’t win this war on its own.
“The goal of President Trump to end the war is commendable,” Kuleba explains, “The problem is that his strategy is to leverage Ukraine with sticks while leveraging Russia with carrots.”
Watch the full GZERO World episode: Will Russia agree to a ceasefire in Ukraine?
GZERO World with Ian Bremmer, the award-winning weekly global affairs series, airs nationwide on US public television stations (check local listings).
New digital episodes of GZERO World are released every Monday on YouTube. Don't miss an episode: subscribe to GZERO's YouTube channel and turn on notifications (🔔).GZERO World with Ian Bremmer airs on US public television weekly - check local listings.
Will Russia agree to a ceasefire in Ukraine?
President Trump has made it clear: He wants a ceasefire in Ukraine. The White House has been engaging with Russia diplomatically, while making it clear to Kyiv that ongoing US military support isn’t a guarantee. The problem? Moscow has so far shown no interest in meaningful compromise. Instead, the Kremlin is slow walking negotiations and increasing demands for concessions, all the while advancing on the battlefield and targeting Ukraine’s population centers with drone strikes. The delay tactics are testing the patience of the friendliest White House it’s faced in years. But will the Trump administration actually start piling the pressure on Russia? And even if Putin makes a deal, can Kyiv trust him to honor it? On GZERO World, Former Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba joins Ian Brmmer to discuss President Trump’s negotiation strategy, Russia’s goals, and Ukraine’s uncertain future.
“Did Putin come to Ukraine to take part of it or all of it?,” Kuleba explains, “If you believe Putin came after the whole of Ukraine because it is so important to him to get it under his control, then there is no ground to negotiate.”
GZERO World with Ian Bremmer, the award-winning weekly global affairs series, airs nationwide on US public television stations (check local listings).
New digital episodes of GZERO World are released every Monday on YouTube. Don't miss an episode: subscribe to GZERO's YouTube channel and turn on notifications (🔔).GZERO World with Ian Bremmer airs on US public television weekly - check local listings.
What is Trump's Gaza playbook?
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: Want to talk about Gaza, which has not been as much in the headlines over the past month because so much other news has been emanating from Washington post Trump's inauguration. But he made some news on Gaza and it's relevant to the ongoing war and ceasefire, which is this idea that the United States is going to take over Gaza, develop it and make it into the Riviera, a new Riviera on the Mediterranean. Certainly they have the beachfront property, they don't have the infrastructure, especially not after the war over the last year plus. Trump saying that no US troops would be involved, but it's an enormous opportunity. The Palestinians would have to be resettled. It's not a new plan. He's been talking about this for the last year together with advisors. The idea that there's an enormous amount of money, particularly from the Gulf, that could be interested in investing on the ground. That security could be provided by the Egyptians. That the Palestinians could be temporarily resettled in Egypt, maybe in Jordan.
They would, at least in principle, have the right to return. But I mean, how much money? Probably $20 billion minimum. What's temporary mean? Probably talking about a generation. Are the Palestinians likely to believe that given what's happened on the ground in the West Bank? Hard to imagine. What does governance for the Palestinians look like? Well, Trump no longer supports a two-state solution, which he did support back in the days of the Abraham Accords. Others in the region certainly do, and they, at least in principle though, they're not willing to do an awful lot to bring that about. Of course, the two-state solution, if you are Arab in the region, doesn't necessarily mean democratic governance after all, with the exception of Israel. It's not like you have democratically elected governments across these states. So you're probably talking about something more technocratic and appointed. But still, what's happened is as Trump has been discussing this, the Jordanians and the Egyptians are unhappy and saying, "No way will they take any Palestinians."
The Gulf states are unhappy. The UAE, which has discussed some of this plan with Israel directly, slow rolling how much they'd be willing to do. The Saudis saying they don't support it. And so Trump with all of that and with Prime Minister Netanyahu coming to Washington DC said, "Fine, I'll make an announcement by myself. I'll just do it if you refuse to be a part of it." And then the US diplomats were spending day and night back channeling with Gulf allies saying, "He didn't really mean he was going to take over all of it. He's not planning on taking over the land. Don't worry about it." What I would say is this is an opening strategy to try to get all of the states in the region together with Israel and negotiate what the development of Gaza would possibly look like. To get some commitments for investment. To get some commitments for security.
And there's a lot of space between all of the Palestinians are resettled because certainly they're not all interested in leaving. But some of them certainly are. And you can hardly blame them even though it's their homeland because there is nothing left and it's really hard to get humanitarian aid in, and it's not likely to get meaningfully better, even with the ceasefire, which may not hold up anytime soon. And given the fact that 80% of Israelis polled in the Jerusalem Post, which is a pretty middle of the road survey group and media institution in Israel, say they want all of the Palestinians in Gaza resettled. Given that and given the fact that if you were to engage in reconstruction that security would be necessary, there's going to be an effort to at least create buffer zones, which means more resettlements internally and a desire to allow Palestinians that want to leave the ability to leave.
And Trump would love to create some facts on the ground there. The way he's creating facts on the ground by bringing some illegal migrants in the United States to Guantanamo. There aren't facilities for them, so they set up some tents. But even if it's only one or two planes, suddenly it becomes a policy. And that's precisely what the Trump administration wants to see with the Palestinians and Gaza is that if you are getting out a few busloads or a few shiploads or a few plane loads, then suddenly it's not a question of can they be resettled, but how many and over what time? It's a very different policy discussion, and that's exactly where they and the Israeli government are looking to get to. Now, who's going to take these Palestinians? Right now nobody. Trump was asked if he was going to be willing to, if the United States what his response was, "Well, it's really too far," which doesn't seem to be his perspective for the white Afrikaners in South Africa who are even farther away.
So maybe it's not really about distance. It might be something else. But nonetheless, I do expect that when Trump says that the Egyptians and Jordanians will take some, that if they are paid to take some and what some means and what kind of population and how they're going to be vetted is all to be discussed. But some would not surprise me at all, might be a matter of hundreds or a few thousand. I don't think it's a matter of hundreds of thousands. But again, it starts that conversation. It changes the policy. And especially if we end up reopening the fighting in Gaza, which I think is quite likely over the coming weeks and months, then there becomes more urgency to engage for some of the Palestinians there in more resettlement, more willingness to. So that's what I think this is all about right now.
We are not close to a Palestinian state. We are not close to a broad agreement that would allow the Gulfies to engage fully in what Trump is demanding or to expand the Abraham Accords, to include Saudi Arabia opening diplomatic ties with Israel. But all of this is on the table and is the backdrop for what Trump is putting forward right now. So that's what we're talking about and something we'll be watching really closely. Hope everyone's doing well, and I'll talk to you all real soon.
Why is Trump starting a trade war with Canada?
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: A Quick Take on the US-Canada relationship, which, right now, is on ice. And I don't mean the hockey kind. Trump, the tariff-man, cometh. Some 25% across the board on Canada, on Mexico too, except on Canadian oil, that's only 10%. Why? Why 10% on oil? Because that's actually what makes up Canada's surplus with the United States. So, wouldn't you actually hit that sector harder if you were trying to balance the budget? And the answer is, of course, no. That's like saying Canada's a friend and China's an enemy, and so wouldn't you hit the Chinese harder than the Canadians instead of the Chinese only 10%, the Canadians 25%, Mexico 25%, but that's also not the case. Why? Because China can cause a lot more damage to the United States. And so therefore, President Trump has to be more careful. Canada, Mexico, a lot smaller, much easier to punch down against the Canadians, even if it's technically punching up, given where they sit geographically. And except for oil, where the United States gets 4 million barrels a day, which is much more than the US gets from the rest of the world combined. And that quality of crude, only replaceable in terms of the kind of crude it is from Venezuela with massive sanctions and run by a dictator, and they've destroyed much of their own oil sector, so that's not a capability, which means that the Canadians can't send it anywhere else, the Americans can't buy it anywhere else, but the US is more powerful, so Trump thinks he can get away with it.
So, why? If it's not about oil and it's not really about the trade surplus, then why is it that Trump is doing this? What he says, is it's about fentanyl and illegal migrants, that the Canadians are not policing their border. Again, doesn't make a lot of sense. It makes more sense for Mexico, and again, there's a big question about whether the smartest thing to do is, you know, shoot first and ask questions later, or negotiate credibly first and not undermine the economies, the much weaker economies of your friends. But when it comes to Canada, the argument doesn't make sense at all. Fentanyl, we're talking about on average every year about 10 kilos of fentanyl that is interdicted at the border, which is, by the way, that's every year from Canada. That's less than what you see in Mexico every day. So, it's way under 1% of the total.
Illegal migrants, it's a larger problem from Canada. Here you're talking about roughly 5% of the interdiction on the northern border of illegals coming into the United States compared to 80% from Mexico, and the remainder mostly by sea and occasional air transit. And yes, I'm talking about what is being stopped, not what's getting through, which you can't measure as easily, but it's not like Homeland Security isn't tracking where illegal migrants are actually coming from. And this is not anywhere close to the issue from Canada than it is from Mexico. But that's not really the issue here either because national security issues are more likely to hold up as legal reasons for the US president to invoke IEEPA, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. And so, if you're worried that the court's going to strike down your tariffs because you don't actually have the law behind you, this is the way you couch it.
And also, Trump doesn't really care what arguments he's using. It's to show that he can't and to get his supporters to go with him to make better deals for the US no matter what. But the timing here is strategically horrible for Trump. Canada is at the beginning of an election, and this from Trump is remarkably unifying for the Canadians. Using fake news to justify a trade war and then leaning in to say that Canada can join as a 51st state if they want. Now, there are plenty of Canadians that over the last eight years have supported Trump. Remember the trucker strike, for example. I mean, I certainly see it and I hear it on my trips there, but these are not America First, Canadians. These are Canada First, Canadians, and they don't want the Canadians to fold to Trump. In fact, the only people that I hear saying quietly that they wish the Canadians would fold are the globalists.
They're the corporate and financial elites in Canada that just really want this to go away because it's hurting their profits. And they're trying to find a way to say, "Well, just give him a win. It'll be okay." But I mean, in terms of the average Canadian, no, no, no, no, no, they want their political leaders, whether it's the Conservative Party or the Liberal Party, to stand up to Trump. And that's why you've seen in the last 24 hours, Liberal leaders, whether it's Trudeau, or it's Chrystia Freeland, or Mark Carney, who are the two that are contesting for the premiership, or it's Pierre Poilievre leading the conservative party, or Doug Ford, head of Ontario, who's also a major conservative leader in Canada, and they're all saying the same thing, which is they've got to stand up for Canada, to hit Trump back hard, that they can't take this laying down. And these are also the people that are booing the US National Anthem at hockey games across the country in Canada right now, which I have not seen happen in Canada, frankly, since the US war in Iraq.
I am not someone who opposes tariffs as a matter of course. I think that tariffs can be a useful tool of economic and national security influence. They can help to deal with national security concerns. They can help nudge rebalancing of economies for domestic reasons that matter politically. And we saw some of that during Trump's first term. We saw some of that during Biden's term. But for Trump's first term, he then had strong economic voices internally that were also moderating his behavior, that stopped fights from becoming long-term destructive. People like Robert Lighthizer, who was the US trade rep. Jared Kushner, who was a senior advisor, had a lot of access and influence of course to his father-in-law. Steve Mnuchin, the Secretary of Treasury. That's not remotely the case this time around. That's not what you're seeing from Treasury Secretary Bessent or from Commerce Secretary Lutnick. Much, much weaker, much more divided forces internally.
So instead, you are taking on America's closest friend, most trusted ally, not to mention critically integrated economy with the United States, and you are hitting them in the teeth harder than you are hitting anyone else. And I would argue that this is a big mistake, long-term, for the United States and frankly for everyone but America's adversaries, who will take advantage of weakness of US allies that have been historically very strong, and that have been harder for adversaries to deal with.
So what is it that the United States stands for? And I go back, I think when I was a kid and when I was starting my studies, 1989, Wall comes down, and around the world, people saw that, and they weren't all pro-American, not by a long stretch, but they would still stay that the United States had values, that it was trying to stand for freedom and liberty and a free market economy. Not always consistently, but nonetheless, the general sense that that was something that the United States wanted to be seen as promoting. And today, you go to Canada, or you go to Denmark, or you go to Panama, or you go to Japan, or South Korea, the European Union, you name it, and you ask people what America stands for, and they say, "Power," and they say, "Money," and they specifically say, "Pay for play." And that is penny-wise and pound-foolish for the United States.
And I don't know how US Canada is going to ultimately resolve itself. I don't think it's going to be resolved quickly. I think there will be a lot of economic pain on both sides, a lot more for the Canadians than the Americans because they're in a weaker position, but sooner or later, I think economic interest on both sides will lead to a deal. And I think, I expect that this is not going to lead to a permanent trade war between the Americans and the Canadians, but you would have to go back to pre-war times to find a major country doing more than the US is doing right now, and President Trump is doing right now, to undermine America's closest alliances. That is what's happening here. And I think long-term, this is really not in the interest of the United States, in the interest the American people, and it's certainly not in the interest of having a sustainable and stable world.
So that's it for me. I'll talk to you all real soon and be good.
How Trump's assertive foreign policy impacts international relations
And the response by President Trump was immediately 25%, maybe 50% tariffs, and shut off visas and shut down diplomatic engagement. And there was immediate response by President Petro that was over the top, and as Trump's own responses are over the top, and going to completely hit the Americans back really hard. Now, America is Colombia's most important trade partner, and the size of these countries is a little bit different. And within a couple of hours, Petro very quietly accepted Trump's terms. The deported Colombians will be accepted back in Colombia, and the trade war with Colombia is in our rearview mirror. Not really a surprise.
So Trump is going out there, and he's saying all these extraordinary, extravagant things. Huge exaggerations about what he demands and what he wants. And if you're Colombia, the response was absolutely on par. I mean, the post that we saw from President Petro, who is also kind of a populist firebrand on the left, isn't enormously popular, frankly, and has had a lot of difficulty in passing economic policies. But he gave it a shot and it was entertaining to watch and read and a lot of Colombians responded well to it. It felt like good old nationalism. And of course, he had to back down. Why? Because you're not allowed to do the same thing that Trump is. It's not just about who's right, it's also about who's powerful. And Trump's more than happy to hit him with a stick. And so that turned out to be a loss pretty quickly for the Colombian government.
There are a lot of other countries that are working the same way. I see this happening with Mexico where the Mexican president has been incredibly careful. US is the most important relationship. Suddenly they are seizing enormous amounts of fentanyl. More in one seizure than they've done in four years under Biden and showing Trump, "Look at what we can accomplish because we know this is important to you." And working to get Chinese trade and investment that is problematic and coming through to the United States out of Mexico and willing to put more money and resources, people on Mexico's southern border to reduce the numbers of people that are coming through Mexico into the United States. They desperately don't want to fight with the Americans. They're going to make a lot of offers. Call it defense. Call it capitulation. But that's definitely what you're seeing.
I see this from Denmark, which is publicly trying to say nothing. There've been some leaks. But in general it's been very careful both from Denmark and all of the Nordic leaders I've spoken to, they've been very, very careful. Nothing public about the challenges that they're having. Of course, privately completely unacceptable that the United States would make demands of Greenland and wouldn't work through a very stalwart, though small, ally. The Danes who do everything the Americans ask in terms of coordinating on military exercises and providing multilateral support when the Americans want more participation in different wars or humanitarian support. You name it, the Danes are there. But that didn't matter to Trump. He said, "I want Greenland."
And they are privately trying really hard to get this out of the headlines to say nothing that would be provocative, not respond the way the Colombian President did, not get Trump to do anything even more angry. And instead, find a way to keep Greenland a part of Denmark, don't vote for independence and keep the alliance stable. Most places around the world, that's what they're doing. They're acting like Mark Zuckerberg and Meta and all of those tech titans that have given the money and have gone down to Mar-a-Lago and are saying, "No, we've always loved you Trump and we want to work with you and please don't hurt us."
But there are a few exceptions and I think it's worth mentioning who I think they are. Exception number one, this may surprise you: Canada. Canada is an exception not because they're unfriendly with the US, not because they don't depend on the US, but because they have an election coming up. Their government fell apart. And now everybody in Canada is angry at the United States with all of this threat of tariffs and we want more money for the Americans for security, and you guys should be a 51st state. Not only are the liberals angry, the conservatives are angry and they have to outdo each other to be tough on Trump in the United States or they think they're going to lose the election upcoming. So the fact is that Trump, I think, made a strategic mistake in going after Canada early because the Canadians are not in the position to respond well given the election.
The other two exceptions, the Europeans who want to be constructive with the US but have a stronger position if they can be collective through the EU and on some areas they can. On Russia-Ukraine, they can be collective, which has helped them bring Trump closer to the European position on Russia-Ukraine in the last three months than he was when he was initially elected. On trade, on tariffs, on China, Europe is more collective and has more regulatory force as long as they can act together. That is going to continue to happen, gives them more leverage, vis-a-vis the Americans.
And then finally the Chinese who don't act collectively, but they are stronger as an individual country. And they're going to be much tougher to engage with as we saw with the first phase one, phase two trade deal. It took a very long time to sort of come together and then they didn't actually uphold a lot of what they promised. A lot of decent conversations, but the Chinese were much more willing to lecture Marco Rubio in their first call with the US Secretary of State than anyone else he has spoken with around the world. Why is that? Because the Chinese want to show they're not going to be pushovers and that they are tougher and bigger and stronger and can hit back the way that many other countries cannot. What does that mean for US-China relationship? Probably going to get worse before it gets better. That would be my bet at this point. But we'll see how much of a deal Trump really wants.
That's it for me. I'll talk to you all real soon.
Trump's Davos address sets up big shifts in US strategy
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: A Quick Take to close out our week in Davos, Switzerland.
Want to talk about now President Trump's address; virtual, direct to everybody, collected yesterday, assembled yesterday, to hear his speech, and then to ask a few pre-planned questions. The speech itself, at the beginning, not all that surprising, "America's back open for business. Everything was horrible before. Everything's going to be great, now." Not a surprise, kind of exaggerated. You'd never think that the US was by far the strongest-performing economy in the advanced industrial world, coming out of the pandemic. But people roll their eyes a bit, they get on getting on. There was still a fair amount of news that was actually made, and some interesting thoughts about where the initial Trump administration is going to go.
First point, on OPEC, talks a lot about Saudi Arabia directly, Mohammed bin Salman. They're very close, they've worked together closely. Not only when he was president the first time, it was his first trip as president back in 2017, but since then. A lot of business with the family as well. And has been promised $600 billion to invest in the United States directly. That beats the $500 billion announcement that the AI giants have just made in what they're going to do, this Stargate project. He likes that. He said, "Why don't you up it to a trillion?" That's a round number. Good thing we're base-10 in this country. Anyway, the fact that Trump is interested in engaging very closely with the Saudis, not a surprise at all, there is going to be a very big push to try to ensure that Saudi Arabia moves on normalization of relations with Israel. Given the fact that there's no two-state solution on the table for the Palestinians, that's challenging, but I wouldn't count it out, frankly.
Secondly, a lot of talk about oil and the fact that Trump really doesn't like where oil prices are right now. Now, the Americans are going to try to pump more, but he knows that there's only so much that can be done in the near term, maybe another 500,000 barrels a day. OPEC, on the other hand, has over four million barrels that are off the market. Why? Because they're willing to ensure that prices are comparatively high. And if that means they lose a little bit of market share, they're happy to do that. Well, Trump doesn't like that one bit, and especially because he wants to hit Iran hard, and take more of their oil off the market. He doesn't want prices to go up, so he wants the Saudis to lean in. How are they going to react? We'll see. Something at least nominal in the near-term, that brings prices maybe down towards, let's say, $70, as opposed to roughly $80, where they've been, that would be interesting to see. I wouldn't put it past the Saudis at all to lean in on that.
Secondly, China. We are going to now see tariffs early on China, 10% across the board, February 1. Markets seem to like the fact that, on the first day, Trump didn't do anything, but a few days later, is that really much better? What was interesting about the conversation, Trump is trying to make it very clear, he doesn't have an ideological beef with China. He continues to speak broadly, more warmly about Xi Jinping, and specifically about China, than generally President Biden has. That's not all that different from the first term, but it's different from expectations over the past few months. And I do expect we're going to see a summit meeting relatively soon, even though there's been no announcements around it. Having said all of that, the fact that the US has a really tough take on China, not only bilaterally but also versus all these other countries, Trump wants to punish the Europeans to ensure that they coordinate with the US on China, wants to ensure the Mexicans, the Indians, the Vietnamese, and others don't allow Chinese goods into the US through their countries.
It's very hard for the US and China to maintain a stable relationship when Trump's going to respond to China, "Well, that's our business. Those are relations with other countries. You have nothing to say about it." They're really stuck on this, and I expect that, despite maybe a bit of a honeymoon, which I wasn't thinking we'd have a few weeks ago, the US-China relations are still going to get a lot more challenging over the coming months.
And then we have Russia. And I thought it was very interesting that when Trump was asked, "So, next year at Davos, if you were here, is the war going to be over between Russia and Ukraine?" Because, of course, he's been saying, "I can end the war in a day." Then he's saying, "100 days." Now, he's saying, "Actually, the Ukrainians are ready for a deal." And by the way, that's true. But you're going to have to ask the Russians. Well, that's very different from, "I can get the deal done very easily."
He also continues to lean into the fact that the Chinese can be useful here, and that's true. That's something that the Biden administration and Trump administration actually agree pretty strongly on, that China has a lot more direct leverage over Russia than the United States does. And there's only so much the US can do with additional sanctions to convince the Russians to stop. Now, Trump can say that Russia needs to end the war, and that this is hurting them, but Putin doesn't actually feel that way. Certainly isn't prepared to accept less than the territory that he's presently occupying. So that, to me, is very interesting.
I would say the place that Trump has moved the most in the last three months, moved specifically towards the position that the Europeans have, and they're a lot less panicked about it now than they were even a week ago, is on the Russia-Ukraine issue. No one here in Europe, not one European leader I spoke with, now believes that Trump is going to basically throw Zelenskyy under the bus. And that's absolutely not where they were even, let's say, in December. So, that's a big deal.
That doesn't mean that the Europeans are feeling comfortable about Trump because, of course, Trump does not like Europe. Does not like a consolidated Europe, doesn't think a strong Europe is good for the United States. He wants to deal with individual European countries, and he wants to deal, of course, preferably with more Europe-first types in those individual countries. So, it's not the British Prime Minister, it's not the German Chancellor. It's organizations like the Reform Party and AFD. And, of course, Giorgia Meloni from Italy. He also bitterly complains about all the regulations, all the taxes, how hard it is to do business in Europe, how hard it is to do business with Europe. And that is a big challenge for Europe, that understands they need to be more competitive, but isn't prepared to spend the money, isn't capable of coordinating to get the kind of industrial policy done that the Americans are now doing.
So, on defense, on Ukraine, existential threat from Russia, Europe's doing a lot more coordination with the United States. On the economy, which concerns the Europeans equally much, and technology, where the Americans are a clear leader and leaning in very heavily, and the regulations are only going to get more comfortable and aligned with the technology companies, those that remain, the regulations, that is, not the tech companies, the Europeans are in very serious trouble.
So, that's it from me. I hope you all guys are well, and I'll talk to you all from New York next week.
From Davos: How global leaders are grappling with Trump’s return
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: A Quick Take to kick off your week.
I am standing here at the World Economic Forum's annual meeting in Davos, Switzerland. And of course, it's a split screen right now because everyone's also got their eyes back on Washington, DC and the inauguration for the second time of Donald Trump as president. It is the end of the post-Cold War order. That's what Borge Brende said, he runs the World Economic Forum, in a piece in the New York Times. I call it the G-Zero world, but this is the organization that's most committed to that order over the last 50 years. And of course, committed to doesn't necessarily mean fighting for. I think that's part of the issue, is that so many people, whether they were captains of industry, or media leaders, or heads of state, just believe that, well, after the Soviet Union was defeated, a united, more multilateral, globalized order was just what was coming.
And so, we didn't have to do anything. We just had to keep on keeping on. Of course, that isn't the way it felt for an awful lot of people living inside those countries. And the Americans definitively elected Trump not just once, but twice. And the first time, it was an experiment. He was an outsider to shake things up. The second time, you're electing somebody who's already been impeached twice, who's been convicted for crimes, who's already made very clear that he has no interest in promoting a US-led multilateral order. And that is exactly what people wanted, or at least, more people than wanted the alternative. And so that's where we are.
Outside of the United States, and Davos is mostly about other countries, 60 heads of state are here, and CEOs from all over the world, it’s really a question of how are you responding to that? And I would say that there's a big question of whether or not you accept it and normalize and capitulate, or whether you try to fight. And overwhelmingly, what we have is the former. I mean, the number of times you're talking about things that you never would have found acceptable, a year ago, five years ago, from the United States, cryptocurrencies being launched by the president in the days before his inauguration, making billions, tens of billions of dollars, that's just the way it's done in the United States now. Elon Musk joining phone calls and meetings with CEOs and heads of state. Really bizarre if that was happening with any other leader. But if the United States is doing it, I guess that's just the way it's done. And if the Americans are telling you we're going to take Greenland or we're going to take Canada, we're going to take the Panama Canal, well, we're not going to take that seriously, but we do recognize that we're going to have to give them a little something, because otherwise it's going to cause us a lot of damage.
One major exception here is that I don't expect the Chinese to capitulate at all. I mean, they're talking with the Americans, and maybe there will even be a meeting in the early days, a summit meeting between Donald Trump and XI Jinping. That's very different from a breakthrough deal. And rather, I think we’re at the beginning of what's very likely to be a trade war between the two largest economies in the world. And frankly, of all the things I just mentioned, that's probably the one that is going to concern the attendees of the World Economic Forum the most. Certainly, the one that's going to affect them most.
Anyway, that's where we're starting off with the summit this week. There'll be massive number of meetings over the course of the next few days and I'm sure I'll talk to you again. Talk soon.
What Greenlanders might want from a deal with Trump
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: a Quick Take to kick off your week.
Let's talk about Greenland. First time I ever encountered it was when I was playing Risk in school, and it was this big island between North America and Europe that connected you with Iceland. But it was part of North America, at least on the Risk map, and that's how you got your five armies if you owned the whole thing. So you always threw a couple up there, a lot of big, big territory. And now we're visiting, and Donald Trump Jr. taking Air Trump One last week and landing in Nuuk, the capital of Greenland. Landed for a few hours, did some social media stuff, and then got back to Mar-a-Lago, where he's probably more comfortable. What's happening? Why do the Americans say that they are going to buy it, incoming President Trump, and what does it mean for American alliances and the future of the global order and all of that?
Well, first, let's recognize that as much as it sounds crazy, Trump is not the first president to offer to buy Greenland. He's actually the third. The first was Andrew Johnson. His Secretary of State, William Seward, who was down for Alaska, also offered 5.5 million to buy Greenland. This was back in 1868. The timing is interesting, of course. There's no historic claim on Greenland. The US troops did briefly occupy it in World War II for defensive purposes, but it's not as if the United States has any reason to believe that this should be American. It's not like, say, what the Russians say about Crimea.
And the Greenlandic government, which is itself, it represents all of 55,000 people, despite the size, is led by a separatist political party. They want independence. Independence is popular in Greenland. They've had a few polls, and people generally say that they'd like to be Greenlanders and not part of Denmark. And they are clearly leveraging all of this spotlight from Trump to advance having an independence referendum during parliamentary elections coming up real soon, like in April. And frankly, given that Denmark is a tiny country and spends about $500 million a year on Greenland, that if the Americans came over the top and said, "Well, we'd make you an ally. We'd put troops on the ground and we'd pay you more, not taking it over, Greenland would be an independent state." I think it would be much more likely that Greenland would actually vote for independence. And then, Trump would say, "We've got a new ally, and we've got everything we wanted. And we have these basing rights for the Arctic," and all of that.
It's pretty significant in terms of talking about the Nordics. Denmark has had Greenland as part of its territory since 1830. And Greenland is autonomous, they have their own parliament, which means they are right now in charge of their own domestic affairs, but not foreign or security affairs. So in that regard, also much like Crimea under Ukraine. But they have moved more towards an independence movement over the past decades. In part, self-determination is what people generally are aiming for around the world, with better understanding of others, post-colonial, being able to achieve it for themselves. Also, because there's a difficult history with Denmark. A lot of forced integration, taking Greenlanders from their homes, from their families, to put them in Danish schools and make them more Danish. Even forced birth control to reduce the Greenland explosion of population. Those things are not happening now, but that is a history that was exploitative and makes a lot of Greenlanders feel about the Danes the way that a lot of Native Americans feel about the United States. So, it's understandable why there would be an independence movement.
Now, the Danes, in addition to all the European leaders, are squashing any idea that Greenland is for sale, but that is very different from Greenland might well go independent. And there's no question that Greenland is important, particularly in terms of national security. Russia has put billions of dollars into Arctic infrastructure, including its Northern Fleet, and they're the only country in the world that's really actively trying to seize the Arctic's economic and strategic potential. That's going to become much more important as the ice cap melts, with transit routes, with exploitation of resources. The United States did have some troops on the ground, a meaningful number, in Greenland, something like 10,000. It's now down to 200. They've reduced that. They could certainly expand it with a new relationship with an independent Greenland.
Of course, they could also expand it with a new relationship with Denmark, of which Greenland is a part, Trump not all that interested in that because it doesn't make spectacular headlines, and also because he likes real estate. Let's face it, you look at him personally, and he loves putting his names on pieces of property that are iconic and that have a large visual footprint in the minds of people. And historically, he almost lost his economic empire a few times by holding on to iconic real estate for too long. So is that a factor in how Trump thinks about Greenland? You'd have to imagine it plays a role. So I think we are going to be talking about this actually a lot more over the coming months, and it's going to have a lot more to do with what 55,000 Greenlanders decide to vote for. And then how the Americans negotiate with them.
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