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JD Vance stuns Munich conference with critique on European democracy
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: A Quick Take from the Munich Security Conference. Just finished with the opening speech for Vice President JD Vance. Before that, Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission. Literally standing room only across the conference. I can't remember the last time it was so busy. And so busy because so many people believe that the NATO and the transatlantic alliance are at a crossroads, are facing a time of crisis.
First, the good news. The recognition on the part of the Europeans that action on their part is urgent is pretty consistent across the board. That a 2% spend on defense is not enough, that they have to take much more of a leadership role on Ukraine. That they have to be much more competitive in terms of growth. That indeed many of the criticisms that are being levied on the Europeans by Trump, as well as by Democrats and Republicans in the United States are things they have not taken adequately seriously, and now they do.
I think the level of urgency, the recognition of crisis is true across the board. The willingness to take action is a different story. We will see that over the course of the coming months, but there's no question it is significant.
Go beyond that to what JD Vance had to say. This speech did not include a mention of Russia and Ukraine. This is a speech to the Munich Security Conference to mention separately of elections in Romania overturned by their constitutional court, politicized questions about that to be sure. But not a speech that resonated or landed well for the Europeans in the audience. They were getting a lecture on freedom of speech and democracy from the United States. They were not getting a sense of how strong and secure the alliance needed to be.
JD Vance was talking about democracy for as opposed to protecting from. The Security Conference is of course much more about protecting from. It's about what kind of external threats exist to NATO, which is the reason it exists. And to the extent that Europeans are concerned about the future of NATO, a lot of it is coming from inside the house, a European sense that the Americans are not committed to them anymore. In fact, Defense Minister of Germany, Pistorius actually yelled out during JD Vance's speech, "This is unacceptable." I've never seen anything like that from a European leader during a major US plenary here at the Munich Security Conference before coming here for about 15 years. So that was quite surprising.
Having said all of that, when the vice president met with the German federal president earlier in the day, he was much more willing to talk constructively about working together on Ukraine, especially in terms of having the Ukrainians at the table, including the Europeans. How essential it'd be for everybody to work together to ensure that the Ukrainians can be reconstructed. That they'll have security guarantees and defense.
So to a degree, what we are seeing is a speech for Vance's domestic audience in the United States, as well as some of the anti-EU Euro-skeptic populace in Europe, including the AfD, the Alternative for Deutschland, who, of course, their support is going to the polls in a couple of weeks just like the rest of this country, Germany. But still, the level of tension here is extremely high. The level of trust has been reduced. And pretty much everyone I've talked to in this conference believes that the Russians today are in a considerably stronger position than they were in 48 hours ago. The Chinese are in a stronger position than they were in 48 hours ago. And that's something pretty much nobody in this conference wants to say, wants to hear. That's it for me. I'll talk to you all real soon.
Trump-Putin chat over Ukraine "deeply" worries Europe
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: A Quick Take from Munich, Germany, where the Munich Security Conference is just about to kick off. And it is going to be a historic meeting, and not necessarily in a good way.
Everyone I've been speaking to here, deeply concerned about the sudden conversation, 90-minute conversation, with a full readout from, both the Kremlin and from the United States, between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin. Not so much concerned that a conversation took place, rather that it happened, and Trump is engaging unilaterally without coordinating in advance with the Ukrainians or the Europeans. And in that regard, very, very different than what we've seen over the first three years of the war.
Look, there's no question, everyone does want to see the war wind down. Everyone would love to see a ceasefire. The question is, how and what does the NATO alliance look like after that? What does Europe look like in terms of its engagement, its trust with the United States, the transatlantic relationship? And, of course, what happens with Ukraine? The statements that have been made by Trump and by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth are things that we've heard a lot about privately, not just from the Trump administration, from the Europeans, from the Biden administration too, the idea that NATO membership is not in the cards, long-term, if there's going to be some sort of formal peace agreement, that Ukraine is going to have to give up some kind of territory, not that they should, not that that's reasonable, not they don't have territorial integrity, but there's no way for them to get back all the territory that they had back in 2014. Those are things that have now been said publicly by the Americans. But they are being said both unilaterally and also in advance of any negotiation. In other words, concessions are being made to the Russians before both sides sit down. And that is, of course, a very significant concern, for the Europeans and the Ukrainians.
There is also a question what kind of security guarantees would be provided to Ukraine? According to the United States, certainly will not involve Americans on the ground. No troops. Would be European troops. They're the ones that have to do the bulk of the lifting. They're the ones that have to ensure that there was a response if Ukraine were attacked again, after a ceasefire. Now, it's not that the Americans are suddenly washing their hands of all of this. In fact, the first cabinet official to go to Kiev from the Trump administration, just met with Zelensky in the last 24-hours; that’s Secretary of Treasury Scott Bessent. Why Treasury? Because Trump is trying to get something for giving something. It's transactional, as he always is. And in this case, focusing on critical minerals from Ukraine. Nominally, the number is some $500 billion of what would be Ukrainian resources to the United States in return for ongoing, US military support for Ukraine.
Outgoing German Chancellor Olaf Scholz said, “This is selfish, the Americans shouldn't be doing this.” The Ukrainian president, who actually has to work with the Americans going forward, unlike Scholz, saying, “What a great offer. Happy to talk to you. Want to find a way to make this work?” So, on the one hand, it's not as if the United States is leaving Ukraine high and dry. And certainly, a level of engagement between the Americans and the Russians is very important. It’s essential going forward. But of course, what Putin wants is a deal not only to his favor, but not just about Ukraine. He wants to be talking just to the Americans, and he wants to be talking to them about missile defense, about NATO enlargement, about a whole range of issues that he has, that he takes issue with. And that's something that Trump is perfectly interested in.
At the end of the day, Trump is a lot more interested in cutting a deal for himself that allows the Americans to focus a lot more on China and on Asia, from a security perspective, than working with the Europeans to try to do something collectively on Ukraine. And this is the biggest challenge and also the biggest difference between Trump and Biden, in terms of foreign policy. Biden fundamentally believe that a strong Europe, coordinated with the United States, was long-term in American interests. President Trump does not. He believes that a strong Europe is a bad thing. He wants to see more exits, like Brexit, from other countries. He supports Euro-skeptic movements across Europe. He would much rather have individual negotiations with individual European countries where the Americans are stronger.
What does that mean for the Munich Security Conference? What does it mean for NATO? What does it mean for the transatlantic relationship? Long-term, nothing good. Final point here, the Europeans are taking this seriously, but it's late. They've been told, by Americans for several administrations now, they need to be spending more time and more money on their own defense, their own collective security. Macron has talked about it a fair amount in France. The Polish government is certainly taking the lead on that, especially after the Russians invade Ukraine. But most European governments aren't taking it nearly as seriously and aren't prepared to spend the money. And that reality, for decades now, made much more stark and severe with the Russian invasion in 2014 of Ukraine, which the Europeans did virtually nothing about, and now, when 2022, you've got Trump coming in and saying, “I'm not going to do this,” that's forcing the Europeans in a much more stark way, but also much too late for them to get their act together, in my view.
So, we'll see what we see over the next couple of days, but this is going to be a very, again, historic Munich Security Conference. Glad to be here, and we'll talk to you soon.
Russian Yars intercontinental ballistic missile launcher takes part in the Victory Day military parade general rehearsal on the Red Square in Moscow, Russia, on May 5, 2024.
Hard Numbers: New records in global defense spending and journalist deaths, Car attack strikes Munich, Danes joke about buying California, Japan may u-turn on nuclear energy
2,460,000,000,000: In 2024, global defense spending rose to a new height of $2.46 trillion, according to the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies think tank. Worth noting: The Kremlin outpaced all other European countries combined. Russia’s military expenditure equated $461.6 billion in purchase parity terms, eclipsing Europe’s $457 billion.
124: 2024 was the deadliest year for journalists on record since the Committee to Protect Journalists started tracking more than 30 years ago. At least 124 media workers were killed last year — nearly two-thirds of them in Gaza. The next deadliest nations were Sudan and Pakistan, with six deaths each.
20: At least 20 people, including children, were injured in Munich on Thursday when a driver plowed into a trade union demonstration. The driver was detained at the scene, and another man in the car, a Mini Cooper, was reportedly shot by police. The attack puts the German city on alert just a day before it's set to hold the 61st edition of the Munich Security Conference featuring world leaders. Some of those involved were critically injured, officials said.
200,000: A deeply unserious campaign for Denmark to purchase California from the United States gained significant traction online this week, following President Donald Trump’s repeated calls to purchase Greenland, an autonomous Danish territory. So far, more than 200,000 people have signed the virtual petition to “Måke Califørnia Great Ægain.”
14: Nearly 14 years after an earthquake and tsunami led to a triple meltdown at the Fukushima power plant, the Japanese government is considering an about-face on its plans to limit reliance on nuclear power. A draft strategic energy plan from the trade and industry ministry calls for a “maximization” of nuclear power to help reach its emissions and energy security targets. The plan calls for around 20% to stem from nuclear reactors by 2040, 40-50% from renewables, and 30-40% from coal (down from 70% at present).
Russian President Vladimir Putin meets with Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin at the Kremlin in Moscow, Russia, on Feb. 7, 2025.
Ukraine is on the line after Putin and Trump's phone call
Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump had a “lengthy and highly productive phone call” on Wednesday, during which they discussed ending the Ukraine War. The hour-and-a-half-long call came the same day that Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth told a gathering of allies at NATO headquarters that “the United States does not believe that NATO membership for Ukraine is a realistic outcome of a negotiated settlement.” He also said it was “unrealistic” to return Ukraine’s borders to where they were before Russia’s invasion in 2014.
The Kremlin-White House call marked the end to Washington’s three-year-long effort to isolate Russia and Putin, signaling that ceasefire discussions could be coming soon. After the call, Trump said that he planned to tell Volodymyr Zelensky to “start negotiations immediately.”
It also raised concern that Ukraine could be entering negotiations under pressure from its biggest military backer. But Hegseth said Thursday in Brussels that there “is no betrayal there” of Kyiv.
To increase his leverage, Zelensky has offered to trade Ukraine’s critical minerals in exchange for continued US support, an offer that Trump has smiled upon, but not clarified whether it would be in exchange for future or past aid. The Ukrainian leader has also made the domestically controversial decision to begin recruiting men aged 18-24 through hefty bonuses to the tune of $48,000 over a year – a sum that would take 10 years for most to earn in Ukraine. This is an attempt to make up for Ukraine’s manpower deficit and to appease Trump, who has criticized the country for keeping the conscription age at 25.Russian President Vladimir Putin speaks during a visit to the Lomonosov Moscow State University, in Moscow, Russia, on Jan. 24, 2025.
Putin looks back to the future
According to theFinancial Times, Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin presented a report last April to several dozen senior government officials and the heads of some of Russia’s largest state-owned companies that suggests the Kremlin hopes to create a “macro region” with Moscow as its center. This bloc would become a financial, trade, and transport network and political sphere of influence that includes much of the territory of the former Soviet Union.
Russian leadership of this bloc would allow the Kremlin to promote a common worldview among members and to set rules, standards, and sanction policies of its own. The establishment of this new bloc, which would be financed largely through trade in raw materials with the global south, would allow Russia to act as a global power on par with the United States, China, and the EU.
The report acknowledges that Western sanctions have limited Russia’s ability to realize this vision and that Moscow must look beyond the war in Ukraine to play a “long game.” It does not consider the possibility that the unwillingness of Russia’s neighbors to return to their former roles as Russian satellites might prove a greater obstacle to Russia’s renewal than Western sanctions have. Nor does it make clear how Russia intends to establish itself as an international peer to countries with far larger and more dynamic economies.
How Trump's assertive foreign policy impacts international relations
And the response by President Trump was immediately 25%, maybe 50% tariffs, and shut off visas and shut down diplomatic engagement. And there was immediate response by President Petro that was over the top, and as Trump's own responses are over the top, and going to completely hit the Americans back really hard. Now, America is Colombia's most important trade partner, and the size of these countries is a little bit different. And within a couple of hours, Petro very quietly accepted Trump's terms. The deported Colombians will be accepted back in Colombia, and the trade war with Colombia is in our rearview mirror. Not really a surprise.
So Trump is going out there, and he's saying all these extraordinary, extravagant things. Huge exaggerations about what he demands and what he wants. And if you're Colombia, the response was absolutely on par. I mean, the post that we saw from President Petro, who is also kind of a populist firebrand on the left, isn't enormously popular, frankly, and has had a lot of difficulty in passing economic policies. But he gave it a shot and it was entertaining to watch and read and a lot of Colombians responded well to it. It felt like good old nationalism. And of course, he had to back down. Why? Because you're not allowed to do the same thing that Trump is. It's not just about who's right, it's also about who's powerful. And Trump's more than happy to hit him with a stick. And so that turned out to be a loss pretty quickly for the Colombian government.
There are a lot of other countries that are working the same way. I see this happening with Mexico where the Mexican president has been incredibly careful. US is the most important relationship. Suddenly they are seizing enormous amounts of fentanyl. More in one seizure than they've done in four years under Biden and showing Trump, "Look at what we can accomplish because we know this is important to you." And working to get Chinese trade and investment that is problematic and coming through to the United States out of Mexico and willing to put more money and resources, people on Mexico's southern border to reduce the numbers of people that are coming through Mexico into the United States. They desperately don't want to fight with the Americans. They're going to make a lot of offers. Call it defense. Call it capitulation. But that's definitely what you're seeing.
I see this from Denmark, which is publicly trying to say nothing. There've been some leaks. But in general it's been very careful both from Denmark and all of the Nordic leaders I've spoken to, they've been very, very careful. Nothing public about the challenges that they're having. Of course, privately completely unacceptable that the United States would make demands of Greenland and wouldn't work through a very stalwart, though small, ally. The Danes who do everything the Americans ask in terms of coordinating on military exercises and providing multilateral support when the Americans want more participation in different wars or humanitarian support. You name it, the Danes are there. But that didn't matter to Trump. He said, "I want Greenland."
And they are privately trying really hard to get this out of the headlines to say nothing that would be provocative, not respond the way the Colombian President did, not get Trump to do anything even more angry. And instead, find a way to keep Greenland a part of Denmark, don't vote for independence and keep the alliance stable. Most places around the world, that's what they're doing. They're acting like Mark Zuckerberg and Meta and all of those tech titans that have given the money and have gone down to Mar-a-Lago and are saying, "No, we've always loved you Trump and we want to work with you and please don't hurt us."
But there are a few exceptions and I think it's worth mentioning who I think they are. Exception number one, this may surprise you: Canada. Canada is an exception not because they're unfriendly with the US, not because they don't depend on the US, but because they have an election coming up. Their government fell apart. And now everybody in Canada is angry at the United States with all of this threat of tariffs and we want more money for the Americans for security, and you guys should be a 51st state. Not only are the liberals angry, the conservatives are angry and they have to outdo each other to be tough on Trump in the United States or they think they're going to lose the election upcoming. So the fact is that Trump, I think, made a strategic mistake in going after Canada early because the Canadians are not in the position to respond well given the election.
The other two exceptions, the Europeans who want to be constructive with the US but have a stronger position if they can be collective through the EU and on some areas they can. On Russia-Ukraine, they can be collective, which has helped them bring Trump closer to the European position on Russia-Ukraine in the last three months than he was when he was initially elected. On trade, on tariffs, on China, Europe is more collective and has more regulatory force as long as they can act together. That is going to continue to happen, gives them more leverage, vis-a-vis the Americans.
And then finally the Chinese who don't act collectively, but they are stronger as an individual country. And they're going to be much tougher to engage with as we saw with the first phase one, phase two trade deal. It took a very long time to sort of come together and then they didn't actually uphold a lot of what they promised. A lot of decent conversations, but the Chinese were much more willing to lecture Marco Rubio in their first call with the US Secretary of State than anyone else he has spoken with around the world. Why is that? Because the Chinese want to show they're not going to be pushovers and that they are tougher and bigger and stronger and can hit back the way that many other countries cannot. What does that mean for US-China relationship? Probably going to get worse before it gets better. That would be my bet at this point. But we'll see how much of a deal Trump really wants.
That's it for me. I'll talk to you all real soon.
Russia's President Vladimir Putin and Belarus' President Alexander Lukashenko take part in a signing ceremony following a meeting of the Supreme State Council of the Union State of Russia and Belarus in Minsk, Belarus, on Dec. 6, 2024.
Viewpoint: With Putin’s protection, is Lukashenko’s reelection in Belarus a foregone conclusion?
Ahead of Sunday’s election in Belarus, there is little doubt that Alexander Lukashenko, Europe’s longest-serving leader, will win a new term in office. After the protests that erupted following the 2020 elections, threatening his grip on power for the first time, a government crackdown supported by Russia has eliminated any opposition to the president.
Yet a new term for the 70-year-old leader, who has complained about health problems, will likely raise questions about potential succession planning in his next term. Regardless of what comes next, Russian President Vladimir Putin, who considers neighboring Belarus a critical part of his country’s sphere of influence, will make sure its interests are protected.
We sat down with Eurasia Group expert Alex Brideau to learn more about the upcoming election.
What do we know about Lukashenko’s true level of support?
Lukashenko has been in power for more than 30 years, ever since he won Belarus’ first and only genuine democratic presidential election, held in 1994 a few years after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Since then, it has been hard to tell just how genuine Lukashenko’s public support is. He has routinely won reelection in votes that were neither free nor fair. Many of his challengers have been arrested for standing against him.
Lukashenko’s reelection in 2020, though, demonstrated that whatever popularity he previously enjoyed had eroded and that his hold on power looked shaky. Public outcry over manipulated results that showed another landslide victory against a credible opposition candidate, Svetlana Tikhanovskaya, prompted major demonstrations that threatened Lukashenko’s hold on power for months. Major repression by the security forces and support from Russia allowed him to regain control of the situation.
Is there any chance of a repeat of the 2020 results or unrest?
This election is going to look very different from the anger of five years ago. Belarus’ security services continue to repress the formal opposition. Parties have been banned and their leaders have been arrested or forced to flee the country. Attempts to protest the results will be met with arrests and force, most likely. The regime may hope that holding the election in January instead of August, as happened in 2020, might limit the appetite for demonstrations. As for the election itself, there is little mystery as to who will win. Lukashenko won’t have a serious challenger, instead facing candidates who are considered to be loyal opposition.
What matters with this vote?
Given his age and past statements suggesting he is concerned about his health, there will be at least some question as to whether Lukashenko might consider a succession plan during his new term. Lukashenko has talked about stepping aside before, only to stay firmly in charge. And it’s doubtful that a succession plan would truly lead to him giving up his control. Lukashenko’s control of the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly gives him a way to exert power if he decided he wanted to transfer the presidency to a loyalist.
How do outside powers view the election?
Russia will recognize the election results, allowing it to maintain its influence over Belarus. Lukashenko isn’t exactly liked in Moscow. His leadership has been considered erratic, and he has thumbed his nose at Moscow’s interests at times when it either helped him at home or when he tried (and failed) to cozy up to the West. But he has become even more dependent on Russian economic and military support since 2020, as Western governments imposed heavier sanctions and even restricted air travel from Belarus. Putin’s policies have treated Belarus much the same way he has approached Ukraine, seeing it as an integral part of Russia’s sphere of influence. Russia has used a bilateral “Union State” treaty from 1999 to boost its role in the country. If there were a crisis stemming from the election, Moscow could very well intervene to ensure that its control was intact.
How about the West?
The US and EU members, meanwhile, will not consider the election legitimate. But so far they aren’t saying all that much. Having already imposed a large number of sanctions against the economy and Belarusian leaders both before and after the 2020 crackdown, there is only so much they are able to do to affect Lukashenko’s control.
Edited by Jonathan House, Senior Editor of Eurasia Group.
Container ships in front of the port of Bremerhaven.
How scared should the world be of Trump’s economic threats?
On Wednesday, President Donald Trump used his social media platform to threatenVladimir Putin with “high levels of Taxes, Tariffs, and Sanctions on anything being sold by Russia to the United States” unless he struck a bargain over Ukraine.
There’s just one problem: Russia has very little trade with the US. Americans imported just $2.8 billion in goods from Russia from Jan. to Nov. 2024, less than a tenth of the pre-war figure and less than 1% of all US imports over the same time period. The extensive sanctions already in place have hardly brought Moscow to its knees, and arguably benefited US rivals like China, Iran, and North Korea. It’s tough talk, but it’s not likely to push Putin to the table.
China is a different story. Trade with the US added up to an average of $54 billion per month in 2024, and the 60% tariffs Trump threatened to put on China on the campaign trail would cause severe damage to both economies. That may be why Trump is backing off the high sticker number and said Tuesday he is considering imposing at 10% tariffs on Chinese goods as soon as Feb. 1.
Now, 10% is a number that Beijing feels is much more manageable. China is experiencing price deflation — a really damaging phenomenon with one silver lining in that it could mean US consumers wind up paying about the same prices even if Trump hikes tariffs. The central government is also promising funds to stabilize the stock market in the face of potential tariffs and prevent investors from seeking safer shelter for their cash.
The fears are more real in Europe, where Trump threatened to impose tariffs without specifying a rate on Tuesday. Growth in the region’s most important economies is already stagnating, and even small barriers to trade with their most important partner will have serious consequences. Further economic troubles could empower far-right movements across the continent, which may suit Trump just fine. We have our eye on Germany, which will hold elections in precisely one month.
And don’t forget Canada and Mexico, which are staring down the barrel of 25% tariffs that Trump threatened on Tuesday as well. It’s creating a decidedly tense atmosphere in North America, with Canadian Prime Minister (for now) Justin Trudeau promising retaliation, which Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum has hinted at as well.
The bottom line? You’re probably in for rising prices in the near future … unless everyone can come up with a reason for Trump to let them slide. We’re watching what Trump says when he speaks at the World Economic Forum in Davos on Thursday.