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Trump tariff is starting a US-China trade war
Ian Bremmer shares his insights on global politics this week on World In :60.
Are the US and China rushing into a trade war?
Absolutely. I mean, if the Americans are actually going to impose tariffs of over 100% on Chinese exports of goods, it's essentially a trade embargo. That is a decoupling, and it's an unmanaged decoupling of US-China direct trade. Still an awful lot of goods from China to get to the United States through third countries. It's not clear all those will be cut off as the US negotiates with a lot of those countries. So people in America will still be buying Chinese goods, but inflation's going to go up. There's no question. And this is going to end up hurting the Chinese even more than it hurts the United States.
With an in-person nuclear talk set for Saturday, how confident is Trump that he can rein in Iran's nuclear program?
Well, it's interesting. What Trump is saying is that Iran will not be allowed to have nuclear weapons. That's different from what Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been saying, which is that they cannot have a nuclear program of any sort. Trump wants to rein the program in. He did announce that there are going to be direct talks between the US and Iran. Iran didn't quite say that. They said they're having indirect talks, but if they go well, they'll lead to direct, which is certainly a concession to the Americans. And it's interesting that Trump did that while the Israeli prime minister was in the Oval Office visiting him. Bibi thought he was coming over for tariff relief, and what he got was Trump saying that Erdogan's his bestie, that the Israelis should be really thankful they get billions from the US, the tariffs aren't going anywhere, and that there's going to be negotiations with Iran. Really interesting. I think Bibi's got to be unhappy on his flight back to Israel.
Zelensky claims Ukrainian troops have captured two Chinese nationals fighting for Russia. How does it change the dynamics of the war?
Not at all. It does reflect the fact that Ukraine is under an awful lot of pressure and is trying to do anything they can to stay in the headlines, stay relevant, keep the Americans engaged and focused. I'm not surprised that there are two Chinese nationals fighting in Ukraine. Doesn't mean they were sent by the Chinese PLA. I mean, there are American nationals that have been fighting for the Ukrainians and it's not because they're sort of involved with NATO or sent by the US government. So I really don't think there's any there, but important enough for you to ask question. That's it for me. I'll talk to you all real soon.
Is Europe in trouble as the US pulls away?
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: I want to talk about the transatlantic relationship. The US relationship with Europe. Because of all of the geopolitics in the world, this is the one that I think has been impacted in a permanent and structural way in the first two months of the Trump administration. I wouldn't say that, for example, look at the Middle East and US relations with Israel, the Saudis, the Emiratis, the rest of the Gulf States, frankly, all very comfortable with Trump. If there's a significant change, I would say it's incrementally more engaged, and in terms of worldview than under the Biden administration. Japan, South Korea, Australia, India, you look at Asia relations and certainly Trump and the US on trade worrying them, making them sort of react in a more defensive posture. Seeing how much, how more quickly, they can get something to the US that will lead to trying to diffuse potential conflict there. But not radically different from the way they thought about the United States in 2017 in the first Trump term.
Mexico, Canada, Panama, here you've got countries that are facing very significant challenges from the United States, but also ultimately understand that they have no other options. Now, in Canada, that's a bigger fight because there are elections coming up at the end of April. But after those elections are over, I certainly expect that they will move quickly to try to ensure that ongoing relations are functional and stable. That's already true for the Mexican government with a president who has 85% approval, can do pretty much everything necessary to ensure that US-Mexico relations aren't dramatically impacted by everything Trump is demanding. So that's everywhere else.
But in Europe, that's just not the case. Three different reasons why the Europeans are facing a much more permanent impact. The first is on the trade side, like everybody else, and trade is well within the European Union's competency. They understand that they have leverage. If the Americans are going to hit them with significant tariffs, they're going to hit back with the same numbers. But that doesn't mean it's going to be relatively difficult and take a long time to resolve it, as opposed to places that are much weaker where they just fold quickly to the United States. Okay, fair enough. But still, that's not all that dramatically different from first term. Second point is there's a war going on in Ukraine, and the United States has made it very clear that they want to engage, to re-engage with Putin, who is Europe's principal enemy. And they're going to do that irrespective of how much the Europeans oppose it, and they're not going to take any European input in those conversations.
Trump would like a rapprochement with Russia to include a Ukrainian ceasefire. But if that doesn't happen, he is oriented towards blaming the Ukrainians for it, towards taking Kremlin talking points on Ukraine not really being a country, and then on moving to ensure that US-Russia relations are functional again. All of that is deeply concerning, is existentially concerning, particularly for a bunch of European countries that are on the front lines spending a lot more in defense, not because the Americans are telling them to, but because they're worried about Russia themselves, feel like they have to be more independent. Then finally, because Europe is the supranational political experiment that relies most on common values and rule of law, and the United States under Trump is undoing that component of the US-led order specifically.
I wouldn't necessarily say that about collective security or existing alliances and willingness to provide some sort of defense umbrella, but I would certainly say that in terms of rule of law and territorial integrity. And here, the fact that the United States no longer really cares about territorial integrity, is prepared to tell Denmark, "Hey, you're not a good ally. You're not defending Greenland. We're interested in moving forward ourselves, and we don't care how you've treated us historically. We're going to send our leaders and we're going to cut our own deal inside your territory." That's exactly the way the Germans felt when JD Vance said that he wanted to engage directly with the Alternatives für Deutschland, who the Germans consider to be a neo-Nazi party.
Everything that's core to the Europeans in their statehood and in the EU, the United States under Trump is on the other side of that, and it's increasingly conflictual. It's directly adversarial. And so I would say number one, the Europeans are aware of these problems. Number two, they're taking them late, but nonetheless finally very seriously. And so they understand that the Europeans are going to have to create an independent strategy for their own self-defense, for their national security, for their political stability, for their democracies, and they have to do that outside of the United States. In fact, they have to do that and defend themselves against the United States.
Now that reality doesn't mean they're going to be successful. And indeed, the more summits I see on Ukraine, frankly the less I have been convinced that the Europeans will be able to do enough, quick enough to really help Ukraine dramatically cut a better deal with the Russian Federation that is very uninterested in doing anything that is sustainable for the Ukrainians long term. It makes me worry that the EU longer term is not fit for purpose in an environment where the principle, the most powerful actors don't care about rule of law. The United States, China, and for Europe, Russia right on their borders. So for all of those reasons, I mean, the European markets have gone up recently. European growth expectations have gone up because the Germans and others are planning on spending a lot more, that's short-term. Long-term here. I worry that the Europeans are in an awful lot of trouble. So something we'll be focusing on very closely going forward over the coming weeks and months. I hope you all are well, and I'll talk to you all real soon.
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Putin-Trump Ukraine call is a small win for both sides
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: The Putin-Trump call, some 90 minutes long, now over. And I would call this a win for both sides, for the Americans and the Russians, and not horrible for Ukraine and Europe, but kicking the can on what's going to be some big problems down the road and setting out where those challenges are going to be. Why is that?
Well, first of all, Putin said, "No," to the 30-day complete ceasefire, but did give a win to Trump, having accepted a 30-day ceasefire with no conditions with the Ukrainians. The Russians are saying they're prepared to do that, with no gives, as long as it's about targeting energy infrastructure, and in principle, still some discussions around maritime attacks around the Black Sea. Places that frankly the Russians have been irritated with what Ukraine has been able to do with air drones and with sea drones. And also allows the Russians to continue to press for territorial gains over the course of the coming weeks, depleting Ukraine's military capabilities. Plus, the weather's getting warmer, how much damage are you going to do to Ukraine, how miserable you can make them when you're no longer dealing with the freeze is not quite as relevant. So, not a particular loss for the Russians.
The fact that you're going to have less engagement militarily means fewer people will get killed. That's good for everybody involved, frankly. So that's where we are. Did you need 90-minutes to get that going? Not really, because the Russians also want to ensure that they have lots of conversations with the Americans about building business between the two sides, about people-to-people engagement, about finding a way to ensure that there is an ongoing bilateral channel where the Europeans aren't involved, where the Ukrainians aren't involved, that's essential for Putin and that he got. So yes, you have a meaningful, relatively contained ceasefire that maybe you can build on, but you also have a meaningful bilateral channel for broader engagement between the Americans and the Russians that the Ukrainians and the Europeans aren't going to be a part of, and that the Americans have no interest in having the Ukrainians Europeans being a part of.
Now, what Trump has heard from Putin in terms of red lines is that to actually have a comprehensive ceasefire ongoing, that the Russians are demanding, that there is no further intelligence or military support to Ukraine from the United States or Europe. That's obviously a non-starter for the Ukrainians because it means they won't be able to defend themselves as the Russians rebuild. It's a non-starter for the Europeans for similar reasons. Trump might be willing to negotiate that, and if he is, then he and Putin can blame Ukraine and the Europeans for not being able to take a 30-day limited ceasefire and expand it, which is exactly the position that Putin wants to be in. So, Putin giving a little bit in the near-term with the hopes of getting a lot more in the longer-term, getting Trump as it were, a little bit pregnant around a deal so that he's more engaged with the Russians in areas that's going to be more consequential and more costly for Europe and for the Ukrainians.
So that's where we are. We don't know yet whether the Ukrainians are going to accept these limited 30-day terms. I expect they will, because Trump wants them to. And when that happens, the Europeans will be onboard, too. The intention will be to try to use that by the Ukrainians, the Europeans, to try to get a longer, broader ceasefire. But there, the working level conversations between the US and Russia, between the US and Ukraine, are going to be far more difficult and they're probably not going to hold.
It feels a little bit like what we have in Gaza. Relatively easy to get the first iteration of a deal in place where no one's really giving anything up, but as you go into the second phase, you find that the fundamental interests don't actually overlap, and that's why we're fighting again on the ground in Gaza, with the Israelis killing hundreds of people there in the last 24-hours, and it's why I expect ultimately we are not heading towards peace, even though we do get a temporary ceasefire with Ukraine.
Trump demands Putin sign ceasefire
Trump has no cards. #PUPPETREGIME
Watch more of GZERO's award-winning PUPPET REGIME series!
What will Trump offer Putin in Ukraine ceasefire talks?
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: A Quick Take to kick off your week. Tomorrow is the call between President Trump and President Putin. The most important geopolitical discussion I would argue that we have seen so far of the Trump administration. Look, what we've had so far has been a move towards a ceasefire. Trump beating up on the Ukrainians, on President Zelensky in particular, which is comparatively easy to do. They are in a much weaker position. That's particularly easy to do if you don't feel like you need to be in lockstep with NATO allies, with the Europeans, with the Canadians. And as a consequence, Trump, off-again and now on-again relationship with the Ukrainian president, has now gotten Ukraine to agree to a one-month ceasefire with no preconditions. And that's definitely progress. And the Europeans are all on board and supportive of that.
That is closer to a ceasefire than Biden certainly ever got the Ukrainians. And though I would argue, it has certainly caused a lot of concern among US allies of whether or not the Americans can be counted on long-term. In the near term, it makes it easier and more likely to get to an end of the war than we were a month ago. And frankly, I think we would've been better off if Biden had been more willing to push Zelensky and push the European allies, and show that American power recognized that Ukraine was weakening in their position, vis-a-vis Russia and that the war was only leading to more expense and more lives being lost on both sides. And so, pushing for a shorter-term ceasefire was an important thing to do.
They weren't willing to expend much political capital. They certainly weren't willing to upset people, and as a consequence, we didn't get there. That's the good news is that we now have Zelensky in a position with everybody on board on the Western side, that a ceasefire should be agreed to, and nothing else needs to be discussed. That, of course, is not the Putin position. And now a much harder point, a much more challenging point, and open to question, is to what degree is Trump when push comes to shove, prepared to hurt Putin. Because of the earlier call that the two men had, 90 minutes long, and then the follow-up conversation in Riyadh between the cabinet members of both countries, that was easy.
That was, "Hey, Biden wouldn't talk to you. I'm willing to talk to you. Let's talk broadly about things we might be able to do together. We can talk about investment. We can talk about strategy. We can talk about the Arctic. We can talk about arms control. And yes, we can talk about Ukraine." And nothing was being forced for the Russians to agree with. This was all upside, especially because it was just a bilateral conversation. The Ukrainians weren't involved. The Europeans were involved. It's exactly the format that Putin wants to support. But now we have the Ukrainians saying they'll support a one-month ceasefire with no preconditions. What about Russia?
Because if Russia comes out of this phone call with Trump and says, "That's it, there's no pathway. I refuse to accept what you're putting forward." Well, then either Trump looks really weak for having gotten the Ukrainians to the table but not the Russians' table, isn't prepared to do anything about it. Or he has to actually follow through with some level of strikes, sanctions, economic strikes against Putin and further support to Ukraine, which is not, of course, at all where Trump wants to be. That will escalate the fighting. It won't lead the fighting to an end. So, what really matters here is how much is Trump prepared to offer to Putin when he drives a harder bargain than Zelensky was driving. And how much is Trump prepared to give away?
And I mean, from Putin's perspective, he wants to test that proposition. Ideally, for Putin, Putin gets enough that Trump says yes, and that Ukraine says no and ruins the conversation, and Ukraine is blamed for not wanting peace. And then the Americans and the Russians can go forth and build their own broader engagement, bilaterally over the heads of the Europeans, and the Ukrainians are the problem and the Europeans are stuffed. That is Putin's ideal outcome, but it's not clear he can get to that ideal outcome. Because if he pushes Trump too hard and it blows up, then suddenly he's angry, he's embarrassed. And he's also much more powerful than the Russians, and he's willing to talk to the Europeans in that environment. It's exactly what the Russians don't want.
If you're Putin, you push, but you also don't want this conversation to blow up. So, you want to see how much you get for Trump, but you also want to get to yes. And so, really, the question is not how much Putin ends up giving up. It's really about whether or not Trump makes it easy on Putin. And there are lots of reasons to believe that he will. So far, he has been willing proactively to say that Ukraine should never join NATO. Well, that wasn't a part of the one-month ceasefire that the Ukrainians agreed to, but it might be a requirement for Putin. Trump throws that out. Does that then blow up the Ukrainian conversation?
Trump has also said that Ukraine's not going to get all of their land, but he hasn't made that a condition of the one-month ceasefire. Does Putin require that? Does Trump say yes? It's a fairly easy give for Trump, except it's not been coordinated with the Ukrainians. Are the Ukrainians prepared to accept that? By the way, that would be the minimum table stakes that I think Putin would demand since Trump has effectively already given them away. Now, he could go much harder than that. He's also talked about wanting formal recognition over some of the territories that Russia presently occupies.
Might the United States directly be willing to recognize that territory? Ukraine wouldn't have to, but the United States would. I think that's a bad idea in a first-phase agreement, where the Russians can come right back and start fighting at the end of 30 days. But it's possible that Trump would be willing to give it away. Putin has said that he refuses to allow a 30-day ceasefire to be an opportunity for the Ukrainians to reconsolidate their military, which is facing pretty much a lot of hardship right now. They don't have as much artillery, they don't have as much ammunition, and they've also been bleeding recruits.
Is Trump willing to say, "Okay, for 30 days, I'm going to re-suspend aid to the Ukrainians?" I could see him doing that. But I can't see Trump saying that the Europeans are going to re-suspend aid to Ukraine over those 30 days. And certainly, I don't see the Europeans agreeing to that by themselves. And well, would Russia agree to a deal that doesn't have the Europeans in that environment? Might the Americans re-suspend intelligence aid to Ukraine over those 30 days? In principle, maybe you don't need that. If there's no fighting going on, maybe the intelligence isn't such a problem. So, that could be an easier give for Trump to offer that Zelensky wouldn't have a problem with.
And then there are broader issues of, for example, the Americans withdrawing forward troop deployments that are presently rotating in the Baltic states. For example, something that would make it feel that the United States is no longer as much of a threat with NATO to Russia, a give to the Russians. Finally, you could imagine the United States being willing to take some sanctions off. This is undermining the common position with the Europeans but is less of a direct problem for Zelensky than saying you don't get NATO or saying that you're not going to get to keep your land as a codified piece of a deal with the Russians.
My view is that the 30-day period, Trump should maintain a fairly hard line because he's maintained a hard line with the Ukrainians and it's been effective. And the US is ultimately in a stronger position than the Russians are. But Trump has also made it clear that he really, really, really wants to get to yes, and that a lot of these things don't matter very much for him. So, he's essentially put Putin in a stronger position than he really is. And this is why it's so interesting that Trump always likes to use these analogies with the cards. He said, "The Ukrainians don't have the cards, and the Russians don't really have the cards." And yet, as someone who plays poker, we all know that frequently people that don't have cards win.
And the reason they win is because they play better than you do. And so, what we're going to see tomorrow is the degree to which Putin, who doesn't have the cards that Trump has, is nonetheless a more effective poker player. And I am concerned, at least somewhat concerned, that Putin's poker skills are actually better, more effective than Trump's are. Even though if both sides were to actually have to show their cards right now, we'd see that the Americans would win quite easily. And the Americans with the Europeans would win overwhelmingly, and yet that's not the way these hands are being played right now.
So, anyway, we'll see where it goes tomorrow. I'm sure I'll give you a quick response after we get that news. But that's where I think we are. I suspect Putin's going to come out of this happier than he should have any right to be and that the Americans will give away more than they should. But hopefully, not by a dramatic margin and that that will make it more likely that we still get to this one-month ceasefire. But we'll see tomorrow, and I'll talk about it then. Be good.
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US-Canada trade war helps Mark Carney's election prospects
With recent tensions between Zelensky and Washington, how likely are the Saudi-hosted peace talks to yield real progress?
Well, we'll find out real soon. Zelensky has certainly made his efforts to make nice on the critical minerals deal, on apologizing to the Trump White House for a meeting that frankly he has very little to apologize for, and that certainly has helped with getting this engagement going. Also, he's not attending personally, rather, his key envoys and advisors meeting with Secretary of State Rubio and National Security Adviser Waltz. I suspect that the meetings will end up being just fine, but they are unlikely to lead to a ceasefire because what the Ukrainians are prepared to accept, the Russians are not close to accepting. So either Trump is going to have to be willing to take some time, bring it to the Russians and see that the Russians are not playing full ball, or he's going to have to throw the Ukrainians under the bus more and make greater demands that they're not prepared to accept. I don't think either of those things are likely to happen today, but that's I think, the direction of travel.
Are we on the cusp of a nuclear proliferation era as Poland and Germany talk of acquiring nuclear weapons?
Germany's talking more about sharing in the nuclear umbrella with France. Poland's talking about getting its own. These things are all harder. They will take longer than these countries have. It's not like France's nuclear umbrella is deep or easily extendable. In order to have anyone believe credibly that a French deterrent would apply to other countries, a lot of things have to happen in terms of coordination and infrastructure and building up those capabilities that will take frankly years. So, I think it's important that these conversations are happening. I think that many countries around the world are moving towards establishing their own nuclear capabilities in, around, the Middle East. I can certainly see over time as Iran gets closer, the Saudis thinking about it, the Turks thinking about it, in Asia, South Korea and Japan. In Europe, a number of countries needing to have collective security because they don't feel like the Americans can provide for them. But I don't think those things are happening overnight. The global order is changing. It is really past the tipping point, but these things are slow moving processes.
Does Justin Trudeau's replacement, Mark Carney, have a shot of winning Canada's general election?
Certainly does, and three months ago would've had no shot at all. There's been an extraordinary bounce back for the Liberal Party, in part because they're now represented by someone that is not an incumbent. Think about what would've happened in the US if it hadn't been Biden or Kamala Harris, but had been an outsider after general primary, better shot of winning. That's exactly what the Canadians have now done. Trudeau forced down, Chrystia Freeland, his deputy prime minister, getting 8% in the Liberal caucus vote, and Carney getting almost 86%. So he's a centrist. He's in much better position to give a serious run against Pierre Poilievre of the Conservatives. The big question is how is Trump going to respond? Because on the one hand, it's very easy for Trump to now say, "Trudeau's gone because of me, and I'm now willing to work with somebody who is more reasonable," and the markets would certainly appreciate that. On the other hand, short of him doing that, and I think it's unlikely that he's going to reach out and extend a hand to the Canadians, then Trump beating on Canada more gives Carney a better shot of winning because he's the guy that can manage an economic crisis and also because the Canadians are so united in their anger with the United States, kind of like Mexico is right now, kind of like a number of European countries are right now. So Trump is definitely a uniter, just not inside the US, more inside other countries.
If Trump's foreign policy pushes allies away, can the US go it alone?
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: A Quick Take to kick off your week. Marco Rubio heading to Saudi Arabia to talk with the Ukrainians. That's clearly the most important of a lot of moving parts geopolitically in the world right now. I say that because so much of what the Americans decide to do and not do with the Ukrainians is going to have massive impact on the transatlantic relationship, on NATO, on US-Europe relations, and on the nature of what has been the most important collective security arrangement in the world and is now experiencing crisis. It's very clear that the Ukrainians, as Trump says, lack the cards. And so the outcome is going to be determined largely by countries outside of Ukraine, not just the willingness and the capacity of the Ukrainians themselves to continue to fight. The United States, on the one hand, is pushing the Europeans to do a lot more. A lot more in terms of providing economic support, providing military support, and having a security backstop for a post-ceasefire environment that the Americans are not prepared to participate in.
Now, if all of that happens, and of course that's a big if, but certainly the Europeans are moving in that direction, then the interesting point is the Americans aren't going to determine the outcome. In the sense that the ultimate ceasefire terms will be driven not by the United States, who's basically saying, "We're washing our hands of it." But instead by the Europeans and the Ukrainians, in concert with Russia. And first of all, that's analogous to what's been happening in the Middle East. Everybody remembers that Trump said, "We're going to own Gaza and all the Palestinians are going to leave," and of course, that's not where we're heading. And the eventual outcome will be determined overwhelmingly by the countries that are prepared to spend the actual money and provide the security and figure out the politics. And that means the Arab States, that means Egypt and Jordan, it means Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and it means the potential for blocking by Israel.
That's the environment that we are increasingly going to be seeing on the ground in Ukraine. That the Europeans are going to be doing the driving. The Ukrainians are going to have to align with that and the blocking potentially by Russia. The big difference, of course, is that in the case of Ukraine, the United States is also very interested in doing a deal with Russia over the head of the Ukrainians and the Europeans. There's no equivalent in the Middle East at all. And here, the reason it's so important is because the ability of the Ukrainians to continue to engage in their willingness with the US and Europe together will determine in large part whether a deal between the US and Russia involves a ceasefire with Ukraine or doesn't. If Trump can say, "Hey, the reason we didn't get a deal and the reason they're still fighting is because Ukraine refuses to be a part of it," then a deal with Russia is actually much easier to get to by Trump. Because it involves just re-engagement diplomatically, investment by the US and Russia, joint projects, reopening of arms control conversations, and doesn't involve a Ukraine ceasefire.
Trump has said, "Not only does Ukraine not have cards, but Russia doesn't have cards." Of course, the reality is that if the Russians are willing to do the fighting for a longer period of time, and the Americans don't care and the Europeans can't stand up, then the Russians are the ones with the cards. That is where we are heading. And if the Americans are prepared to do a deal with the Russians irrespective of what happens on the ground in Ukraine, and that is being tested very much over the coming days, that's perhaps the most important outcome of what we see from the US-Ukrainian talks in Saudi Arabia, then the transatlantic relationship is in a lot more trouble than it is right now.
So I think those are the pieces that we're talking about here. It is very clear that the Americans see alliances and see allies as expendable, that it's not that important for the Americans to treat allies with respect. If they're smaller, if they're less powerful, you can do whatever you want. And we saw that with Elon Musk beating up on Poland and the Foreign Minister, Radek Sikorski, someone I've been actually friends with for a very long time, and I think that's not a smart way to conduct business. Poland's been a steadfast ally, they're spending upwards of 4% of their GDP on defense, heading towards 5% going forward. They've housed millions of Ukrainian refugees. They've done far more on the ground in Ukraine per capita than the Americans have on pretty much every front. And also, by the way, there are a lot of Polish Americans that vote, and some of them vote Republican. Far more important than the Ukrainian vote, for example, and that seems to matter too, but maybe not to Elon.
I think that these sorts of insults are unnecessary, and they damage American allies. But I think the Trump administration's perspective is as long as the US is the most powerful country in the world, that America alone is stronger than America with friends, and it's probably the area of greatest geopolitical disagreement that I have with this administration. But we will see how it plays out. I certainly agree that there will be a lot of wins that we will continue to see, because less powerful countries do not want to get into a big fight with the United States. But long-term, I think this is going to play out badly. And I particularly think that's true in the transatlantic relationship where permanent damage is being done irrespective of what happens after Trump. Anyway, a lot to talk about, a lot of moving pieces. We'll talk real soon, and that's it from me.
Is the US-Europe alliance permanently damaged?
Carl Bildt, former prime minister of Sweden and co-chair of the European Council on Foreign Relations, shares his perspective on European politics from Stockholm, Sweden.
Is the transatlantic relationship permanently damaged by what we have seen during the last 10 days or so?
Well, there is no question that the last 10 days or so have been the worst by far for the transatlantic relationship in, well, modern recorded history. You can go through all of the details if you want. It started with the shameful vote in the UN General Assembly on the same day that was three years after the war of aggression that Russia started, where the United States turned around, lined up with Russia, and with primarily a bunch of countries that you would not normally like to be seen in the company of, in order to try to defeat the Europeans, and defeat the Ukrainians, and defeat the Japanese, and defeat the Australians, defeat all of the friends who have criticized the Russians.
It was truly shameful. It was defeated, needless to say, but it left deep marks there. And then it was downhill from there, with that particular week ending with the ambush in the Oval Office, with all of the details associated with that, with sort of a childish dispute about dress codes, and respect for whatever, and total disregard for the important issues that are at stake at the moment. And to that was added, the vice president seriously insulting the allies, primarily the British and the French, and then cutting of aid to Ukraine, including intelligence cooperation, which is unheard of, unheard of when it comes to these particular issues.
So, is damage permanent? Well, one would hope that... well, hope springs eternal, that there would be a way back. But this will be remembered for a long time to come. And the reaction in Europe, well, you have to keep a straight face if you are a political leader. And they do, they hope for the best, but they're increasingly preparing for the worst. What we might be heading into is Mr. Trump, President Trump lining up with President Putin in a deal that is essentially on Russia's term over Ukraine, then trying to force Ukraine into that particular deal, a repetition of Munich 1938.
Will that work? I think it's unlikely to work because the Ukrainians are determined to stand up for their country. And they have the support of the Europeans. Czechoslovakia in 1938 didn't have much support. So, whether it will work or not is debatable, but that is the direction in which things are heading at the moment. Can this be stopped or can the trajectory of things be changed? Let's hope. There's a flurry of meetings in Europe. There will be a lot of contacts across the Atlantic. There is a strong support for Ukraine in Europe, but then deep apprehensions of where we are heading. Further four years with President Trump. After that, (possibly) four to eight years with JD Vance. Well, well, there's a lot of thinking that needs to be done on this side of the Atlantic.