Trending Now
We have updated our Privacy Policy and Terms of Use for Eurasia Group and its affiliates, including GZERO Media, to clarify the types of data we collect, how we collect it, how we use data and with whom we share data. By using our website you consent to our Terms and Conditions and Privacy Policy, including the transfer of your personal data to the United States from your country of residence, and our use of cookies described in our Cookie Policy.
{{ subpage.title }}
Putin bombs Ukraine
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: Hi everybody. Ian Bremmer here. A happy Monday to you. A Quick Take, again, turning to the war in Russia. Lots going on, almost all of it escalatory at this point. Most recent state of play, a spectacular attack by the Ukrainians on the Kerch Bridge, the Crimea bridge that was said by Putin to be impregnable, can't possibly be able to attack it. It was providing a lot of supply chain, military supply chain from Russia sourcing capabilities material into Crimea and the rest of Ukraine, and suddenly significantly disrupted by a Ukrainian truck bomb.
That led Putin to respond in the early hours today, rush hour in Ukraine. Indiscriminate attacks against all of Ukraine's major cities. Nearly 100 bombs, civilian targets, killing lots of Ukrainians. An act of state terrorism on the part of Russia. On the one hand, absolutely horrifying that the Ukrainians are living through the kind of attacks in recent years that we've only seen in Aleppo in Syria, in Grozny, by the Russians in early post-Soviet days, and now seeing it across Ukraine.
War crimes, yet again. Acting with impunity in terms of Russia's complete indifference to how the rest of the world sees him and reacts to him. Having said all of that, part of the reason why we're seeing state terrorism from Putin is because he does not have conventional capabilities to respond to the Ukrainian counter offensive, which continues to eat up territory, Ukrainian territory, that they are retaking from the Russian occupation, significantly in Kherson which is north of Crimea, but if the Ukrainians are able to take it, that would disrupt yet another key supply chain of Russia to Crimea.
Then finally, Zaporizhzhia, which is the land bridge between Russian and Crimea, you get all three and the Russians can mobilize all they want. They can't get troops to Crimea. They can't get troops to the South. This war continues to go badly for the Russians. The Russians continue to try to make the Ukrainians pay. The Ukrainians, of course, have extraordinary support from all of NATO. That continues. Russia's willingness to take these acts against the Ukrainians is only going to harden the resolve of NATO countries to continue to provide direct military support to Ukraine, and even to increase the levels of, say, air defense, missiles, and the like to defend themselves and also to be able to counterattack.
The next few months we are looking primarily at Ukrainian counteroffensives to take as much territory from the February 24th lines as they can. The Russians trying to get their troops in as quickly as they can to hold some of that territory. That's basically what's playing out. Beyond that, the big question is whether or not the Russians are going to take asymmetric attacks against NATO. If you watch this conflict played out from Russian state media and how Putin is portraying it to his people, it's that they are losing territory and they admit to losing territory. They're losing the bridge. They admit to losing the bridge, at least for a brief period of time, because of attacks from NATO. This isn't just Ukraine, it's all the intelligence. It's all the ordinance. It's all the money. It's all the training. They're fighting against NATO.
Well, are they going to do anything against NATO? So far what they've been doing is only against Ukraine. And the ability of the Russians to engage in asymmetric attacks against fiber attacks, cyberattacks, pipeline attacks, critical infrastructure attacks, things that the Europeans need to be able to function as normal economies, and yet well short of weapons of mass destruction on the ground in Ukraine. If the Russians were to take steps like that, how might NATO respond? That is, I think, a big question that the European leaders are asking themselves and we don't have a clear answer for. I do expect that over time, especially as it is clear that Russia's economic stranglehold on energy for the Europeans is increasingly not going to make a difference in terms of NATO response, that Putin has to think about what else he can do.
Suing for peace does not appear to be in his playbook at this point. The other thing I would say is watch carefully the Chinese, the Indians, other countries that have been more supportive or at least more willing to be on the sidelines for Putin, increasingly are being outspoken and saying they want an immediate ceasefire. They want the Russians to stop this war. Putin has been ignoring them thus far. Will he continue to, and will those countries be willing to make Russia pay any cost themself? So far they have not. That may change.
One disturbing side, we have coming up very soon in the General Assembly, a global vote that will be taken about condemning the Russian annexations of the four Ukrainian territories. That will easily pass, but it looks like the number of positive votes are going to be around 100, 110. In other words, very large numbers of abstentions from the majority of the developing world. That continues to be the story here. That because Ukraine is being treated so differently as a conflict by the West than other invasions, illegal invasions in other parts of the world, where the West would normally say, "We want a ceasefire and then we'll see what we do."
Here, the West isn't calling for a ceasefire. The West is saying it's an illegal invasion, and so the Ukrainians need to be supported to take their land back. That hypocrisy, certainly that level of lack of alignment in the way the West treats Ukraine compared to other parts of the world, is leading the developing world to say we want very little part of this crisis. To the extent that Putin is increasingly seen as a war criminal globally, is involved in terrorist activities that other states would not be allowed to get away with, that of course is going to increase pressure on the developing world to get on-side publicly on this issue. Puts more pressure on Putin, too.
That's state of play right now. I still am someone who thinks that nuclear weapons, of course, are something to be worried about because Russia has lots of them and because they're in a tough position, but the likelihood of being used or being used soon in my view is still very, very low indeed. Higher than at any point since 1962. The Cuban Missile Crisis. I wasn't around for that. I don't want to be around for this, but let's hope we can avoid it.
For more of Ian Bremmer's weekly analyses, subscribe to his GZERO World newsletter at ianbremmer.bulletin.comThe tide is turning in Russia’s war against Ukraine
For the past 100 days, the narrative in the West on the Russia-Ukraine war has been remarkably consistent. Against all odds, vastly outnumbered and outgunned Ukrainians have time and again humiliated the Russian forces, supported by a relentlessly united Western front doing more and more each day to help Ukraine win the war.
As the conflict goes on, however, that will no longer be the dominant story. Increasingly, the narrative will be punctured by more frequent Russian military wins and Ukrainian losses, with cracks emerging in Ukraine’s information war and with American and European support for Ukraine getting close to peaking.
This narrative shift won’t happen immediately or suddenly. There’s still momentum behind Ukraine’s counteroffensives in Kharkiv and Kherson, Kyiv is still winning the information war (though not in the developing world), and much of the West is still committed to helping it defeat Russia.
Want to understand the world a little better? Subscribe to GZERO Daily by Ian Bremmer for free and get new posts delivered to your inbox every week.
But we’re already seeing the military tide turn a bit, with Russian forces slowly but steadily gaining territory in the Donbas, taking about a kilometer of land every day. On Tuesday, they seized most of Severodonetsk and made headway toward Lysychansk, two of the last remaining Ukrainian strongholds in the Luhansk region. They are also gaining territory in Donetsk, threatening the cities of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. So in addition to having won the battle for Mariupol and secured a land bridge to Crimea, Russia is now getting close to capturing much of the Donbas—its stated aim for the “second phase” of the war.
View of Severodonetsk from damaged building in the outskirts of the frontline city.Rick Mave/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images
As Russians continue to make gains in the Donbas, the Ukrainians will find it harder to win the information war as overwhelmingly as they have thus far. We’re going to see more negative stories like the one published in the Washington Post on May 29, the first since the war started to shine a light on Ukraine’s military losses and attrition problems.
Moreover, as neither side is able to eke out a decisive victory and war fatigue sets in, the limits of the West’s support for Ukraine will start to show.
The latest move from Europe came late Monday, when European Union leaders agreed on a sixth round of sanctions effectively banning most Russian oil imports. In a compromise reached after weeks of wrangling with Hungary’s Viktor Orbán—Russian President Vladimir Putin’s best friend in Europe—the embargo blocks oil delivered by sea but temporarily (albeit indefinitely) exempts imports via pipeline, which make up one-third of all imports. Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic, which are highly dependent on piped Russian oil, will be excluded from the ban.
Hungary's Prime Minister Viktor Orban shakes hands with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Yuri Kadobnov/AFP via Getty Images
The partial embargo, which is expected to be finalized this week, comprises two-thirds of all the oil Europe gets from Russia. Add to that Germany and Poland’s pledge to voluntarily wind down their piped oil imports by the end of 2022, and 90% of Russian crude exports to Europe will be effectively cut off. That’s a big deal for a nation that has been described as “a gas station masquerading as a country,” depriving the Russian war machine of billions of dollars every year.
Some of that revenue they’ll make up on the back of higher oil prices, with Brent crude rising to over $120 per barrel following the embargo announcement. And some of that oil they’ll be able to sell at a discount to other countries around the world, especially China and India. But some of it they won’t be able to offload at all, because the EU and the United Kingdom are also set to prohibit European underwriters from insuring Russian oil shipments to third countries. Given that most of the world’s oil trade is insured by European companies, the measure will make it hard for Russia to redirect oil to Asia and other non-aligned markets.
As they reach the top rungs of the sanctions ladder, though, European leaders will find it increasingly hard to keep their steady escalation going to include a ban on piped oil imports, a gas embargo, and secondary sanctions—especially after having agreed to water down the oil ban at the behest of Orbán. These measures would inflict considerable economic pain on their citizens and risk political backlash, therefore requiring more resolve than European leaders have displayed so far.
Meanwhile, the Americans continue to send billions of dollars’ worth of aid and advanced weaponry to Ukraine, but the Ukrainians want more, most recently pleading for long-range advanced multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) they say they desperately need in order to counter Russia’s long-range firepower and challenge its artillery dominance in the Donbas. The White House wants to do everything it can to help Ukraine win, but not at the expense of risking a direct confrontation with Russia. While President Biden confirmed the US will supply medium-range rockets, he ruled out sending long-range rocket systems “that can strike into Russia” and expand the war.
Western leaders won’t tolerate unlimited pain and risk to support Ukraine. The longer the war continues and Russia hangs on, the more likely it is those limits will be exposed—especially as the U.S. gets closer to midterm elections and winter threatens European homes with soaring energy costs.
Debates will shift from how to best help Ukraine win to whether Ukraine can actually win and what their endgame should be. The allies will become increasingly split over whether to keep ramping up their support of Ukraine’s quest for total victory, and calls to end the conflict and normalize relations with Russia will become more common. Wavering Western backing will in turn further embolden Russia and hurt Ukraine’s chances.
To be clear, the Ukrainian government is still standing—that’s not about to change, and it’s a reality that flies in the face of Putin’s war goals. But the Russian military is unlikely to melt away anytime soon, and increasing Western support is contingent on what happens on the battlefield and at home. That makes a drawn-out (and not particularly stable) stalemate all the more likely.
🔔 And if you haven't already, don't forget to subscribe to my free newsletter, GZERO Daily by Ian Bremmer, to get new posts delivered to your inbox.
Your Russia-Ukraine questions, answered (part 4)
You asked, I answer.
Note: This is the last installment of a four-part series responding to reader questions on Russia-Ukraine. You can find the first part here, the second part here, and the third part here. Some of the questions that follow have been slightly edited for clarity. If you have questions you want answered, ask them in the comments section below or follow me on Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn and look out for future AMAs.
Want to understand the world a little better? Subscribe to GZERO Daily by Ian Bremmer for free and get new posts delivered to your inbox every week.
Did Putin miscalculate, or is what's happening all part of a plan? (Arno V)
He massively miscalculated. He was convinced his army could take Kyiv and remove President Zelensky within at most a couple of weeks. He did not think the Ukrainians would put up a fight. And he certainly didn’t imagine the West would respond so strongly and cohesively. Accordingly, the war has turned out to be a disaster on most every front. There’s no conceivable scenario in which Putin—and Russia—comes out of this war stronger than before he decided to invade Ukraine.
What impact does this war have on Russia’s ability to project force and control its near abroad? (Alexandre M)
It depends on how the war goes. What we can say for sure is that at a minimum, Russia now has a very serious enemy in Ukraine, a country that even 15 years ago was well-disposed toward Russia. Combined with the substantial loss of military capabilities (equipment and personnel) Russia has suffered thus far, which will take a minimum of 5 years to rebuild, that creates a big (and entirely self-inflicted) security problem in its own backyard.
Does a weaker and poorer Russia strengthen Putin's grip on power? (Hugo A)
Not necessarily. Deep economic and identity crises of the kind Russia is about to experience can either strengthen or weaken the tyrant in power. The key question is whether Putin is perceived by his people as weak. That’s the worst thing that can happen to an authoritarian leader like him. And it’s one reason why declaring a domestically credible victory in Ukraine is essential for his political survival. It’s also why he insists he’s fighting NATO rather than the much weaker Ukraine, which he should have beaten swiftly. So far, that narrative has been promoted by Russian media and is largely believed by the Russian people.
Aside from a Russian attack that triggers Article 5, do you see any other scenarios where the U.S. or NATO draw a “red line” and commit troops? (Ben H)
The only conceivable scenario is if Putin goes “scorched earth” and uses chemical weapons or tactical nukes. But even then, it’s a tough call and on balance I’d say still unlikely. The fact is that the U.S. and NATO (rightly) have no appetite for a hot war with the Russians unless their vital interests are directly attacked.
Can the West sell seized Russian assets to fund aid to Ukraine? (John H)
It can and it very likely will. Just last week, President Biden asked Congress to pass a legislative package authorizing the government to liquidate assets seized from sanctioned Russian oligarchs (though not the frozen Russian Central Banks reserves) and use the proceeds to pay for the defense and rebuilding of Ukraine. The House passed the bill in a symbolic vote with overwhelming bipartisan support, so it should get through Congress sooner than later. And it’s not just the U.S.— the EU is also considering a similar measure.
If Russia manages to win in the Donbas region and ceases hostilities claiming that the “special military operation” has been a success, what happens next? Do you see the Kyiv government ever accepting Russia's claim on further territory in Donbas (beyond Crimea)? (Peter W)
I don’t see that, no. Zelensky will remain unwilling to cede anything to Putin as long as he sees prospects for improving Ukraine’s position through military means, while Putin will only settle for major territorial concessions in addition to Ukrainian neutrality. Which means that there won’t be a diplomatic solution or a negotiated ceasefire. The fighting will continue for the foreseeable future, most fiercely in southern and eastern Ukraine, and the Ukrainians will launch counteroffensives on places like Kherson city and Kharkiv oblast. Western sanctions will ratchet up and Moscow will retaliate. The conflict will settle into an unstable stalemate with no prospect of a climbdown.
Does India’s stance on the war change its standing in the West? (Sandeep K)
Not really. Yes, India’s ongoing ties with Moscow highlight the limits of its strategic alignment with the West and make clear that the relationship is transactional rather than ideological or values-based. Their common interests on the issue of China are more important for both sides and trumps any other disagreements they have, though. Plus, the West doesn’t have much of a leg to stand on when Europe continues to fund Putin’s war to the tune of $1 billion per day in energy imports.
What lessons has China learned from the Russian invasion of Ukraine and how will this impact China's strategic approach to taking over Taiwan? (Andrew S)
The Chinese have learned that the West is perfectly capable of responding to threats strongly and together, including by weaponizing interdependence—even to come to the defense of a country (Ukraine) that isn’t a treaty ally. This will make China (far more economically integrated with the West than Russia) think twice about the potential consequences of making a move on Taiwan, which unlike Ukraine is a vital U.S. national security interest. I’d expect Beijing to take a much more cautious approach, especially after witnessing how unprepared for large-scale war a military that hasn’t faced significant combat in decades (Russia’s) can be—something that Chinese leaders must be worrying about themselves.
What long-term effect do you think this war will have on our “pivot to Asia”? (Danielle M)
In the long term it should help, as a weaker Russia and stronger Europe will allow the U.S. to shift more attention and resources toward the Indo-Pacific theater. But the U.S. is (understandably) very focused on Russia/Europe right now, and it will be for the foreseeable future. We want to get out, but they keep dragging us back in... Sure enough, the U.S. has the capabilities to walk and chew gum at the same time. Although the US hasn’t been great at multitasking in recent decades, so there’s no question that Ukraine makes the pivot more challenging in the short run. But the bigger concern about the pivot to Asia isn’t the Ukraine war, it’s American political dysfunction at home.
How does the war affect global food availability? (Jason G)
When the world’s largest wheat exporter (Russia) invades the 5th largest (Ukraine), global food availability is bound to get strained. The world’s poorest—especially in low- and middle-income countries—are already experiencing shortages of staples and rising food inflation, driven not just by reduced exports of grains and vegetable oil from the Black Sea region but also by increased energy and fertilizer prices as well as adverse shipping conditions. The shock is especially pronounced because it comes 2 years into a pandemic that had already taken food prices to record highs, at a time when climate change is already having an impact on yields and productive capacity. Countries in the Middle East, North Africa, and the Levant are most at risk of increased food insecurity.
🔔 And if you haven't already, don't forget to subscribe to my free newsletter, GZERO Daily by Ian Bremmer, to get new posts delivered to your inbox.
Your Russia-Ukraine questions, answered (part 2)
You asked, I answer.
Note: This is the second installment of a four-part series responding to reader questions on Russia-Ukraine. You can find the first part here, the third part here, and the fourth part here. Some of the questions that follow have been slightly edited for clarity. If you have questions you want answered, ask them in the comments section below or follow me on Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn and look out for future AMAs.
Could the West have actually prevented the war? (Christopher M)
I don’t usually traffic in speculative history, but if you made me bet I’d say no. Nothing the West did or didn’t do forced Putin to start this war. If Russian leaders didn’t want their eastern European neighbors to yearn for NATO and EU membership, maybe they should have refrained from treating them as vassal provinces that would one day be reincorporated into Greater Russia, by force if necessary. That said, I’ve written at length about what the West could have done differently after the end of the Cold War to more firmly embed Russia in international institutions and give it a stake in the stability of the global order. Certainly, greater efforts by both NATO and Ukraine to make clear to Russia that Ukraine wouldn’t join NATO anytime soon were worth more of a shot in recent years. The problem is the sides weren’t aligned—Ukraine didn’t accept that an invasion was likely and wanted the West to say they were pulling the rug from membership, which the West refused to do as they didn’t want to be seen as kowtowing to Moscow and undermining NATO’s “open door policy.”
Want to understand the world a little better? Subscribe to GZERO Daily by Ian Bremmer for free and get new posts delivered to your inbox every week.
Besides fear of Russian protestation, are there other reasons Ukraine hasn't "qualified" for NATO membership? (Jason M)
The fact that part of its territory has been under Russian occupation since 2014 made NATO accession a non-starter, since it would have entailed immediate and automatic direct conflict between NATO and nuclear-armed Russia. Beyond that, there are certain political, technical, and institutional criteria related to the strength of democratic institutions and control of corruption that Ukraine didn’t fully meet and that acted as limiting factors for some NATO allies (the vote to accept a new member has to be unanimous). After all, Ukraine isn’t Sweden.
Should the US and its allies make explicit the conditions for a reduction in sanctions in order to encourage a peace deal? Do domestic politics, which benefit from resolute punishment of an enemy, preclude this wise policy in practice? (Silent Cal)
That’s not a bad idea in principle. But frankly, the minimum conditions the West would (and should) need to roll back sanctions are so beyond what Russia might be remotely willing to accept—namely, a complete withdrawal of Russian troops from all Ukrainian territory including the Donbas—that I don’t think it matters much whether they do or don’t spell them out. Everyone already knows that relations between the advanced industrial democracies and Russia are permanently broken for as long as Putin remains in power.
Will the Russian economy collapse in the near future? (Shah A)
No. Russia is not North Korea. It has lots of resources that other countries need, including not just oil and gas but also critical metals, cereals, fertilizer... These will get sold one way or another. Keep in mind that the “West” might be cutting off Russia’s economy, but the vast majority of the world isn’t. In fact, much of the Global South (China, India, Africa, Latin America, etc.) has not joined in the Western sanctions and continues to trade with Russia (although constrained by the fear of secondary sanctions). Right now, Putin is looking at a 15% contraction of GDP and a massive brain drain. This is a big structural hit similar to the one Russia experienced after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, but it’s not a full-blown collapse. Rather, it’s more like a politically-induced depression.
Will increasingly broad sanctions undermine the USD's reserve currency status? (Gareth J)
Only at the margin and in the very long term, as China and other would-be U.S. adversaries diversify their reserves and begin to look for alternatives. Effectively, the answer is no. The dollar’s status as global reserve currency and preeminent safe-haven asset has been remarkably strong and stable for decades, backed by America’s military, economic, political, and institutional might. That is unlikely to change just because the United States government showed itself willing to weaponize it against Russia in this one instance and in a coordinated fashion with allies. In part because there are no viable alternatives in the horizon—for different reasons, neither the euro, the yuan, nor cryptocurrencies are plausible substitutes—and in part because there are very strong inertial forces propping up the USD’s continued dominance.
Who is Putin really listening to? Does he have any sources of credible information? (Neesha P)
Mostly his inner security services circle, the siloviki. He is an avid consumer of Western media but considers it propaganda (and some of it is, of course, but not remotely comparable to Russian state media). He has a reasonably good sense of what’s happening on the ground militarily and what people are doing politically, but his worldview is radically different from others, and that filters out a lot of critical information and colors his interpretation of the information that does get through.
If Ukraine were to emerge victorious against Russia on the battlefield (at least a denial of Russian objectives), what's Russia's next move? (Tim F)
That would be an incredibly dangerous situation, as I explained in a recent article. If Putin were to lose in the Donbas, he wouldn’t be able to sell the war as a “win” at home and, having little downside anymore, would see a reason to escalate further. That likely means scorched-earth tactics against Ukrainian cities involving many more civilian casualties, and possibly even the use of chemical and biological weapons. The relentless escalation we’ve seen from the West in terms of military support, sanctions, and now Finland and Sweden about to join the alliance has convinced Putin that the only way Ukraine can defeat a great power like Russia is if NATO is actually doing the fighting (it doesn’t help that he continues to underestimate the Ukrainians and overestimate Russia’s capabilities). Accordingly, he’ll increasingly take the fight to NATO in the form of cyberattacks, disinformation, espionage, and subversion.
Who do you think are the best contenders to succeed Putin following his natural demise or removal? (Todd G)
I have no idea. Ideologically, it has to be someone who is a Russian nationalist and believes in a strong state and military. But it’s not like there are public contenders (other than Alexei Navalny, and he’s in jail)... While Putin’s political position is quite secure and I think a coup is highly unlikely, it’s still a really important question given that he’s almost 70 years old.
How would a Le Pen victory in the French elections upend European unity as it relates to sanctions? (Michael P)
It would shatter European/NATO unity on Ukraine policy, putting an end to further EU sanctions against Russia (and possibly pushing to end existing sanctions) and significantly weakening European coordination on defense support for Ukraine. It might also freeze the NATO membership process for Finland and Sweden. But you can rest easy: while a Le Pen victory would be a huge win for Putin, it’s very unlikely to happen.
Will Trump undo everything that Biden and NATO have done? Is Putin counting on that for 2024? (Paul C)
Not necessarily. Despite President Trump’s Putin-friendly rhetoric, in some ways his administration was more hawkish on Russia than Obama’s, naming it as an adversary in its National Security Strategy, sending Javelin anti-tank missiles to Ukraine, and imposing significant sanctions in response to Russian provocations. Having said that, Trump himself would weaken U.S./NATO policy, as he’s a unilateralist by disposition and is mistrusted by most NATO allies.
🔔 And if you haven't already, don't forget to subscribe to my free newsletter, GZERO Daily by Ian Bremmer, to get new posts delivered to your inbox.