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Trump and Khamenei staring at eachother across an Iranian flag.
Will Trump’s Iran strategy actually prevent war?
The United States is ramping up its “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran.
In a letter sent to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in early March, President Donald Trump gave Tehran an ultimatum: reach a new nuclear deal with the US within two months or face direct military action – “bombing the likes of which they have never seen before,” as he told NBC News’ Kristen Welker on Sunday.
The letter proposed mediation by the United Arab Emirates (whose emissaries delivered the missive in question) and expressed Trump’s preference for a diplomatic solution. “I would rather have a peace deal than the other option, but the other option will solve the problem,” the president said.
In the three weeks it took the Iranian leadership to figure out how to respond, the US turned up the temperature.
First came intense airstrikes (of Signalgate fame) against Iran’s last remaining functional ally in the region, the Houthis in Yemen, starting on March 15 and continuing to this day. Then, the US issued its first-ever sanctions against Chinese entities for buying Iranian crude oil, including a “teapot” refinery in Shandong and an import and storage terminal in Guangzhou. And in recent days, the US military deployed a fleet of B-2 stealth bombers – capable of carrying the 30,000-lb. bunker-busting bombs needed to blast through Iran’s hardened enrichment sites – to its Diego Garcia base in the Indian Ocean, in range of both Yemen and Iran. This move was “not unrelated” to Trump’s ultimatum, according to a senior US official.
Iran finally rejected direct negotiations with the US in a formal response to Trump’s letter delivered last Thursday via Oman, its preferred mediator. President Masoud Pezeshkian stated on Sunday that although the Islamic Republic won’t speak directly with the Trump administration while maximum pressure is in place, Tehran is willing to engage with Washington indirectly through the Omanis.
Whether Trump’s two-month deadline was to strike a deal or to begin negotiations remains unclear. Either way, there’s no chance that two sides that deeply mistrust each other – especially after Trump unilaterally withdrew from the original nuclear deal in 2018 – could reach an agreement over issues as complex as Iran’s nuclear program and support for regional proxies in just a couple, or a few, months (let alone a single one).
But does that mean that Trump’s ultimatum is doomed to end in confrontation? Not necessarily. In fact, his “escalate to de-escalate” strategy could be the best hope to avoid a crisis this year.
A ticking time bomb
While US intelligence assesses that Iran is not building a nuclear weapon, it has become a threshold nuclear state with enough 60% enriched uranium to produce six nuclear weapons (if enriched to 90%) and the ability to “dash to a bomb” in about six months (though weaponizing a device would probably take it 1-2 years).
European governments have long made it clear that unless Iran reins in its enrichment activities by this summer, they will “snap back” the UN sanctions that were lifted as part of the 2015 nuclear deal before the agreement expires in October and they can no longer do so.
Iran has vowed to respond to snapback sanctions by withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Given the precedent set by North Korea – whose NPT exit in 2003 was followed by ever-greater steps toward weaponization – and the already advanced state of Tehran’s nuclear program, NPT withdrawal could be the action-forcing event Israel needs to convince Trump to support a joint strike on Iran’s underground nuclear facilities.
Which means that the US and Iran were likely headed for a collision later this year even if Trump hadn’t issued his ultimatum.
Strange bedfellows
And yet, both Trump and Iran’s leadership would much prefer to avoid a military confrontation in the near term.
Trump’s political coalition includes both traditional Republican war hawks and “America First” isolationists who are averse to US involvement in new forever wars. Whereas cabinet officials like Secretary of State Marco Rubio, National Security Advisor Mike Waltz, and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth advocate for a more combative approach toward the Islamic Republic, none of these prominent national security hawks are in charge of the Iran file – Middle East Special Envoy Steve Witkoff, a Washington outsider and a restrainer, is.
Most importantly, Trump ran as a peacemaker and has repeatedly stated his preference for a deal, believing that bombing Iran could mire the US in an unpopular war that’d divert precious resources from his domestic priorities and endanger his friends in the Gulf for little political upside. The solidly MAGA Vice President JD Vance echoed this concern when, in the leaked Signal group chat, he flagged the risk to oil prices from striking the Houthis for the sake of “bailing out” the Europeans.
For its part, Iran is historically vulnerable and eager to negotiate a deal that brings sanctions relief to its battered economy. While capitulating to Trump’s demands is politically dangerous for Khamenei and would weaken the regime’s domestic position, neither he nor other hardliners would welcome a military showdown with the US and Israel.
Take it or leave it
The threat of a crisis later this year creates an opening for Trump to pressure Tehran into offering concessions that allow the US president to claim progress and avoid triggering snapback sanctions.
Last year’s effective destruction of Iran’s regional proxy network – Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Bashar al Assad’s regime in Syria – dealt a blow to the country’s conventional deterrence and heightened the importance of its nuclear program. Iran will therefore resist making any meaningful concessions on this front. If there’s one piece of the nuclear file it could cede ground on, it’s its stockpile of 60% enriched uranium, which Tehran could conceivably agree to freeze.
Where Iran could potentially offer more is in backing away from its proxies, at least temporarily. Though it doesn’t have operational control over the Houthis (unlike the decimated Hezbollah), the Islamic Republic could deprive them of the bulk of the weapons systems and intelligence they rely on to attack Red Sea shipping lanes. It could also instruct Shia militias in Iraq to refrain from targeting US troops.
The regime would find these choices politically and ideologically unpalatable. But with its so-called Axis of Resistance already in shambles and little Tehran can do to rebuild it in the near term, its strategic value is nowhere near what it was a year ago. A chance at avoiding a snapback and US bombing could accordingly be seen as a worthwhile trade.
Less for less
While a breakthrough agreement is highly unlikely to be reached before the summer (or at all), the two sides’ mutual desire to avoid escalation suggests that Trump would be receptive to the relatively minor concessions Tehran could be willing to make – the most it can conceivably offer under the circumstances.
But those concessions would need to come soon, before snapback is triggered. And even this best-case scenario wouldn’t buy Iran any sanctions relief. Instead, they’d get to kick the can on snapback sanctions and possible US military action while negotiations on a more comprehensive – and aspirational – deal are underway.
If, however, Iran’s modest concessions fall short of what Trump deems acceptable, the risk of military escalation this year will rise sharply – either when Trump’s ultimatum comes to a head or when snapback gets triggered, Iran exits the NPT, and Israel considers a strike (whether solo or joint with the US).
Iran has not yet made the decision to build a nuclear weapon. And unless it’s attacked, it remains unlikely to do so, knowing full well that any overt steps toward weaponization would invite certain, immediate, and devastating retaliation. But nothing would make the Islamic Republic dash for a bomb more than getting bombed.
FILE PHOTO: Children eat bread on a street near a flag adopted by the new Syrian rulers, after the ousting of Syria's Bashar al-Assad, in Damascus, Syria, December 24, 2024.
Syria seeks sanction relief
Diplomats and foreign ministers from17 Arab and EU states convened in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on Sunday to discuss the lifting of economic sanctions on Syria, originally imposed during the rule of ousted president Bashar al-Assad. Removing the sanctionsis key to reconstruction efforts for Damascus but will hinge on the new government’s ability to guarantee human rights in the country.
After the meeting, German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbockadvocated maintaining sanctions against Assad’s allies but alleviating restrictions that affect the general population. Baerbock alsopledged an additional $51.2 million in aid for essential services. EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas also announceda meeting of foreign ministers in Brussels on Jan. 27 to discuss further relief measures.
As for the US, while it has not lifted sanctions, last week it issueda six-month exemption for certain transactions with Syrian governing institutions to expedite humanitarian assistance.
We’re watching whether those measures will be extended under the new administration of US President-elect Donald Trump, who in December said that Syria’s change of regime is “not our fight.” Trump also remarked that“Turkey is going to hold the key to Syria” – something thatSaudi Arabia may take issue with as it positions itself as a key regional player in Syria’s rebuilding.
An F/A-18 Hornet approaches the flight deck of aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt as USS McFaul trails behind, October 30, 2001. Theodore Roosevelt and its carrier airwing are conducting missions in support of operation Enduring Freedom.
Hard Numbers: US friendly fire downs F/A-18, Russia guns down prisoners, US court rules on Pegasus spyware case, China goes after Canadian activists
2: Two US Navy pilots were forced to eject from their F/A-18 fighter over the Red Sea on Sunday during a “friendly fire” incident when a US warship targeted their plane with a missile. Both pilots survived the ejection but one sustained minor injuries, and it is not immediately clear why the ship, which was on station to shoot down Houthi missiles launched from Yemen, fired upon the aircraft.
127: Russian forces have summarily executed at least 127 Ukrainian troops this year according to prosecutors investigating these war crimes. The figures is an immense spike — officials counted just 20 summary executions of prisoners of war in 2022 and 2023 combined — suggesting an alarming shift in Russian doctrine.
1,400: A US court on Friday ruled that Israeli cyber-intelligence firm NSO Group was liable for hacking the devices of 1,400 WhatsApp users using the secretive software known as Pegasus, in violation of US cybersecurity laws. Pegasus has been implicated in hacks on dissidents by authoritarian governments around the world, and has been on a US blacklist since 2021.
20: Beijing announced Sunday it was taking punitive action against twenty people and two Canadian institutions advocating on behalf of the human rights of Tibetan and Uyghur minorities in China. The measures include asset freezes, bans on entry to China, and seizure of any real estate in the PRC. They come just weeks after Canada also announced sanctions on Chinese officials accused of human rights abuses.People carry Venezuela's national flag to protest the election results that awarded Venezuela's President Nicolas Maduro a third term, in Maracaibo, Venezuela, on July 30, 2024.
US declares Edmundo González rightful winner of Venezuela election
Based on exit polls from around 90% of the votes from last Sunday's election, opposition leaders say González beat Maduro by a large margin, and international pressure is building against Maduro. On Thursday, Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia called on Caracas to release detailed tallies of the vote, and the European Union has said it would not recognize Maduro’s claimed victory without independent certification of the election results.
Still, the US announcement is unlikely to change anything on the streets of Venezuela, where protesters have been demanding Maduro to accept defeat. Demonstrations, which have led to violent clashes with authorities and hundreds of arrests this week, are ongoing.
But Washington's move is likely to spur on the protesters. President Joe Biden, meanwhile, is mulling whether to reintroduce sanctions against Venezuela, despite it being a critical source of oil.FILE PHOTO: The International Criminal Court building is seen in The Hague, Netherlands, January 16, 2019.
Hard Numbers: ICC Sanctions, Legislative deadlock, Fading free speech, Attacks on health workers, Mexico campaign tragedy
37: At least 37 members of the House of Representatives are co-sponsoring a bill that would sanction prosecutors and staff at the International Criminal Court involved in applying for arrest warrants against senior Israeli leaders. The bill was introduced by a Republican member, but the Biden administration has expressed support. The president called the warrant applications “outrageous,” and Secretary of State Antony Blinken promised to work with Congress on the issue.
0.37: If the above bill does pass, it would be remarkable because just 0.37% of all the bills introduced in the 118th Congress have become laws. That passage rate is the lowest since the 1990-1991 Congress, during which Newt Gingrich executed his first government shutdown.
53: A sharp rise in restrictions on free speech and expression globally left 53% of all humans unable to speak freely last year, up from 34% in 2022, according to Article 19, an advocacy group. The big culprits? Crackdowns in India, home to the world’s largest population, and a deterioration of freedoms in Ethiopia, Senegal, Burkina Faso, and Mongolia. It’s not all bad news though: Article 19 specifically praised Brazil’s progress on freedom of expression after former President Jair Bolsonaro left power.
2,500: Researchers at Safeguarding Health in Conflict, a coalition of nongovernmental organizations, recorded over 2,500 attacks on healthcare workers who struggled to look after patients in conflict zones in 2023, a 25% increase from 2022. Researchers attributed the jump to new wars in Gaza and Sudan while older wars in places like Ukraine and Myanmar continue unabated.
9: A stage at a campaign rally collapsed in high winds in Nuevo Leon, Mexico, last night, killing at least nine people, including a child. Scores more were injured at the event featuring presidential long-shot candidate Jorge Álvarez Máynez. The country is in campaign mode ahead of the June 2 presidential, state, and municipal elections. Máynez has suspended upcoming events in response to the tragedy.
Why the US-China relationship is more stable than you might think
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: Hi everybody. Ian Bremmer here and a Quick Take to kick off your week. US Secretary of State Tony Blinken in the Middle East right now. But he just came from China, Beijing and Shanghai, and the US-China relationship is what I'm thinking about. Want to give you a state of play.
It continues to be better managed and more stable than we've seen in a long time. Now, not clear that would necessarily be the case, given the number of issues and places where we have friction between these two countries. Just over the course of the last couple weeks, you've got President Biden, putting new tariffs on Chinese steel, opening a new investigation into Chinese shipbuilding. You've got this anti TikTok policy that's coming down from US Congress. You've got $2 billion in additional military aid for Taiwan from the United States. You've also got lots of criticism from the Americans on ongoing Chinese support, dual use technologies for the Russians, allowing them to better fight the war in Ukraine.
Given all of that, is the relationship starting to become much more confrontational? And the answer is not really. It's true that the Chinese foreign minister said that the Americans need to choose between having a relationship of containment and a relationship of partnership, and it's certainly true that the Americans would rather have it both ways. They want to have partnership in areas where it suits the Americans, and containment in areas where it suits the Americans. The Americans getting away with more than that than other countries can because the US is the most powerful country in the world and ultimately the Chinese need Americans more than Americans need China. Still, there's a lot of interdependence, and there is an ability to push back. How much is China actually doing that? And the answer is there's been very little direct Chinese tit for tat, despite all of the policies I just mentioned. It is true that overnight, the Chinese Foreign Ministry said that there would be resolute and forceful measures if the supplemental support for Taiwan, which is a red line for the Chinese, is signed and Taiwanese assistance from the US moves ahead, and I suspect that means we're going to see some more sanctions from China against US defense contractors.
That is largely symbolic. It is a tit for tat. But on all the other policies I've mentioned that the Americans have just brought against China, we've seen Chinese focus on making their country and their economy more resilient against American efforts to contain, but not hitting the Americans back, not calibrated, moves of sanctions or reciprocal investigations. In fact, the Chinese have been pretty stable.
Also. We saw that Xi Jinping still met with Secretary of State Blinken directly, a meeting that would be very easy for the Chinese government to take down, and historically certainly wouldn't have been present if there had been a lot of tension in the relationship. They chose not to do that. And in fact, Blinken went to a record store, you know, he plays guitar and sings, and he's into music. And the coverage from the Chinese state media of that trip was very humanizing, was very friendly, frankly, better coverage of a US secretary of state than I've seen at any point since Xi Jinping has been in power. That's something it's very easy for the Chinese government to put their thumb on the scale if they want to show that they're unhappy with where the US relationship is. I think about Obama and the town hall, that he wanted to put together and the Chinese unwilling to give him the kind of coverage that the Americans at the time had wanted. You know, this is a lesser official from the US and is still getting, frankly, tremendous treatment from the Chinese government. I think that matters a lot.
Having said all of that, this is a relationship that is becoming more challenging to manage. And that's true because in the United States, whether you're Democrat or Republican, one of the very few things you can agree on in foreign policy is that there is a benefit in going after China. So the policy from the US is not just about Biden making decisions himself, but it's also about members of Congress. It's about governors. It's about the media. All of whom are taking their own shots. And they're not coordinated. Where from China, if Xi Jinping wants it, everyone basically rose in the same direction. Now, there are lots of American corporations and banks that are sending their CEOs, making trips with China right now. And there's much more people to people engagement between the two countries, something that Chinese officials are strongly focused on.
There's a lot more communication and cooperation on things like climate, as well as in response to America's fentanyl crisis, where the Chinese are shutting down the labs, the companies that have been exporting the precursor chemicals. Those things matter. They are engaged. There's also a lot of willingness of the United States, at the highest level, to provide more information to China, just on what the Americans are seeing happening around a confrontation in the Middle East that China would like to see a cease-fire for, so would the Americans at this point. And also, the Chinese don't have a lot of high level diplomats and a lot of ability to collect information that the Americans do. And when high level Americans are talking to their Chinese counterparts about the Middle East, the Chinese are very much in taking notes mode and appreciating that they're getting that information from the US.
So overall, I continue to see a lot of high level engagement that is very constructive. But coming against a relationship that has virtually no trust and where the baseline of conflict is going to pop up in a lot of different ways and a lot of different places around the world. Over time it's going to be harder to maintain that stable floor on US-China relations. But for now, I think we're likely to continue to see it, at least until elections in November.
That's it for me. I'll talk to you all real soon.
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U.S. Representative George Santos (R-NY) chats with his State of the Union guest and members of his staff as they prepare for the evening in Santos’s office on Capitol Hill in Washington, U.S. February 7, 2023.
Hard Numbers: Santos chargesheet grows, Niger kicks out UN rep, GOP voters question McCarthy ouster, China reaps oil windfall
44,000: US Rep. George Santos (R-NY) — already under scrutiny for lying about his background — allegedly stole more than $44,000 from campaign donors by using their identities and credit card information, according to a new 23-count indictment. Santos is also alleged to have lied to the Federal Elections Commission by claiming he loaned his campaign $500,000 at a time when he only had around $8,000 in the bank.
72: The military junta in Niger ordered UN resident coordinator Louise Aubin to leave the country within 72 hours, following expulsions of France’s ambassador and military missions. Mali and Burkina Faso similarly soured on the UN and expelled French forces following their own coups.
25: Just 25% of Republicans support the move by a small group of far-right Republicans in the House of Representatives to remove former Speaker Kevin McCarthy (R-CA) last month, according to an AP-NORC poll. Around 30% say it was the wrong move, and the lion’s share of the party, 43%, is unsure.
10 billion: Chinese oil importers have saved about $10 billion this year thanks to access to heavily discounted oil from Russia, Iran, and Venezuela, all subject to US-led sanctions. The relatively cheaper energy has been a rare boon for Beijing amid China’s economic crisis.
A graph comparing Venezuela's GDP per capita with the average price of crude oil.
The Graphic Truth: Economic turmoil in Venezuela
Venezuela has the world’s largest oil reserves but a combination of corruption, mismanagement, and tough US sanctions since the Maduro regime came to power in 2013 has meant that the petrostate has failed to benefit from its vast reserves of liquid gold.
While high oil prices under the Chavez regime in the early 2000s gave a boost to Venezuela’s middle class, US sanctions first imposed in 2006 – and significantly ramped up under the Obama and Trump administrations – have cut Caracas off from US financial systems.
Economic hardship is rife, with a staggering 50% of people living in extreme poverty. Pervasive hopelessness has also led to one of the worst migrant crises in the world.
In a bid to offset a global energy crisis in 2022 as a result of Russia’s war in Ukraine, the Biden administration began lifting some sanctions on the Venezuelan oil sector. So how are things faring? We look at GDP per capita and corresponding oil prices since 1999.