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Former president Jair Messias Bolsonaro is inaugurating Route 22 in eight cities in Rio Grande do Norte, starting with the cities of Extremoz, Natal, Parnamirim, and Mossoro, in Natal, Brazil, on August 16, 2024.
Brazil’s ex-President Jair Bolsonaro sentenced to 27 years for coup plot
Brazil’s Supreme Court has convicted former President Jair Bolsonaro of plotting a coup to stay in power after losing the 2022 election — a historic first in a country that’s lived through 15 coups.
Four of the court’s five justices voted to find Bolsonaro and seven allies, including his running mate and top military officials, guilty of conspiring to overturn the result and hatching a plan to kill their opponent, current president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. Bolsonaro, who had already been banned from seeking public office again, has been sentenced to a 27-year prison sentence. He is expected to appeal.
How we got here. Bolsonaro, a former army captain far-right firebrand who was elected president in 2018, spent the 2022 re-election campaign spreading claims of election fraud that were disproven by official investigations. After losing to his leftwing nemesis Lula, his supporters stormed Brazil’s Congress, Supreme Court, and presidential palace on Jan. 8, 2023, demanding the military step in and overturn the results.
In recent weeks, the US has put pressure on Brazil over the trial. Bolsonaro is a close ally – and stylistic emulator – of US president Donald Trump, who has publicly pressured Lula to force the court to drop the charges, threatening high tariffs, sanctions on court justices, and other punitive measures on Latin America’s largest economy.
Those attacks have seemingly backfired – boosting the popularity of the aging and unpopular Lula, who has styled himself as a defender of Brazilian honor and sovereignty. The court justices, meanwhile, appear not to have been swayed by American pressure.
But Bolsonaro’s movement isn’t going away. Eurasia Group Brazil expert Silvio Cascione warns this is not the “turning of the page” many of Bolsonaro’s opponents may hope for. The ruling “crystallizes Brazil’s deep polarization rather than resolving it,” he said. Public opinion is split almost evenly: 43% say the trial was unfair, 51% back the conviction.
“The real concern isn't massive street protests,” Cascione says, “but rather the continued erosion of institutional trust that's been poisoning Brazilian politics for years. Courts, media, and political parties all suffer from a credibility deficit.”
Bolsonaro is still the kingmaker of the Brazilian right. Polls still show he’d be the strongest challenger to Lula in next year’s presidential election, so his endorsement could still shape the race. São Paulo Governor Tarcísio de Freitas has already emerged as a top heir to Bolsonaro’s movement, courting the former president’s base and floating an amnesty bill in Congress.
The conviction is set to roil relations with Washington. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio called the ruling a “witch hunt” and signaled possible retaliation, including sanctions on the justices who voted to convict.
If so, Brazil is unlikely to hit back directly, as an actual trade war with the world’s largest economy – and a major source of investment – could get ugly fast.
But tensions with Washington could still have a political upside for Lula. “In what promises to be a highly competitive race,” says Cascione, “playing the victim of American bullying could actually help Lula
Collage of Ian Bremmer, Putin, and Trump.
Vance 2028, AI doomsday, Russia after Putin, and more: Your questions, answered
Moose and I are trading Manhattan’s muggy sidewalks for Nantucket sand, but first, one more mailbag. Since this is the last newsletter you’ll get from me until after Labor Day, we’ve got an extra-long edition to tide you over. Thanks to those who sent in so many smart and snarky questions, to all of you for reading, and I’ll see you fully energized in September.
What recourse does the Supreme Court have against a president who doesn't follow the rule of law?
Ultimately, the Court’s leverage lies with its own legitimacy in the eyes of the American public. President Donald Trump has thus far respected its rulings because outright defiance would risk a backlash that could damage his political standing. That said, the Court has also been selective about the cases it’s taken, partly to avoid confrontations with the executive it might struggle to enforce that would expose the limits of its power. The institution is being challenged; even if for now its authority is holding. It’s a mistake to assume that will necessarily last forever.
The Trump administration is incredibly pro-Israel, both in terms of sending weapons to Israel for offensive operations throughout the Middle East as well as arresting pro-Palestinian protesters on US college campuses (and also going after the colleges themselves). How does one reconcile this position with the administration's support for the Alternative for Germany (AfD) and other far-right parties in Europe and elsewhere that hold very strong antisemitic views?
There’s no contradiction: pro-Israel policy, anti-Palestine campus crackdowns, and support for far-right parties all serve the same worldview – nationalist, populist, anti-globalist, anti-immigration – rather than any coherent, principled stance against antisemitism. The Trump administration’s support for the AfD, France’s National Rally, and other European ultranationalists – all of which praise Israel as a model “ethnostate” despite their persistent antisemitism – was driven less by President Trump himself than by Elon Musk (who’s now out) and Vice President JD Vance (who has now stepped back from that policy push). Trump personally likes leaders like Hungary’s Viktor Orban, but that’s less about shared ideology than the fact that Trump likes people who profess their love for him.
The question is not why Trump is so strongly pro-Israel, but rather, why the United States is. After all, Trump may be even more pro-Israel than Joe Biden, but compared to the rest of the world, both presidents are outliers in terms of their support for the Jewish state. Some of that comes down to the depth of intelligence-sharing and military coordination between the two countries. Some is about genuinely shared geostrategic interests and common enemies in the region. Some is about the strength of the political lobby in the US. And some used to be about Israel’s status as the only strong democracy in the Middle East (Gaza and the West Bank notwithstanding), though that’s now less true of Israel and less important to American leaders.
With the broken promises of "no new wars," increased budget deficits, and now the swirling conspiracies around the Epstein files, can Trump hold together a cohesive base to maintain the very slim majorities they hold in Congress come midterms?
I would not call “no new wars” a broken promise. True, Trump has failed to end the war in Ukraine (so far at least), but he has clearly tried. He’s had moderate success helping to broker truces in the India-Pakistan, Thailand-Cambodia, and Rwanda-DRC conflicts. He does get a big zero on Gaza, having helped make matters worse. It’s unclear he (unlike Elon, who was not on the ballot) credibly promised to end budget deficits; his base cares less about this than ending the two-tiered economic and justice system – and on that front, they have grounds to be angry both about the tax breaks for the rich in the “big beautiful bill” and the lies and misdirection about Jeffrey Epstein. I suspect that undermines his (very resilient) support with the base somewhat, but it might get washed out by a kept promise that was key to getting him elected in 2024: closing the southern border and deporting illegal aliens. At the end of the day, though, a lot will come down to how the economy is doing by then.
Is it too early to even think about a Vance presidency?
It’s too early, especially given how much has already happened – and how fast things have changed – in the first six months of the Trump-Vance administration. Folks need to pace themselves; this is a marathon, not a sprint. Trump has no incentive to crown a successor and weaken his own power while he’s still center stage. Expect him to keep everyone guessing until the very last minute (and maybe even later).
Global investors are increasingly de-risking from US assets and reducing their US dollar exposure. As the US moves away from the rules-based order, who (China, the EU) or what (gold, oil, cryptocurrencies) can fill the vacuum?
There’s still no alternative to King Dollar. Yes, more investors are trimming their outsized holdings of historically overvalued USD assets and looking for alternatives to hedge against political shock and weaponization risk. In the long term, China’s economic heft and global lead in some of the most important frontier technologies make the yuan a leading contender (yes, despite its demographic collapse). But a true substitute has to offer scale, liquidity, open capital markets, and trustworthy national institutions. Washington’s self-inflicted wounds may erode the greenback’s appeal, but they don’t make the RMB – with its capital controls and legal opacity – any more suitable to be a reserve asset. Nor do they allow Europe’s rule of law, deep markets, and capital openness to make up for the persistent lack of a true fiscal, financial, and political union. Gold and oil remain commodities, not currencies; they can’t grease modern finance. And crypto is still far too volatile (and, in the case of dollar-pegged stablecoins, paradoxically reinforces greenback dominance).
The more realistic future is a messier, more multipolar system where central banks, institutional investors, and corporations still keep most of their dry powder in dollars yet diversify more into euros, yuan, bullion, and digital tokens. Fragmentation means higher transaction costs and less automatic US leverage, but until someone marries China-style scale with Swiss-style trust, the dollar remains first among unequals – just less overwhelmingly so.
If critical minerals are necessary for energy security and warfighting, how can the US diversify supply chains within a credible timeframe?
Trump’s executive order to fast-track permitting and expand financing for mining projects is useful, as is the Pentagon’s direct equity investment in MP Materials. But it’s going to take a lot of money and several years – I’d say no fewer than five – of coordinated and consistent policy support to build out not just production capacity but refining and processing ecosystems, especially for defense-critical heavy rare earths. Putting aside the technical hurdles, fiscal constraints, and permitting bottlenecks, there’s presently no strategy to make Western-led projects commercially viable against a non-market competitor whose dominance not only spans upstream and midstream production but also extends to pricing, logistics, and trading infrastructure, resulting in both direct supply pressure and indirect influence over global pricing.
Is the fight against climate change dead? What will it take for it to return to the political agenda?
No, because clean energy technologies are getting cheaper and being deployed at an unprecedented speed and scale, driven not by woke ideology or government regulation but by scientific breakthroughs and market forces. To be sure, the global transition is not being led by the United States, but it’s also not being particularly held back by it. That deep-red Texas leads the US (and China and India lead the world) in renewable deployment is a case in point: the fight against climate change will be won by economic self-interest and tech ingenuity, not Greta tweets and political diktat.
Do you think the US will ever leave NATO altogether?
Ever? Sure, since it’s easy to see nation-states no longer being the principal geopolitical actors a generation or two from now. But probably not in the coming, say, 5-10 years. Trump may once again threaten to pull out of the alliance (both for domestic politics and to encourage fairer burden-sharing), but even before taking office in January he had already admitted to changing his mind about NATO being obsolete.
What is preventing Secretary of State Rubio and President Trump from insisting that Israel stop impeding the free flow of humanitarian aid (including food) into Gaza?
They don’t consider the Palestinians strategically relevant and/or worthy of concern (also see: Europe). They certainly have more political leeway and, therefore, more leverage to pressure Israel with than the Biden administration did (and than the Europeans). But they just don’t care (not enough and not yet, at least).
Are we ever going to witness the United States of Europe?
If the pandemic, climate change, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and America’s isolationist turn haven’t done the trick, I have a hard time imagining what will. Each crisis nudges the bloc toward more coordination and incremental integration (banking union, joint vaccine procurement, a modest pandemic recovery fund), but the same shocks also fuel populist backlash against ceding another inch of sovereignty. Add the centrifugal pull of NATO for security, national capitals for taxation, and Berlin-Paris bargaining for everything in between, and the path to a true federation keeps receding. That reality means Europe will keep punching below its collective weight – let alone the US and China’s.
Do you think the UK should consider rejoining the EU?
Brexit dented growth and diminished Britain’s bargaining power vis-à-vis great powers, but re-entry is a practical, political, and diplomatic slog with diminishing returns. Having spent years extricating the UK, Europeans are once burned, twice shy; even if they were to reopen the wound, good luck getting Brussels to agree to London’s old rebates and opt-outs. At home, any government would have to sell free movement, loss of sovereignty, and a meaningful budget contribution to voters who were told they’d “taken back control.” Plus, the world has changed since 2016. Relinquishing veto power to 27 other capitals in a G-Zero era where agility and autonomy are key strategic assets risks trading one set of constraints for another. The smarter play is to stitch together flexible partnerships with the EU – from security to green tech – while keeping a free hand on the steering wheel.
If the US steps away from the Ukraine/Russia negotiations, do you think Europeans will step up and take a leading role in defending Ukraine?
They are already taking the lead. Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, the combined support for Ukraine (financial, military, and humanitarian) from European countries has exceeded US contributions by over $45 billion – and that’s not including the over $110 billion in European aid commitments still to be allocated plus new funding to scale the continent’s own defense industry so the flow keeps growing.
Considering Russia's historical proficiency in winter warfare and its ability to exhaust enemy resources ahead of spring offensives, why have they been unable to decisively overwhelm Ukrainian forces during the past several winters of the ongoing conflict?
Endemic corruption sapping resources and logistics, overconfident and incompetent military leaders squandering Russian materiel and manpower superiority, and poorly led conscripts with low morale, fighting against a more motivated and savvy Ukrainian force bolstered by strong Western support and impressive homegrown tech capabilities.
Is there hope for Russia after Vladimir Putin?
The analyst in me doesn’t expect a dramatic shift at the Kremlin if Vladimir Vladimirovich were to suddenly croak tomorrow. His successor is far less likely to be a liberalizing democrat than another authoritarian, strongly anti-Western nationalist who’d behave even more risk-aversely than Putin, needing the continuous support of the Russian military, intelligence, and security establishment – the siloviki – to stay in power.
Do you think "traditional" news providers such as the FT, NYT, etc. will become stronger as people look for more credible sources of information in the age of increasing disinformation on social media? Or is this wishful thinking?
I’m skeptical that traditional media as a whole can become stronger in an era of hyper-polarized audiences, an ever-more-fragmented information ecosystem, declining ad revenue, and business models that depend on paywalls. Disinformation thrives not because people actively seek out lies, but because they consume news the way they consume everything else online: passively, emotionally, algorithmically, and in soundbites. The key challenge isn’t trust, it’s attention. The NYT and the FT can’t win a game that’s optimized for engagement without compromising the very accuracy and credibility that make them valuable. Though I do think select sources that are trusted and have authentic voices will become increasingly essential to a narrow slice of the public willing to pay for the “credibility premium” (whether in money or attention). I hope that’s what GZERO Media is for most of you.
What are we missing on the horizon that we should pay more attention to behind all the current dust?
Artificial intelligence transforming our economies, societies, global security, and geopolitics in a matter of years. Compared to the magnitude and speed of change we’re used to, we’re in for a wild ride.
Do you have a p(doom) number for AI? What's your take on the value of making p(doom) predictions?
My distribution of possible AI outcomes currently looks like a barbell. I think either we blow ourselves up in the next 10-20 years or we end up with a radically better quality of life, extremely high economic growth and scientific progress, and even much longer lifespans. But I can’t tell yet which tail scenario is more likely, making my p(doom) – the probability of existentially catastrophic outcomes as a result of AI – incredibly uncertain. I need to see more to update decisively one way or the other. As the technology advances, these estimates will become increasingly important.
Have you noticed any growing suspicion abroad due to your nationality? Are you being threatened or intimidated by anyone here at home because of your opinions?
I’ve noticed a rise in anti-American sentiment more generally, on the back of the belief that the United States is no longer as reliable a partner and ally (fact-check: true). I think some people do presume that as an American you must hold a certain worldview (e.g., Russia and China always bad, US always good, etc. etc.), which is as ridiculous and offensive as thinking you would do that as a white or black person. But I have thankfully never been threatened or intimidated, neither at home nor abroad, other than on social media – which is a feature, not a bug, of these platforms.
Are you giving any thought to moving to a different country, and if so, where would you consider going?
Zero. I love New York City. And unlike mayoral candidate and former governor Andrew Cuomo, I can’t imagine leaving under any circumstances.
Graphic Truth: Federal employment already dropping
The US Supreme Court on Tuesday allowed President Donald Trump to proceed with widespread cuts to the federal workforce, pending a full trial, overruling a San Francisco judge’s order in May that temporarily blocked layoffs at 22 agencies. Prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling, thousands of government employees had been preparing for mass layoffs, with many notified of their pending terminations but awaiting official confirmation.
Here’s a look at the changing size of the federal workforce, which includes the US military, since Trump first took power in 2017.
President Trump takes on the Judiciary
From Supreme Court rulings on deportations and birthright citizenship to federal troop deployments in Los Angeles, the courts are becoming ground zero for challenges to executive authority. Emily Bazelon tells Ian Bremmer that the judiciary can’t save American democracy alone—and with Congress sidelined and the DOJ increasingly politicized, checks and balances are wearing thin. “The judges cannot save the country from an authoritarian president… by themselves."
GZERO World with Ian Bremmer, the award-winning weekly global affairs series, airs nationwide on US public television stations (check local listings).
New digital episodes of GZERO World are released every Monday on YouTube. Don't miss an episode: subscribe to GZERO's YouTube channel and turn on notifications (🔔).
Yale Law School's Emily Bazelon on Trump's showdown with the courts
Listen: President Trump has never been shy about his revolutionary ambitions. In his second term, he’s moved aggressively to consolidate power within the executive branch—signing more than 150 executive orders in just over 150 days, sidelining Congress, and pressuring the institutions that were designed to check his authority. His supporters call it common sense. Critics call it dangerous. Either way, it’s a fundamental shift in American governance—one that’s unlike anything happening in any other major democracy.
While Congress has largely collapsed into partisan submission, and the DOJ and other power ministries face political purges, one institution still stands: the courts. In this episode, Ian Bremmer speaks with New York Times Magazine staff writer and Yale Law School’s Emily Bazelon about how the judiciary is holding up under pressure, what rulings to watch, and whether the rule of law can survive the Trump revolution.
Subscribe to the GZERO World Podcast on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Stitcher, or your preferred podcast platform, to receive new episodes as soon as they're published
President Trump has launched a revolution. Will it succeed?
President Donald Trump calls himself a revolutionary—and I actually agree with him. His second term has ushered in sweeping attempts to expand executive power and defang oversight institutions. Congress has rolled over. The DOJ? Under pressure. The only remaining institutional check appears to be the courts—especially the lower ones. So far, federal judges across the country, including some Trump appointees, have pushed back on illegal overreach. As has the Supreme Court on some high profile immigration and trade cases. But what happens when Trump gets tired of losing in court?
GZERO World with Ian Bremmer, the award-winning weekly global affairs series, airs nationwide on US public television stations (check local listings).
New digital episodes of GZERO World are released every Monday on YouTube. Don't miss an episode: subscribe to GZERO's YouTube channel and turn on notifications (🔔).
Was it legal for Trump to deploy federal troops to Los Angeles?
In this clip from a larger interview for the latest episode of GZERO World, New York Times Magazine staff writer and Yale Law School fellow Emily Bazelon sits down with Ian Bremmer to unpack President Trump’s unprecedented decision to send National Guard troops and US Marines into Los Angeles without the governor’s consent. She argues the administration may have intentionally provoked the unrest through targeted immigration raids in the Latino neighborhoods of a densely populated city.
As California Governor Gavin Newsom sues the federal government, Bazelon makes clear that legal recourse may be limited. Even if Newsom wins, she says, Trump could comply with consultation requirements after the fact and proceed as planned. “The judges cannot save the country from an authoritarian president... by themselves,” Bazelon warns.
GZERO World with Ian Bremmer, the award-winning weekly global affairs series, airs nationwide on US public television stations (check local listings).
New digital episodes of GZERO World are released every Monday on YouTube. Don't miss an episode: subscribe to GZERO's YouTube channel and turn on notifications (🔔).
Lee Jae-myung, the presidential candidate of the Democratic Party, speaks during a policy agreement ceremony with the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions at the Korea Press Center in Seoul, South Korea, on May 1, 2025.
South Korean court throws likely next president into jeopardy
South Korean opposition leader Lee Jae-myung had a rough day on Thursday. The Supreme Court sent the election law case against him back to a lower court, a move that could extend the country’s political chaos. Lee is the favorite to win the June 3 election, but he could be ousted from office if the court rules against him weeks, months, or even years down the line.
The legal circumstances are murky. If elected, Lee might claim that he’s constitutionally protected from prosecution. But the constitution only gives the sitting president immunity against indictment for crimes — other than treason, as impeached former President Yoon Suk-yeol knows all too well. Lee has already been indicted, setting up a contentious debate if the courts rule against him, according to Eurasia Group’s Jeremy Chan.
“The conservatives will be saying that he clearly committed this crime and was charged before he became president, and the punishment is that he’s not allowed to seek public office, which would invalidate this whole election,” says Chan. “The left will be saying that the highest law in the land says very specifically that the president should be immune from these types of charges, and should focus on governing.”
The conservative ruling party is still reeling from Yoon’s impeachment after his quixotic attempt at a military coup in December. Nonetheless, acting President Han Duck-soo resigned on Thursday to make way for his own bid for the top job, despite grim polling numbers. The Joong Ang Daily, a conservative paper, found 42% of voters are leaning toward Lee, while only 13% back Han.
Then again, given the sword of Damocles hanging over Lee, Han might be willing to roll the dice.