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Members of the Basij paramilitary force hold Iranian flag, Lebanese flag, and various militia flags, during a rally commemorating International Quds Day in downtown Tehran, April 14, 2023.
Q + A: Is this the end of Iran’s “Axis of Resistance?”
As the world reacted to Israel and the US bombing Iran’s nuclear facilities last week, one group was largely silent – Iran’s network of allied militias in the Middle East.
Since the 1980s, Tehran has cultivated what it calls an “Axis of Resistance” – a network of groups closely aligned with its agenda, encompassing Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Palestine, the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq, and the Houthis in Yemen.
In a sharp contrast to the weeks after October 7th, when Hezbollah and the Houthis launched missiles at Israel in solidarity with Hamas and the Palestinian people, this time around, the militias have not joined the fray.
Hezbollah reportedly has no plans to strike Israel right now. Hamas and the Houthis have done nothing despite vowing to respond against “Zionist-American aggression.”
The relative silence this time around reflects in part how much weaker some of these groups are. Hezbollah and Hamas in particular have been decimated by Israel over the past year and a half. But it also reflects Iran’s overall diminished position in the region. Last December, Iran suffered another blow with the demise of the closely-allied Assad regime in Syria.
So where does Iran’s 'Axis of Resistance' stand today? Is this relative silence temporary or permanent? And how might all of this affect a region where Iran has until recently been a major strategic player?
To find out, we asked two experts, with somewhat clashing views. Lina Khatib, a visiting scholar at Harvard Kennedy School’s Middle East Initiative, and Renad Mansour, a senior research fellow and project director of the Iraq Initiative at Chatham House. Their responses have been lightly edited for clarity and concision.
GZERO: Are we witnessing the end of Iran’s “Axis of Resistance”?
Khatib: “The whole model of Iran's presence in the region has permanently changed…the Axis of Resistance, as Iran calls it, has crumbled in terms of it being a network. What we are left with are the individual groups, each struggling for survival in the country in which it operates…Iran is now fighting Israel and the United States on its own, its proxies are unable and unwilling to help it.”
Mansour: “For the time being, Iran is overstretched and looking to survive right now internally…but the connectivity will continue to be there to some extent…what remains of the axis has transitioned into more of a horizontal, non-hierarchical network – where Iran is still important – but the different groups have also begun to take on leadership roles.”
GZERO: With Iran’s decades-long dominance now diminished, how will the balance of power shift in the Middle East?
Khatib: “What we will see is an increased importance for the Gulf countries in the Arab world, in terms of being the heart of power in the Middle East, influencing where the rest of the region will head.”
Mansour: “It's hard to see whether there will be a hegemonic force…what we're looking at moving forward is a fragmented Middle East where you have multi-alignment, where you have different sides working with each other…based on different issues, where you don't really have clear spheres of influence.”
GZERO: What does this mean for regional stability moving forward?
Khatib: “Without Iran and its proxies, there will be less sectarian tension in the region and a greater possibility for cross-country cooperation in the Middle East, and therefore increased stability…[though this still] depends on whether Israel agrees to restart the peace process regarding Israel Palestine.”
Mansour: “There's so much unexpected, so much more violence that will happen before this comes to an end…[when] the US had overwhelming force and they went to war against Iraq or Afghanistan, would they have thought that this would actually facilitate the rise of their big enemy, Iran?”
Belarussian dissident Syarhei Tsikhanouski hugs his wife, Belarussian opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, after he was released from prison, in this screengrab taken from a social media video released on June 21, 2025.
HARD NUMBERS: Belarus frees dissident, Farmers kidnap Colombian soldiers, Damascus church attacked, & More
5: Belarussian dissident Siarhei Tsikhanouski, husband of the de-facto opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, was freed on Saturday after spending more than five years in jail. US special envoy Keith Kellogg reportedly helped foster the deal. GZERO recently interviewed Tsikhanouskaya here.
57: Colombian farmers in the southwestern region of Valle del Cauca have kidnapped 57 government soldiers. Authorities say the farmers were pressured by local rebel factions that have rejected the 2016 peace deal with the government. For more on rising political violence in Colombia, see our recent piece here.
25: At least 25 were killed in a suicide bombing at a church Damascus, Syria, amplifying concerns about sectarian violence under the government of former-jihadist Ahmed al-Sharaa, who overthrew the Assad regime in December. Syria’s interior minister said the attacker was affiliated with Islamic State – the group itself has not claimed credit.
12: A suspected female suicide bomber killed at least 12 people at a fish market in Borno state in northeast Nigeria on Friday night. Borno is the center point of Boko Haram’s insurgency movement – an insurgency that has been going on for 16 years.
1.8%: War, huh, what is it good for? The Israeli stock market, evidently. The country’s main index reached record highs on Sunday after rising 1.8% following the US attack on Iran’s nuclear enrichment facilities. Since Israel began wider airstrikes on Iran last week, the index is up a total of nearly 8%.
A satellite image shows the Natanz nuclear facility after an airstrike in Iran, on June 14, 2025.
What the world thinks of the Israel-Iran conflict
The Israel-Iran conflict continues to rage on: US President Donald Trump called for “UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER” on Tuesday, while Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei ruled out surrendering Wednesday morning. Iran is also considering bombing US bases.
Much of the world’s focus is, understandably, on what the United States will do next (for more, see here) – but there are other major powers with a big stake in this conflict too. Here’s a roundup of their views on the rapidly escalating conflict.
Russia on the fence. Moscow, long friendly with Tehran, has drawn even closer to the Islamic Republic since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, in large part thanks to Iran’s supply of drones. The two sides even signed a security agreement earlier this year. Yet with Iran now facing a bombardment, the Kremlin has offered little to Tehran other than verbal condemnation of Israel. That’s because… it’s complicated.
Iran’s downfall – coming after the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime last December – would mean the loss of another major Russian ally in the region. The Kremlin, though, has also long-sought to keep Tehran from going nuclear, and has been reluctant to furnish the Islamic Republic with certain weapons – in part because the Kremlin also maintains good relations with Israel. Putin must tread carefully here, but he is certainly on his back foot.
Risks for Beijing. China has publicly denounced Israel, but a more immediate concern is Iran’s oil supplies. Beijing now sources 16% of its seaborn crude oil imports from the Islamic Republic, and gets it at a discounted price. Smaller Chinese refineries have become reliant on Iranian oil, switching to this energy source in 2022 to protect their margins. If those supplies are cut – either by Israel or by Iran shutting the critical Strait of Hormuz in order to pressure the world into stopping Israel – it would be another hit to China’s already-vulnerable economy.
“China is quietly nervous, but doesn’t want to interfere,” says Eurasia Group’s Director of Analysis Marc Gustafson. “China gets a lot of oil from Iran and is worried Israel will strike the oil facilities. It also knows that Iran is a pariah state for most of the West, so it won’t be very vocal in defending the country.”
Europe backs Israel, but with some caveats On the surface, Europe is wholeheartedly backing Israel. The G7 – which includes four of the strongest and largest European countries – issued a joint statement at their summit this week that condemned Iran.
Still there are some differences of opinion. While Germany has praised Israel for doing the West’s “dirty work” and the UK signaled possible military support for the Israeli Defense Forces, French President Emmanuel Macron warned that regime change in Iran would cause “chaos.” His position has angered Trump.
Conflicted views in the Arab world. In public, countries in the Gulf and the Levant are criticizing Israel’s attacks on Iran. Privately, there may be more satisfaction than they let on. For nearly half a century, many Sunni Arabs have viewed Revolutionary Iran as a meddlesome and disruptive foreign power, fomenting proxy conflicts in Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen and beyond.
Then there’s Syria, where the current government overthrew al-Assad’s brutal, Iran-allied dictatorship just six months ago. It’s no surprise that Damascus’s new leaders, resentful of Iran but also delicately smoothing ties with a belligerent Israel, have gone radio silent.
The one notable exception is Qatar. The oil-rich peninsula maintains cordial relations with Iran, and even shares a gas field with them – Israel bombed it on Saturday.
But if there is any schadenfreude among Arab nations, there is also wariness of the conflict exploding into a wider regional war that draws them in. As the Persian proverb goes: “Those who laugh on Friday will cry on Sunday.”
Trump’s Middle East playbook: Business first, diplomacy later
Ian Bremmer unpacks the significance of AI, defense partnerships, ongoing Iran negotiations, and the potential lifting of Syria sanctions. He also looks at how Trump’s personal rapport with Middle Eastern leaders, absence from Israel, and business ties are shaping US foreign policy. What does this approach signal about Trump’s priorities abroad—and how might it affect America’s global relationships?
Saudi Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Salman, and US President, Donald Trump, meet with the Syrian president Ahmad Al-Sharaa
Trump pledged to lift Syria sanctions, can Damascus seize the moment?
When US President Donald Trump promised to lift sanctions on Syria this week, the streets of Damascus erupted in celebration.
“It was a huge, huge day for Syrians,” says Ibrahim al-Assil, a Senior Fellow at the Middle East Institute in Washington, D.C., who is from the Syrian capital.
“Many people, my relatives and friends in Damascus, they are saying the same thing: ‘this is the second biggest day in my life after the fall of the regime!’”
For a country battered by more than a decade of war and mass emigration, Trump’s announcement has flung open a window of opportunity that few thought possible as recently as December. That was when current president Ahmed al-Sharaa, a one-time Al-Qaeda member, led a coalition of militias that overthrew the Assad dictatorship.
The reconstruction needs are huge. A recent UN report says Syria’s 14-year civil war cost the country at least $800 billion in lost GDP – the country’s annual output plunged from $67.5 billion in 2011 to just $23.62 billion in 2022. Estimates of the cost to rebuild the country’s infrastructure run into the hundreds of billions of dollars.
Trump’s move now opens the way for powerful foreign players like Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey to help foot that bill, without fear of running afoul of US law.
Hold up, those sanctions didn’t vanish just yet. There are numerous restrictions on the books. The president can lift some, but others require Congress. US Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC) has already questioned the wisdom of scrapping sanctions before it’s clear al-Sharaa and his allies have fully shed their jihadist pedigree.
Still, Trump’s personal commitment to sanctions relief, and the strong interest of US allies Saudi Arabia and Turkey in seeing it happen, means the measures are likely to come off sooner rather than later.
“There were some very strong dissenting voices within the administration,” says Firas Maksad, head of Eurasia Group’s Middle East practice. “But this was one of those times where the president just went over and above those differences.”
But even if the sanctions are scrapped, al-Sharaa still faces huge challenges if he wants to make good on the promise of Trump’s move.
For starters, he must tamp down long-standing sectarian tensions. Pro-government gunmen have recently clashed with both the Alawites – the Assad family’s own sect – and the Druze minority, which is backed by Israel. Christian and secular Syrians remain wary of a government still run almost entirely by Islamists close to al-Sharaa. At the same time, efforts to forge a new security force out of the country’s dozens of local militias have slowed.
What’s more, al-Sharaa has yet to follow through on a promise to appoint a new legislative council. The composition of that body will tell us a lot about whether he is willing, or able, to carefully balance the country’s various factions, but it will also serve a more basic function, says al-Assil.
“When we talk about investments and reviving the Syrian economy, that requires new laws to govern those investments, and a space to resolve conflicts so that they aren’t resolved through violence.” To date, that space seems to exist only among a small number of power-brokers close to al-Sharaa.
Lastly, Damascus will have to manage competition among the various outside powers jostling for influence in the new Syria.
The most immediate concern is Syria’s old foe Israel, which since December has moved aggressively to wreck Damascus’s military capabilities and establish its own sphere of influence in Southern Syria. The two sides are now speaking via backchannels, though, giving al-Sharaa the change to reach an understanding with the Israelis that gives him more breathing room.
But even among Syria’s friends there will be friction. The two likely giants on the scene, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, have in the past clashed over Istanbul’s support for Islamist political groups. Riyadh and Doha have had similar run-ins. Competing visions for Syria among its biggest patrons could prove destabilizing.
Despite this thicket of challenges, al-Assil is cautiously optimistic.
“Syrians want this to work,” he says, “they want to navigate a way to reconcile their differences, and they recognize how important this opportunity is. And that gives me hope.”
French President Emmanuel Macron talks with Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa as they arrive to attend a joint press conference after a meeting at the Elysee Palace in Paris, France, on May 7, 2025.
Syria’s president visits France, and chats (indirectly) with Israel
Syria’s interim president Ahmed al-Sharaa, the former jihadist whose forces overthrew the dictatorship of Bashar al-Assad last December, met on Wednesday with French President Emmanuel Macron. It was his first trip to Europe.
The upshot: The French president said he would push for the lifting of EU sanctions – which have been in place since 2011 – if al-Sharaa continued on a path of reform and reconstruction that respected the rights of Syria’s religious minorities. He said he’d also lobby the US to follow suit.
The goal: France, with regional players Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey, favors swift relief from Western sanctions against Syria to speed the rebuilding of a country wrecked by civil war and mass emigration.
But the US has been more cautious, giving Damascus a list of conditions for sanctions removal that include icing out Iran, expelling Palestinian groups, and giving the American military a free hand in Syria.
The bombshell: During the meeting, Al-Sharaa revealed Syria has been holding indirect security talks with Israel. That’s a big deal: since Assad’s fall, Israel has bombed Syrian military sites, expanded a “buffer zone” into the country, and conducted airstrikes on behalf of Syria’s Druze minority.
Any prospect of an accord with Israel – which is deeply suspicious of Damascus’ intentions – would significantly improve Syria’s prospects of stability and prosperity.A member of the Syrian security forces gestures next to a vehicle at the entrance of the Druze town of Jaramana, following deadly clashes sparked by a purported recording of a Druze man cursing the Prophet Mohammad, which angered Sunni gunmen southeast of Damascus, Syria, on April 29, 2025.
HARD NUMBERS: Sectarian clashes hit Damascus, Will India attack Pakistan?, Trump eases auto-tariffs, Germany creates coalition government, Malnutrition soars in Gaza, Cuba jails top dissident again
10: At least 10 people were killed in sectarian clashes outside Damascus late Monday. The firefight erupted between pro-government Sunni fighters and gunmen belonging to the Druze minority after a Druze cleric was blamed for an audio recording that insulted the Prophet Muhammad. Containing sectarian violence is a top concern for the post-Assad government as it seeks to rebuild the war-torn country. In response to the violence and threats against the Druze minority, Israel conducted what it called a “warning operation” on Wednesday, targeting an armed group in Syria’s Damascus province.
24-36: Pakistan’s information minister claimed on Tuesday that the country has “credible intelligence” that India may launch a military strike within 24 to 36 hours. The warning follows India’s accusation that Pakistan-backed militants were responsible for an attack in Indian-administered Kashmir last week that killed 26 tourists — a charge Islamabad denies.
2: Donald Trump on Monday reduced the tariff burden on US-based car manufacturers by ensuring that the 25% levies on vehicles and parts don’t pile on top of existing duties, such as those on imported steel and aluminum. He also provided tariff rebates on foreign parts to automakers operating in the US for a two-year period, giving them more time to shift their supply chains.
84: In Germany’s parliament late Tuesday, 84% of Social Democratic Party members strongly supported the party’s proposal to join a coalition government with the Christian Democratic bloc. Friedrich Merz, leader of the center-right party that won the February election, is set to be officially appointed chancellor next week. His main priority? Reviving Germany’s struggling economy.
10,000: Roughly 10,000 cases of acute malnutrition have been registered among children in Gaza so far this year, according to a new UN report. Overall, about 60,000 children there are chronically underfed. Israel has blocked all aid deliveries to the enclave since March 2, saying that Hamas hijacks humanitarian convoys. Dozens of local and internationally run community kitchens have run out of supplies and been forced to close in recent weeks.
3: On Tuesday, after just three months of freedom, Cuban dissident Jose Daniel Ferrer was arrested again on charges that he had violated his parole agreement. Ferrer, one of the few high-profile opponents of the island’s communist dictatorship, was released earlier this year as part of a Vatican-brokered deal. The Castro regime continues to wield significant influence in Cuba, even amid a crippling economic crisis that has driven more than a fifth of the population abroad since 2022.
Trump’s inaction on wrongful deportation may spark constitutional crisis
Ian Bremmer shares his insights on global politics this week on World In :60.
If the US won't work to return a wrongly deported man to El Salvador despite a Supreme Court ruling, are we headed towards a constitutional crisis?
It certainly appears that way, and I think this is the constitutional crisis that the Trump administration would love to have. Because wrongfully deporting someone without evidence who is in the country illegally and therefore guilty of a misdemeanor, but sending them to a max security prison, which the Supreme Court says you shouldn't do, but now is in another country. Very few Americans are sympathetic to the case of this person. And indeed, Trump won on the basis in part of being sick and tired of allowing illegal immigrants to spend enormous amounts of time in the United States without recourse.
So he's breaking the law here. He's flouting independent judiciary and their decision-making, but he's doing it on an issue that most Americans have no sympathy on the other side. So the Democrats would have to be very wary of making this a hill they want to die on, and Trump knows exactly what he's doing. It is pretty impressive playbook for undermining rule of law and checks and balances on an increasingly authoritarian leaning executive. That's where we are.
Trump claims China-Vietnam talks are intended to "screw" the US. Does this run the risk of pushing Vietnam to China?
Certainly, most Vietnamese now are more well-disposed towards China than the US. First time we've seen that since the war. It's not true across Southeast Asia. Philippines, about 80% still pro-US, not pro-China. But it is a problem, and Xi Jinping understands that. And that's why he went in and was received directly by the president as opposed to the prime minister last time who met him at the airport. 45 big deals that they're signing on trying to improve economic coordination. Clearly a bit of a surprise to Trump, just as the direct retaliation from the Chinese, even though the Americans warned them, "Negotiate, don't retaliate." But that's exactly what China did, and Trump frankly should have expected that was coming. Now he looks a little bit weaker in the way he's backing down and creating exemptions for a lot of people in this space.
Saudi Arabia plans to pay off Syria's World Bank debt. Could this be a major turning point for Syria's future and its ties with regional allies?
It certainly helps. We've also seen the Qataris already say they're going to offer gas through Jordan into Syria. I think that this is all promising. The Saudis were never going to do that, provide any support as long as Assad was in place. Now they are. The Americans are pulling troops out, and Turkey is going to be the most important country on the ground. But economically, it's going to be the Gulf States, and that gives this new Syrian regime a better chance to succeed. Something we all clearly are rooting for in terms of one of the places that we'd like to see a little more stability from. Anyway, that's it for me, and I'll talk to you all real soon.
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