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Members of Syrian security forces ride on a back of a truck after Syrian troops entered the predominantly Druze city of Sweida, Syria July 15, 2025.
What’s behind Syria’s surging sectarian violence?
The latest round of deadly sectarian violence in Syria started off small. Last Sunday, a Bedouin tribe reportedly robbed and attacked a Druze man at a checkpoint in southern Syria, near the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. The incident quickly escalated into a battle that has left more than 350 people dead and drawn in not only Syrian government forces, but also Israel, which intervened forcefully under the pretext of protecting the Druze.
The clashes add to a series of sectarian flare-ups since the fall of the Assad dictatorship seven months ago. In March, forces aligned with the government massacred nearly 1,500 Alawites in response to a failed rebellion by Assad loyalists within the community, and in April, dozens were killed when the Druze clashed with security forces near Damascus.
Violence of this kind has destabilized an already fragile post-war Syria, raising fresh doubts about the transitional government’s ability to maintain control and safeguard the rights of minority communities. Interim president Ahmad al-Sharaa, a former jihadist who has restyled himself as a statesman since leading the militia coalition that overthrew Assad, has promised to unify and rebuild Syria after a brutal 14-year civil war and decades of dictatorship.
So, what are Syria’s main ethno-sectarian fault lines? Arabs make up the majority of the population, which is about 75% Sunni Muslim.
But there are tensions with several powerful minority groups. They include the Druze, an Israel-friendly community in the South which practices an offshoot of Islam considered heretical by Sunni fundamentalists, and the Alawites, the sect that the Assad family belonged to and conspicuously elevated throughout the dictatorship.
Tensions also persist between Arabs and the Kurds, who operate a semi-autonomous government in northeastern Syria. Although the Kurds have agreed to merge with the new Syrian army, they remain deeply skeptical of al-Sharaa – particularly because of his recent overtures to Turkey, a long-standing opponent of armed Kurdish groups.
Lastly, there are fears of persecution among Syria’s ancient but shrinking Christian population – which came to a head last month when a suicide bombing left dozens dead at a church in Damascus.
The fact that al-Sharaa, a veteran of Al-Qaeda, overthrew the Assad regime atop a coalition of Sunni extremist militias has put all minority groups on edge, fearful of the intentions of a new government that is led largely by Islamists and former jihadists not known for their tolerance of ethnoreligious diversity.
What’s standing in the way of peace? For one thing, Syria’s newly formed army remains fragmented, with many fighters drawn from Islamist extremist groups. Lacking cohesion and a clear chain of command, al-Sharaa can’t rely on the military to effectively control the country.
In fact, the military itself has been part of the problem. Syrian troops were seen to be helping the Bedouins in the recent flareup, according to the UK-based Syrian Observatory for Human rights.
“There isn't a well disciplined national army that could take control of all the Syrian territories.” says Ibrahim al-Assil, senior fellow at the Atlantic Council. “Whenever there is an erupting cycle of violence…they just go and they start fighting, they start looting, and killing as well.”
But there’s also a question about the intentions of a government that often seems to be exacerbating precisely the tensions it claims to be concerned about.
“Whenever there are clashes and confrontations, the authorities in Damascus and Ahmad al-Sharaa try to utilize that as a ploy to gain political achievements,” adds al-Assil. “[While] people could argue if the government was behind that eruption of violence or not, it has certainly used this to gain more power.”
And external actors aren’t helping. Israel, which insists on the demilitarization of Southern Syria, has repeatedly attacked government troops and facilities there under the pretext of defending the Druze. On Wednesday, the IDF escalated tensions further, striking the Syrian defense ministry in Damascus. Al-Sharaa has since redoubled his pledge to protect the Druze amid a fragile ceasefire in the area, but also said Syria is “not afraid of war.”
At the same time, Iran – having lost a key ally in Assad – may also be seeking opportunities to reestablish a foothold in the country.
“Iran is trying to find a way to regain some influence inside Syria and any force or any group that challenges the authority in Damascus creates an opportunity for Iran to find a way back,” says al-Assil.
Can the “new Syria” survive these tensions? “It shows a huge challenge for Ahmad al-Sharaa and, and the legitimacy of the government inside Damascus,” al-Assil says. “Most countries, including the West, do want to see Damascus consolidating inside Syria. They do want to see territorial integrity in Syria.”
But the failure of the Syrian government to stabilize the country could also open the door for more regional interference, complicating things further.
“Violence and fragmentation won’t stay inside Syria,” al-Assil warns. “Most likely, it will spill over to the region.”
Syrian residents in Madrid have gathered in Puerta del Sol to celebrate the fall and end of the government of President Bashar al-Assad in the Arab country on December 14, 2024.
Hard Numbers: Spain top destination for asylum seekers, Pakistan’s deadly monsoons, babies born with three DNA’s, & more
12,800: Spain replaced Germany in May as the top destination in the European Union for asylum seekers, receiving 12,800 applications that month. Germany had 9,900 asylum applicants, down from 18,700 in the same period last year, as Berlin tries to stem the influx of Syrian nationals – who represent the largest of asylum seekers – following the fall of Bashar al-Assad.
69: At least 69 people have died in a fire at a shopping mall in the city of al-Kut in eastern Iraq. The origin of the fire is not yet known, but initial analysis of the site suggests that it started on the floor where cosmetics and perfumes are sold.
8: In a major scientific breakthrough, 8 UK babies were made using DNA from three people rather than two. The approach, which uses the egg and sperm from a mom and a dad along with a second egg from a donor woman, is meant to prevent a deadly mitochondrial disease. Most DNA still comes from the two parents, with just 0.1% from the second egg donor.
69: A Reuters/Ipsos poll found 69% of Americans believe the Trump administration is hiding information about Jeffrey Epstein’s clients. Just 6% disagreed, while about 25% were unsure. President Donald Trump had pledged to release more information, but now is trying to shift the conversation elsewhere.
Smoke rises after Israeli strikes on Syria’s defense ministry, according to Al Jazeera TV, in Damascus, Syria, on July 16, 2025.
What We’re Watching: Israel hits Syria’s military HQ, Trump rings up trade wins, Cuban minister resigns over denial
Israel strikes Damascus as feud escalates
Israel struck Syria’s military headquarters in Damascus on Wednesday and continued to bomb areas of southern Syria where the Israel-backed Druze minority group is clashing with Bedouin tribes whom Israel says are being supported by the Syrian regime. The escalation risks further undermining Syria’s fragile post-Assad stability. Meanwhile, Israel also launched its deadliest strike on Lebanon since last year’s ceasefire, killing five Hezbollah fighters as it tries to pressure the militant group to disarm. For more on whether that could ever happen, see here.
Trump’s trade policy gathers some momentum
US President Donald Trump’s efforts to strike trade deals may finally be gathering momentum. The White House on Tuesday announced a deal with Indonesia, its first since Trump sent letters to several major trade partners threatening higher tariffs by Aug. 1. US-China tensions also appear to be easing slightly after Washington rescinded its export restrictions on AI chips. Meanwhile in Canada, Washington’s second-biggest trade partner, Prime Minister Mark Carney acknowledged that he’ll have to accept some US tariffs in order to reach a deal with Trump, a sign that he too may be ready to strike a trade pact.
Cuban minister resigns after denying existence of beggars
Ignorance is strength, as the slogan from George Orwell’s “1984” goes, and beggars don’t exist – at least not according to Cuban Labor Minister Marta Elena Feitó Cabrera. Her comments sparked a rare public backlash, forcing her to resign. Communist-led Cuba has been suffering from an especially painful economic crisis recently, with frequent blackouts, rising levels of poverty and hunger, and even shortages of basic medicines. The pain is so bad that at least 10% of the island’s population has fled since 2022.
Members of the Basij paramilitary force hold Iranian flag, Lebanese flag, and various militia flags, during a rally commemorating International Quds Day in downtown Tehran, April 14, 2023.
Q + A: Is this the end of Iran’s “Axis of Resistance?”
As the world reacted to Israel and the US bombing Iran’s nuclear facilities last week, one group was largely silent – Iran’s network of allied militias in the Middle East.
Since the 1980s, Tehran has cultivated what it calls an “Axis of Resistance” – a network of groups closely aligned with its agenda, encompassing Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Palestine, the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq, and the Houthis in Yemen.
In a sharp contrast to the weeks after October 7th, when Hezbollah and the Houthis launched missiles at Israel in solidarity with Hamas and the Palestinian people, this time around, the militias have not joined the fray.
Hezbollah reportedly has no plans to strike Israel right now. Hamas and the Houthis have done nothing despite vowing to respond against “Zionist-American aggression.”
The relative silence this time around reflects in part how much weaker some of these groups are. Hezbollah and Hamas in particular have been decimated by Israel over the past year and a half. But it also reflects Iran’s overall diminished position in the region. Last December, Iran suffered another blow with the demise of the closely-allied Assad regime in Syria.
So where does Iran’s 'Axis of Resistance' stand today? Is this relative silence temporary or permanent? And how might all of this affect a region where Iran has until recently been a major strategic player?
To find out, we asked two experts, with somewhat clashing views. Lina Khatib, a visiting scholar at Harvard Kennedy School’s Middle East Initiative, and Renad Mansour, a senior research fellow and project director of the Iraq Initiative at Chatham House. Their responses have been lightly edited for clarity and concision.
GZERO: Are we witnessing the end of Iran’s “Axis of Resistance”?
Khatib: “The whole model of Iran's presence in the region has permanently changed…the Axis of Resistance, as Iran calls it, has crumbled in terms of it being a network. What we are left with are the individual groups, each struggling for survival in the country in which it operates…Iran is now fighting Israel and the United States on its own, its proxies are unable and unwilling to help it.”
Mansour: “For the time being, Iran is overstretched and looking to survive right now internally…but the connectivity will continue to be there to some extent…what remains of the axis has transitioned into more of a horizontal, non-hierarchical network – where Iran is still important – but the different groups have also begun to take on leadership roles.”
GZERO: With Iran’s decades-long dominance now diminished, how will the balance of power shift in the Middle East?
Khatib: “What we will see is an increased importance for the Gulf countries in the Arab world, in terms of being the heart of power in the Middle East, influencing where the rest of the region will head.”
Mansour: “It's hard to see whether there will be a hegemonic force…what we're looking at moving forward is a fragmented Middle East where you have multi-alignment, where you have different sides working with each other…based on different issues, where you don't really have clear spheres of influence.”
GZERO: What does this mean for regional stability moving forward?
Khatib: “Without Iran and its proxies, there will be less sectarian tension in the region and a greater possibility for cross-country cooperation in the Middle East, and therefore increased stability…[though this still] depends on whether Israel agrees to restart the peace process regarding Israel Palestine.”
Mansour: “There's so much unexpected, so much more violence that will happen before this comes to an end…[when] the US had overwhelming force and they went to war against Iraq or Afghanistan, would they have thought that this would actually facilitate the rise of their big enemy, Iran?”
Belarussian dissident Syarhei Tsikhanouski hugs his wife, Belarussian opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, after he was released from prison, in this screengrab taken from a social media video released on June 21, 2025.
HARD NUMBERS: Belarus frees dissident, Farmers kidnap Colombian soldiers, Damascus church attacked, & More
5: Belarussian dissident Siarhei Tsikhanouski, husband of the de-facto opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, was freed on Saturday after spending more than five years in jail. US special envoy Keith Kellogg reportedly helped foster the deal. GZERO recently interviewed Tsikhanouskaya here.
57: Colombian farmers in the southwestern region of Valle del Cauca have kidnapped 57 government soldiers. Authorities say the farmers were pressured by local rebel factions that have rejected the 2016 peace deal with the government. For more on rising political violence in Colombia, see our recent piece here.
25: At least 25 were killed in a suicide bombing at a church Damascus, Syria, amplifying concerns about sectarian violence under the government of former-jihadist Ahmed al-Sharaa, who overthrew the Assad regime in December. Syria’s interior minister said the attacker was affiliated with Islamic State – the group itself has not claimed credit.
12: A suspected female suicide bomber killed at least 12 people at a fish market in Borno state in northeast Nigeria on Friday night. Borno is the center point of Boko Haram’s insurgency movement – an insurgency that has been going on for 16 years.
1.8%: War, huh, what is it good for? The Israeli stock market, evidently. The country’s main index reached record highs on Sunday after rising 1.8% following the US attack on Iran’s nuclear enrichment facilities. Since Israel began wider airstrikes on Iran last week, the index is up a total of nearly 8%.
A satellite image shows the Natanz nuclear facility after an airstrike in Iran, on June 14, 2025.
What the world thinks of the Israel-Iran conflict
The Israel-Iran conflict continues to rage on: US President Donald Trump called for “UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER” on Tuesday, while Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei ruled out surrendering Wednesday morning. Iran is also considering bombing US bases.
Much of the world’s focus is, understandably, on what the United States will do next (for more, see here) – but there are other major powers with a big stake in this conflict too. Here’s a roundup of their views on the rapidly escalating conflict.
Russia on the fence. Moscow, long friendly with Tehran, has drawn even closer to the Islamic Republic since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, in large part thanks to Iran’s supply of drones. The two sides even signed a security agreement earlier this year. Yet with Iran now facing a bombardment, the Kremlin has offered little to Tehran other than verbal condemnation of Israel. That’s because… it’s complicated.
Iran’s downfall – coming after the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime last December – would mean the loss of another major Russian ally in the region. The Kremlin, though, has also long-sought to keep Tehran from going nuclear, and has been reluctant to furnish the Islamic Republic with certain weapons – in part because the Kremlin also maintains good relations with Israel. Putin must tread carefully here, but he is certainly on his back foot.
Risks for Beijing. China has publicly denounced Israel, but a more immediate concern is Iran’s oil supplies. Beijing now sources 16% of its seaborn crude oil imports from the Islamic Republic, and gets it at a discounted price. Smaller Chinese refineries have become reliant on Iranian oil, switching to this energy source in 2022 to protect their margins. If those supplies are cut – either by Israel or by Iran shutting the critical Strait of Hormuz in order to pressure the world into stopping Israel – it would be another hit to China’s already-vulnerable economy.
“China is quietly nervous, but doesn’t want to interfere,” says Eurasia Group’s Director of Analysis Marc Gustafson. “China gets a lot of oil from Iran and is worried Israel will strike the oil facilities. It also knows that Iran is a pariah state for most of the West, so it won’t be very vocal in defending the country.”
Europe backs Israel, but with some caveats On the surface, Europe is wholeheartedly backing Israel. The G7 – which includes four of the strongest and largest European countries – issued a joint statement at their summit this week that condemned Iran.
Still there are some differences of opinion. While Germany has praised Israel for doing the West’s “dirty work” and the UK signaled possible military support for the Israeli Defense Forces, French President Emmanuel Macron warned that regime change in Iran would cause “chaos.” His position has angered Trump.
Conflicted views in the Arab world. In public, countries in the Gulf and the Levant are criticizing Israel’s attacks on Iran. Privately, there may be more satisfaction than they let on. For nearly half a century, many Sunni Arabs have viewed Revolutionary Iran as a meddlesome and disruptive foreign power, fomenting proxy conflicts in Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen and beyond.
Then there’s Syria, where the current government overthrew al-Assad’s brutal, Iran-allied dictatorship just six months ago. It’s no surprise that Damascus’s new leaders, resentful of Iran but also delicately smoothing ties with a belligerent Israel, have gone radio silent.
The one notable exception is Qatar. The oil-rich peninsula maintains cordial relations with Iran, and even shares a gas field with them – Israel bombed it on Saturday.
But if there is any schadenfreude among Arab nations, there is also wariness of the conflict exploding into a wider regional war that draws them in. As the Persian proverb goes: “Those who laugh on Friday will cry on Sunday.”
Trump’s Middle East playbook: Business first, diplomacy later
Ian Bremmer unpacks the significance of AI, defense partnerships, ongoing Iran negotiations, and the potential lifting of Syria sanctions. He also looks at how Trump’s personal rapport with Middle Eastern leaders, absence from Israel, and business ties are shaping US foreign policy. What does this approach signal about Trump’s priorities abroad—and how might it affect America’s global relationships?
Saudi Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Salman, and US President, Donald Trump, meet with the Syrian president Ahmad Al-Sharaa
Trump pledged to lift Syria sanctions, can Damascus seize the moment?
When US President Donald Trump promised to lift sanctions on Syria this week, the streets of Damascus erupted in celebration.
“It was a huge, huge day for Syrians,” says Ibrahim al-Assil, a Senior Fellow at the Middle East Institute in Washington, D.C., who is from the Syrian capital.
“Many people, my relatives and friends in Damascus, they are saying the same thing: ‘this is the second biggest day in my life after the fall of the regime!’”
For a country battered by more than a decade of war and mass emigration, Trump’s announcement has flung open a window of opportunity that few thought possible as recently as December. That was when current president Ahmed al-Sharaa, a one-time Al-Qaeda member, led a coalition of militias that overthrew the Assad dictatorship.
The reconstruction needs are huge. A recent UN report says Syria’s 14-year civil war cost the country at least $800 billion in lost GDP – the country’s annual output plunged from $67.5 billion in 2011 to just $23.62 billion in 2022. Estimates of the cost to rebuild the country’s infrastructure run into the hundreds of billions of dollars.
Trump’s move now opens the way for powerful foreign players like Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey to help foot that bill, without fear of running afoul of US law.
Hold up, those sanctions didn’t vanish just yet. There are numerous restrictions on the books. The president can lift some, but others require Congress. US Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC) has already questioned the wisdom of scrapping sanctions before it’s clear al-Sharaa and his allies have fully shed their jihadist pedigree.
Still, Trump’s personal commitment to sanctions relief, and the strong interest of US allies Saudi Arabia and Turkey in seeing it happen, means the measures are likely to come off sooner rather than later.
“There were some very strong dissenting voices within the administration,” says Firas Maksad, head of Eurasia Group’s Middle East practice. “But this was one of those times where the president just went over and above those differences.”
But even if the sanctions are scrapped, al-Sharaa still faces huge challenges if he wants to make good on the promise of Trump’s move.
For starters, he must tamp down long-standing sectarian tensions. Pro-government gunmen have recently clashed with both the Alawites – the Assad family’s own sect – and the Druze minority, which is backed by Israel. Christian and secular Syrians remain wary of a government still run almost entirely by Islamists close to al-Sharaa. At the same time, efforts to forge a new security force out of the country’s dozens of local militias have slowed.
What’s more, al-Sharaa has yet to follow through on a promise to appoint a new legislative council. The composition of that body will tell us a lot about whether he is willing, or able, to carefully balance the country’s various factions, but it will also serve a more basic function, says al-Assil.
“When we talk about investments and reviving the Syrian economy, that requires new laws to govern those investments, and a space to resolve conflicts so that they aren’t resolved through violence.” To date, that space seems to exist only among a small number of power-brokers close to al-Sharaa.
Lastly, Damascus will have to manage competition among the various outside powers jostling for influence in the new Syria.
The most immediate concern is Syria’s old foe Israel, which since December has moved aggressively to wreck Damascus’s military capabilities and establish its own sphere of influence in Southern Syria. The two sides are now speaking via backchannels, though, giving al-Sharaa the change to reach an understanding with the Israelis that gives him more breathing room.
But even among Syria’s friends there will be friction. The two likely giants on the scene, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, have in the past clashed over Istanbul’s support for Islamist political groups. Riyadh and Doha have had similar run-ins. Competing visions for Syria among its biggest patrons could prove destabilizing.
Despite this thicket of challenges, al-Assil is cautiously optimistic.
“Syrians want this to work,” he says, “they want to navigate a way to reconcile their differences, and they recognize how important this opportunity is. And that gives me hope.”