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Donald Trump gestures after taking the oath of office during his first inauguration in Washington, DC, in January 2017.
Was Iran trying to assassinate Donald Trump?
The Justice Department on Friday charged three men with plotting to assassinate Donald Trump on the orders of the Iranian government.
“The charges announced today expose Iran’s continued brazen attempts to target US citizens, including President-elect Donald Trump, other government leaders and dissidents who criticize the regime in Tehran,” FBI Director Christopher Wray said Friday.
The alleged murder-for-hire scheme was unveiled as investigators interviewed an apparent Afghani Iranian government asset who told them that a contact in Iran’s Revolutionary Guard instructed him to create a plan to surveil and ultimately kill Trump. The plot was unsealed days after Trump prevailed in this week’s presidential election and is purportedly among other ongoing Iranian efforts to take out US government officials on American soil. Another alleged plot targeted Brooklyn-based human rights activist Masih Alinejad. (See Ian Bremmer’s interview with Alinejad in the wake of Mahsa Amini’s in-custody death in Iran from 2022 here).
Two of the three men have been arrested, but one, Farhad Shakeri, remains at large and is believed to be in Iran.
Why would Iran want to kill Trump? During the first Trump presidency, the US and Iran found themselves on the brink of war after Trump ordered a strike that killed Qassem Soleimani, one of Iran’s top generals. Trump also withdrew the US from the Iranian nuclear deal and reimposed economic sanctions on the Islamic Republic.
Iran likely dreads another Trump presidency, not only because the president-elect may pursue another “maximum pressure” strategy, but because he is likely to empower Israel to intensify its fight against Iranian proxies.
A man holds a laptop computer as cyber code is projected on him in this illustration.
How Iran is messing with the US election
Iranian-linked groups have been trying to disrupt the 2024 US presidential election, according to a recent report from Microsoft’s Threat Analysis Center.
On Aug. 10, former President Donald Trump’s campaign claimed that Iranian actors had hacked, stolen, and distributed its internal documents. While the Trump campaign provided few specifics, the claim came a day after Microsoft issued a report detailing Iranian attempts to sow discord online around the upcoming election. The Trump campaign hack appears to line up with what Microsoft called a “spear phishing email” sent from an Iranian-linked group to a “high-ranking official on a presidential campaign.”
Further, Microsoft found that the Iranian group, called Storm-2035, set up four fake news websites, disguised as legitimate American news outlets, with the intention of polarizing American voters on political issues, including LGBTQ rights and the ongoing Israel-Hamas conflict. The group used generative AI-based tools, the report said, to write article headlines and rephrase stolen content to boost traction with search engines. They also used AI tools to plagiarize existing US publications, the report said, but didn’t offer additional specifics.
Microsoft said that while they have seen malicious actors from China, Russia, and Iran trying to incorporate generative AI into their operations, “recently many actors have pivoted back to techniques that have proven effective in the past — simple digital manipulations, mischaracterization of content, and use of trusted labels or logos atop false information.” AI isn’t a breakthrough technology for these groups just yet — though they’re clearly trying to incorporate them into their operations.
Clint Watts, who runs the Microsoft Threat Analysis Center, said Iran’s goal is different from Russia’s past attempts to affect US elections. “Russia is very different. They're very focused on shaping the outcome of the election,” he told NPR. “Iran is focused as much on just breaking the ability of an election to occur" and interrupting the mechanics of voting. In 2021, the US Justice Department indicted two Iranian nationals who sent threatening materials to voters and spread disinformation about election integrity in the run-up to the 2020 presidential election.
Microsoft has previously reported that Russia is actively seeking to undermine US support for Ukraine through online influence campaigns. CNN reported on Aug. 12 that the FBI is investigating the breach.Donald Trump supporters in Huntington Beach, Calif., on July 14, 2024.
Iran reportedly plotted to kill Trump
While Day Two of the RNC focused on “Making America Safer Once Again,” reports surfaced Tuesday that US authorities had received intelligence in recent weeks about an Iranian plot to kill former President Donald Trump.
The warning reportedly led to increased security for Trump, raising even more alarm and questions over the security breach by would-be assassin Thomas Matthew Crooks last Saturday. Officials said no link has been found between Crooks and a foreign plot.
The Trump campaign would not comment on what it knew before Saturday. But the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the UN had plenty to say: It denied the allegations, noting that while Trump is a criminal in Tehran’s mind “and must be prosecuted and punished in a court of law for ordering the assassination of General Soleimani,” Iran is pursuing only legal recourse.
NSC spokesperson Adrienne Watsonsaid the US has “been tracking Iranian threats against former Trump administration officials for years, dating back to the last administration.” She said the threats emanate from Tehran’s desire for revenge over the US drone strike that killed Qasem Soleimani, who was Iran’s top general, which Trump ordered in January 2020.
Flags of Israel and Iran on broken ground.
Israel hits Iran directly – what next?
Well, now we know the answer to the question of how Israel planned to respond to Iran’s recent attack. Explosions were reported early on Friday near the northwestern Iranian city of Isfahan, in what several major outlets reported, citing US officials and local sources, as an apparent Israeli strike.
The blasts come just days after Iran launched its first-ever direct attacks on Israel, launching hundreds of missiles and drones, almost all of which were shot down by Israeli and US missile defenses. That salvo was itself seen as a response to Israel’s strike on an Iranian diplomatic compound in Damascus early this month.
Syria and Iraq blasts reported as well. Blasts possibly related to the strikes on Iran were also reported around the same time at sites in Iraq and Syria. Both countries are home to sizable Iranian proxy forces and intelligence units.
So much for the Passover head fake. Earlier on Thursday, US officials had suggested anonymously that Israel would wait until after the Jewish holiday of Passover, which begins Monday, to retaliate.
No nuclear sites in the crosshairs, it seems. The full extent of the Israeli attack is not yet precisely clear, but the strike doesn't appear to have targeted the Natanz nuclear facility, a major component of Iran’s controversial nuclear program, which is located about 100 miles north of Isfahan. Israel has long made clear its desire to destroy Iran’s nuclear research. The International Atomic Energy Agency, the UN's nuclear watchdog, on Friday said there was "no damage" to Iran's nuclear sites.
Isfahan, meanwhile, is home to several military bases and airfields, which may have been the targets. Iranian officials told the New York Times that a strike hit a military air base near the city. Outside Iran, Isfahan is known chiefly for its rich history of Islamic architecture, which includes several UNESCO heritage sites.
Was this an escalation by Israel? “On the surface, it appears rather limited,” said Gregory Brew, lead Iran analyst at Eurasia Group, “beyond the symbolic significance of Israel hitting Iranian territory.”
Iran isn't blaming Israel. Tehran is claiming to have shot down several drones in the Isfahan area but is downplaying the significance of the incident and hasn't blamed Israel — instead pointing the finger at "infiltrators." Iran has not indicated any plans for retaliation, in a potential sign that it doesn't want to escalate the situation.
“It’s early,” Brew noted, “but the official regime line may be that this is not an action that requires immediate and public retaliation.”
That’s good news even in a bad situation, he says. “It would suggest that the Israeli effort to hit back without triggering further escalation has been successful.”
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Iranian and Israeli flags behind an hourglass.
Iran launches ballistic missiles at Israel in revenge attack
Late Saturday, Tehran launched ballistic and cruise missiles toward Israel as part of a retaliatory attack for the recent Israeli strike on Iran’s consulate in Damascus that killed top Iranian commanders.
IDF Spokesman Daniel Hagari said early Sunday that more than 200 different rockets, including drones and ballistic and cruise missiles, were launched at Israel, with Israeli defenses and partners having intercepted the vast majority. More than 100 drones were intercepted with help from Jordan, the US, and the UK.
More worrying are ballistic missiles. While Israel’s missile defense systems can target them, an attack involving both drones and missiles makes it more likely that some of the Iranian weapons could hit their targets. Medics said shrapnel from one interception injured a girl in the Negev, and Hagari said other impacts had damaged infrastructure at a military base in southern Israel.
There have been fears of an escalation of regional violence ever since Hamas attacked Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, with flareups along the Lebanese border and attacks by Hezbollah and other Iran-backed proxies in the region.
Saturday’s move comes just days after US President Joe Biden warned that Iran was threatening a “significant attack” against Israel. At the time, he promised Washington’s “ironclad” support to Israel, and the US notably has a large number of troops in the region.
Many have feared that a direct attack by Iran could put the entire region at risk. Israel’s top diplomat, Israel Katz, warned earlier this week that “If Iran attacks from its territory, Israel will react and attack in Iran.”
But the Iranian attack may have ended just as quickly as it started. The Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations tweeted that Saturday’s move by Tehran was in response to the “Zionist regime’s aggression against our diplomatic premises in Damascus” and that “The matter can be deemed concluded.”
Ian Bremmer, the president of GZERO Media and Eurasia Group, says this signals that Iran is sending a “strong message that [the] attack is limited” and it's “looking to avoid war with Israel or the United States.”
What we know (and don't know) about Iran's role in the Israel-Hamas war
Hamas’ unprecedented terrorist attack on Israeli soil on Oct. 7 left many with two burning questions: Was Tehran behind it? And if so, would the war between Israel and Hamas expand to include Iran?
Iran had a lot to gain but even more to lose
So far, the answer to the first question appears to be no.
The day after the Hamas attack, citing Hamas and Hezbollah sources, the Wall Street Journal reported that Iran not only gave Hamas the green light but in fact helped the terrorist group plan the operation. However, a few days later the New York Times reported that Tehran was actually surprised by the attack, citing US intelligence. Washington and Jerusalem, meanwhile, have denied having hard evidence of direct Iranian involvement in the Oct. 7 operation.
The strongest argument in favor of Iranian complicity is that Iran has backed Hamas for decades, supplying it with an estimated $70 million a year in funding along with weapons, training, and logistical aid. There’s no doubt that Hamas wouldn’t have been able to carry out an operation of this magnitude without Iranian military and financial support. It’s also likely that members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps had a hand in training the terrorists who carried out the attacks. So it’s not like Iran had nothing to do with it.
However, as of now, there is no evidence tying Iran directly to this specific Hamas operation. Yes, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei celebrated Hamas’ success, but that was to be expected irrespective of direct Iranian involvement, and he unambiguously denied Iran’s participation. The Wall Street Journal report has been broadly disputed, with certain details — such as the alleged involvement of Iran’s foreign minister, who normally has no role in coordinating military operations with regional proxies and who is under close American and Israeli surveillance — casting doubt on its accuracy. By contrast, US intelligence showing that Iranian leaders were themselves caught off guard by the attack is credible.
While it’s true that Hamas’ capabilities rely on Iranian support, the group operates with a broad degree of autonomy and has its own agenda independent of (albeit usually aligned with) Tehran’s. In fact, plausible deniability is a design feature of the proxy relationship between Hamas and Iran, allowing the latter to pressure Israel without becoming involved.
To be sure, Tehran stands to benefit from the ensuing chaos in three ways. First, the attack will keep Israel distracted and focused on domestic security concerns, temporarily limiting its ability to project power regionally. Second, the attack has for now scuttled negotiations for a Saudi-Israeli normalization deal that would have included an implicit commitment to containing Iran. And third, the attack undermines Israel’s image as a military power, while the humanitarian toll of Israel’s devastating response in Gaza will turn global public opinion against the Jewish state.
But Tehran benefitting from the attacks is a far cry from Tehran orchestrating the attacks and risking a war with Israel — and, potentially, the US — at a time when the strategic environment was getting somewhat more constructive for them. Israel had been deterred by the US from attacking Iran, and Netanyahu was distracted by domestic politics. Commercial and diplomatic ties with Beijing and Moscow were booming. Oil exports were flowing again. They had just signed a China-brokered breakthrough agreement to restore full diplomatic relations with their longtime foe Saudi Arabia. They were even days away from receiving $6 billion in frozen funds as part of a prisoner exchange with the US amid a broader de-escalation effort over the past six months. None of these actions and developments implied a desire on the part of Iran to destabilize the region.
No one is interested in a bigger fight … for now
At this point, the likelihood that Iran gets directly involved in the war seems very, very low to me — at least in the near term.
Iran has much to gain from allowing events to play out while keeping its own involvement relatively limited given the risks of disrupting its broader foreign policy strategy, which includes normalization with the Gulf states and a de-escalatory understanding with the US. Case in point: Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi had his first direct call with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman on the back of the attack, where they both called for short-term containment and de-escalation.
Iranian officials did warn that a full ground offensive by Israel into Gaza could elicit a response from proxies like Hezbollah, the Houthis in Yemen, and other groups in Syria and Iraq, with Quds Force commander Esmail Qaani visiting Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq to coordinate among allies. But there are no major drills or troop movements going on among its own forces, so it does not seem like Iran is gearing up for a big fight beyond training or supplying its proxies.
Absent Iranian escalation or conclusive evidence of direct Iranian involvement in the Oct. 7 operation, neither Israel nor the US will take action to expand the crisis with an attack on Iran. Israel will be focused on containing the immediate security threat from Hamas and managing the offensive in Gaza, while the US will support Israel but push back in private against any move to broaden the conflict. (The Biden administration did announce on Oct. 12 that it had “re-frozen” the $6 billion in Iranian funds previously released following significant bipartisan political pressure to get tougher on Iran, but this move was intended for a domestic audience and does not signal more escalation to come.)
Both Israel and the US will remain reluctant to broaden the conflict while the crisis in Gaza is ongoing. If Israel does retaliate against Iran, it will likely do so through covert operations (e.g., sabotage, cyberwarfare, assassinations) at a time and place of its choosing. For its part, the US has limited options to escalate beyond slapping additional (largely symbolic) sanctions on Iranian officials short of clamping down on Iran’s oil exports, which would cause a spike in the price of oil (in turn raising US inflation) and provoke a strong response from Tehran and potentially Beijing (because China refines the bulk of Iranian crude). The risk of the conflict turning into a general war between Iran and Israel and/or the US is therefore low.
In the short term, the biggest risk of the conflict escalating comes not from Iran but from Hezbollah, the crown jewel of Iran’s proxy network. For now, the Lebanon-based group — already in a vulnerable domestic position as Lebanon’s economy remains weak and its public support has suffered — seems uninterested in opening a second front in the war beyond some symbolic strikes and skirmishes along the Israel-Lebanon border. But that could change if Hezbollah and Iran become concerned that Hamas will be completely wiped out.
And if Iran feared both its major proxies in the Levant were about to be destroyed … well, there’s no telling what they might do to avert that.
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Ukraine's Deputy of Defence Minister Hanna Maliar addresses during a media briefing of the Security and Defense Forces of Ukraine in Kyiv, Ukraine on 13 April 2023, amid Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Hard Numbers: Ukraine’s housecleaning continues, China outdoes itself over Taiwan, California sues Big Oil, US loses its wings, Nobody gets to see Cristiano Ronaldo play in Iran
6: The big fall cleaning at the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense continues, as President Zelensky fired six deputy ministers over the weekend. No reason was given, but the move comes just weeks after his office sacked the Defense Minister on allegations of corruption.
103: China set a new record for aerial aggression against Taiwan, sending a total of 103 warplanes towards the island in a mere 24 hours from Sunday to Monday. The move is part of Beijing’s carrot-and-stick approach to influencing Taiwan’s upcoming presidential election. Read more about that here.
135: The state of California, AKA the world’s fifth largest economy, has filed a 135-page lawsuit against the leading American oil companies and lobbying groups, arguing that the industry systematically misled the public about the relationship between fossil fuels and climate change.
80 million: Uh, you lost a what now? The US government is asking for help to locate an $80 million fighter jet that went missing after its pilot ejected somewhere over South Carolina on Sunday. On the plus side, if the US can’t find the state of the art f-35 warplane, chances are the Chinese or Russians can’t either, right? Right?
7: For the first time in 7 years, a Saudi football club will visit Iran, as Al-Nassr, home of living football legend Cristiano Ronaldo, arrives in Tehran. The trip comes amid a thaw between Saudi Arabia and Iran, but fans will have to catch a glimpse of “CR7” anywhere but the pitch, because Al-Nassr’s match against Tehran’s Persepolis isn’t open to fans. The Asian Football Federation reportedly hit Persepolis with a one-game crowd ban after the team goaded an opponent in Goa with a post about Iran’s 18th century invasion of India.
Iran's Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian and Saudi Arabia's Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud hold a press conference in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
As diplomatic thaw continues, Saudi Arabia and Iran exchange ambassadors
The rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran continued this week when the two Middle East powers exchanged ambassadors for the first time in seven years. This comes after they reopened embassies in each other's capitals over the past few months as part of a groundbreaking detente.
Quick recap: The two states had been at loggerheads for years, but things reached a nadir in 2016 after the execution of a Shiite cleric in Saudi Arabia prompted Iranian protesters to storm the Saudi mission in Tehran.
Back in March, China mediated a diplomatic breakthrough between the two forever enemies that have long been locked in regional proxy wars. It was a massive blow for the US, which is concerned about China’s growing clout in the region – at its expense.
Some takeaways: This move suggests that the two sides are committed to moving relations along – even if trust remains limited and the Saudis don’t appear to have much faith that Iran will change its bellicose activities in the region.
This also appears to fit in with Riyadh’s broader strategy of preempting and ameliorating regional crises – including a recent thaw with Bashar Assad in Syria and a potential one with Israel – to lure the investment needed to diversify its economy away from hydrocarbons under its Vision 2030 economic agenda.