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U.S. President Joe Biden walks with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy during an unannounced visit, in Kyiv, Ukraine.
Can the US keep Europe together?
Just days out from the one-year anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, US President Joe Biden is making a splash in Europe. After a surprise stop in Kyiv on Monday, Biden is now in Poland, where he is expected to give a formal address at the Royal Castle gardens in Warsaw on the global state of democracy. He's also set to meet a group of nine eastern European leaders.
Biden’s trip comes amid growing fears in the region of both an imminent military escalation in Ukraine and concern for how long European cohesion on supporting Kyiv will last. This view was reinforced when Poland's Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki recently said: “We must admit that it will be a big challenge to keep the EU member countries enthusiastic.”
Over the past year, there’s been much attention on how a united Europe has served as a crucial punitive force against Russia. But as the war lingers, anxiety is growing about whether deviating interests within Europe could, over time, splinter its war response.
First, what are the differing views within the European camp? Post-Soviet states, like the three Baltic nations, as well as fearful neighbors – like the Scandinavian and Balkan countries – have adopted a hawkish Russia stance. They know what it’s like to live under the fist of an oppressive Soviet state or to be bullied by an expansionist Russia. Crucially, Poland, which has emerged as an anchor for Eastern European unity, recalls all too well how the country was carved up in 1939 between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Fearful of Russia's imperialist aspirations, Warsaw has been channeling its fears by upping its defense budget.
But the view is very different from much of Central and Western Europe — particularly Germany, which, in the post-Cold War years intertwined its economy with Russia’s. The same is true for other EU countries, including Italy and Austria. This economic interdependence has at times slowed some states from adopting the same full-throttled anti-Russia stance as those who feel more directly threatened by Moscow.
“There are many cleavages between Eastern European countries, the Baltic states, and Western European countries,” says Engjellushe Morina, a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. “Eastern Europeans and Baltics have different expectations of European unity because they live right next door to Russia.”
As the war in Ukraine metastasizes, there’s increasing fear among Eastern European states that the rest of Europe, reeling from inflation and other domestic crises (the French right now … ils sont malheureux!), will lose patience with the West’s maximum pressure campaign.
But this would appear to counter a dominant view that Eastern Europe’s clout has grown since the war broke out: “Our voice is now louder and more heard,” Romania’s foreign minister said recently. What’s more, some analysts have credited the bloc’s powerful advocacy with having pushed the Biden administration – followed by European heavyweights – to give Ukraine heavier military equipment.
A divided East. But while Eastern European leaders may have played a more prominent role in leading the charge in recent months – compared, for instance, to 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea – varying priorities impede the bloc from presenting a united front.
Consider that Poland, for its part, abhors the Kremlin and has taken in more Ukrainian refugees than any other country, while Hungary’s PM Viktor Orban, long cozy with Moscow, said this week that he would not break ties with Russia. Serbia is closely aligned with the Kremlin and has not joined NATO, choosing to maintain a neutral defense posture, while Albania, Montenegro, and North Macedonia are NATO members. Meanwhile, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has warned that Bosnia and Herzegovina and Moldova are vulnerable to Russian interference.
Another limiting factor is that the Eastern Europeans don’t have the goods. Estonian PM Kaja Kallas acknowledged this recently when she said, “it’s very easy for me to say … ‘Of course, give fighter jets [to Ukraine] but — I don’t have them.” Likewise, while Poland has called for NATO members to send Kyiv fighter jets, it said that its stockpiles are limited and it needs Washington to lead the way. And even when they do have the goods, Europe's eastern flank often can’t send them to third parties without getting the go-ahead from the heavyweights that produced them. This dynamic was highlighted in recent months when Ukraine pushed for the US, the UK, and Germany to send advanced battle tanks, paving the way for other European allies to do the same.
America's job. As the war passes the one-year mark, the endurance of a united Europe on Ukraine will continue to depend on how well the US can keep the group in check. Why? Because no Europeans seem up to the task.
“There are no European leaders to maintain this unity,” Morina says, adding, “we don‘t see any powerful European countries like France or Germany taking the lead.”
Putin aims to draw Belarus into Ukraine war
Carl Bildt, former prime minister of Sweden, shares his perspective on European politics.
What's the mood in the transatlantic relationship?
Well, not bad. Certainly not, but not as good as it should be. There's been or there is a substantial European irritation with a very high level of subsidies that is given to industries in the US, excluding European deliveries of electric vehicles and energy investments and things like that. And that is causing a somewhat of a mini crisis that I hope will be resolved in the next few months. Let's hope for the best.
What is Mr. Putin doing in Minsk, in Belarus these days?
Well, it's fairly obvious that he's trying to press Belarus and Lukashenko in a far more active role in his aggression against Ukraine. He is now looking medium- and long-term at that particular war. He's probably going to make another go for Kyiv when his new army mobilized hundred thousands of people, when his new army is ready, that he needs Belarus on board. That's in all probability, the meaning of his visit to Minsk today.
US President Joe Biden and French President Emmanuel Macron
Can Macron woo Biden?
French President Emmanuel Macron is in Washington, DC, for an official state visit, the first world leader given that honor since President Joe Biden moved into the White House nearly two years ago.
Marked by military processions and fancy dinner parties, a state visit is essentially the greatest expression of “friendship” between two countries.
Biden and Macron, both known for public displays of affection, will surely go to great lengths to demonstrate that US-French relations are warmer than ever. But behind the scenes, the two leaders will have to hash out a series of thorny issues.
Macron’s already winning. While Macron is hoping to secure certain material gains, the invitation itself is likely already deemed a win by the French president, who has long been trying to carve out his place as the de facto leader of Europe.
To be sure, the competition isn’t stiff: The leader of a degraded Britain was hardly going to get the star treatment from the White House – nor was German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, Angela Merkel’s wildly underwhelming successor.
What’s on the agenda?
Relatively straightforward: Reaffirming the transatlantic alliance and a coordinated Ukraine policy
The US and France have come a long way since Sept. 2021, when Macron briefly withdrew his ambassador from Washington after the AUKUS debacle, where the US froze Paris out of a crucial Asia Pacific security pact with Australia and the UK.
But since then, the US and France – leading the broader European Union – have exhibited a resilient partnership in an effort to isolate Russia and bolster Ukraine. Despite some divergent economic and strategic interests, the EU and US agreed early on to hit the Kremlin with coordinated coercive economic measures, while also presenting a united front on the diplomatic stage. Indeed, Biden and Macron will want to highlight this unity for Presidents Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin watching at home.
However, Biden and Macron have at times seemed to offer conflicting visions of an eventual endgame in Ukraine. While Paris previously called for dialogue with Russia to end the war, Biden has mostly reiterated Kyiv’s view that a settlement will only be reached once Russia withdraws from all Ukrainian territory.
Still, what leaders say in public is often very different from admissions made behind closed doors, and this multi-day summit will give Biden and Macron an opportunity to talk candidly about their views of a lingering conflict that has sent the global economy into a tailspin.
What’s harder to fix?
Made in America vs. Buy European
The EU – and France in particular – has made no secret of the fact that it abhors the Inflation Reduction Act, a key component of Biden’s legislative agenda that includes tax breaks for Americans who purchase electric vehicles made from parts manufactured only in North America. Decrying America’s protectionist policies, which he says discriminate against Europe’s robust auto industry, Macron has called for subsidy loopholes for the EU resembling those given to Mexico and Canada.
But Clayton Allen, a US expert at Eurasia Group, says that remains a pipe dream. “There is no room to extend the same exceptions granted to Mexico and Canada without new legislation,” Allen says, adding that “there is no appetite to pass that legislation in the lame duck [session],” or to do so in the next Congress.
Biden, for his part, “has no real wiggle room on the provisions of the IRA itself,” Allen adds.
Indeed, this sticking point has caused Paris to push its own “Buy European” agenda – a move aggressively backed by Berlin – with Macron calling for Europe to pass its own subsidy package to safeguard key industries.
Still, both Macron and Biden will be keen to stave off a transatlantic trade standoff that could deepen the global financial crisis. Rather, Macron will be trying to feel out how the US might respond to reciprocal protectionist measures.
Energy wars. While energy-dependent Europe is bearing the brunt of Western efforts to transition away from Russian energy exports, the US has in fact benefited from the global energy flux. Indeed, in the first half of 2022, the US surpassed Qatar and Australia to become the number one exporter of liquified natural gas, in large part due to the EU and UK having boosted their LNG imports to offset dwindling supplies from Russian pipelines.
With the EU feeling the pain, Macron has called on the Biden administration to pressure US gas companies to lower prices. The White House, for its part, says that its options are limited, noting that increased LNG prices are largely a result of the US Federal Reserve’s efforts to tackle inflation, which have made US exports more expensive for everyone. In reality, there’s little the Biden administration can do: High global demand for LNG is pushing prices up, including domestically. Indeed, some US lawmakers have even called for export limits on US LNG, but the Biden administration isn’t going for it.
Still, Macron isn’t buying it and accuses the White House of a “double standard” on energy and trade policy.
France and the US: et maintenant?
Despite all the tough talk, European – and French – “political preferences will be to maintain transatlantic unity over the Ukraine war and avoid a trade spat with the US,” says Mujtaba Rahman, Europe Managing Director at Eurasia Group. Indeed, Uncle Sam seems to be in a strong bargaining position.
Wolfgang Ischinger: Ukraine made German foreign policy go "out the window"
For Wolfgang Ischinger, former chair of the Munich Security Conference, the state of transatlantic relations is in good shape right now, although whether we'll have the stamina to stay on course is uncertain. In a Global Stage interview with Ian Bremmer, he seems more worried about American war fatigue than the Europeans — although the EU has Viktor Orbán and it's hard for Germany to cut off Russian gas. One lesson Ischinger has learned from the current crisis is that Europe must have America's back on China, especially with Taiwan. And he calls German Chancellor Olaf Scholz's recent foreign policy U-turns as "going out the window."
Ian Bremmer: With my friend Wolfgang Ischinger here at the World Economic Forum in Davos. Wolfgang, so state of transatlantic relations today, from the Davos perspective, what do you think?
Wolfgang Ischinger: Good shape. Better than at any time in recent memory. If we had had a Davos a year ago, we would've been talking about the debacle of Afghanistan, et cetera. We're in good shape now. NATO is essentially on track, the European Union has surprisingly not fallen apart. I think my only concern is if it is correct to assume that this war in Ukraine will drag on for not weeks but months, are we going to be in good shape three, six, nine months down the road? That's my concern. Are we going to have the stamina to stay on course?
Ian Bremmer: Now, question; to the extent that war fatigue is starting to set in over time, and again, I think most people presume this is not ending any time soon.
Wolfgang Ischinger: Exactly.
Ian Bremmer: Does it come first from the Europeans or from the Americans? And why?
Wolfgang Ischinger: Well, let's talk about America for a moment. You guys have elections coming up, midterm elections, and I'm not so certain that the average American voter is going to like the idea of paying higher gas prices and spending more money on foreign expeditions, etc., etc. So I'm worried a little bit about the American commitment longer term. In Europe, I think at the moment we're in good shape, but of course we have these outliers. We have Viktor Orbán.
Ian Bremmer: Hungary.
Wolfgang Ischinger: We have Hungary, and we have a couple of other partners that have specific interests. Germany has its own problem with gas. I wish I could say in six weeks or in 12 weeks, we're going to be able to cut gas imports from Russia. It's hard to do. It's hard to do, and I feel sorry for those in my own government who have to respond to this urgent question from our Ukrainian partners. When are you going to stop financing the Russian war of aggression by continuing to buy this stuff? But then again, it's not going to help if Germany cuts gas imports now. With the obvious, obvious consequence of a significant recession, then of course the commitment by the German wider public for our Ukrainian determination will surely shrink. And whose interest would we serve with that? So this is really a dilemma.
Ian Bremmer: And the Americans and the Europeans have had diversion perspectives for a while on Russia that are now aligning. They've also had some diversion perspectives on China for a while.
Wolfgang Ischinger: Yes. Yeah.
Ian Bremmer: Are they now aligning?
Wolfgang Ischinger: I think there's one lesson we are learning, we Europeans. We cannot ignore that the US is looking at a huge problem, potential problem with China, with the Taiwan issue, etc. And we cannot possibly leave the United States alone in that. In other words, we need to understand that even though this is many thousands of miles away, it is in our interest to get involved. Maybe not militarily, we don't have the capacities militarily, but certainly politically, and we need much closer coordination between Washington, and Brussels, and Berlin and Paris on China.
Ian Bremmer: And Olaf Scholz so far, when you saw that initial speech he gave, the turning point speech he gave, did it reflect for you a new strategic vision for Germany? Is this a new generation for Germany in politics or is it more modest than that?
Wolfgang Ischinger: No. It was a major decision. Look, essential elements of established German foreign policy went up the chimney.
Ian Bremmer: We'd say out the window.
Wolfgang Ischinger: Out the window.
Ian Bremmer: But that sounds more definitive, if it's up the chimney.
Wolfgang Ischinger: Out the window. The idea which about which we had been preaching for many years, the future partnership with Russia; out the window, no longer possible. The idea of a security order for all of Europe, with Russia included; out the window. In other words for no country has this Russian attack against Ukraine produced more sharp cuts and the need for total revision of our foreign policy. The problem for Olaf Scholz is not that he gave the wrong speech. The problem for him is that it's not so clear that all of his followers in his own party agree with his speech-
Ian Bremmer: Social democrats.
Wolfgang Ischinger: And with the consequences of spending a hundred billion extra on defense, and on meeting the 2% defense goal going forward, etc. So, he has to fight this internal political fight, not against the opposition, which supports him, but against his own party.
Ian Bremmer: The Americans have been saying for a long time, how come the Europeans aren't sacrificing the Germans? The Europeans are sacrificing more this time around. There's no question.
Wolfgang Ischinger: Yes. Absolutely.
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US President Joe Biden
Biden goes to Europe to talk Ukraine. Will it make a difference?
Wars can make or break political careers. They present opportunities for leaders to show off their statesman bonafides, or alternatively, to flounder.
The test is on this week for US President Joe Biden as he heads to Europe to shore up allied resolve against Russia’s assault on Ukraine. Biden likely hopes he can rally European countries to put further pressure on Moscow and force the Kremlin to make some concessions. Can he pull it off?
Biden on tour. On Wednesday, Biden flies to Brussels, where he’ll meet with NATO members and European leaders Thursday. He’ll say all the right things about the transatlantic relationship and America’s enduring commitment to European security interests.
Biden will then fly to Warsaw, where he’ll meet President Andrzej Duda as a show of solidarity amid the ballooning Ukrainian refugee crisis spilling over into Eastern Europe. Poland, which shares a 300-mile border with Ukraine, has absorbed roughly 2 million Ukrainian refugees thus far, and Polish society is already feeling the pinch of this massive absorption effort.
The leaders of Poland, Slovenia, and the Czech Republic visited Kyiv last week, and former Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko said recently that Biden should make the trip to Ukraine in a show of support. But the White House has said there is no plan for Biden to visit Ukraine.
“This is a country at war,” US Ambassador to the United Nations Linda Thomas-Greenfield has said. “I can’t imagine that [a Biden visit to Kyiv] would be on the table.” But US presidents have visited war zones many times, and a Biden touchdown in Kyiv would send a powerful message to Ukrainians, and the Kremlin.
Heavy on symbolism, light on action. Washington and Brussels have already rejected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s requests to establish a no-fly zone over Ukraine because Moscow would likely see it as an act of war. They’ve also balked at requests to provide Soviet-era fighter jets to Kyiv, claiming that this would bring NATO members into direct conflict with Moscow.
Still, transatlantic allies will be under pressure to announce something after this week’s summit. Washington has tried recently to get Turkey, a NATO member, to transfer the sophisticated Russian-made S-400 missile system to Ukraine, according to Reuters. But such a move would infuriate the Kremlin, and Ankara, which shares a maritime border with Kyiv and Moscow in the Black Sea, knows that it would be playing with fire.
But the West still has plenty of other options up its sleeves to inflict further pain on the Kremlin. Crucially, the EU is discussing measures targeting Russia’s energy exports, says Edoardo Saravelle, a former energy and economics researcher at the Center for a New American Security. “Biden’s presence could help build a consensus on Europe’s next step on energy. Much will depend on building so-called ‘sanctions resilience,’ that is, ensuring that Europe has the resources and support to weather potential economic collateral damage from additional sanctions on Russia,” Saravelle says.
Indeed, the United States and Europe could also announce new ways to tighten financial sanctions and target more high-profile Russians. “Given the high-profile nature of the trip and the general trend of transatlantic coordination in sanctions actions since the invasion,” Saravelle says, “it seems likely that some sanctions announcement will come from President Biden’s travel, even if short of the strongest energy measures.”
What else is on the agenda? The alliance might also try to establish a blueprint for easing – or lifting – crippling economic sanctions on Russia. Though Brussels and Washington have been in lockstep in recent weeks, it still isn’t clear what Western preconditions are for loosening the chokehold on Russia’s economy.
What’s more, the Biden administration says that Russia is preparing to use chemical weapons on Ukrainian civilians and to launch cyberattacks on American infrastructure. Haunted by the ghost of Syria’s past, will Biden establish a “red line” requiring Western military intervention?
The China equation. Amid reports that Vladimir Putin has called on Beijing to supply Moscow with weapons and economic support, President Biden held a long call with his Chinese counterpart last Friday in which he tried to dissuade President Xi Jinping from rescuing Moscow. Indeed, ahead of an upcoming EU-China virtual summit on April 1, Biden wants to make sure that the EU and US speak with a single voice when navigating relations with Beijing.
Quick Take: "America Is Back": Biden on Munich's virtual tour
Ian's Quick Take:
Hi everybody, Ian Bremmer here on a snowy Friday in New York City. But if it was any other year, I'd actually be in Munich right now for the annual Munich Security Conference. It's the largest gathering every year of foreign and security policy leaders and experts from the transatlantic community, and increasingly from around the world. It's, for obvious reasons, postponed this year, they're hoping to put something together in the summer in-person, but that didn't stop some of the most prominent leaders across the transatlantic partners from speaking virtually at an event that streamed live over a few hours today. So, given that I thought I'd give you a quick response on what I thought was happening and answer some of your questions.
So, first of all, President Biden, Chancellor Angela Merkel, French President Emmanuel Macron, and the UK's Boris Johnson all spoke today, as well as multilateral leaders like António Guterres, my buddy from the UN and Dr. Tedros Adhanom of the World Health Organization. The pandemic, vaccine rollout, distribution, renewed commitment to transatlantic partnerships, the big topics today.
Let me first give you some highlights. Obviously, the big news is a sense of enthusiasm from the leaders that were speaking. You look at the transatlantic relationship, America First under President Trump was not meant to be popular in Europe, it was not popular in Europe. All of the leaders speaking today with Biden, happy to bang on the message that the United States is back on the global stage and embraces multilateralism and wants to work primarily with American allies.
Biden himself, committing to working together with partners on a host of issues like pandemic response and vaccine distribution, as well as climate change. Just a very different top-line message, a very different feel from the American president than we've seen from the last four years of Trump. Maybe the most interesting point from Joe Biden was him describing the world as being at an inflection point, calling out the need to defend democracy in the United States, as well as in Europe and saying to combat the rise of autocracy, you have to demonstrate that democracy can deliver for our people. And on the back of January 6th in the United States, on the back of a contested election, that many Americans still believe was stolen, on the back of so many in Western democracies that increasingly see the Chinese model seems stable and it's economically continuing to succeed, but they're getting angry about the effectiveness of their own democracies well before they exported, that certainly was a message, not of American exceptionalism, but rather of American potential, rather of what needs to be done, the work that needs to be done before the US can really be back. I think it's important, it's fine to say that America's back, but it's not like everybody really believes that we can just jump into the status quo ante.
Angela Merkel, this is her swan song. This is 16 years of Chancellor of Germany, and they come to an end this year. A very similar message, a very aligned message. I felt pretty confident that both Merkel and Biden had read each other's draft speeches before they gave their own comments, which is kind of a nice thing to see, shared belief that the democracy is the foundation of the transatlantic partnership, more than shared security, more than economic interests, alignment of values. Again, something that has taken an enormous hit over the past several years, both inside Europe and increasingly inside the United States to an even greater degree. And so, even though the allies may not agree on every issue and in some, they clearly don't, that on core values compared to countries like Russia and Iran and China and other rogue States around the world, that this is what the transatlantic relationship is founded on, and certainly what the Munich Security Conference has been founded on.
The reality is that there is near-term relief from everybody appearing, but also a lot of long-term mistrust, at least unease and still not an awful lot of real policy alignment. I mean, you see President Biden right before this speech announcing tougher "buy American" clauses to ensure that when the US spends trillions of dollars in relief and stimulus, that it goes to the United States and its corporations, and it doesn't go to other countries around the world, no matter how aligned they are. That is much more of an America First policy perspective, and much more unilateralism than the multilateralism that is being touted. But of course, that's a reality for how politics in Washington gets done, especially given how divided and how angry the population is. Europe doing an awful lot of that on issues like trade and technology as well. The US much more worried about China as the principal national security threat out there. Europe, it depends on who you talk to, not so much. Economics, much more important. Certainly, willingness to go after China on values, much, much weaker in the case of Europe these days. And the United States, increasingly not as interested in the Middle East, not like Europe has much of a choice, geographically and that is also going to be an area of tension.
Among other major themes today, climate for sure. Bill Gates, giving a speech drawing comparisons between climate change and global response on pandemic saying, "There is no vaccine for the environment and that we can't wait until it's too late." By the way, I'd add, there's also no vaccine for political divisions inside the United States and Europe. Another big problem, perhaps one that we'll hear Biden say in future speeches. Gates also said that by the end of the century, climate change will kill five times as many people per year as the pandemic is right now. Clearly that is what he is pivoting towards in terms of top priorities now that the vaccines have such a strong kickstart in the United States and increasingly in Europe too.
Also heard today on climate from John Kerry, President Biden's Special Envoy for Climate, it is a cabinet position, a new one, that climate change must be treated as a national security issue. Everyone in the Biden administration is rowing in the same direction on that. By the way, we expect at least two to $3 trillion for green infrastructure after the 1.9 trillion in initial coronavirus relief is passed in the coming weeks. That is an enormously big deal for 2021 made possible because you actually have 50 Democrats in Senate. A lot of that will be paid for by taxes, additional taxes, corporate taxes, taxes on the wealthy, but a lot of that's going to be more deficit financing as well. So, you're going to have your infrastructure year after so much failure for so many decades in the United States for not putting money into that as we see playing out in Texas, for example, right now. Also, Boris Johnson, the UK Prime Minister calling for building back better and greener after the pandemic, certainly wanting to show how aligned he is with the US and the Biden administration after the shambolic Brexit proceedings over the course of the last five plus years.
Cyber and technology, also a big topic. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen notably calling for ensuring that what is illegal offline is also illegal online and for internet companies to take a lot more responsibility for that. By the way, this is clearly the issue where there's very little alignment between the US and Europe. There is certainly no strategy between the two. I would argue that the Europeans mistrust the United States on tech policy almost as much as they mistrust China, which is quite something and going to be very hard to align this year.
Anyway, the first of several virtual events like this, I'm sure, on the road to Munich 2021, organizers of the conference, very optimistic that an in-person or hybrid event is going to happen later this year. When it does, GZERO will certainly be there to cover it.
Okay, I said I'd answer a couple of your questions. Here we go. I have them from you.
Number one, isn't it in the EU's interest to see more pro-China now that they are their biggest trade partners?
Oh, absolutely. I mean, lots of sharp language about the challenge posed by China across the board and the need to put up better competition. But the Europeans clearly see that on issues of trade and investment, China matters a lot more to them. And unless the United States has a very clear and aligned strategy that is very attractive to the Europeans in the near term, they are going to continue to hedge like crazy. Keep in mind, China's only getting bigger. By 2028, the expectation is that China becomes the largest economy in the world with a very different economic model, a very different political model, a very different technological model, a very different set of standards and architecture. The transatlantic relationship was set up common values, but also security dealing with Russia where actually for the United States, the principal concern now overwhelmingly is China and that's a real serious problem.
Okay. How much does Merkel's departure and Super Mario's arrival matter for US-European relations?
Surprisingly, not a single direct mention of Mario Draghi today. I'm a little shocked about that. I mean, this guy, after Merkel, is the most significant, the most respected leader on the European continent and he has just taken over a big majority as Prime Minister in Italy. This is the best news for one of the largest economies in the EU and he is a super advocate of stronger, more integrated European Union and a strong relationship with the United States. I'm really surprised that there were no callouts about Draghi's. The biggest, biggest mistake in my view made by the leaders speaking today. But I certainly think it will be good for US-EU relations, it will be good for keeping the Europeans closer together. As we know, in Italy, you can never count on governments for long, but this one is good while it lasts.
What will the international community do to ensure universal vaccine equity, particularly where's there's minimal state capacity and/or regime reluctance?
It's going to be tough. It's great that we saw that Joe Biden is committing $2 billion to COVAX with a pledge of an additional $2 billion if others step up. Emmanuel Macron talking about Africa, specifically, calling for a lot more aid to ensure that all healthcare workers there, he says about 6.5 million people, get the vaccine immediately. But the reality is you're getting vaccines to wealthy countries well before it gets to poorer countries, well before it gets to the poorest countries. You're rolling out vaccines, really fast to the wealthy countries, it's extraordinary. Most of the world still hasn't gotten their first jab yet. In most of the world's countries still haven't gotten their first job yet. So, there is an obvious and massive question on vaccine equity and it's going to hurt a lot of the economies of the world pretty stiffly. It's more of an economic issue than a healthcare issue. So many of these countries, very, very young people, which means not many people get really sick. Most of the spread is asymptomatic, but it's going to hurt them in terms of reopening their economies, getting their people to travel, remittances that come from that, all of these challenges, that's a big lift. I hope we'll see more.
So, that's it for me. I hope you enjoyed this. I hope you found the Munich coverage interesting and worthwhile and have a great weekend. Stay safe, stay warm and avoid people.
Europe’s place in tomorrow’s world
How can European Union leaders boost the long-term security and prosperity of EU members while advancing a European vision for the future in an era of intensifying rivalry between the US and China? That's a subject of hot debate inside the EU these days.
Should Europe…
- Double down on strengthening traditional transatlantic relations in hopes of containing China's growing power to set new trade and technology rules, and to buttress support for "Western values" of human rights and individual liberty?
- Engage both newly dysfunctional Washington and ever-more-assertive Beijing?
- Strengthen Europe's strategic independence from the US and China?
For the moment, the answer looks to be "all of the above."
The EU is clearly hoping that President Biden will boost US-EU relations. As part of his "America First" approach to foreign policy, and warning that US allies take American taxpayers for suckers, former president Donald Trump proved willing to question the value of NATO and to slap tariffs on European steel and aluminum.It's no surprise then that after Biden's November victory, the European Commission quickly issued a report titled "A new EU-US agenda for global change," which called for greater transatlantic cooperation on trade, digital regulation and data privacy, strengthening NATO, screening foreign (particularly Chinese) investment, and limiting China's ability to set new technology standards.
And yet… As I wrote last Friday, European allies are all too aware that Trump and his defiantly unilateralist approach to traditional US allies remain popular with enough Americans that Europe could face a less friendly face in Washington again very soon. There is also recognition in Europe that China remains strong and resilient — and will continue to offer important commercial opportunities for European companies.
That's why the EU was also quick to sign a major investment deal with China, once Biden's victory persuaded China to offer important last-minute concessions. Beijing wants to avoid a united US-EU break on the expansion of its global influence on trade and tech. While the Biden team hoped Europe would hold off on the agreement, EU officials saw it differently and were willing to set aside deep concerns about China's recent push to limit democracy in Hong Kong and its use of Uighur Muslim slave labor in the Chinese region of Xinjiang. Germany's Angela Merkel has publicly rejected calls to contain China in favor of pragmatic engagement.
But change is coming to Europe. Merkel will soon exit the stage, and France's Emmanuel Macron will become, at least temporarily, Europe's most prominent voice. And Macron, like many French presidents extending back to Charles de Gaulle, is a forceful champion of European strategic independence. His vision of European "collective security" would give the EU a robust defense capability outside NATO, easing dependence on the US for European security. Macron's recent high-profile debate on the subject with German Defense Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer underlines his ambition. There are also those who want to strengthen the euro for greater use as an international reserve currency to relieve deep dependence on the dollar.
For now, realism will prevail. Despite decades of differences on important question, the EU has no more powerful military and trade ally than the United States. NATO boosts Europe's security at low cost to European taxpayers. Yet, the commercial opportunities offered by China and Beijing's growing global influence will only expand. Macron will soon be far too distracted by next year's French elections to change skeptical minds on strategic autonomy.
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