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How Trump's assertive foreign policy impacts international relations
And the response by President Trump was immediately 25%, maybe 50% tariffs, and shut off visas and shut down diplomatic engagement. And there was immediate response by President Petro that was over the top, and as Trump's own responses are over the top, and going to completely hit the Americans back really hard. Now, America is Colombia's most important trade partner, and the size of these countries is a little bit different. And within a couple of hours, Petro very quietly accepted Trump's terms. The deported Colombians will be accepted back in Colombia, and the trade war with Colombia is in our rearview mirror. Not really a surprise.
So Trump is going out there, and he's saying all these extraordinary, extravagant things. Huge exaggerations about what he demands and what he wants. And if you're Colombia, the response was absolutely on par. I mean, the post that we saw from President Petro, who is also kind of a populist firebrand on the left, isn't enormously popular, frankly, and has had a lot of difficulty in passing economic policies. But he gave it a shot and it was entertaining to watch and read and a lot of Colombians responded well to it. It felt like good old nationalism. And of course, he had to back down. Why? Because you're not allowed to do the same thing that Trump is. It's not just about who's right, it's also about who's powerful. And Trump's more than happy to hit him with a stick. And so that turned out to be a loss pretty quickly for the Colombian government.
There are a lot of other countries that are working the same way. I see this happening with Mexico where the Mexican president has been incredibly careful. US is the most important relationship. Suddenly they are seizing enormous amounts of fentanyl. More in one seizure than they've done in four years under Biden and showing Trump, "Look at what we can accomplish because we know this is important to you." And working to get Chinese trade and investment that is problematic and coming through to the United States out of Mexico and willing to put more money and resources, people on Mexico's southern border to reduce the numbers of people that are coming through Mexico into the United States. They desperately don't want to fight with the Americans. They're going to make a lot of offers. Call it defense. Call it capitulation. But that's definitely what you're seeing.
I see this from Denmark, which is publicly trying to say nothing. There've been some leaks. But in general it's been very careful both from Denmark and all of the Nordic leaders I've spoken to, they've been very, very careful. Nothing public about the challenges that they're having. Of course, privately completely unacceptable that the United States would make demands of Greenland and wouldn't work through a very stalwart, though small, ally. The Danes who do everything the Americans ask in terms of coordinating on military exercises and providing multilateral support when the Americans want more participation in different wars or humanitarian support. You name it, the Danes are there. But that didn't matter to Trump. He said, "I want Greenland."
And they are privately trying really hard to get this out of the headlines to say nothing that would be provocative, not respond the way the Colombian President did, not get Trump to do anything even more angry. And instead, find a way to keep Greenland a part of Denmark, don't vote for independence and keep the alliance stable. Most places around the world, that's what they're doing. They're acting like Mark Zuckerberg and Meta and all of those tech titans that have given the money and have gone down to Mar-a-Lago and are saying, "No, we've always loved you Trump and we want to work with you and please don't hurt us."
But there are a few exceptions and I think it's worth mentioning who I think they are. Exception number one, this may surprise you: Canada. Canada is an exception not because they're unfriendly with the US, not because they don't depend on the US, but because they have an election coming up. Their government fell apart. And now everybody in Canada is angry at the United States with all of this threat of tariffs and we want more money for the Americans for security, and you guys should be a 51st state. Not only are the liberals angry, the conservatives are angry and they have to outdo each other to be tough on Trump in the United States or they think they're going to lose the election upcoming. So the fact is that Trump, I think, made a strategic mistake in going after Canada early because the Canadians are not in the position to respond well given the election.
The other two exceptions, the Europeans who want to be constructive with the US but have a stronger position if they can be collective through the EU and on some areas they can. On Russia-Ukraine, they can be collective, which has helped them bring Trump closer to the European position on Russia-Ukraine in the last three months than he was when he was initially elected. On trade, on tariffs, on China, Europe is more collective and has more regulatory force as long as they can act together. That is going to continue to happen, gives them more leverage, vis-a-vis the Americans.
And then finally the Chinese who don't act collectively, but they are stronger as an individual country. And they're going to be much tougher to engage with as we saw with the first phase one, phase two trade deal. It took a very long time to sort of come together and then they didn't actually uphold a lot of what they promised. A lot of decent conversations, but the Chinese were much more willing to lecture Marco Rubio in their first call with the US Secretary of State than anyone else he has spoken with around the world. Why is that? Because the Chinese want to show they're not going to be pushovers and that they are tougher and bigger and stronger and can hit back the way that many other countries cannot. What does that mean for US-China relationship? Probably going to get worse before it gets better. That would be my bet at this point. But we'll see how much of a deal Trump really wants.
That's it for me. I'll talk to you all real soon.
Trump's Davos address sets up big shifts in US strategy
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: A Quick Take to close out our week in Davos, Switzerland.
Want to talk about now President Trump's address; virtual, direct to everybody, collected yesterday, assembled yesterday, to hear his speech, and then to ask a few pre-planned questions. The speech itself, at the beginning, not all that surprising, "America's back open for business. Everything was horrible before. Everything's going to be great, now." Not a surprise, kind of exaggerated. You'd never think that the US was by far the strongest-performing economy in the advanced industrial world, coming out of the pandemic. But people roll their eyes a bit, they get on getting on. There was still a fair amount of news that was actually made, and some interesting thoughts about where the initial Trump administration is going to go.
First point, on OPEC, talks a lot about Saudi Arabia directly, Mohammed bin Salman. They're very close, they've worked together closely. Not only when he was president the first time, it was his first trip as president back in 2017, but since then. A lot of business with the family as well. And has been promised $600 billion to invest in the United States directly. That beats the $500 billion announcement that the AI giants have just made in what they're going to do, this Stargate project. He likes that. He said, "Why don't you up it to a trillion?" That's a round number. Good thing we're base-10 in this country. Anyway, the fact that Trump is interested in engaging very closely with the Saudis, not a surprise at all, there is going to be a very big push to try to ensure that Saudi Arabia moves on normalization of relations with Israel. Given the fact that there's no two-state solution on the table for the Palestinians, that's challenging, but I wouldn't count it out, frankly.
Secondly, a lot of talk about oil and the fact that Trump really doesn't like where oil prices are right now. Now, the Americans are going to try to pump more, but he knows that there's only so much that can be done in the near term, maybe another 500,000 barrels a day. OPEC, on the other hand, has over four million barrels that are off the market. Why? Because they're willing to ensure that prices are comparatively high. And if that means they lose a little bit of market share, they're happy to do that. Well, Trump doesn't like that one bit, and especially because he wants to hit Iran hard, and take more of their oil off the market. He doesn't want prices to go up, so he wants the Saudis to lean in. How are they going to react? We'll see. Something at least nominal in the near-term, that brings prices maybe down towards, let's say, $70, as opposed to roughly $80, where they've been, that would be interesting to see. I wouldn't put it past the Saudis at all to lean in on that.
Secondly, China. We are going to now see tariffs early on China, 10% across the board, February 1. Markets seem to like the fact that, on the first day, Trump didn't do anything, but a few days later, is that really much better? What was interesting about the conversation, Trump is trying to make it very clear, he doesn't have an ideological beef with China. He continues to speak broadly, more warmly about Xi Jinping, and specifically about China, than generally President Biden has. That's not all that different from the first term, but it's different from expectations over the past few months. And I do expect we're going to see a summit meeting relatively soon, even though there's been no announcements around it. Having said all of that, the fact that the US has a really tough take on China, not only bilaterally but also versus all these other countries, Trump wants to punish the Europeans to ensure that they coordinate with the US on China, wants to ensure the Mexicans, the Indians, the Vietnamese, and others don't allow Chinese goods into the US through their countries.
It's very hard for the US and China to maintain a stable relationship when Trump's going to respond to China, "Well, that's our business. Those are relations with other countries. You have nothing to say about it." They're really stuck on this, and I expect that, despite maybe a bit of a honeymoon, which I wasn't thinking we'd have a few weeks ago, the US-China relations are still going to get a lot more challenging over the coming months.
And then we have Russia. And I thought it was very interesting that when Trump was asked, "So, next year at Davos, if you were here, is the war going to be over between Russia and Ukraine?" Because, of course, he's been saying, "I can end the war in a day." Then he's saying, "100 days." Now, he's saying, "Actually, the Ukrainians are ready for a deal." And by the way, that's true. But you're going to have to ask the Russians. Well, that's very different from, "I can get the deal done very easily."
He also continues to lean into the fact that the Chinese can be useful here, and that's true. That's something that the Biden administration and Trump administration actually agree pretty strongly on, that China has a lot more direct leverage over Russia than the United States does. And there's only so much the US can do with additional sanctions to convince the Russians to stop. Now, Trump can say that Russia needs to end the war, and that this is hurting them, but Putin doesn't actually feel that way. Certainly isn't prepared to accept less than the territory that he's presently occupying. So that, to me, is very interesting.
I would say the place that Trump has moved the most in the last three months, moved specifically towards the position that the Europeans have, and they're a lot less panicked about it now than they were even a week ago, is on the Russia-Ukraine issue. No one here in Europe, not one European leader I spoke with, now believes that Trump is going to basically throw Zelenskyy under the bus. And that's absolutely not where they were even, let's say, in December. So, that's a big deal.
That doesn't mean that the Europeans are feeling comfortable about Trump because, of course, Trump does not like Europe. Does not like a consolidated Europe, doesn't think a strong Europe is good for the United States. He wants to deal with individual European countries, and he wants to deal, of course, preferably with more Europe-first types in those individual countries. So, it's not the British Prime Minister, it's not the German Chancellor. It's organizations like the Reform Party and AFD. And, of course, Giorgia Meloni from Italy. He also bitterly complains about all the regulations, all the taxes, how hard it is to do business in Europe, how hard it is to do business with Europe. And that is a big challenge for Europe, that understands they need to be more competitive, but isn't prepared to spend the money, isn't capable of coordinating to get the kind of industrial policy done that the Americans are now doing.
So, on defense, on Ukraine, existential threat from Russia, Europe's doing a lot more coordination with the United States. On the economy, which concerns the Europeans equally much, and technology, where the Americans are a clear leader and leaning in very heavily, and the regulations are only going to get more comfortable and aligned with the technology companies, those that remain, the regulations, that is, not the tech companies, the Europeans are in very serious trouble.
So, that's it from me. I hope you all guys are well, and I'll talk to you all from New York next week.
How US foreign policy brought us Bad Bunny
Donald Trump wants to take back the Panama Canal, and Bad Bunny’s new album "DeBÍ TiRAR MáS FOToS" is the most streamed record in the world right now. What do these two things have to do with each other?
More than you’d think.
That’s because reggaetón, the genre Bad Bunny is best known for, was actually born on the banks of the Panama Canal. And American foreign policy is part of that story.
When the Americans built the canal in the years before World War I, they brought in thousands of workers from across the West Indies, but especially Jamaica, to do the hard labor. Afterward, those laborers were permitted to live and work in the Canal Zone, a strip of US sovereign territory inside Panama that flanked the canal, ensuring US control over the waterway.
The Panamanians didn’t love this arrangement. Many felt the original canal treaties were illegitimate, and resentment at the US presence grew. In 1964, when the US stopped students from flying a Panamanian flag in the Canal Zone, a mass riot left four American soldiers and 22 Panamanian police officers dead. The Soviet Union blasted Washington’s “colonizing policy.” Fidel Castro decried “Yankee imperialism.”
In 1977, US President Jimmy Carter decided to give the canal to Panama. Carter thought this would improve America’s relations with Latin America, and avoid a more costly crisis around the Canal itself.
“Fairness, not force, should lie at the heart of our dealings with the rest of the world,” he said at the time.
Carter’s plan was unpopular at home. The stiffest opposition came from a telegenic young California governor named Ronald Reagan. But Carter’s dogged lobbying – and some help from John Wayne, whose first wife was Panamanian – helped to win narrow passage of the handover treaties. The canal itself wouldn't be given to Panama until 1999, but the controversial canal zone was dissolved almost immediately, in 1979.
And that’s where the music comes back into the story. Many of the Jamaicans and West Indians living in the Canal Zone moved to nearby Panama City. And when they did, they brought with them the popular new sound coming out of Jamaica at the time – “dancehall,” a rawer, streetier, more club-oriented successor to the reggae of the 1970s.
It wasn’t long before dancehall was reinterpreted in Spanish, becoming a new genre called Reggae en Español, a unique mashup made by the West Indians of the Canal Zone and Panama’s own Afro-Panamanian communities.
But we still aren’t in Puerto Rico yet! Right. We’re getting there.
In 1985, one of the pioneers of the Panamanian scene, known as El General, moved to New York. There he introduced the sound to the city’s huge Puerto Rican diaspora, who helped popularize it back on the island where, in turn, local artists brought hip-hop and Puerto Rican traditional styles into a musical mix that would soon go from the streets of Panama and Puerto Rico to the whole globe.
The first documented use of the term reggaeton dates from this period, when a young Daddy Yankee (whose song “Gasolina” would become the first global reggaeton hit in 2004) used it in a freestyle on an early 1990s mixtape. And just a few years after that, Benito Antonio Martínez Ocasio was born in Bayamón, Puerto Rico.
You now know young Benito as "Bad Bunny."
So why does Trump want the canal back anyway? He thinks it was a “mistake” to give up a canal that handles more than 5% of global trade. As Trump sees it, the US is locked in a zero-sum economic competition with China, and controlling that canal is critical, whether the Panamanians like it or not.
This is the inverse of Carter’s formulation – Trump's world is one where force is squarely at the center of America’s dealings with both friends and foes.
Trump's view echoes older ideas about America’s natural right to expand and dominate the Western Hemisphere. His America will, he says, be one that “expands our territory ... and carries our flag into new and beautiful horizons,” as he pledged in his inaugural address.
But do you know what the last major US territorial expansion in Latin America was? It was the takeover, in 1898, of Puerto Rico, as a result of the Spanish-American war. The island has been, in effect, a colony of the US ever since.
And to come full circle here, the negative impacts of that 127-year relationship – political repression, exploitative neglect, mass emigration, and creeping gentrification – are all major themes of … Bad Bunny’s new album.
If you want to learn more about this story – including the complicated issues of class, gender, and race that are part of reggaeton’s evolution – check out the podcast “LOUD,” a history narrated by Ivy Queen, one of the pioneering women of the genre.
From Davos: How global leaders are grappling with Trump’s return
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: A Quick Take to kick off your week.
I am standing here at the World Economic Forum's annual meeting in Davos, Switzerland. And of course, it's a split screen right now because everyone's also got their eyes back on Washington, DC and the inauguration for the second time of Donald Trump as president. It is the end of the post-Cold War order. That's what Borge Brende said, he runs the World Economic Forum, in a piece in the New York Times. I call it the G-Zero world, but this is the organization that's most committed to that order over the last 50 years. And of course, committed to doesn't necessarily mean fighting for. I think that's part of the issue, is that so many people, whether they were captains of industry, or media leaders, or heads of state, just believe that, well, after the Soviet Union was defeated, a united, more multilateral, globalized order was just what was coming.
And so, we didn't have to do anything. We just had to keep on keeping on. Of course, that isn't the way it felt for an awful lot of people living inside those countries. And the Americans definitively elected Trump not just once, but twice. And the first time, it was an experiment. He was an outsider to shake things up. The second time, you're electing somebody who's already been impeached twice, who's been convicted for crimes, who's already made very clear that he has no interest in promoting a US-led multilateral order. And that is exactly what people wanted, or at least, more people than wanted the alternative. And so that's where we are.
Outside of the United States, and Davos is mostly about other countries, 60 heads of state are here, and CEOs from all over the world, it’s really a question of how are you responding to that? And I would say that there's a big question of whether or not you accept it and normalize and capitulate, or whether you try to fight. And overwhelmingly, what we have is the former. I mean, the number of times you're talking about things that you never would have found acceptable, a year ago, five years ago, from the United States, cryptocurrencies being launched by the president in the days before his inauguration, making billions, tens of billions of dollars, that's just the way it's done in the United States now. Elon Musk joining phone calls and meetings with CEOs and heads of state. Really bizarre if that was happening with any other leader. But if the United States is doing it, I guess that's just the way it's done. And if the Americans are telling you we're going to take Greenland or we're going to take Canada, we're going to take the Panama Canal, well, we're not going to take that seriously, but we do recognize that we're going to have to give them a little something, because otherwise it's going to cause us a lot of damage.
One major exception here is that I don't expect the Chinese to capitulate at all. I mean, they're talking with the Americans, and maybe there will even be a meeting in the early days, a summit meeting between Donald Trump and XI Jinping. That's very different from a breakthrough deal. And rather, I think we’re at the beginning of what's very likely to be a trade war between the two largest economies in the world. And frankly, of all the things I just mentioned, that's probably the one that is going to concern the attendees of the World Economic Forum the most. Certainly, the one that's going to affect them most.
Anyway, that's where we're starting off with the summit this week. There'll be massive number of meetings over the course of the next few days and I'm sure I'll talk to you again. Talk soon.
Gaza ceasefire likely as Biden and Trump both push
Ian Bremmer shares his insights on global politics this week on World In :60.
A Gaza ceasefire has gained momentum. What is the likelihood a deal will be reached soon?
We've heard this news before. At least five times over the last year that we've heard we were almost at a Gaza ceasefire. This time around though it looks much more likely. Why is that? Because Trump is about to be president, because Trump's envoys and Biden's envoys have been working together on these issues, and also because that means pressing the Israeli government in a way that feels much more serious if you are the prime minister. And also because Trump has been pressing Hamas. And so, I think the unilateralism is there. The fact the deal was already very close, and now this means Biden gets to say he got the deal and Trump gets to say he's ended a war, at least for the time being, and a lot more hostages get freed. So yeah, this time around it looks pretty likely.
What do I make of a potential sale of TikTok to Elon Musk?
Well, it's just been announced that the Chinese are considering it. I always thought that it was more likely than not that if the Supreme Court were to uphold a ban that the Chinese would probably allow a sale to go through. Though they were going to say they were never going to until the last moment because why give up leverage when you don't necessarily have to? So their historic unwillingness doesn't mean to me that they're actually unwilling. To the extent that there is a deal and it goes to Elon, he becomes more powerful, and he also is seen by the Chinese as owing them one. So would he facilitate an improved, a more stable relationship between the US and China? It's an early indication that he could play a role. He hasn't said anything on the China front yet, but certainly you would expect that he would meet with the high-level envoy that's going to the inauguration that Xi Jinping was invited to on the 20th. That's what we should watch in the next week. Okay, that's it for that one.
What does Lebanon's new president mean for Hezbollah?
Weaker Hezbollah, but so much is going to be determined on what Israel decides to do on the ground in the south of Lebanon. Are they staying there for a longer period of time? We've heard news of late that they intend to maintain that occupation in a longer than just couple of weeks, couple of months environment, which makes it harder to keep Hezbollah from starting fighting again. On balance, I think this ceasefire is looking a little shakier right now, even with the new Lebanese president than it had a few weeks ago. We'll see. But if it does break down, the level of fighting won't be what it was a few months ago because Hezbollah doesn't have that capacity and the Iranians can't restock their weapons because Assad has fallen in Syria.
What Greenlanders might want from a deal with Trump
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: a Quick Take to kick off your week.
Let's talk about Greenland. First time I ever encountered it was when I was playing Risk in school, and it was this big island between North America and Europe that connected you with Iceland. But it was part of North America, at least on the Risk map, and that's how you got your five armies if you owned the whole thing. So you always threw a couple up there, a lot of big, big territory. And now we're visiting, and Donald Trump Jr. taking Air Trump One last week and landing in Nuuk, the capital of Greenland. Landed for a few hours, did some social media stuff, and then got back to Mar-a-Lago, where he's probably more comfortable. What's happening? Why do the Americans say that they are going to buy it, incoming President Trump, and what does it mean for American alliances and the future of the global order and all of that?
Well, first, let's recognize that as much as it sounds crazy, Trump is not the first president to offer to buy Greenland. He's actually the third. The first was Andrew Johnson. His Secretary of State, William Seward, who was down for Alaska, also offered 5.5 million to buy Greenland. This was back in 1868. The timing is interesting, of course. There's no historic claim on Greenland. The US troops did briefly occupy it in World War II for defensive purposes, but it's not as if the United States has any reason to believe that this should be American. It's not like, say, what the Russians say about Crimea.
And the Greenlandic government, which is itself, it represents all of 55,000 people, despite the size, is led by a separatist political party. They want independence. Independence is popular in Greenland. They've had a few polls, and people generally say that they'd like to be Greenlanders and not part of Denmark. And they are clearly leveraging all of this spotlight from Trump to advance having an independence referendum during parliamentary elections coming up real soon, like in April. And frankly, given that Denmark is a tiny country and spends about $500 million a year on Greenland, that if the Americans came over the top and said, "Well, we'd make you an ally. We'd put troops on the ground and we'd pay you more, not taking it over, Greenland would be an independent state." I think it would be much more likely that Greenland would actually vote for independence. And then, Trump would say, "We've got a new ally, and we've got everything we wanted. And we have these basing rights for the Arctic," and all of that.
It's pretty significant in terms of talking about the Nordics. Denmark has had Greenland as part of its territory since 1830. And Greenland is autonomous, they have their own parliament, which means they are right now in charge of their own domestic affairs, but not foreign or security affairs. So in that regard, also much like Crimea under Ukraine. But they have moved more towards an independence movement over the past decades. In part, self-determination is what people generally are aiming for around the world, with better understanding of others, post-colonial, being able to achieve it for themselves. Also, because there's a difficult history with Denmark. A lot of forced integration, taking Greenlanders from their homes, from their families, to put them in Danish schools and make them more Danish. Even forced birth control to reduce the Greenland explosion of population. Those things are not happening now, but that is a history that was exploitative and makes a lot of Greenlanders feel about the Danes the way that a lot of Native Americans feel about the United States. So, it's understandable why there would be an independence movement.
Now, the Danes, in addition to all the European leaders, are squashing any idea that Greenland is for sale, but that is very different from Greenland might well go independent. And there's no question that Greenland is important, particularly in terms of national security. Russia has put billions of dollars into Arctic infrastructure, including its Northern Fleet, and they're the only country in the world that's really actively trying to seize the Arctic's economic and strategic potential. That's going to become much more important as the ice cap melts, with transit routes, with exploitation of resources. The United States did have some troops on the ground, a meaningful number, in Greenland, something like 10,000. It's now down to 200. They've reduced that. They could certainly expand it with a new relationship with an independent Greenland.
Of course, they could also expand it with a new relationship with Denmark, of which Greenland is a part, Trump not all that interested in that because it doesn't make spectacular headlines, and also because he likes real estate. Let's face it, you look at him personally, and he loves putting his names on pieces of property that are iconic and that have a large visual footprint in the minds of people. And historically, he almost lost his economic empire a few times by holding on to iconic real estate for too long. So is that a factor in how Trump thinks about Greenland? You'd have to imagine it plays a role. So I think we are going to be talking about this actually a lot more over the coming months, and it's going to have a lot more to do with what 55,000 Greenlanders decide to vote for. And then how the Americans negotiate with them.
- Trump wants something, but likely not a 51st state ›
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- The Graphic Truth: The politics of polar bears ›
- It's Not So Absurd To Want Greenland ›
- Trump talks of taking the Panama Canal - and jokes about Elon Musk ›
- What Trump wants from Greenland, Canada, Panama … and more - GZERO Media ›
Meta scraps fact-checking program: What next?
Ian Bremmer shares his insights on global politics this week on World In :60.
What do you make of Meta ending its fact-checking program?
Well, it's a direct response to Trump's victory and a little late. They probably could have done it a few weeks ago, but they wanted to line up their new board members with people that are more aligned with Trump and also their new head of public policy. Now that Nick Clegg, who was much more oriented to Harris, is gone. So, they're like everybody else, heading to Mar-a-Lago and wanting to get on board with the new administration. That is what's happening. And of course, it means implications for those concerned about safety features on social media are going to grow. This is a complete shift of the pendulum in the other direction.
What is the fallout from Justin Trudeau's resignation?
It's not surprising. He's been there for 10 years. His popularity had really fallen off a cliff. And that was even before Chrystia Freeland, his deputy prime minister, shot him in the face a few weeks ago. So, it was clear that he was going to go. The most important implication is that after elections coming up, you're likely to have a conservative government run by Pierre Poilievre, which will be much more aligned with Trump. I don't consider Poilievre's policies to be very America First-ish for Canada. He's not quite that kind of a politician. But he will be, I think, very supported by Trump, Elon Musk and right-wing populists in the United States.
So, in that regard, as you think about re-upping the US-Mexico-Canada relationship, agreement-trade relationship, you talk about tariffs and all the rest, I suspect that relationship will be more normalized and more stable for the Canadians going forward.
As Trump is about to kick off his second term, who are his friends around the world?
A lot more than he had last time around. I mean, you could focus on Argentina and President Milei. In the recent G20 Summit, Trump wasn't there yet, but Milei was. And I mean his talking points were as if Trump was in the room. Of course, Giorgia Meloni, who just made her trip to Mar-a-Lago, she's very strongly pro-EU. But she's also very aligned personally with Trump. And that is going to be a strong relationship for them.
Germans are going to have their election shortly. Friedrich Merz is likely to win. And I suspect he's going to be much closer to Trump, certainly than outgoing Chancellor Olaf Scholz has been. The Gulf States, Israel, that was Trump's first trip as president back in 2017, will be his early trip. I am very sure in this presidency, very strong relations. Don't sleep on Narendra Modi in India either. That's it for me. I'll talk to you all real soon.
What Trump's Panama Canal threats reveal about today's geopolitics
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: A Quick Take to kick off your Merry Christmas week. Maybe it'll be a little bit quieter, but it doesn't feel that way these days.
I wanted to talk a little bit about the statements from President-elect Trump about the territories that he seems to have some interest in. Over the last day, we've had statements that the US should take the Panama Canal, and some memes being posted by Trump and the vice president-elect. And he said that it used to belong to the United States, the Panama Canal, and President Jimmy Carter foolishly gave it away. And now he wants it back. And is it because he's angry that the Panamanian government is claiming that he owes lots of taxes for Trump properties? Maybe. Certainly, the governments don't like each other. The Panamanian president came out and said sovereignty and independence of his country are not negotiable, not surprisingly.
And then, Trump with another statement, and it's not the first time, saying that ownership and control of Greenland is an absolute necessity. In his first administration, he wanted to try to buy it. Denmark said no. Now he's saying, "Look, national security reasons for the United States, absolute necessity, that's like pretty much 100%, right? So, got to take Greenland over." And the Greenland prime minister has said it's very much not for sale.
So, look, what are we talking about here? Well, first, national security reasons are of course defined by the United States as the most powerful country. That is a different type of US exceptionalism. Historically, US exceptionalism was more about the idea that the Americans actually had right on their side, and so their values were somehow different and better than those of other countries.
Now, it's more about we want it. It's for our national security. It has nothing to do with values, but we can get away with it because we are stronger. Now, lots of countries do this. Russia they have made that argument about Crimea, which used to belong to the Soviet Union under the leadership in Moscow and the Russian Federation first among equals. And then was given to the Ukrainians by Khrushchev, which I remember Elon Musk referred to as "Khrushchev's mistake," which seemed the kind of thing he wouldn't come up with and would've heard from the Kremlin. Now they want it, and they want it because it was historically theirs, and they shouldn't have given it back. And so, it doesn't matter if the Ukrainians have sovereignty, and the locals wanted to be a part of Russia anyway, which is true in the case of Crimea. Not in the case of the Southeast Ukrainian territories that the Russians presently occupy.
But of course, it's against international law. Having said that, against international law, when you're the more powerful country, doesn't seem to matter very much in today's international environment. Certainly not as much as it used to. That's why Ukraine is going to get partitioned, and Ukraine is going to have to accept a loss of territory de facto in order to maintain security guarantees going forward. We see this in terms of China and the "nine-dash line" in the South China Sea, which clearly is ridiculous, if anyone that looks at a map recognizes that China should have no claim on all of this territory and the resources inside that territory. But China's more powerful than all these other countries, like Indonesia, and the Philippines, and so they can get away with a lot more.
Israel in the West Bank, and more territory that they're taking, and more territory just in the last couple of weeks that they say is temporary. But for how long? Who knows. Near the Golan Heights, strategically important for them, national security reasons, so it's ours, right? That is where we are heading.
And does Trump mean it? Probably not. He didn't mean it last time with Greenland. It's just a negotiating stance, and he exaggerates a fair amount. And he's looking to both say things that amuse him and put other countries on the back foot. Just like he did with Prime Minister Justin Trudeau in Canada who is facing a much harder domestic political time because Trump is making him look like an idiot on the international stage, and Trump and the US are a lot more powerful than Trudeau in Canada.
But it does matter if the United States doesn't support international law. It does matter if the US is not interested in upholding its existing trade deals, its existing collective security agreements. And unlike in 2016, when Trump won for the first time, this time around there's more legitimacy to it in the United States. And what I mean by that is, Trump won, and he won the popular vote. And he almost got 50% of all of the voters in the United States. And it's not like Americans don't know what Trump did, don't know what he's accused of, don't know his role around January 6th, don't know what he's intending to do going forward. They're fully aware of this, and they voted for him anyway. Or maybe I should say they voted for him in part because of that.
So, you don't get to blame the Russians, which was farcical back in 2016, but no one's even trying to make that argument now. Trump won, and Trump won on an agenda that he is now very much moving forward with. And that is going to be a big issue for other countries because they are a lot less powerful than the United States. Elon Musk, similar challenge here, acting in many ways as the most powerful person in the US government after Trump. Certainly the most unfettered, and when he comes out publicly and says that Germany's in trouble if it's not for the alternatives for Deutschland, the AFD, it's not close to a majority of support in Germany, but the German government's in trouble. And he will push for more support for a Euro-skeptic group. Very far on the right in the German political spectrum, and the German government is going to be scared.
How much do you want to go after Elon and push him back when you know that he has the full support of the American president? Do you really want to fight with him? And the answer is a lot less than you would've been willing to fight with him before Trump won. So, I think all of this is really creating a much more transactional law of the jungle global space, where both the United States, and China, and a number of other countries are increasingly playing by a very similar lack of rule book if you will. And we're becoming more a world of winners and losers, as opposed to a world of leaders that bring people together, and that is a problem. We've experienced that in the past, but we haven't experienced it when the challenges are so obviously larger, the national challenges.
So, clearly global challenges when it comes to climate, or it comes to AI, when it comes to the proliferation of dangerous weapons. So, clearly a much more dangerous environment is the consequence of all of that, and that's how I think I respond to what I see from Trump. Not that it's so different from what we're seeing from other countries, but precisely because it's so similar, and because those are countries that the Americans historically are like, "No, no, no, we don't play by that." And that's increasingly where we are. So, anyway, a lot that we'll be looking towards in 2025, and a very, very volatile geopolitical environment. Merry Christmas to everyone. Hope you have a happy New Year, and I'll talk to you all real soon.