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An Indian security personnel stands guard as women voters queue to cast their ballots at a polling station during the Budgam Assembly constituency bypoll in Budgam district, Jammu and Kashmir, on November 11, 2025.
What We’re Watching: Modi tested in India elections, Iraq election promises little, Cambodia-Thailand truce on the rocks
Local election test for India’s prime minister
The state of Bihar, population 174 million, is holding local legislative elections seen as a test for Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his ruling BJP party, which is currently in power there. Local parties aligned with the opposition Congress party are posing a stiff challenge in an election focused on poverty alleviation (Bihar is India’s poorest state) and competing welfare schemes for female voters, who are now an important bloc. But with Modi under broader economic pressure from US tariffs and Russian oil sanctions, a loss in Bihar would be a bad omen. Adding to his woes, authorities are still seeking those responsible for a terrorist attack that killed 13 outside the historic Red Fort in Delhi yesterday.
Iraq’s election pits Washington against Tehran
Iraqis head to the polls today to vote for the country’s 329-member parliament, largely disillusioned over what they see as an election that will just be used to figure out how to divide the Middle East country’s oil reserves. That’s not the top concern for Iraqis: endemic corruption, inadequate services, and high unemployment are also leaving voters frustrated. The next Parliament will also have to contend with a delicate foreign policy balance: they must placate dozens of armed groups that have Iranian ties, while the US pressures them to dismantle these groups. Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani’s party is forecast to win the most seats but fall short of a majority.
Cambodia and Thailand suspend Trump-brokered peace deal
On Monday, Thailand suspended peace talks with Cambodia after two soldiers were killed by a landmine in disputed border territory. The two countries had been planning to start negotiations to release prisoners of war tomorrow, but that has now been called off. Cambodia denies laying new landmines – saying they are the remnants of three decades of war in the region. The two-week old Donald Trump-brokered peace agreement now hangs in the balance. The US president initiated the ceasefire by threatening to stop tariff negotiations if the conflict continued – will he intervene again to get it back on track?
US President Donald Trump welcomes Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to the White House for bilateral discussions about trade and security on February 13, 2025.
Is a US-India détente near?
After months of tensions between the world’s richest country and the world’s most populous one, it appears that the United States and India are on the verge of making a trade deal.
“We’re going to be bringing the tariffs down,” US President Donald Trump said during a swearing-in ceremony for the newly-minted US Ambassador to India Sergio Gor, while noting that India’s purchases of Russian oil have decreased. He didn’t give a timeframe, but added that the two sides were “pretty close” to a deal.
The inevitable question will be how much Trump lowers the tariff. The US president slapped a 25% levy on India in late July, in part because of Delhi’s purchases of Russian oil. When India refused to tell their companies to stop buying Russian crude, the tariff doubled to 50%.
“India’s oil purchases from Russia are on the downward trend,” Ashok Malik, partner and chair of The Asia Group’s India practice, told GZERO. “This creates a pathway for the removal of the 25% ‘oil tariff’ on India and, coinciding with Ambassador Sergio Gor’s arrival, steps towards the trade agreement.”
How did we even get here? Trump and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi were two peas in a pod during the former’s first term in office. The two leaders believed in espousing strength and in a foreign policy that prioritized bilateral relationships over multilateral agreements. They both viewed radical Islam and China with skepticism. When they held a giant rally together in Houston in 2019 – labeled, “Howdy, Modi” – the pair held hands.
“India was central in terms of our Asian strategy… It was incredibly simpatico between the two leaders,” Matthew Bartlett, who served in the US State Department during Trump’s first term, told GZERO. “Now there’s a new, rather difficult dynamic – maybe dysfunction – to it, and you would hope that we would be able to put this back on track in short time.”
When Trump returned to office earlier this year, it appeared that the two would start where they left off. Modi visited the White House in February, and the two leaders exchanged effusive messages.
But the good times didn’t last. Six months ago, when India and Pakistan announced a ceasefire following a brief flare-up in Jammu and Kashmir, Islamabad credited the Trump administration for helping to foster the peace, whereas India said the White House wasn’t involved. The issue was exacerbated when Trump told Modi over the phone that he was proud of the role he played in fostering peace – the Indian leader rejected his counterpart’s account.
Then in July, the tariff war began. Months later, even as the US has struck deals with the European Union, Japan, South Korea, and its greatest rival China, it still hadn’t reached any sort of truce with India. Washington’s 50% levy on India is now larger than the 47% effective rate on China.
“The entire dialogue between India and the US reached a boiling point where it was just very tense in terms of relations,” said Bartlett. “I think even Modi dodged Trump on his last trip.”
Further, Trump announced last week that he would exempt Hungary from Russian oil sanctions. No such luxuries were afforded to India, the second-highest purchaser of Russian oil.
The duties have taken a toll: Indian goods exports to the US, its largest foreign market, are down 40% over the last few months. Smartphones and pharmaceuticals were hit especially hard – exports of the former plunged by 58% from May to June. In September, the country’s trade deficit reached its highest level in 13 months.
Then the season changed. Tensions started to ease during the fall, as Modi and Trump shared kind words on social media following a September phone call. Then India started to comply with the new sanctions on Russian crude – they won’t even come into place until Nov. 21. A deal now appears imminent.
While conversations are moving in the right direction again, Malik says the relationship isn’t yet back to the heady days of that famous Houston rally.
“Does this resolve all problems and clean up all the bad blood from the past few months? Likely not,” said Malik. “But that’s fodder for a considered assessment on another day.”
The surprising similarities between China and the US
The US and China are often cast as opposites: East vs. West, democratic vs. authoritarian, market-led vs. centrally-planned. But according to Dan Wang, author of the new book “Breakneck: China’s Quest to Engineer the Future,” the two countries are more alike than you might realize. Wang joins Ian Bremmer on GZERO World to talk about the US, China, and their competing visions for the future. Despite their political and cultural differences, the two superpowers share a restless drive to build, innovate, and hustle—a hunger for the “technological sublime” that pushes both countries toward big projects and ambitions.
But there’s also a more complicated side to that ambition. In China, entrepreneurs are caught between opportunity and uncertainty, never sure when the Communist Party and Xi Jinping’s “smothering love” might smash one of their businesses or punish their success. In the US, tech leaders have more freedom to pursue their goals but still need to cozy up to power in their own ways, courting the Trump administration for favorable policies and legislation. Ultimately, two very different systems have led to strikingly similar ambitions (and anxieties) when it comes to innovation and the race to build the future.
“There is a sense in which these are two great powers,” Wang says, “And that the US and China are the countries that are going to be changing the world.”GZERO World with Ian Bremmer, the award-winning weekly global affairs series, airs nationwide on US public television stations (check local listings).
New digital episodes of GZERO World are released every Monday on YouTube. Don't miss an episode: subscribe to GZERO's YouTube channel and turn on notifications (🔔). GZERO World with Ian Bremmer airs on US public television weekly - check local listings.
Pope Leo XIV presides over a mass at Saint John Lateran archbasilica in Vatican City on November 9, 2025.
Pope vs president: could Leo sway American Catholic voters?
It’s been six months since the Catholic Church elected its first American pope, Leo XIV. Since then, the Chicago-born pontiff has had sharp words for another high-profile US leader: President Donald Trump, most recently urging “deep reflection” on Trump’s treatment of migrants. Leo’s interventions have irked the White House – but could they also shape political opinion in America?
What has Leo said – and how has the White House responded? Shortly after his election as Pope, a series of tweets by Robert Prevost (Leo’s lay moniker) attacking Trump’s migration policies and the views of Vice President JD Vance went viral, prompting former Trump advisor Steve Bannon to call Leo the “worst pick for MAGA Catholics.” Vance, who converted to Catholicism at age 35, responded, “I try not to play the politicization of the Pope game.”
In October, Leo described Secretary of War Pete Hegseth’s remarks to US generals that, “The only mission of the newly restored Department of War is this: warfighting, preparing for war and preparing to win, unrelenting and uncompromising in that pursuit,” as “worrying.” He also questioned whether someone who is against abortion but “in agreement with the inhuman treatment of immigrants who are in the United States” could be considered “pro-life.” White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt, herself a Catholic, subsequently rejected the pope's claim that the Trump administration's treatment of migrants was inhumane.
On November 7, Leo criticized ICE for denying deportees their religious rights, including to take communion, and added that US military and enforcement actions could “fuel regional tension” in Latin America. In response, Homeland Security Assistant Secretary Tricia McLaughlin posted to X that, “Religious organizations have ALWAYS been welcome to provide services to detainees in ICE detention facilities.”
Continuity with Pope Francis. Leo’s predecessor was also a vocal critic of Trump. In February 2016, Francis criticized Trump’s plan for a border wall with Mexico, and in February 2025 penned a letter to Catholic bishops in the US stating that US deportations were damaging “the dignity of many men and women.”
How are Leo’s words being received by American Catholics? Reactions vary. Some American bishops and Catholic charities say Leo’s comments have emboldened their efforts to assist immigrants. But some conservative US Catholics are dismayed that the pope would challenge a president they see as a friend of their faith.
Leo is also seen as attempting to sway Catholic lawmakers. According to Catholic historian Austen Ivereigh, “When the Pope speaks very definitely like this, it does put pressure on the US administration – particularly those who identify as Catholics.”
Could Leo influence the Catholic and Hispanic vote in the US? In 2024, Trump got 55% of the Catholic vote; one in five Trump voters was a follower of the faith. He got 42% of the Hispanic vote, up from 28% in 2016 and 32% in 2020. However, in last week’s gubernatorial and mayoral elections, Latino districts went significantly Democrat, voting 68% for the Democratic candidate for governor in New Jersey and 67% in Virginia. Support is slipping due to anger at immigration crackdowns – the same issue taken up by Leo.
The extent to which the pope can influence voting patterns is unclear, but his views appear to align with many Hispanic Catholics, 65% of whom believed immigrants should have a pathway to citizenship, per a PRRI poll last year. If Trump continues to adopt a severe tone on immigration, he risks repelling a group of voters who had been shifting in his direction as the US heads into a midterm election year.
Is the US falling behind China?
Over the last two decades, China has transformed into an engineering state. Its ability to build almost anything—bridges, high-speed rail, entire cities from nothing—has led to record growth, but also domestic challenges and soaring debt. On GZERO World, Ian Bremmer sits down with Dan Wang, tech analyst and author of the new book “Breakneck: China’s Quest to Engineer the Future,” to talk about China’s rapid growth, the US-China relationship, and who is winning the race for technological and economic supremacy.
For better or worse, Wang says that China has leaned into a belief that almost anything can be engineered. They’ve invested massively in infrastructure, which has improved life for Chinese citizens in many ways, but the country is also dealing with a stagnating economy and record youth unemployment. China’s “engineering” mentality has led to a stubborn belief that society itself can be built from the top down, Wang says, often to draconian results like the harsh ‘zero Covid’ rules or state crackdowns on the tech sector. Can the US learn from China’s rise and avoid its mistakes?
“China's a country I describe as the ‘engineering state’ because they build a lot,” Wang explains, “They also treat society as a big engineering project, where people are yet another building material that the leadership just want to tweak and destroy if necessary.”
GZERO World with Ian Bremmer, the award-winning weekly global affairs series, airs nationwide on US public television stations (check local listings).
New digital episodes of GZERO World are released every Monday on YouTube.Don't miss an episode: subscribe to GZERO's YouTube channel and turn on notifications (🔔). GZERO World with Ian Bremmer airs on US public television weekly - check local listings.
US President Donald Trump and Hungary's Prime Minister Viktor Orbán shake hands as they pose for a photo, at a world leaders' summit on ending the Gaza war, amid a US-brokered prisoner-hostage swap and ceasefire deal between Israel and Hamas, in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, on October 13, 2025.
What We’re Watching: Orbán seeks Russian oil carveout from Trump, Nigerien uranium to pass through risky area, Israel hits southern Lebanon
MAGA’s European hero comes to Washington – with a mission
Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán will visit the White House today to try to convince US President Donald Trump to allow him to continue purchasing Russian oil despite new US sanctions on Russia’s two largest oil firms. Oil refineries in China and India – the largest two buyers of Russian oil – are already exploring alternatives. But Orbán is hoping he can leverage his personal and ideological connection to Trump to gain a carveout. Landlocked Hungary relies on Russian pipelines for nearly 90% of its oil, though other non-Russian import routes via the Balkans are also possible. With the opposition surging ahead of next April’s election, there’s a lot on the line for Orbán. Will Trump give his mate a favor, or put his foot down?
Will Nigerien uranium reach Russia?
French officials believe Russian nuclear giant Rosatom struck a $170-million deal with the ruling military junta in Niger to purchase 1,000 tons of uranium from a mine formerly run by a French firm. The reported deal is the latest sign of Russia’s growing influence in the region, at the expense of the former colonial power, France. The greater concern with this purchase, though, could be that the uranium will have to pass through areas of Burkina Faso that are controlled by jihadist groups. Islamist militants are gaining momentum in West Africa – they have the Malian capital surrounded – sparking concern among governments in the region.
Israel attacks southern Lebanon
Israel temporarily breached its ceasefire deal with Lebanon on Thursday, issuing evacuation orders before bombing buildings in southern Lebanon it claimed were a part of Hezbollah’s military infrastructure. One person was killed and three were injured, per media reports. The Israeli military said the strikes were due to Hezbollah rebuilding its military capabilities, despite the Lebanese government agreeing to disarm the group. Fears are rising in Lebanon that Israel may resume major airstrikes if Hezbollah doesn’t give up its weapons soon, but Lebanon's government worries about inflaming local tensions if they push Hezbollah too aggressively.
October 21, 2025: The owner of this cattle feedlot in Sergeant Bluff, Iowa, USA, used to fly a Trump/Vance flag. The Trump/Vance flag is no longer flying at the feedlot.
Farmers feel the impact of Trump’s trade policies
These days, US farmers aren’t just worried about the weather jeopardizing their harvests. They’re keeping a close eye on geopolitical storms as well.
The American agricultural industry exports roughly 20% of its production, making it heavily reliant on global trade. This year, China – the third biggest buyer of US agriculture – has drastically cut back orders in response to President Donald Trump’s tariffs. While China agreed to resume buying soybeans, a major import crop, after meeting with Trump at the ASEAN summit last week, it has not bought any US corn, wheat, sorghum, or soybeans so far this year. Accordingly, the USDA projects that American agricultural exports to China will fall 30% compared to last year, to $17 billion. That’s down more than 50% since 2022.
“There’s uncertainty in the markets,” Farm Bureau economist Dr. Faith Parum explains. “Farmers are making decisions now for next year, unsure of where the markets are for what they planted this year.”
Parum says she is “optimistic” about the trade deals Trump made with Southeast Asian countries at the ASEAN summit last week, as Malaysia, Cambodia, and Vietnam all opened up to more US exports. The region is now the fastest-growing export market for US agriculture, with over $12 billion in products shipped there last year.
But the US-China trade tensions come at a bad time for many farmers. Despite a record corn harvest this year, many US growers are losing more than $100 an acre, according to Parum, squeezed between falling crop prices, a result of losing their major buyer, and rising production costs. Parum says production costs, like fertilizer, transportation, and labor, have increased over the past few years. Fertilizer prices have not stabilized since Russia’s full scale invasion of Ukraine, and have risen since July because of China limiting exports. Meanwhile, immigration crackdowns have caused the price of farm labor to go up.
From 2020 to 2022, 61% of the hired farm workers were immigrants, and only 7% were US born – the rest were immigrants who had obtained US citizenship. As a result, according to Eurasia Group US policy expert Noah Daponte-Smith, “A lot of [workers] are losing their authorization to work or being deported outright. And that is creating labor market pressures in the food supply chain that are pushing prices up.”
“[Immigration] is one of these issues where administration policy counteracts other policies, namely: keeping food prices down,” Daponte-Smith added.
This tension can also be seen in the meat aisle. Beef prices are at record highs due to droughts which have shrunk herd sizes. Trump’s solution was to quadruple imports of Argentine beef. The deal gave Argentine President Javier Milei, an ideological ally of Trump’s, a lifeline ahead of midterm election but enraged US beef producers who were suddenly subjected to more foreign competition. The pushback was immediate, prompting Vice President JD Vance to hold a private meeting with lawmakers from leading agricultural states to hear out their grievances.
There’s a political component to this: America’s agriculture industry is disproportionately consolidated in Republican led-states like Iowa, Texas, and Nebraska, and farmers are an “ancestral” contingent of the GOP, says Daponte-Smith. Republicans have a 25-point advantage over the Democratic party in rural areas of the country, according to Pew Research Center.
“Trump’s between a rock and a hard place,” says Daponte-Smith. “The administration campaigned on an anti-inflation message, but his efforts to bring prices down anger a core Republican constituency.”
Yet farmers remain optimistic about the country’s direction, according to Purdue University, with 71% saying the US is “headed in the right direction.” However, confidence in tariffs has declined: only 51% now believe tariffs will strengthen the agricultural economy, down from 70% in spring. Meanwhile, 30% think tariffs will weaken it.
Politically, Trump appears to be moving quickly to neutralize the farm backlash, offering farmers a multibillion dollar financial support package drawn from tariff revenues.
“They don’t want this to be happening next August,” says Daponte-Smith. “That’s when it really could be an issue.”
America’s “buy now, pay later” trap
The United States is #winning.
At least that’s how it looks if you’re tracking the economy, market indices, or the parade of countries lining up to cut deals with President Donald Trump. Asian and Gulf countries have pledged trillions of dollars in foreign direct investment in the US during the Trump presidency. The United Kingdom, the European Union, and several Southeast Asian nations have offered non-reciprocal trade deals. Canada folded on its plan to impose a digital services tax. Japan made unilateral concessions on automotive tariffs and Nippon Steel. European pharmaceutical companies are relocating production stateside to avoid punitive tariffs. Consumer confidence may be in the doldrums, but spending remains resilient (driven by the wealthiest Americans). Combined with an artificial intelligence spending boom and massive deficit spending – enabled by the dollar’s ongoing status as the global reserve currency – markets continue betting on American liquidity and growth.
It’s a heady moment. But while the short-term picture looks strong, the United States is systematically trading long-term strategic advantages for immediate tactical gains, with the accumulating costs hiding in plain sight.
Start with immigration. For decades, the cornerstone of America’s technological, economic, and soft-power dominance has been its ability to attract the best and brightest from around the world. Talented engineers, scientists, and entrepreneurs long chose the US because it promised opportunity, freedom, openness, and meritocracy – a fair shot at the American Dream. Now, the welcome mat is fraying. The Trump administration is increasingly hostile to immigrants (whether legal or illegal, skilled or unskilled), nativist sentiment among Americans is growing, and civil liberties (especially for non-white immigrants) feel increasingly uncertain. The numbers speak for themselves: International student arrivals to the US have declined by nearly 20% relative to last year. Meanwhile, China is rolling out new visas explicitly designed to poach high-skilled workers from the United States, and Canada is plastering airports with recruitment pitches. As America becomes a less attractive destination for top global talent relative to its competitors, the long-term economic damage will compound.
Then there are the universities. Yes, many humanities departments had grown intellectually insular and politically captured. Taking on these echo chambers for fringe woke ideology was long overdue. But the Trump administration has gone much further, slashing research infrastructure at America’s (and the world’s) finest universities. These institutions are what keep America at the cutting edge of advanced science and technology and draw the most talented students globally – the ones who become tomorrow’s leading researchers, inventors, and entrepreneurs. Undermining that ecosystem will erode one of the most important pillars of the US economy at a time when public trust in science itself is declining. Growing vaccine skepticism, embrace of conspiracy theories, reflexive rejection of expertise – these aren’t just cultural quirks, they’re a structural disadvantage when competing against countries where faith in science remains strong. They’re making Americans less capable of driving the next wave of technological advances, and therefore less likely to dominate the commanding heights of the world economy and geopolitics.
Consider artificial intelligence. The United States is racing ahead in consumer-facing AI – chatbots, engagement-maximizing social media algorithms, generative tools to produce yet-more-addictive slop, ever-larger language models that claim to be one step closer to superintelligence – because that’s where the money is. But these technologies are also fragmenting society, amplifying misinformation, and possibly contributing to a kind of collective psychosis. China, by contrast, has channeled AI development away from consumer applications in favor of defense and industrial uses, which carry less risk of social fragmentation and more strategic upside.
It’s a similar story when it comes to energy. The United States has become the world’s most powerful petrostate, producing more oil, gas, and coal than any other country. That’s not inherently a problem – fossil fuels will continue to power data centers, agriculture, and heavy industry for decades to come. But the US has effectively ceded leadership on post-carbon energy to China, which already dominates battery technology, solar power, next-generation nuclear, and supply chains for critical minerals. Washington is doubling down on hydrocarbons while letting the future of energy pass it by.
Or take trade policy. The Trump administration is imposing the highest US tariffs in a century – including on major allies, on countries with no bilateral trade imbalances, and on sectors where America lacks capacity to ramp up domestic production quickly enough to avoid shortages or inflation. Following Trump’s Oct. 30 meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping – which put escalation on hold for a year and lowered fentanyl tariffs on China from 20% to 10% in exchange for politically-sensitive soybean purchases – the effective US tariff rate on Chinese imports now sits at 32%, close to the rate on ASEAN countries and lower than on its strategic partner India and South America’s largest economy, Brazil, which actually runs a trade surplus with the United States.
The cumulative result is a roughly 17% regressive tax on American businesses and consumers, which are forced to pay more for intermediate inputs and final goods. Paired with a sharp turn toward industrial policy and state capitalism, the US is moving away from the free-market principles that made its economy so competitive in the first place. Targeted government intervention in select sectors (e.g., semiconductors, banking) can sometimes be justified on specific grounds (e.g., national security, financial stability), but history shows that broad protectionism and state direction tend to make economies less, not more, dynamic over time.
This short-term thinking extends to geopolitics. As I wrote last week, most countries are prepared to give the US wins – some pyrrhic, some significant – to avoid open conflict. But these same countries are also working to ensure they’re never in that position again. The EU has finalized trade agreements with Mexico, Indonesia, and the South American trading bloc Mercosur. Brazil is deepening economic ties with Europe, China, and Canada. India is working to stabilize relations with China while accelerating infrastructure projects that reduce its dependence on US markets. Saudi Arabia has signed a nuclear deal with Pakistan to hedge against future security neglect from Washington.
These moves aren’t costless – they require years of political capital, billions in investment, and new institutional architecture. Once built, they’re hard to reverse. But countries have learned the hard way that US policy can change course every election cycle with little in the way of policy continuity or long-term strategic planning, and they’re building alternatives now while accommodating Washington in the short run. Every four years, there’s a 50/50 chance that everything – not just the winners and losers but the rules of the road – shifts. Gone are the days when politics ended at water’s edge. That structural volatility reduces American leverage over time, even as it delivers wins for the world’s largest economy.
So when asking whether the United States will retain its lead over its allies and adversaries, the answer depends on the time horizon. Short-term? Absolutely. America remains by far the world’s most powerful country, so there’s a lot of room for damage before structural decline sets in. Moreover, artificial intelligence is about to change everything, and the US is one of only two games in town (China being the other) and still the preferred partner for most of the West and parts of the Global South.
But long term, the trajectory is troubling. The historical advantages the United States enjoyed over its peers – better physical and institutional infrastructure, superior demographics driven partly by immigration, public tolerance for inequality undergirded by perception of meritocracy, greater capacity for deficit spending – are all heading in the wrong direction, arguably unsustainably so. China, despite being in a weaker overall position, is doing what it can to exploit these shifts. And while Beijing faces severe structural challenges of its own, it benefits from the increasingly accurate perception that it takes the long view while America chases the next election.
Perhaps most worrying is the one thing everyone in a deeply divided America now agrees on: that the country’s biggest threat is domestic. They just disagree on who that threat is. That kind of inward turn ensures the bulk of the national energy and focus will remain on fighting internecine political battles rather than making the deeper, patient investments – in people, institutions, research, and infrastructure – required to keep the United States competitive a generation from now.
America is giving up long-term leadership in exchange for short-term wins. The question isn’t whether the United States will pay for this addiction to immediate gratification. It's only when the bill will come due – and how much it will cost.