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Where the US is gaining and losing influence
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: Hi everybody, Ian Bremmer here and a happy Monday from Vancouver. I'm here for the TED Conference. I've never done the main TED conference before, believe it or not, but giving a speech tomorrow and so came in a little early to meet some of all of these crazed public intellectuals and see what they have to say about the world. Should be kind of interesting, kind of fun.
But thought I would talk a bit about where US relations are with other countries in the world. I got a question from someone over the weekend that said, "Are there any countries where the United States actually has better relations today than they did ten years ago?" And I think this reflects, this wasn't an anti-Biden or pro-Trump sensibility, it's more the world feels like it's heading in a difficult direction, America losing influence. How do we think about that?
And it's mixed, right? It's mixed. It's very clear that China is much more commercially and economically powerful than it has been at any point in modern times. And it's also more willing to use its diplomatic leadership as well as the consistency of a single president, Xi Jinping, for eleven plus years now and going on however long he's alive. And so that I think makes people, especially that grew up in a time of more consistent global leadership from the United States, more discomforted or more excited, depending on their background. I think that also the United States is more, and we're looking it's some more divided, there are a lot of questions of why the United States would want to be the world's policeman, would try to drive global trade agreements when people inside the United States don't feel it necessarily benefits them. But the outcomes are a little more varied than that story would give you as a headline.
So for example, it is pretty clear that there's a lot of architecture being built by the United States with its allies in Asia. It's true that the US didn't get the Trans-Pacific Partnership done, and that was Obama's alleged pivot to Asia, never really happened. But now when you look at the Quad, you look at AUKUS, you look at the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework and you look at the CHIPS 4. And then you look at all of the alignment of countries that rely on the United States, particularly for national security in Asia and the backlash that you see from a China that is increasingly dominant militarily in some Asian security conflicts and Asian security areas. And as a consequence you have Japan, South Korea, improving their relations with each other and with the United States, you have the Australians much more aligned. You have New Zealand joining AUKUS as a non-NATO nuclear member and much more hawkish towards China than they would've been even two years ago, nevermind ten.
The Philippines pivoting into that direction, Indonesia concerned. So there are some countries that are really dominated by China and Asia. I'm thinking about Laos, Cambodia. But those aren't the countries with geopolitical heft. And for the rest they're more aligned with the United States. In Europe, you'd certainly say that most Europeans are more aligned with the US and yes, you'd probably even say that about France. Now, again, not necessarily Macron-Biden or Macron-Trump, given the personalities of all involved, but the fact that the French have voted along with every other EU country for ten rounds of sanctions against the Russians and to invite Ukraine into the EU and are decoupling their economies from Russia. That is a level of very significant alignment that we weren't seeing over the last five or ten years. And some countries in Europe may not like it, may be discomforted, but they don't necessarily have good alternatives.
And then Mexico and Canada where a level of economic integration, political integration and security integration with the US is just overwhelming. So those are all places where I see the relationship with the US as either as strong or getting stronger, getting more aligned, at least for the present and not really mattering hugely just on leadership, also mattering structurally with what's happening in the world. Then you have the Middle East and you have emerging markets around the world. You have the so-called Global South, and that's where I think the US is really and rapidly getting displaced, particularly in the Middle East where the US is not as focused on fossil fuels from there. And where the security relationship has been more challenged, Congress less interested in allowing the most advanced weapons to go to some of these countries. Some focus on human rights and just less engagement given how much more the Asian and the European environments are just sucking up all the airspace for the US diplomatically.
So there, I think China is displacing the United States in influence and countries in the Middle East are feeling like they need to do everything themselves. In terms of the Global South, also lots of countries that feel a level of hypocrisy from the United States, don't feel aligned, feel that the revealed preferences of US policy are really not supporting what these countries need. Whether it's in response to the pandemic or response to big inflation or response to the Russian invasion. Anything else, climate change, thinking that their relationship with the US is becoming less important. And meanwhile, globalization is less of a benefit for them as Americans focus more on nearshoring and on providing jobs for Americans in the middle and working classes. And this will even speed up with AI developments. Finally, and most dangerously, rogue states, North Korea, Russia, Iran, these are countries that have relations which are not just badly broken with the US but increasingly dangerous.
These are countries willing to be hostile and take risks with their relations with the US and allies. And China, which is not a rogue state, but is a country where there is zero trust between them and the US. And the relationship is at its worst it's been in decades. So if you were to put all of that together and say which world is more stable, definitely not where we are today. Is global power at largely shifting towards the US, away from the US or pari-passu, staying the same? I'd say it's very mixed, but slightly away from the US if you add all of those things up. Still, lots of areas where the Americans have a lot of power, but also a lot of areas where the world and its geopolitical balance is shifting far faster than the Americans and its allies can effectively respond to it.
So that's a little bit of the big picture for me. Seems like the thing one to talk about at TED. We'll do more of that tomorrow and I hope everyone's doing well. Talk to you soon.
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European & US leaders resolute as threat of Ukraine war grows
Carl Bildt, former Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Sweden, is joined by Ian Bremmer, president of Eurasia Group and GZERO Media, to provide perspective on the Ukraine crisis at the Munich Security Conference.
Carl Bildt: This is the most dramatic conference that I think every one of us has experienced. I mean, there seems to be significant probability of war breaking out in Europe within days. We have the Ukraine president, we'll see if he will come during the day, but we have an assortment of European leaders and vice president of the United States. And everyone is discussing, can anything more be done to prevent war? And what really do we do if it breaks out?
Ian Bremmer: And it's kind of funny. The theme of the conference this year is helplessness. And when I flew in, I'm like, "That's a horrible theme for the conference." But actually, as it plays out, it's starting to feel a little bit more on target.
Carl Bildt: Yeah. But a lot of sort of resolute speeches here, a lot of cohesion among Europeans, across the Atlantic. If war breaks out, the world will change.
Ian Bremmer: It will. I think, and I'm quite surprised that Zelenskyy is not staying in Kyiv. I hope he brings an extra suitcase or two. But I mean, there is no question. The one good piece of news is that I've never seen the NATO Alliance this cohesive, frankly, in terms of the way that they're responding to this challenge.
Carl Bildt: And the same applies to Europeans.
Ian Bremmer: Absolutely.
Carl Bildt: Where there have always been significant divisions on how you deal with Russia. And some have taken a more benevolent view of Russia. But what might happen is, of course, that Mr. Putin is going to confirm some of the darkest predictions of where Russia is heading.
Ian Bremmer: But if there is a silver lining in all this is that the Swedish-American partnership, as you see, remains resolute as ever.
Carl Bildt: Well, so far.
Ian Bremmer: Well, I mean, you know?
Carl Bildt: Yeah. Can't get everything.
Ian Bremmer: I mean, we've had a bunch of breakfasts. Let's put it that way.
Carl Bildt: Too, too true.
Ian Bremmer: Yeah.
Carl Bildt: Okay.
Ian Bremmer: Very good.
Carl Bildt: Off from Munich.
Ian Bremmer: Off from Munich.
Europe and US plan harsh measures if Russia takes action against Ukraine
Carl Bildt, former Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Sweden, shares his perspective from Europe this week from Brussels.
Are Europe and the US really aligned when it comes to reckoning what the Russians might be up to towards Ukraine?
Well, first, we don't really for certain know what Russia is up to. The military preparations for an invasion are there. There's no question about that. But exactly how he wants to handle this politically is somewhat uncertain. He has made demands. He's put down the gauntlet against the West in a way that is absolutely extraordinary. So exactly how this will end, we don't know.
Are we aligned across the Atlantic?
I think we are. There are always some people on this side, in Europe, who have some doubts about some of the measures, but I'm quite certain that if there is an invasion, if there's a major military operation of some sort, a military aggression of any sort against Ukraine, there will be unity, and you will see fairly harsh measures or very harsh measures imposed on Russia with highly detrimental effect to development of the Russian economy for years to come.
The US and EU further talks on technology governance
Marietje Schaake, International Policy Director at Stanford's Cyber Policy Center, Eurasia Group senior advisor and former MEP, discusses trends in big tech, privacy protection and cyberspace:
Hello, and welcome to the new Cyber In 60 Seconds. My name is Marietje Schaake, and you're finding me at the Democracy Forum in Athens. So, from my hotel room, I'm looking back at the Trade and Technology Council that took place in Pittsburgh this week.
For those who missed it, this gathering brought together high-level officials from the Biden administration and the European Commission. It was a long-anticipated meeting that was supposed to reach conclusions about a shared governance agenda for tech-related issues like AI, data, semiconductors, and foreign direct investments. But the Trade and Technology Council was also expected and hoped to mark a new start after very difficult years across the Atlantic. I think we all remember the years when President Trump was still in the White House. And thankfully, the August fallout and French anger did not end up pouring cold water over the events. Although, the general sentiment in Europe that the honeymoon weeks are over is widely shared.
The conclusions of the Trade and Technology Council actually read more like an agreement on the agenda for the next couple of years, rather than tangible actions and conclusions. Tony Gardner, the former US Ambassador to the EU actually remarked that reading them, he figured the fact that the meeting took place at all was a result to mark. But with low expectations, the only way seems up, and there is work being planned in no less than 10 working groups, focusing on green tech standards and SMEs.
And developments that I'm going to watch are trade rules such as sharing information on dual-use export controls, but also FDI screening. The coordination on semiconductors, despite respective programs to develop domestic industries. Data governance, including access for academics. But without the privacy, because that issue is negotiated separately. And then of course, the question of aligning and governing AI in line with democratic values and respect for human rights. Between now and the next meeting, it will be interesting to watch how the tensions between the EU, the US, and China may unfold and whether the EU and the US will converge as part of a larger democratic alliance, but also which domestic legislative initiatives may go on and unfold that could actually impact the agenda of the next Trade and Technology Council in a year.
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Do Euro warriors need Captain America?
Should Europe depend on the United States for its defense, as it has done since the end of World War II? Or do changing times demand that Europe develop an independent military capability? In other words, does Europe need "strategic autonomy?"
This debate, which began in the Cold War's early days, is now heating up again across Europe.
What is "strategic autonomy"? It's the ability to exert military power abroad without help. For that, you need more than just lots of troops willing and able to fight. (EU countries in NATO already have 1.26 million troops in service.) You also need the equipment and trained personnel to move large numbers of your soldiers and all their equipment by air or sea to sometimes far-flung places. You need state-of-the-art air defense systems. You need seamless communication to ensure your forces are working in harmony. From the founding of NATO in 1949 until today, Europe has relied on the US military to provide these things.
Who wants Europe to have this power? France is the EU's loudest hawk. It's the one European country with an ability (even if it's limited) to project power outside Europe. Even before then-president Charles de Gaulle pulled France out of NATO's command structure in 1966, French officials have called for a European foreign and defense policy that's independent of Washington. (France rejoined in 2009.) It's needed, they say, to properly defend European (cynics would say French) interests in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia.
Why might other Europeans start to like this idea? The end of the Cold War removed the Soviet threat to Western Europe, easing fears that American muscle might be needed to defend the continent itself. And since then, US presidents have given Europeans ample reason to doubt that Washington is a dependable ally. Let us count the ways:
- George W. Bush invaded Iraq despite strong European objections.
- Barack Obama dithered on the Arab Spring and Syrian civil war, both of which proved crucial for Europe in the form of a migrant crisis in 2015-16.
- Donald Trump questioned the value of US alliances in general and NATO in particular.
- President Joe Biden is now the latest US leader to emphasize the need to focus more on China and less on Europe and the Middle East. The dustup with France over the newly announced security pact with Australia and the UK is the latest example. European anger that Biden botched the NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan hasn't helped.
- Europeans know they have no idea where US politics is headed next.
Why hasn't Europe embraced "strategic autonomy" already? There are several reasons:
- Defense is expensive. Most European countries are still happy to have Americans help pay for it.
- Many Eastern Europeans, mindful of Russian aggression against Ukraine, still fear the Kremlin and want the military superpower to back their security.
- Germany, Europe's lead economy, remains deeply reluctant to send its soldiers into combat missions abroad or to accept the costs and risks likely to follow French-led interventions in other regions.
So, does this debate have a future? Probably, because the world is changing in ways that favor greater European strategic independence over time. The UK, a longtime defender of strong transatlantic defense ties, has left the EU. China's continued rise will intensify pre-existing US and European differences over how to respond. The possibility that Trump — or someone with a similarly transactional view of alliances — could come back to the White House means Europeans can't ever be totally confident in US commitments.
All these realities will bolster the arguments of those who want a more militarily robust Europe, one that can eventually become a more equal partner with the US and follow a more independent path.
Looking ahead to a post-Merkel Europe
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take:
Hi, everybody. Ian Bremmer here. Happy week to all of you and thought I'd talk a little bit about Germany and Europe. Because of course, we just had elections in Germany, 16 years of Angela Merkel's rule coming to an end - by far the strongest leader that Germany has seen post-war, Europe has seen since the collapse of the Soviet Union. And indeed in many ways, the world has seen in the 21st century. Xi Jinping, of course, runs a much bigger country and has consolidated much more power, but in terms of the free world, it's been Angela Merkel.
Now what we see from the election is a population that's generally content, not because Merkel's party did so well. In fact, they didn't. The CDU only came in second with 24% of the vote. The Social Democrats actually won it, almost 26% of the vote. But as frequently we see in Germany, it's broad coalitions. The interesting thing though, and the reason I say the Germans generally happy is because it's a centrist vote. It is a pro-establishment party's vote. The extreme parties on the right and the left actually loss support, particularly the Alternatives for Deutschland, the Euro skeptic, EU skeptic, anti-migrants, much more overtly nationalist party, actually lost about three points. They're down to about 10% now. And that's a big deal because in the story in the world and democracies over the past decade has been populism growing, anti-establishment sentiment growing, people believing that the countries, their governments don't really represent them, don't reflect their interests well. And as a consequence, they want to break things. Certainly, we're experiencing that in the United States. We're seeing it in Brazil to a degree. It's happening even in a place like Canada and the UK and France, but not in Germany.
In Germany, what we're seeing is strong support for centrism. This is a government that will be weaker because the leadership will be weaker. And because whether or not it's Olaf Scholz or Armin Laschet, and we won't know that for several weeks as the coalition building occurs, even though Scholz is most likely, either one of them with a three-party coalition will be much weaker on the European and the global stage than Merkel has been.
The takeaway is a lot of political continuity and stability in Germany, but weaker German leadership internationally. What does that mean? Well, for Europe, I mean, France of course, Macron has a very strong interest in being seen as the leader of Europe, but his interests are not aligned with a lot of the other Europeans. You saw that with the announcement of the recent US-UK-Australia, defense pact. France wants to be an Indo-Pacific power while the Americans increasingly aren't comfortable with him having that role and the EU doesn't really want to play along.
From the EU position, from the position of almost all the other countries inside Europe, not the UK, but the UK isn't in Europe anymore, they see the Indo-Pac region as an area of commercial interest, of industrial interest, of technology interest, markets, but absolutely not one where they want to play from a security perspective. And so the French government is trying to push the EU to develop this strategy. And he doesn't have a lot of support. He's trying to get them to develop a independent European defense capability, but most of the Europeans are perfectly happy being in NATO and they don't want to spend more on defense, even when the Americans tell them to for the preexisting group, they certainly don't want to do it for a new questionably effectiveness of an on its own EU force. They don't want to take leadership on the security side. So for all of those reasons, the French won't be as powerful.
The Italians have a great government. Super Mario, Mario Draghi, who is running a sort of technocratic government with almost all the parties in the country supporting him. It means lots of reforms in a time of surplus. It's fantastic for Italy for a couple of years, but it's Italy and it won't last long. And when it goes away, you'll have another succession of weak governments and weak prime ministers and it's a smaller economy than Germany and France. And their levels of diplomacy internationally are much lower than those of either of the other two countries.
So what that really tells you is individual European governments are going to matter less, which would be a problem for Europe if there wasn't an EU super structure, but there is. So what really is happening is the EU is going to matter more. Brussels is going to matter more in areas of their competence, on the environment, on trade, on tax policy, on technology, data, privacy. We're going to be all spending more time in Brussels.
That's my view. The restaurants suck. It's not a very interesting city. I'm sorry. It's a nice place, but we are going to be spending more time there. I certainly am. Anyway, that's it for me. Hope everyone's doing well. Be good. Talk to you soon.
The US-EU honeymoon is over
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take:
Hi everybody. Happy Monday. Ian Bremmer here with your Quick Take. Plenty going on between the United States and its allies. You have seen the fallout from the US announcement of this new defense pact with the Australians and the United Kingdom called AUKUS. That's great, always like USMCA, we take the acronyms, and we try to find a way to make it comprehensible. And of course, the Chinese are not enormously happy about this, because it is a military plan to put more American material in their backyard. And the day after the Chinese announced formerly that they wanted to apply to the CPTPP, which is the major trade deal that the Americans initially were the architect of and then under Obama said, "No, we can't get it done." And then Trump pulled out. That's unfortunate and long-standing and not surprising. And China won't be able to get in, in all likelihood, because it's a heavy lift, even though Vietnam did make it, but state capitalism and TPP doesn't really work very well together.
But the more interesting and salient point for the headlines is that the French government was absolutely incensed. So, what's going on here? Why are the allies having such difficulty?
One obvious point that I've heard directly from Paris is that the French government disliked and mistrusted Trump a lot more, but it's precisely because their expectations with Biden were higher, that they wanted to send a much more sharp and direct message. Under Trump, the ambassador never was recalled from the United States. I mean, certainly the relationship in many ways was dysfunctional. In part, the French were walking on eggshells when there was summitry because they just didn't know what Trump might actually do. And in part it was more strategic misalignment. So, you saw the French trying to lead an anti-Trump group in the EU on trade, which is certainly not where the French are today, vis-à-vis the United States.
But they were very surprised. They had had ongoing meetings with the United States specifically on defense coordination in the Pacific. Most of the EU has very little interest in the Pacific. The French are more interested on the national security side. Some of that's competitive. After the US and Russia, the French are the third-largest arms exporter in the world. So, it matters to their GDP, their bottom line, but also, they have territories in the Pacific. They're actually the closest neighbor to Australia in a couple of directions. The island of Réunion, for example, is part of France. So, unlike say Germany, the French really do see the Indo-Pacific as a place that is important to them. And the Americans had been asking/telling the French that they wanted more coordination and more support, particularly against China on the national security side, through NATO, through the EU, on trade, on export restrictions, on cyber, as well as on military support.
And indeed, the French had been doing joint patrols with the Americans and the Australians. So, they were particularly angry that they were cut out, both economically as well as an ally. And I would argue the latter is more important to them than the former. I mean, the deal itself was some 60 billion euros, which is major, but only about eight billion of those euros were going to be spent in France itself. Most of it was in Australia and elsewhere. And also, the French had been playing hardball on the negotiation of the contract. The contract was already agreed, but they wanted lots of European contractors, subcontractors to be involved in the deal, and that was unacceptable to the Australians as well as the Americans. So, there were difficulties in the contract, but the Americans and the Australians didn't just shift the contract. They also announced a new defense pact that was the US, Australia, and the United Kingdom. And France was no part of it.
France only learned of it afterwards. Indeed, France had a suspicion that things were going badly. They found out a week and a half ago that several Australian Cabinet ministers were in Washington negotiating with the Americans. The French didn't get a heads-up, which is unusual given the Defense Minister and given the fact that there was coordination on lots of other issues there. So, the French immediately get in touch with the Americans on the day and ask for phone calls, both with state and with defense. At the secretary level, they hear nothing back. In fact, they hear nothing back until Wednesday when the deal is announced in the Australian press. So, in other words, the French actually found out not only that they lost their submarine contract, but also that there was a new defense pact and France wasn't going to be a part of it.
That was really ... I mean, particularly Macron, who I mean his level of ego didn't seem perhaps to drive so many headlines when Trump was around for four years, but absent that, very clear that embarrassing Macron is something he takes very, very personally. So as a consequence, the ambassadors from the US and Australia were pulled. From the UK, not pulled, interestingly, and in part that's because they weren't as directly involved in the deal, and also because the relationship is itself so broken. A bit like Trump, but also what one French diplomat said is, "Look, if the dinner's horrible, you don't complain to the dishwasher. You complain to the chef." A particularly French way of describing their level of pique with just what is going on right now.
I do think it's very clear that the honeymoon between the United States and the Europeans is over. It's one thing for Trump's "America First", which most of the Europeans saw as an unusual and exception to the rule in the United States, but they didn't think it was a more structural shift. Now it's becoming more clear that a greater level of unilateralism, a greater focus on internal American affairs is baseline for what they should expect, irrespective of how experienced the diplomatic hands are, how oriented they may be, the domestic constraints are more significant and the relative level of indifference of how American allies respond if they're not seen as providing something transactionally important to the United States.
The US, of course, is much more powerful. So, to a greater degree, it can get away with that. And I've also heard from French leaders in the past couple of days that they certainly intend, they want to still work with the Americans on Indo-Pacific strategy. They want to still be seen as an ally. They don't want to throw NATO away, but this is going to make it harder to coordinate on a bunch of issues. And certainly, the G20 coming up in Rome is going to be much more publicly dysfunctional than the G7 was in Cornwall.
So that's a little bit for me. That's kind of a deep dive into the politics behind AUKUS. And I do expect that the French ambassador, at least to Washington, and probably to Canberra, will be quietly back in relatively short order, let's say weeks, not months, but the damage will last for longer. That's it for me. Talk to you all soon.
Europe in "shock & disbelief" over US withdrawal from Afghanistan
Carl Bildt, former Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Sweden, shares his perspective from Europe:
What has been the European reaction to what's happening in Afghanistan?
Well, I think shock and disbelief is the appropriate expression for it. Shock and disbelief over the Americans just cutting out running, although you might argue that we should have seen it coming. And then, of course, a lot of long-term questions that will play out over time. Can the United States be relied upon, right or wrong? That question is going to linger for quite some time.
Are the EU nations prepared to accept Afghan refugees?
Well, the priority at the moment must of course be those that have worked for our forces, our development efforts, our embassies, and to get them out. As otherwise, Europe already has a substantial number, as a matter-of-fact Afghans are the number one nation when it comes to regular migration. Last year our figures for 2020 was 34,000 coming in. There are nearly 150,000 of them in Germany, there are 30,000 in Sweden. This is to compare with single digit thousand numbers in the US. So there will be an enormous effort to try to help displaced refugees in the region, and then the somewhat more managed global handling of the refugee issue will be called for.