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Europe's reaction to US election win: Gloom and despair
Carl Bildt, former prime minister of Sweden and co-chair of the European Council on Foreign Relations, shares his perspective on European politics from Stockholm, Sweden.
This is Carl Bildt in Stockholm. I’m going to do one question this morning.
What’s the mood on this side of the Atlantic after the US election?
Well, I think it can be summed up fairly shortly: gloom and despair in Brussels and Kyiv, jubilation in expectations in Budapest, and a determination to press on in Moscow and Tel Aviv. That’s roughly, it.
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A global leadership void and ongoing wars
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: Hi, everybody, Ian Bremmer here, and a Quick Take to kick off your week. I am here in Tokyo, Japan. Just got back from Beijing. Being in this part of the world has me thinking a little bit about the state of our world and leadership, or should I say, the lack thereof. Those of you following me know I talk about a G-zero world, not a G-7, not a G-20, a place where we lack global leadership, and that has been so clear, thinking about the wars that continue, between Israel and Palestine, and now Lebanon, and more broadly in the Middle East, and between Russia and Ukraine, and increasingly NATO in Europe.
I think about the fact that all over the world, everyone wants these wars to be over. They're causing enormous amounts of suffering, displacement of human beings, massive war crimes, but they persist. It's worth thinking about what that means in terms of leadership because when we talk about the Middle East, and Israel-Palestine in particular, the United States is the most powerful ally of Israel, overwhelmingly in terms of its political and diplomatic support, its economic support, technological support, its military aid and training and intelligence. And yet, over the last year, the United States has had virtually no influence in the ability to contain, constrain, or end this war, irrespective of all the suffering.
You can complain about the United States on that with good reason, but then you look at Russia-Ukraine, and you see that over the last three years, China's been, by far, the most powerful friend and supporter of Russia, massive amounts of trade only expanding and dual-use technologies and diplomatic support. Yet, despite that, China has been unwilling to use any influence on Russia to try to bring the war to the end.
Now, to be clear, both the United States and China say all the right things. In Beijing, I was hearing from the leaders that they're friends with the Ukrainians and they maintain stable relations, and of course they want the war over, and they respect Ukrainian territorial integrity. And of course, the Americans support a two-state solution for the Palestinians and want to ensure that they get humanitarian aid and want to see a ceasefire happen, but I mean, the revealed preferences of both of these countries is their willingness to do anything about it is virtually zero. The Chinese don't care about the Ukrainians ultimately. That's what we're learning over the last few years. The Americans don't care about the Palestinians ultimately. That's what we've learned over the last year.
Absent leadership from the two most powerful countries in the world, where do you think we're going to get geopolitically? The answer is, to a much more dangerous place. That's the concern. I don't see that changing, particularly whether we have a Harris or a Trump presidency. I don't see that changing whether we have a Xi or a Xi presidency in China. It's not like they're making any real choices going forward. But look, maybe I'll be surprised. And certainly, it would be nice if no matter who wins, this was a topic of conversation between the Americans and the Chinese. That, "Hey, China. If you'd be willing to do a little bit more with Russia, we'd be willing to do a little bit more with Israel." I mean, frankly, at the end of the day, that's the kind of horse-trading I think we could really use diplomatically. Right now, that's a conversation that hasn't happened yet, but maybe it will.
That's it for me, and I'll talk to y'all real soon.
Canada accused of being an unreliable ally in the Middle East
Canada’s Foreign Minister Mélanie Joly told the United Nations General Assembly on Monday that Ottawa supports the creation of a Palestinian state and will officially recognize such an entity “at the time most conducive to building a lasting peace and not necessarily as the last step of a negotiated process.”
For more than 70 years, Canada and the United States have been in lockstep on policy in the Middle East. But Canada has been indicating for some time that it is preparing to join countries like Spain, Norway, and Ireland in unilaterally recognizing Palestinian statehood.
Despite pressures from within the Democratic caucus, that is not the position of the Biden administration. President Joe Biden has said he believes a Palestinian state should be realized through direct negotiations between the parties, not through unilateral recognition.
An early 20th-century Canadian cabinet minister, Sir Clifford Sifton, once said the main business of Canadian foreign policy is to remain friendly with the Americans while preserving the country’s self-respect.
That friendship has been tested in recent times.
Last December, Canada voted in favor of a cease-fire in Gaza that did not condemn, or even mention, Hamas. The US voted against the resolution.
For two decades, Canada has voted against UN resolutions that it felt unfairly sought to isolate Israel. Yet in May, it abstained on one that proposed to upgrade Palestine’s rights at the UN to a level short of full membership. Again, the US was one of only nine countries that voted against it.
Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has criticized his Israeli counterpart Benjamin Netanyahu’s opposition to a future two-state solution – a frustration shared by the Biden administration. But Canada has gone a step further by saying that the peace process cannot indefinitely delay the creation of a Palestinian state.
Tensions were heightened in August when Joly announced new restrictions on the sale of defense equipment to Israel, suspending 30 export permits and blocking a deal to sell Quebec-made munitions to the US that were intended for Israel.
The move drew the ire of Netanyahu, who said it was unfortunate Joly took the steps she did as anti-Israel riots were taking place in Canadian cities.
It also attracted the attention of Sen. James Risch, the ranking member of the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. “It is disappointing to see our allies make domestic political decisions intended to hamstring our shared ally, Israel,” he wrote on X.
Graeme Thompson, a senior analyst at Eurasia Group, and a former policy analyst at Canada’s Global Affairs department, said Risch’s comments reflect a “habitual disappointment” about Canadian foreign policy in Washington.
“By now, expectations are so low that it is hard to be disappointed by anything. People have come to the conclusion that Canadian foreign policy is about grandstanding and domestic politics, rather than national interests,” he said.
Risch was one of 23 bipartisan senators who wrote to Trudeau before the prime minister traveled to Washington for NATO’s summit in July saying they were “concerned and profoundly disappointed that Canada’s most recent (military spending) projection indicated it will not reach the 2 percent commitment this decade.”
At the summit, Canada’s ambassador in Washington, Kristen Hillman, said there remains “a strong recognition that Canada is a steadfast ally in all aspects.” But that rosy view was not reflected in the comments made by US policymakers. House Speaker Mike Johnson described Canada’s promise to get to 1.76% of GDP on defense spending by 2030 as “shameful.” “Talk about riding on American coattails,” he said.
Even Biden’s extremely discreet ambassador in Ottawa, David Cohen, referred to Canada as “the outlier” in the alliance.
Eurasia Group’s Thompson agreed with Risch’s assessment that domestic politics are at the root of a shift in foreign policy that moves away from traditional support for Israel and does not view security spending as a priority.
He said the debate in the ruling Liberal Party is similar to the one playing out in the Democratic Party in the US – but is at a more advanced stage because it has the blessing of the leader, Trudeau.
He noted the base of support for the Liberals has moved from ridings with large Jewish populations in Toronto and Montreal to ridings with large Muslim populations in the suburbs of both big cities. Trudeau has tried to walk a fine line between both communities, often failing to please either of them.
His Liberals are trailing the Conservatives by around 20 points in most polls, and the opposition party leader, Pierre Poilievre, is pushing for a general election.
The Liberals are relying on the support of the left-leaning New Democratic Party and separatist Bloc Québecois to keep them in power. Both of those parties are highly critical of Israel and strongly supportive of a Palestinian state.
A debate in the Canadian House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee on the recognition of a Palestinian state last week reflected the realignment of foreign policy. The committee voted in favor of a short study, after which a recommendation to unilaterally recognize a Palestinian state will likely be made to the government. The Liberals on the committee voted alongside the NDP and the Bloc, arguing that for a two-state solution, you need two states.
The Conservative foreign affairs critic, Michael Chong, said that unilateral recognition would break with the long-standing position of the successive Canadian governments and would isolate Canada from its allies, including the US.
“To veer from that path rewards violence and authoritarianism,” he said.
The committee vote has not yet drawn a response from Washington.
That does not surprise Derek Burney, a veteran Canadian diplomat who served as Ottawa’s ambassador in Washington from 1989 to 1993.
He said Canada’s view has become inconsequential to its allies. “I’ve never seen a time when we were more irrelevant than we are now. We are nowhere on the global scene. We are nowhere in Washington because we have nothing to contribute or to support what the Americans are trying to do,” he said.
“Nobody knows what we stand for, or stand against. We don’t count. It’s a sad fact of life.”
The White House in Washington, DC.
The world is knocking on the door
It has already been a dangerous week for the world. After months of trading aerial attacks, Israel’s northern border with Lebanon has shifted from a watchpoint to the brink of a ground invasion and wider regional conflict.
As Gov. Tim Walz and Sen. JD Vance take the debate stage tonight for the only vice presidential debate of this election season, everyone from global leaders to young people is asking: What will the next US president do with the world they are inheriting?
In his final remarks before last week’s United Nations General Assembly, President Joe Biden sought to remind the international audience of his 40-year political career. Biden’s speech framed the Afghanistan withdrawal as much-needed, the global coalition in support of Ukraine a resounding success, and new partnerships like the Quad as pillars for the US’s future.
Despite the personal highlight reel, Biden’s global legacy hangs in the balance. After dropping his reelection bid, it was widely reported that Biden viewed ending the war in Gaza as the top priority for the remainder of his term. Months of negotiations and tireless trips to the region by US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, the Central Intelligence Agency’s Director Bill Burns, and others have translated into almost no tangible progress on a May 2024 US cease-fire proposal. Senior US officialsacknowledged earlier this month that a deal is neither imminent nor likely.
Instead, a second front along Israel’s north has gone from warm to blazing hot. This weekend’s assassination of longstanding Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah (reportedly without US awareness) followed by targeted Israeli strikes against Iran’s “axis of resistance” in both Syria and Yemen have sent shockwaves through the region.
When the next US president assumes office on Jan. 20, 2025, they will likely encounter a geopolitical landscape with wars in the Middle East, Ukraine, and Sudan, the threat of a nuclear Iran, US-China tech and space races flaring, and a host of other global challenges, from climate and inequities to radicalization. As we saw with last week’s UNGA, global engagement and interconnectivity may be at an all-time high. Yet, no one knows what the incoming US leadership will do about the tests ahead.
In speaking last week with leaders of the next generation across Europe and Africa as part of an election-related conversation forChatham House’s Common Futures Conversationsproject, the desire for clarity from the US is clear. There is anxiety that US voters will not reject former President Donald Trump’s America First brand of isolationism in November. Trump worried Europe earlier this year when he claimed he would encourage Russia to do whatever it wanted with any NATO member not paying their fair share of defense. Likewise, his plans to impose blanket tariffs of 20% on all imports, including those manufactured by US allies and partners, are ringing the alarm that American friendship may not be what it once was.
Alternatively, if American voters reject Trumpism, a status quo foreign policy strategy under Vice President Kamala Harris is also considered unsatisfactory. There is a sense that more unfulfilled rhetoric of democratic resilience and values will not move the needle for the next generation. There’s a nagging concern that even under a Harris administration the US may be turning inward,focusing on “American workers, innovation, and industry.” What will this mean for the future of development aid and foreign investment across Africa and elsewhere?
Instead, these young voices are hoping for new solutions – and innovation – in US foreign policy that acknowledge the attitude and norm shifts they are experiencing as well as the technological change and saturated information environment around them.
There are two camps about this moment in US geopolitical history. One side draws a trendline from Trump’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and over-reliance on tariffs and sanctions to the Biden administration’s “small yard and high fence” as the start of the US retrenchment from global leadership.Another side says the US remains the most important actor in every room it enters and will continue to set the global agenda.
We may only know in hindsight if this decade turned out to be a turning point. For now, it seems clear that the world is still knocking on the door of the White House, asking for a glimpse of the blueprint ahead.
Lindsay Newman is a geopolitical risk expert and columnist for GZERO.
Trump balancing a burning world on his finger.
How a second Trump term could reshape global politics
What if Donald Trump wins in November?
With less than 50 days to go until the US election and the former president now having near-even odds of taking back the White House, governments around the world are scrambling to work out what a second Trump term could mean for US foreign policy.
One thing’s certain: For better and worse, Trump is still the same charismatic, narcissistic, impulsive, transactional leader he was four years ago (albeit a little slower). But even though Trump the person hasn’t changed since 2020, the world around him has become dramatically more dangerous.
Some will point out that as president from 2017-2021, Trump was able to score some notable foreign-policy successes, including a revitalized North American free trade agreement, the Abraham Accords, fairer cost-sharing among NATO members, and new and stronger security alliances in Asia. It’s also true that this happened amid a generally benign and peaceful international environment, at least before the COVID-19 pandemic started near the end of his term.
Two major regional wars, intensifying great-power competition with China, serious instability threatened by emboldened rogue actors like Russia and Iran, a sluggish global economy strained by structural supply chain shifts and 20-year-high interest rates, and disruptive technologies like artificial intelligence will place entirely new demands on Trump’s leadership.
The more challenging and volatile geopolitical context means the stakes are much higher than they were in 2017 when Trump first took office. Combined with the former president’s immutable traits, this suggests that a second Trump term would likely deliver significantly more extreme foreign policy outcomes than his first term, the current Biden administration, and a Kamala Harris presidency.
On China, a second Trump presidency would take a harder line toward the rivalry, after the Biden administration finally managed to halt the three-year slide in relations. This would begin with the return of Robert Lighthizer, Trump’s hawkish trade czar, and a push for much higher tariffs on Chinese imports. (Trump would also rekindle old tensions with US allies like Japan and South Korea in his zeal to extract better trade terms from them, too, driving at least some into China’s arms – or encouraging them to hedge more.)
The success of Trump’s confrontational approach would depend almost entirely on how Beijing responds. President Xi Jinping might decide his strategy of engagement and conflict management has run its course and the US can never be a reliable partner. He would accordingly retaliate symmetrically wherever possible and asymmetrically where not, leaning further into economic decoupling and taking advantage of Trump’s disdain for allies to drive a wedge between them and America. By reducing US-China interdependence and therefore the cost of going to war, this Cold War scenario would also increase the risk of direct military confrontation – be that over Taiwan, the South China Sea, or whatever else.
But there’s an alternative: Xi could decide that China’s worsening long-term economic prospects demand a more conciliatory response to Trump’s escalation and instead present him with a “grand bargain” that he could sell at home as a win. That is, after all, what Trump cares most about: not Taiwanese sovereignty, not treaty allies, not the rules-based order, not US global leadership (all of which Xi believes Trump is less committed than Biden/Harris to defending), but claiming credit for reducing the bilateral trade deficit. Whatever happens, a second Trump term would create both bigger risks and bigger opportunities in relations with China than a Harris presidency.
In the Middle East, Trump could play a stabilizing role. The Abraham Accords, probably the biggest foreign policy achievement of his first term, normalized relations between Israel and several Arab countries, sparking hope for a more stable and prosperous region. (They also exposed the indifference that Arab governments feel toward the Palestinians, whose plight was largely decoupled from the agreements.) While Hamas’ Oct. 7 terrorist attacks and the crushing Israeli response to them have put this hope – and the prospect that even Saudi Arabia might cut a breakthrough deal with Israel – on hold, Trump’s transactional nature and strong relationships with deep-pocketed Gulf leaders could revive this possibility (if a lame duck Biden doesn’t get there first…).
The flipside is that Trump’s lack of inhibition about using military force against Iran – remember his administration’s targeted assassination of Iranian defense chief Qasem Soleimani? – could also create wildcard risks, most notably inadvertent escalation from autonomous Iranian proxies or a desperate or emboldened Israeli government. But as the last several months have shown, Tehran itself has no interest in a dangerous direct war with either the US or Israel that it can’t win, particularly when a loss would destabilize the economy, jeopardize recently normalized relations with the Gulf Arabs, and precipitate a crisis at home. So even here, Trump’s risky approach is more likely than not to result in de-escalation and regional stability.
Trump has famously claimed that if elected, he will end the war in Ukraine within 24 hours by unilaterally forcing Presidents Volodymyr Zelensky and Vladimir Putin to accept an immediate cease-fire on terms favorable to Russia. In the likely event that Zelensky, who he strongly dislikes, rejected his terms, he would cut off US military aid as leverage. But, to avoid appearing weak, he would ramp up aid to Ukraine if it was Putin who refused to negotiate.
While Trump’s deal would freeze Russian control over the presently occupied Ukrainian land, the fact remains that Kyiv doesn’t have the manpower to win it all back. It can, however, still end up in a stronger geopolitical position than it was before the invasion. NATO accession would be off the table under Trump, but if he was prepared to sign onto hard security guarantees for Kyiv as part of a breakthrough agreement, the onus would then be on the Europeans to fast-track EU integration and fund Ukraine’s reconstruction. The war would stabilize, and Ukraine would get about as good an outcome as it plausibly could. Absent security commitments or a cease-fire, though, Russia would continue to attempt to take more Ukrainian territory, while a desperate Ukraine would continue its drone and asymmetric warfare to retake its land.
Speaking of NATO, a second Trump term would weaken the transatlantic alliance. Despite increased defense spending across the continent (largely to the credit of Trump’s first-term threats), most European countries won’t be willing or able to meet Trump’s demands for more burden-sharing across the alliance. Whatever he may say, Trump is unlikely to unilaterally withdraw the US from NATO. But he may pull back troop deployments from member countries he believes are “ripping off” the US (whether on defense costs or bilateral trade) to get them to pay up.
American allies in Europe and enemies in the Kremlin will each have cause to doubt the Trump administration’s Article 5 commitment to defend NATO members under attack. A leaderless, divided, and fiscally challenged Europe will be unable to act on French President Emmanuel Macron’s call to bolster its “strategic autonomy,” shore up its collective defenses, and fill the US-shaped hole. Frontline NATO states closest to Russia’s borders – Poland, the Baltics, and the Nordics – are right to worry for their national security under a second Trump presidency.
North Korea’s Kim Jong-un would be happy to welcome back Trump, the only US president willing to bargain with him … while Trump remains intrigued by the enduring prospect of a deal he believes no other US president can get: North Korean denuclearization. That’d be bad news, of course, for South Korea and President Yoon Suk Yeol, who would have little say in what Trump offers Kim in exchange. Last time around, he canceled joint military exercises, questioned the US troop presence in South Korea, and undermined Seoul’s deterrent … without coordinating with Seoul in advance. Diplomacy would not only alienate the conservative Yoon administration, but also it may not be as attractive to Pyongyang now that North Korea is receiving support from Russia, Iran, and China as a member of the “axis of rogues.”
Finally, a second Trump administration would also attempt to cut deals with Mexico on both border security and trade yet again. Trump’s abrasive rhetoric and the scheduled review of the US-Mexico-Canada trade deal in 2026 might get relations with incoming President Claudia Sheinbaum off to a contentious start, but both sides know the US has all the negotiating leverage. Ultimately, there are more than enough vested interests in both countries to find mutually beneficial compromises here, setting Trump up for easy breakthroughs.
In short, Trump’s return at a time of heightened geopolitical turbulence would be more likely to precipitate both catastrophic breakdowns and improbable breakthroughs. Do you feel lucky?
Starmer's plan to boost UK economy will take some time
Carl Bildt, former prime minister of Sweden and co-chair of the European Council on Foreign Relations, shares his perspective on European politics from the Adriatic Sea.
How is Europe’s policy on Ukraine going to change if Trump arrives in the White House?
Well first, it is not going to change its fundamentals. You should know that the very first thing done by the newly elected European Parliament was to take a very strong and very broadly supportive resolution with very strong support for Ukraine. So what's going to happen is that, yes, Europe will continue that particular line, that it might be necessary. I think it will be necessary to further increase the financial support, the support that Europeans is already substantially higher than the Americans. But if the Americans diminish, reduce, stop, whatever Trump is going to do, then Europe clearly would have to step up even more.
How does Prime Minister Starmer's “renewal plan” make it possible to sort of make Britain great again?
Well, it's early days. It's clearly going to be economic policy that is somewhat more sort of interventionist in different ways. I think the important thing is that he wants to have a new start relationship with Europe. I think that's going to take some time, but I think it's going to have some effect. But, I don't think we will see any dramatic steps in the next few months anyhow. So it's early days.
JD Vance
Strongman politics and working-class appeal: GOP’s foreign policy
On the third day of the Republican National Convention, themed “Make America Strong Once Again,” the GOP laid out their vision for the world, outlining what US foreign policy could look like under Donald Trump and JD Vance.
In his keynote address, Vance officially accepted the nomination to be Trump’s VP running mate and used his working-class upbringing to make his key foreign policy points: that globalization has ruined neighborhoods like his, foreign intervention has led to his friends dying overseas, and that the working class is declining because Washington is in the pocket of multinational corporations.
He said the US needs “a leader who is not in the pocket of big business but answers to the working man, union and nonunion alike … a leader who won’t sell out to multinational corporations.” This runs in contrast to an interview Trump gave this week callingfor a more than $700 billion cut to the corporate tax rate.
Vance couldn’t have been received with more enthusiasm. He called out his grandmother, who he referred to as “Mamaw,” and his mother Beverly, who struggled with drug addiction in his early life, as the crowd broke into chants of “JD’s mom” and “Mamaw.”
“To the people of Middletown, Ohio, and all the forgotten communities in Michigan, Wisconsin, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and every corner of our nation,” Vance said, shouting out key swing states in this year’s election, “I promise you this: I will never forget where I came from.”
Before he took to the stage, the evening’s speakers painted Trump as a strongman necessary during tumultuous times. They also called for increasing US energy production, hammered Joe Biden on his trade policy and handling of the Afghanistan withdrawal, and called for a crackdown on immigration through the Southern border.
Texas Gov. Greg Abbott was met with a resounding chant of “Send them back! Send them back! Send them back!” during his speech in praising Trump’s immigration agenda, which he said includes plans to deport migrants who enter the US illegally. He was followed by Trump’s former ICE director, Tom Homan, who told undocumented immigrants “You’d better start packing now. You're damn right. Because you’re going home.”
Doug Burgum gave a hint at what energy policy would look like under Trump 2.o. The North Dakota governor is a likely pick for Trump’s Energy Secretary and linked US energy independence with national security, saying that Biden “is using mandates to shut down reliable baseload electricity. That is why your electric bills have shot upwards.” He ended by taking a knock at Biden’s efforts to incentivize Americans to purchase electric vehicles, saying that Trump will let the crowd keep driving gas-powered cars.
He was followed by the parents of the 13 US soldiers killed in the bombing in Kabul amid the Afghanistan withdrawal in 2021 who, alongside military officials, criticized Biden’s handling of the withdrawal and response in the aftermath.
But could Republican criticisms of the withdrawal from Afghanistan under Biden come back to bite them when it comes to defending Trump’s plans for Ukraine? Vance said at the Munich Security Conference earlier this year that it is unrealistic for the US to continue providing the same level of assistance to Ukraine moving forward, and Trump has signaled that he would reduce aid to Ukraine. But would the former president – who prides himself on being a winner – be willing to lose Ukraine?
Tomorrow, on the RNC’s final day, Trump will address the country for the first time since becoming the official Republican nominee – and less than a week after he was nearly assassinated.
Election 2024: Are American allies worried about the US presidential election?
What do NATO allies think of conversations among US voters about President Biden’s age and ability to serve a second term? Are they worried a second Trump presidency will negatively impact the war in Ukraine? On GZERO World, Ian Bremmer sat with Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski on the sidelines of NATO’s 75th-anniversary summit in DC for his take on a potential second Biden or Trump administration. Sikorksi says Poland will have a partner and ally in whoever ends up in the Oval Office.
“Once you start interfering in the internal party, political affairs of other countries, you’re on a very slippery slope,” Sikorski warns, “Poland wants to have the best possible relations with the US, whoever is your president goes without saying.”
Despite concerns from Democratic voters about Biden’s stamina and cognitive abilities, Sikorski says that at a recent summit, he found Biden “focused, strategic, and actually quite amusing.” He also notes that the Polish government has good relations with both candidates and disputes the idea that a second Trump term would limit further US aid to Ukraine. He concedes that Donald Trump was right on many issues, like the necessity of all NATO members to meet requirements for defense spending. Ultimately, Trump responds to strength and power, and accepting defeat or a settlement on Putin’s terms in Ukraine may not align with the image he wants to project on the global stage.
Watch the full episode: Ukraine can still win this war, says Poland's FM
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