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Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and then-US President Donald Trumpshake hands before a meeting at Hyderabad House in Delhi, India, on Feb. 25, 2020.
India hopes Trump will lean its way
Last month, the Trudeau government expelled Indian diplomats after revealing allegations of assassination plots that Canadian officials linked to the highest levels of the Indian government. India denies the allegations and complains bitterly about a lack of security cooperation in dealing with what it sees as threats from Canadian Sikhs who are seeking an independent homeland in India.
On Wednesday, Canadian police confirmed that last month they arrested a man India calls a terrorist on gun charges.
The hostility between Canadian Sikhs and Hindus turned violent in the suburban Toronto community of Brampton earlier this month, leading to an angry denunciation from Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. India is now hoping Modi’s friend Trump will put Trudeau in his place and resolve the impasse in India’s favor.
But there is an active US prosecution of an Indian intelligence official over a plot to kill Sikh activists in both Canada and the United States. Trump is unlikely to turn a blind eye to that, says Jamie Tronnes, executive director of the Center for North American Prosperity and Security.
“Anyone who is looking for a foothold to do foreign interference that involves violence on citizens of a country on that country’s soil should be deterred strongly by the United States, particularly under Trump,” she says. “He is strong on national security, and he is not going to tolerate murder-for-hire plots on American soil.”
On the other hand, Trump tends to be motivated by transactional concerns, and India has a lot of leverage in the global chess match between China and the United States.
Canada's fight with India over Sikh assassination heats up again
Ian Bremmer shares his insights on global politics this week on World In :60.
What is the role of the United Nations in the Israel-Gaza war?
Well, it's actually quite a few roles. One, the General Assembly and the Security Council are principle places where you get to see how the various countries around the world respond to the war, what their political positioning is, so the comparative isolation of the United States on the Security Council, for example, what countries do, don't stand with Israel, the Palestinians of the 194 member states around the world? Secondly, the UN is the principal organization that delivers humanitarian aid on the ground in Gaza, staffed overwhelmingly by Palestinians, thousands of them. That's been controversial because a number, something like seven or eight, have been found to have been involved in the support for the attacks on October 7th, the terrorist attacks. And then, finally, you have UN peacekeepers, thousands of them, on the ground in southern Lebanon, with many countries around the world participating. That's the Security Council that's responsible for that but has not been particularly effective at ensuring that the Security Council resolutions, creating a buffer zone, pushing Hezbollah back, and not allowing them to strike Israel, have actually been implemented. So lots of places that they have a role, you learn a lot about the world as a consequence, but it's not like they have a lot of power or a lot of money.
Why did Canada expel Indian diplomats?
Well, it's a fight that's been going on for over a year now with the assassination of this Sikh terrorist that India was found to be behind on sovereign Canadian territory. There had been a conversation between Modi and Trudeau on the sidelines of recent G20 Summit. It looked like facilitated by the United States, that that relationship was improving. It has fallen apart again. One of the things, I mean, there's more information that's come out in Canada about what India's role has been interfering with Canadian politics and citizens, but also the fact that Trudeau is in really tough shape domestically. He's thinking that a fight with India right now may help him in terms of popularity. I don't think it's going to work, but that certainly is not irrelevant.
How important is Elon Musk in the US election?
I don't think he's very important to the outcome. Obviously, Twitter/X is significantly oriented towards the right in terms of both Elon and what's being algorithmically promoted, but it's a lot smaller for US citizens than TikTok, which is younger and is more focused to the extent there's a political slant on the left. So if you ask me, which is going to matter more? I suspect TikTok will bring out more voters than Twitter/X, will. I think you on, is important in the election because he has personally done so much to promote disinformation, and it's making it harder for the average American to know what they can trust, what's a trusted source of media, what's a trusted source of information, what they should believe around vaccines, around FEMA response to a hurricane, around whether or not the election is free and fair. And I'm worried deeply that there's much greater likelihood of violence in the United States on the back of his personal decision of how to run Twitter/X than there would've been otherwise. We'll be focused on this very closely.
How the Supreme Court immunity ruling changes presidential power
Ian Bremmer shares his insights on global politics this week on World In :60.
What does the Supreme Court's immunity decision mean for Trump and the future of presidential power?
Well, for Trump, the first thing it means is that you're not going to be hearing about on the case of his involvement in January 6th. All of that gets punted until after the election earliest, assuming Biden wins and more likely these days, Trump. The case is kind of a dead letter. More broadly for presidential power. We're talking about immunity for all official acts that are engaged in during the course of a person's presidency. Now, in dissent, Justice Sotomayor, who's pretty far left on the court, has said that this doesn't prevent a president from engaging in treasonous acts and makes the president a king. Most jurists don't accept that, but it certainly does lead to huge questions about what is and what is not an official act. And of course, presidents would be inclined to argue that very broadly to be able to avoid the potential at any cases against them. So this is a pretty significant, not necessary momentous, but certainly very significant decision by the court.
With the far-right surging in the French elections, what would a caretaker government in France mean for Europe?
Well, it is more likely that we see a caretaker government than we see a far-right majority. And the efforts by President Macron and the left to ensure that they are not running against each other in the second round, triangular three-person elections make it more likely that you have a hung parliament. Then you have the far right in a cohabitation of this very unusual situation where the prime minister is opposition to the president. But what's going to happen is that you have a very, very weak French government and that almost nothing can pass in the next 12 months until another election would occur. It certainly makes Le Pen stronger. It makes it more likely that the far right is eventually able to defeat a Macron successor from the center in 2027.
And it also makes it more likely that the French budget is out of whack with the EU. They're not able to pass anything that looks like a balanced budget, that more parliamentary approvals for things like, additional support for Ukraine or training troops on the ground, would have a hard time getting through the French parliament if it requires such a vote. So it's a real challenge for the EU. It's a challenge for France.
Does the West have any concerns with Modi's upcoming visit to Russia?
Not really. The West relationship with Prime Minister Modi is very strong. Modi is increasingly decoupling the defense relationship between India and Russia. They buy a lot from Russia. No Indian technology goes to Russia the way that it does from China, for example. So you don't have that dual use problem. And India buys an awful lot of oil from Russia, at a discount. But that is in line with American and the West's policies, because they don't want a global recession. Modi and Putin, in principle, are supposed to visit each other every year. That hasn't happened. And so this is sort of getting that relationship in that regard on track. But I think there's not a lot strategically that the West is worried about near term here.
Is Modi's India a friend or foe to the US?
What is an ally? How is it different from a strategic partner? At what point does a shared interest between two nations bloom into a full-fledged alliance? Those questions are at the heart of the DC-Delhi relationship.
So, is India a US ally? Based on the pomp and circumstance surrounding Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s state visit to Washington in June, the answer seems obvious, right? They love us! We love them! End of story. Right?
Ian's guest today, award-winning Indian journalist and Washington Post columnist Barkha Dutt, has some tough love to share: Sorry America, India will never be your ally. "India's hardwired from inception, as an independent country," Dutt tells Bremmer, "to be what what used to be called non-aligned, and what India's foreign minister now calls multi-lateralism ... India is asserting her moment in time."
On the other hand, both nations share a common interest in countering a rising China. So how does Dutt square that circle? Tune in to “GZERO World with Ian Bremmer” on US public television starting this Friday, July 7, to watch the full interview. Check local listings.
India is not a US ally ... or is it?
If the United States and India were ever to make it Facebook official, their status would be: "It's Complicated." These two global behemoths may seem like close allies, especially judging by the warm welcome President Biden gave Prime Minister Modi during his White House visit in June, but in reality, they are anything but best friends.
During the Cold War era, India maintained a "strategically non-aligned" global status and it has tried to stay on the geopolitical fence since fall of the Soviet Union. But when Russia invaded Ukraine and Delhi refused to explicitly condemn Moscow, India's self-proclaimed "multilateral" approach was severely tested.
On the show this week, a deep dive into the nation that recently surpassed China to become the most populous country on earth. Ian is joined by award-winning broadcast journalist and Washington Post contributor Barkha Dutt to talk US-India relations, the state of democracy within India, and how the trauma of COVID has reshaped the country.
Tune in to “GZERO World with Ian Bremmer” on US public television starting this Friday, July 7, to watch the full interview. Check local listings.
Ian Explains: Is India a US ally? It's complicated
Whose side is India on? Well, it's complicated. Based on the plushest of red carpets that President Biden rolled out for the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi during his White House visit in June, one might think the two were the closest of allies. But India has a long history of what it used to call "strategic non-alignment" and now refers to as "multilateralism."
After enduring a century of British colonial rule, it’s understandable that Indians would bristle at being told to enter the fold of one global alliance or another, especially when one side includes their former colonizer. And Indians feel they shouldn’t have to hide behind anyone. This behemoth of a nation just overpassed China to become to most populous country on earth and its rapidly growing economy could overtake Germany and Japan’s within this decade.
The sustainability of that stance has been severely tested, however, in the wake of Delhi's refusal to explicitly condemn Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and critics argue that it's long past time for India to pick a side.
Watch Ian Explains for the full breakdown, and for more on India, watch GZERO World with Ian Bremmer on US public television and at gzeromedia.com/gzeroworld.
US President Joe Biden holds a virtual meeting from the White House with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi.
Biden takes his shot with Modi
Since the end of the Cold War, every US president has tried to boost relations with India. After all, closer defense ties with the world’s largest democracy would advance US interests in Asia, and an opening of economic ties with the world’s most populous country would create enormous opportunities for US companies and consumers.
Bill Clinton’s bid to boost ties with Delhi all but ended when India tested a nuclear weapon in 1998, but George W. Bush dropped the resulting sanctions on Delhi, recognized India as a nuclear power, and signed a landmark civilian nuclear deal with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.
Barack Obama lifted a US travel ban on Prime Minister Narendra Modi, imposed in response to a 2002 massacre of Muslims in the state where Modi then served as chief minister, and welcomed him to the White House in 2014. Obama later recognized India as a “major defense partner.”
Donald Trump imposed tariffs that hit India’s economy, but he also revived the so-called Quadrilateral Security Dialogue with India, Japan, and Australia in response to a more assertive China.
Next Thursday, President Joe Biden will take his shot at deepening ties with India, as Prime Minister Modi arrives at the White House for a much-anticipated state visit, his first since meeting Obama nine years ago.
The backdrop for their conversations will include all the things that might bring the US and India closer together and the issues that have long limited how much they can accomplish. Shared anxiety over a more assertive China and the opportunity for India, the world’s largest arms buyer, to purchase powerful weapons and technologies the US typically reserves for its treaty allies will give them plenty to talk about. The US, already India’s top trade partner and largest direct investor, is happy to replace Russia as India’s lead arms dealer.
Biden and Modi are also expected to discuss the so-called “initiative on critical and emerging technology,” which creates US-India projects to develop defense-related advanced technology centered on semiconductors, artificial intelligence, and quantum computing. This is the area where Biden and Modi are most likely to make news.
But, while Biden and Modi will acknowledge their shared security and economic interests, Modi continues the Indian tradition of presenting himself as a voice for the developing world. In that role, differences over who will bear the heaviest burdens in the fight against climate change loom large.
That’s why Biden is expected to offer substantial US investment next week in projects designed to boost development in countries of the “Global South,” targeted with guidance from Modi.
If Biden and Modi discuss human rights – the treatment of India’s Muslim minority by members of Modi’s Hindu nationalist government and party, in particular – it’s likely to be within limits agreed in advance by the US and Indian officials who prepped the visit.
More broadly, while Americans have long wanted a more productive partnership, Indian leaders, Modi in particular, value their country’s independence of action.
In short, next week’s visit will offer big opportunities for both Biden and Modi. But US and Indian leaders have been here before, and the US-Indian relationship has remained a work in progress for decades.
US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and India's Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar hold a news conference in Washington, DC.
US warns India on dealing with Russia: “Pakistan is Plan B”
After years of favoring New Delhi, the US is now back to balancing between India and Pakistan.
The decade-long deterioration of ties with Islamabad, propelled by Pakistan’s support for the Taliban in Afghanistan and tilt toward China, had shaped Washington’s conventional thinking into a neat binary: that a democratic, anti-China India is ‘in’ and an autocratic, pro-China Pakistan is ‘out’ of the American camp.
That’s no longer the case in America’s response to India’s consistent hedging and betting on Russia, as well as Pakistan’s diplomatic overtures and counterterrorism cooperation. Indeed, the future of US positioning in South Asia seems to be shifting, as Washington resumes playing ball with both nuclear-armed rivals like it’s done for decades.
America’s pal, but Russia’s BFF. On Saturday, India abstained from voting for a US-sponsored UN Security Council resolution slamming Russia’s illegal annexation of Ukrainian territory. This wasn’t the first time the Indians have refused to back the Americans — every UN resolution tabled against Russian aggression in Ukraine since the beginning of the war has seen India walk away from the crime scene.
For India watchers who acknowledge New Delhi’s stated policy of strategic autonomy — basically a we-will-do-the-right-thing-but-in-our-own-way approach to a values-based order — the latest abstention was a disappointment, coming just days after PM Narendra Modi was praised by Washington for lecturing Vladimir Putin about this not being “an era of war.”
Although Indian diplomats insist that dialogue is the only answer to settling disputes, Modi’s government is now being criticized even at home for speaking from both sides of its mouth, especially as the war takes on a nuclear dimension.
The frustration is premised on a contradiction. Though it is still counted as a strategic partner of the US and an important teammate on the Quad, India’s decades-long defense ties with Moscow continue to thrive.
The Indians are shoring up the Russian economy by buying more fossil fuels (albeit at steep discounts). This year, oil imports are up thirty-fold from 2021, and coal purchases have quadrupled. Meanwhile, the Indians remain Moscow’s biggest arms customer and continue buying sophisticated Russian weapons despite the risk of triggering US sanctions.
This attitude of sacrifice-rules-for-money by India shows that “since Russia invaded Ukraine, Modi and his government have become ultra-realist on foreign policy,” says Derek Grossman, a senior defense analyst at the RAND Corporation.
The Indians, he explains, “have refused to condemn Russian aggression and its undermining of the rules-based international order, which New Delhi claims to uphold along with like-minded democratic states,” he said. Rather, India has prioritized discounted Russian oil — a business over values approach — which doesn't say much about India’s commitment to the rules-based system that it claims to support.
Pakistan as Plan B? But Washington isn’t just sitting pretty watching India play both sides. Responding to New Delhi’s hedging through its own, the US is gearing up to balance the military relationship with Islamabad.
After suspending all military aid in 2018 due to Pakistan’s support for the Taliban in Afghanistan, the US State Department reversed course last month, resuming critical military assistance to Islamabad. India, of course, is up in arms. After all, the F-16 fighter-bomber — which the Americans are servicing for the Pakistanis — was used to shoot down at least one Indian Air Force MiG-21 in 2019.
While the State Department has pushed back against India’s protests by saying it values its relations with both sides, Pakistan seems to have been let out of Washington’s doghouse. Last week, State fêted Pakistan’s foreign minister for a week-long sojourn, topped with a ceremony commemorating 75 years of diplomatic ties at the Museum of American Diplomacy. (His Indian counterpart — who was in town around the same time complaining about the Pakistani weapons deal — was also given the royal treatment, with a dinner at Blinken’s home.)
As far as the Pakistanis are concerned, the boys are back in town. This week, the Pentagon is hosting Pakistan’s all-powerful army chief, Gen. Qamar Javed Bajwa, who played a crucial role in the ousting of former prime minister Imran Khan, an anti-American populist. On Gen. Bajwa’s agenda: Pakistani support for Washington’s over-the-horizon counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan, as well as grappling with the Taliban, ISIS-K and al-Qaida.
“The US seems to be finally recognizing that despite the full-throated pronouncements from New Delhi about a rules-based international order, India’s need for cheap Russian oil and Russian weapons override everything else,” says Uzair Younis, director of the Pakistan Initiative at the Atlantic Council.
Given this context, he adds, Washington is finally realizing that it must also pursue “a parallel diplomatic path with Pakistan, especially given that New Delhi is unlikely to be weaned off its addiction to Russian energy and weapons any time soon.”
However, India will remain important for America. Surely, this maneuvering hasn’t ruptured the proximity between Washington and New Delhi – China remains their common rival, after all — but it is being seen as a tactical response to India’s dealing with the Russians.
Plus, after years of increasing dependency on China, the Pakistanis are only too eager to balance their interests with Washington, but only till the Chinese come back to them with a better offer for their rentier state.
Also, the resumption of US military aid to Pakistan — still paltry compared to America’s broad defense, economic, and tech ties with India — has not disturbed India’s standing as a “strategic partner." Though we are not back to hyphenating India with Pakistan — a Cold War-era Washingtonian trait that irritated New Delhi for decades — recent moves by the US have clearly irked the Indians. But are they going to reset US priorities in South Asia?
“One of the enduring challenges for the US-India relationship is that each country insists on maintaining cordial ties with the other’s key rival,” says Michael Kugelman, director of the South Asia Institute at the Wilson Center.
This problem appeared to be working itself out in recent years, as India reduced its share of Russian arms imports and the US cut off security aid to Pakistan. But now we are seeing a return to what Kugelman calls the “old normal” — India reasserting its friendship with Russia and the US restarting security ties with Pakistan.
“At the end of the day, neither New Delhi nor Washington are willing to let go of these longstanding relationships,” he explains.
Still, what the Americans are doing to the Indians — a diplomatic tit-for-tat, really — makes the long-term trajectory of India-Russia and US-Pakistan relations more unsettled than that of US-India relations.
For Kugmelman, “they’re still realities in the here and now. It’s little more than a nuisance for US-India relations, but a nuisance nonetheless.”
Bottom line: The Pakistanis might be back in play in Washington, but India’s not getting on any American blacklist anytime soon. Regardless, the US has put on its Great Power suit, and sent New Delhi a bill about the cost of doing business with the Russians.This article comes to you from the Signal newsletter team of GZERO Media. Sign up today.