Trending Now
We have updated our Privacy Policy and Terms of Use for Eurasia Group and its affiliates, including GZERO Media, to clarify the types of data we collect, how we collect it, how we use data and with whom we share data. By using our website you consent to our Terms and Conditions and Privacy Policy, including the transfer of your personal data to the United States from your country of residence, and our use of cookies described in our Cookie Policy.
{{ subpage.title }}
British soldiers with NATO-led Resolute Support Mission arrive at the site of an attack in Kabul, Afghanistan March 6, 2020.
Hard Numbers: Secret British plan resettles Afghans, More Palestinians die at aid sites, US AIDS relief lives on, robots take the field, & more
19,000: According to a BBC report, the personal details of 19,000 Afghans who had applied to move to the United Kingdom following the 2021 Taliban takeover were leaked in February 2022. The government learned of the data breach in August 2023 and created a secret resettlement scheme for those affected, as it was deemed they were at risk of harm by the Taliban. Under the program, 4,500 Afghans have relocated to the UK.
20: At least 20 Palestinians were killed in a stampede at an aid distribution site operated by the controversial US- and Israeli-backed Gaza Humanitarian Fund on Wednesday. The UN says at least 875 people have lost their lives in the past six weeks alone while trying to access aid at these sites, with the majority reportedly gunned down by Israeli security forces. While Israel denies deliberately targeting civilians, it has said it is investigating the incidents.
$400 million: US Republican senators reached a budget deal on Tuesday that will preserve the $400-million President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) program, which helps to stem the spread of HIV in more than 50 countries and has reportedly saved 26 million lives. President Donald Trump had previously frozen funding for PEPFAR as part of his foreign-aid freeze.
2: A US citizen, Daniel Martindale, who spent more than two years spying on Ukrainian troops for Russia was awarded citizenship by Russian President Vladimir Putin on Tuesday. Martindale reportedly biked from Poland to Ukraine after Russia’s invasion in 2022, and surveyed key military positions and facilities from a Ukrainian village near the front line.
4: Our new robot umpire overlords have arrived! Last night’s Major League Baseball All-Star game – a meaningless but fun contest between the sport’s biggest stars – featured a trial system allowing players to appeal to a computerized system to challenge ball-and-strike calls made by human umps. Four out of the five challenges in the game were successful. The system could be introduced in meaningful games at the Major League level as soon as next season. Do we want this?
Zelensky and Putin in front of flags and war.
$300 Ukrainian drones vs. $100 million Russian bombers
The combined message from Kyiv could not have been clearer: we may be far smaller and – on paper at least – weaker, but we can strike hard and reach far into Russia. Using drones produced indigenously for less than the cost of an iPhone, Ukraine took out strategic bombers worth upward of $100 million each – many of which are nearly impossible to replace due to sanctions and Russia’s degraded industrial base. At a 300,000-to-one return on investment, this is the kind of asymmetric operation that can upend the rules of modern warfare.
Just as significant as the material damage is what the attacks revealed: that a small but determined and innovative nation can deploy cheap, scalable, and decentralized tech to challenge a much larger, conventionally superior foe – and even degrade elements of a nuclear superpower’s second-strike capacity. The lessons will reverberate globally, from Taipei to Islamabad.
Perhaps the biggest impact of Ukraine’s battlefield coup may be to challenge the core strategic presumption that has guided Vladimir Putin’s thinking for over three years: that time is on his side. Since the invasion began, Putin has bet on outlasting Ukraine – grinding down its defenses, draining Western support, and waiting for the political winds in Washington and Europe to shift. That assumption has underpinned his refusal to negotiate seriously. But the success of Ukraine’s drone and sabotage operations challenges that theory of victory. It shows that Ukraine is not simply holding the line or surviving a war of attrition; it is shifting the battlefield and expanding the costs of continued war for Russia in ways the Kremlin has not anticipated.
That shift matters, especially in the diplomatic context. The timing of the drone campaign – just 24 hours before a direct round of talks between Russian and Ukrainian officials in Istanbul – was hardly coincidental. Kyiv’s actions were designed to signal that Ukraine is not negotiating from a position of weakness and won’t be coerced into a bad deal. Though the Istanbul meeting itself was predictably fruitless – lasting just over an hour and reinforcing the irreconcilability of the two sides’ positions – the fact that the Kremlin showed up fresh off such a high-profile embarrassment suggests it may be starting to realize that Ukraine has cards to play and continuing the war carries risks for Russia.
This may not be enough to bring Russia to the negotiating table in good faith, but it could make it more open to limited agreements. To be sure, a permanent peace settlement remains as distant as ever. Kyiv continues to push for an unconditional ceasefire that Russia rejects out of hand. In Istanbul, Moscow proposed two equally unacceptable alternatives: either Kyiv retreats from Russian-claimed territories or accepts limits on its ability to rearm, including a halt to Western military aid. But the right kind of pressure from the United States, coordinated with European allies, could now stand a better chance of extracting a first-phase deal – whether that’s a 30-day ceasefire, a humanitarian corridor, or a prisoner swap – that could then potentially turn into something bigger and more durable.
At the same time, Ukraine’s gains increase the tail risks of dangerous escalation. Russia’s deterrent posture has been eroded. Putin’s red lines – on NATO enlargement, Western weapons use, attacks inside Russia – have been crossed repeatedly without serious consequence. That makes him look weak but also increases the risk that he will feel compelled to escalate the conflict more dramatically to restore his credibility at home and abroad.
Russia’s immediate response to the recent attacks will be more of the same: heavier indiscriminate bombing of Ukrainian cities and infrastructure. But a darker possibility is that, boxed in and humiliated, Putin might consider a tactical nuclear strike. The threshold for such an extreme step is high – not least because China, Russia’s most important global partner, strongly opposes nuclear use. That scenario remains unlikely, but less so than before June 1. And Putin is emboldened by the belief that the West – particularly Trump – fears direct military confrontation more than anything. If he assesses that Russia’s position in the war is becoming untenable or its conventional deterrence is crumbling, his calculus could change.
Ukraine has just reminded the Kremlin – and the world – that it can shape events, not just react to them. This doesn’t put it on a path to victory or bring the war to an end. But by showing that it has leverage and that Moscow has more to lose than it thought, Ukraine has altered the strategic equation and opened a narrow window for diplomacy – even if the endgame remains as elusive as ever. The alternative is a deeper and more unpredictable conflict that grows more dangerous the longer it drags on.
U.S. President Donald Trump speaks during a swearing-in ceremony of Special Envoy Steve Witkoff in the Oval Office at the White House in Washington, D.C., U.S., May 6, 2025.
What We’re Watching: Trump talks peace, Pakistan charms China, Romania, Poland and Portugal go to the polls
Trump seeks peace between Ukraine and Russia - again
US President Donald Trump will speak Monday at 10 am EST to Russian President Vladimir Putin to discuss “STOPPING THE 'BLOODBATH'” in Russia’s war with Ukraine, as well as “trade.” After that call, Trump will speak with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, in the hopes of brokering a 30-day ceasefire.
But is a deal DOA? Ukrainian sources claim that Moscow insists that Ukrainian troops first withdraw from the Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, and Luhansk regions of Ukraine, which doesn’t align with Washington’s proposal. Moscow hasn’t commented, but such demands could torpedo a truce before it begins.
A new eastern axis: Pakistan, China…. and Afghanistan?
Pakistan’s Foreign Minister and deputy Prime Minister, Ishaq Dar, is in Beijing Monday to meet with his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi "on the evolving regional situation in South Asia and its implications for peace and stability.” The meeting follows April’s violent conflict between Pakistan and India which saw Islamabad deploy Chinese weapons.
Is Kabul now in play? While in China, Dar is reportedly also holding trilateral talks with Afghanistan to discuss "enhanced security cooperation". The three countries all border India, and an alliance could threaten that country’s territorial integrity in the north. Pakistan further claims that its ceasefire with India expired Sunday, raising the possibility of renewed hostilities.
A mixed night for the right in trio of European elections
A centrist takes the crown in Romania, the right makes gains in Portugal, and a run-off awaits in Poland.
In Romania, the centrist mayor of Bucharest, Nicușor Dan, bested hard-right election front-runner George Simion 53.8% to 46.2%. The results won’t please the White House, which had plumped for Simion, but will delight the EU, NATO, and Ukraine, which Romania has supported in its war with Russia.
In Portugal, the center-right Democratic Alliance (AD) won 32% of the vote, improving on last year’s results by 4 points and boosting its number of seats in the Assembly to 89. They remain short of an outright majority, though. It was a dismal night for the opposition Socialist Party (PS), which scored just 23% and lost 20 seats, leaving it with just 58. This means that Chega, a hard-right party, will be the joint-second-largest party in Portugal, after it also won 58 seats. This is by far Chega’s best result in its six-year history.
In Poland, liberal Warsaw Mayor Rafal Trzaskowski narrowly bested conservative historian Karol Nawrocki, 31.4% to 29.5%, in the first round of the presidential election. Trzaskowski would help Prime Minister Donald Tusk reform laws enacted by the former governing party, Law and Justice, while Nawrocki would align with the far right. The two men will now face off in a second-round runoff on June 1.
A Ukrainian rescue worker sits atop the rubble of a destroyed residential building during rescue operations, following a Russian missile strike on a residential apartment building block in Kyiv, Ukraine, on April 24, 2025.
Kyiv under fire, Trump blasts Putin on Truth Social
At least 12 people were killed and 90 others injured in a large-scale Russian assault on Kyiv early Thursday, prompting Donald Trump to post on Truth Social: “I am not happy with the Russian strikes on KYIV. Not necessary, and very bad timing. Vladimir, STOP!”
This strike was among the most lethal of the conflict and marked the worst attack on the Ukrainian capital since July, when Russian missiles hit a children’s hospital. Reports suggest that Thursday’s assault involved missiles provided by North Korea.
The attack occurred just hours after Trump and his senior advisers urged Ukrainian officials to accept a US-backed peace proposal that would effectively legitimize Russian control over all occupied Ukrainian territory.
Despite pushing for a resolution, with his Truth Social post concluding “Let’s get the Peace Deal DONE,” the Trump administration has recently indicated they might pull out of peace negotiations if progress isn’t made soon. While this could just be a threat to force Ukraine to the negotiating table, a round of high-level peace talks originally planned for London on Wednesday was postponed, primarily due to the US opting not to attend.
President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy speaks during a briefing, Kyiv, Ukraine, on March 28, 2025.
Elections coming in Ukraine?
But speculation is growing that Zelensky may be changing his mind. Ukraine’s president could promise elections in return for a ceasefire from Putin and move ahead with a national vote as early as this summer. Ukrainian officials have dismissed a recent report from The Economist that plans are under active consideration in Kyiv, and the man considered Zelensky’s strongest potential rival, former commander of Ukraine's army and now Ukraine’s ambassador in London, Valerii Zaluzhnyi, has refused to comment.
But a recent poll by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology found that 69% of Ukrainians say they trust Zelensky, a small rise from the previous month. With Ukraine’s future uncertain as Russia continues to push for new battlefield gains, Zelensky might be as popular now as he’s likely to get.
If elections were held and Zelensky won, the Ukrainian president’s credibility would be strengthened both inside and outside Ukraine, pushing the focus of peace negotiations back onto the Kremlin’s intransigence.
Friedrich Merz, Vladimir Putin, Donald Trump, and Alice Weidel
Can Friedrich Merz be the leader Germany – and Europe – needs?
As expected, Friedrich Merz is set to become the next German chancellor after his conservative Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) won one of the tightest and highest-turnout elections in the country’s postwar history.
But the 28.5% earned by Merz’s CDU/CSU was the party’s second-lowest tally ever – hardly a mandate. Not to be outdone, outgoing Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s center-left Social Democrats (SPD) came third with just 16.4% – their worst defeat in 137 years. The moderate Greens led by economy minister Robert Habeck lost ground, too, scoring a disappointing 12.5%.
By contrast, extremist parties had a great night on Sunday. The far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) came in second place, doubling its vote share since the 2021 elections to 20.8% on the back of large gains with previous nonvoters, in the poorest districts, and across eastern Germany. The former communist Left Party (Die Linke), meanwhile, secured 8.8% of the vote by mobilizing younger women.
Neither the liberal Free Democrats (FDP) nor the far-left Alliance Sahra Wagenknecht (BSW) were able to clear the 5% threshold needed to enter parliament, increasing the number of seats allocated to the larger parties. The CDU/CSU and SPD’s combined allocation of 328 of 630 seats in the Bundestag will allow Merz to form a two-way coalition with the Social Democrats, avoiding the worst-case scenario of a weak, unwieldy, and unstable three-party coalition like Scholz’s ill-fated government with the Greens and the FDP (before it collapsed).
Though the CDU/CSU and SPD have real differences on immigration, social spending, and taxation, and their presumptive 13-seat majority won’t be large, so-called “grand coalitions” between these rival establishment parties have a long history in Germany and are popular with voters for their track record of delivering moderation and stability. Merz’s predecessor as party leader, former Chancellor Angela Merkel, presided over three of them.
But the inevitable alliance this time around is a flashing warning sign of Germans’ fading patience with the political center – and, conversely, of their growing appetite for radical movements – in a fragmented party landscape. The AfD won enough seats to make a two-way coalition with the CDU/CSU mathematically possible, but it is considered a neo-Nazi party by the entire German political establishment. Merz has made it clear that, despite his flirtation with them over migration and the recent embrace by Elon Musk and US Vice President JD Vance, the “firewall” keeping the extremists out of power will continue to hold – for now at least.
Yet as mainstream parties continue to lose voters to the far right, they will be increasingly forced into forming ever weaker and more ineffective coalitions just to stay in power. Alice Weidel, the AfD’s leader, has set her sights on the 2029 elections, hoping that the AfD can capitalize on – and nudge – the failure of yet another disappointing centrist government to become Germany’s strongest party and kingmaker. Over the next four years, it will aim to use its much-strengthened position to dominate agenda-setting and sabotage the new government as much as possible.
One weapon the AfD may be able to wield to hamstring Merz’s coalition is the so-called “blocking minority” it’ll form with the hard-left Die Linke, given the radical parties’ combined 216 Bundestag seats – just above the 210 seats needed to thwart constitutional reforms like the loosening of Germany’s strict fiscal rules (aka “debt brake”), which require a two-thirds majority in both houses of parliament.
Created in 2009 to restrict deficits, the constitutionally enshrined debt brake has since limited Berlin’s ability to borrow money to finance public spending. But 2025 is not 2009. Europe’s largest economy is in the midst of a profound economic crisis at a time of unprecedented geopolitical upheaval. Berlin needs to unlock hundreds of billions of dollars to modernize the country’s infrastructure, lower energy costs, invest in innovation, revive its stalled economy, ramp up support for Ukraine, and bolster its defense capabilities. The scale of the challenge has been compounded by President Donald Trump’s recent pivot toward Russia and threat to abandon Europe as the war in Ukraine turns three years old.
Merz struck the right level of urgency when he said that his “absolute priority” as chancellor will be “to strengthen Europe” in order “to achieve independence” from the United States, given that the Trump administration seems to be “largely indifferent” to Europe’s fate. A staunch transatlanticist before Washington started behaving like an adversary, Merz understands that what’s at stake is not just German interests but Europe’s future.
But Germany’s incoming chancellor has his work cut out for him. The AfD will obstruct all attempts to revamp the debt brake and raise borrowing, while the anti-militarist Die Linke supports reforming the borrowing rules but has explicitly vowed to oppose any vote to increase the country’s defense spending on principle. With a blocking minority in the Bundestag, these fringe parties could seriously undermine Merz’s agenda and, by extension, European security.
Merz’s plan to circumvent that challenge is the kind of boldness Germany needs more of. Instead of waiting for the blocking minority to be seated, the soon-to-be chancellor is exploring the possibility of pushing the defense spending hike through the lame-duck parliament, where mainstream parties will technically have a two-thirds supermajority until the newly elected parliament is sworn in on Mar. 25. The fiscally conservative Merz ruled out using this gimmick to reform the debt brake outright yesterday, but he’s reportedly in talks with the Social Democrats and the Greens to set up a special off-budget defense fund worth around 200 billion euros (this would also require a two-thirds majority).
Admittedly, four weeks is very little time to negotiate a workaround while juggling tricky coalition talks in a country that’s notoriously averse to big, fast changes. But extraordinary times call for extraordinary measures. If the German political establishment can’t muster the courage to act decisively now, it may not just be the AfD knocking on their doors in four years – Russian troops could be knocking at Europe’s doorstep, too.
A civilian enterprise in Kharkiv, Ukraine, after being struck by a Russian drone, on January 28, 2025.
Why it matters that Putin won't talk to Zelensky
If it didn’t concern one of the world’s deadliest conflicts, it would read like a bad soap opera: Russian President Vladimir Putin says he’s ready for peace talks regarding the Ukraine war but that he’ll only talk directly to US President Donald Trump, not Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky. Meanwhile Zelensky, for his part, says Putin is simply “afraid.”
Putin’s position is that because Zelensky postponed the Ukrainian election that was scheduled for last year, he is not a “legitimate” president. The election was canceled, of course, due to the war that began when Putin invaded Ukraine nearly three years ago.
But this all complicates things. Zelensky worries Putin is seeking to “manipulate” Trump into mediating a deal that is unfavorable to Ukraine. He has reason to be worried at least in one respect: Trump has much more pull with Ukraine than he does with Russia.
If Trump cuts aid to Ukraine, it would immediately cripple Kyiv. But with Russia, he has less leverage. His recent tariff threat against Russia was, as we noted here, hollow (Russia exports almost nothing to the US), and further sanctions on the world’s most sanctioned country would hardly move the needle.
Meanwhile, adding to the soap drama, Trump and Putin are signaling that they’re interested in having a phone call, but that each is waiting for the other to reach out.
The terrible TV of it aside, it’s a reminder that although Trump campaigned in part on a promise to swiftly end the Ukraine war, there are major challenges, even for the Artist of the Deal himself.
Meanwhile, the conflict rages on: Russia this week seized another key town near the Ukrainian city of Kharkiv, while Ukraine launched a massive drone attack on Russian energy infrastructure.
Opinion: After 25 years, has Putin "won"?
An aging, visibly infirm president is about to hand off power to an authoritarian-minded successor with a mandate to restore “order” and “sovereignty.”
Sound familiar? Da. It’s New Year’s Eve 1999, and a bloated, barely intelligible Boris Yeltsin is handing the Kremlin over to a shifty young spook named Vladimir Putin. “Take care of Russia,” he famously said before staggering out of the room.
When Vladimir Vladimirovich first took power 25 years ago, the world was a different place. Cell phones weren’t smart yet. Lou Bega was burning up the charts with “Mambo Number Five.” The most feared hacking group in the world wasn’t called “Fancy Bear” or “Salt Typhoon” but “Napster.”
It was also a world in which the US was at the pinnacle of its post-Cold War triumphalism. The disputed elections, disastrous wars, and crippling financial crises of the 21st century were still – just barely – in the future.
History had ended, or at least been paused. Uncle Sam had won the Cold War. Free markets, free trade, and liberal democracy were on the march globally, gloriously, and inevitably. So too, it seemed, was NATO, which began expanding eastward in the 1990s.
Putin did not like this world. From his perspective it was a world that treated Russia either as an afterthought or as a charity case. He resented the high-handed moralizing from the West about “democracy.” He dreamed of a “multipolar” world where the US couldn’t boss Russia around or humiliate the Kremlin and its friends.
Now, five US presidents, three Russian invasions, and countless predictions of his demise later, Putin is still standing. And as a result, he has lasted long enough to witness the return of Donald Trump to the White House – this time not with an asterisk but with a mandate.
In a way, Trump’s return means Putin has finally won. Not because of the silly notion that Trump is a “Russian agent” – but because it closes the door, finally and fully, on the post-Cold War era that Putin confronted when he first came to power.
Trumpism is, at its core, a rebuke to all the pieties of that era: that globalism would trump nationalism, that free trade and open societies had an inherent appeal, and that there were international “norms” that the US was responsible for policing.
Trump, whether you like him or not, isn’t interested in a high-handed foreign policy based on abstract “values.” He doesn’t care whether Russia is a democracy or an empire. He questions the net benefit of decades-old US alliances like NATO. He has already blown apart what Robert Lighthizer, his first-term trade czar, calls the “free trade theology” that held sway in Washington for decades.
His worldview is a zero-sum, mercantilist, hyper-nationalistic one. Putin, in many ways, can relate. When Trump talks about using force to take over the Panama Canal, Greenland, or Canada because these things would be in America’s national interest as a hemispheric power, for example, he is speaking a political language from before the “end of history.” This is a language Putin speaks fluently. Panama isn’t quite Crimea, but you get the idea.
At his annual marathon press conference a few weeks ago, Putin reflected on the past quarter century, telling BBC’s journalist Steve Rosenberg that he was proud to have “pulled Russia back from the abyss,” after inheriting a deeply indebted, politically fragmented, and listless country from Yeltsin.
Perhaps that’s true, but Russia today is a country locked in a costly conflict of Putin’s choosing, with a shrinking and aging population, a war-warped economy, and a flagging technological base. Shorn of its traditional partners in Europe, Moscow is increasingly dependent either on rogue pariahs like North Korea and Iran, or a superpower China that dwarfs Russia in economic and military capacity.
Over the past 25 years, Putin outlasted the “post-Cold War” world that he resented. But it’s less obvious that he has “taken care of Russia” well enough for it to thrive and prosper over the next quarter century of whatever comes next.