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Pushing Putin for a ceasefire: Dmytro Kuleba on Ukraine's future and Russia's goals
Listen: What will it take to end Russia’s invasion of Ukraine? President Trump is pushing hard for a ceasefire deal, but is Vladimir Putin actually interested in negotiation? On the GZERO World Podcast, Ian Bremmer is joined by former Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba for a sober assessment of the war with Russia—and what it will take to end it. Kuleba resigned last year amid a cabinet shuffle, but spent years at the heart of Ukraine’s diplomatic fight for survival. As long as Russia believes it can win the war, he says, Putin will never compromise on a meaningful ceasefire deal. That won’t change until the Kremlin faces serious pressure from the White House, which so far has seemed to only offer incentives to Moscow, while punishing Kyiv, according to Kuleba. So is Trump ready to get tough on Putin? And what is Ukraine prepared to offer Russia in return to bring the fighting to an end? Bremmer and Kuleba discuss Putin’s goals in the war, the Trump administration's negotiation strategy, and what it will take to finally bring peace to Ukraine.
Subscribe to the GZERO World Podcast on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Stitcher, or your preferred podcast platform, to receive new episodes as soon as they're published.
President Donald Trump talks to the media next to Tesla CEO Elon Musk, with a Tesla car in the background, at the White House on March 11, 2025.
Report: Pentagon set to reveal secret China war strategy to … Elon Musk
Elon Musk may have a big day ahead. On Friday, according to the New York Times, he’ll reportedly be made privy to war plans for a US military conflict with China. But President Donald Trump has notably denied that Musk will be briefed on China during the visit.
While discussions about such a confrontation within the walls of the Pentagon are nothing new — defense officials have been war-gaming such a scenario for years — this would be a novel and expanded advisory role for the man at the helm of DOGE, the agency that has federal workers dodging pink slips.
The Tesla CEO was, according to the NYT report, invited to visit America’s five-sided symbol of strength by Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, who will lead a slide presentation detailing the operational plan, aka O-plan, from early indications of a possible threat from China through to full-on engagement.
Is there a conflict of interest? Good question. Pundits are wondering whether Musk, who helms both SpaceX and Tesla and has plenty of financial investments in China, should be let in on state secrets about how the US might fight a hypothetical war with China. Should Beijing get wind of the plans, it would help China prepare, giving it the advantage.
But, on the other hand ... the man who’s driving bids to reduce the federal deficit may need to know how much money is required to keep American war-fighting capabilities afloat. The White House has noted that Musk would recuse himself in the case of such conflicts of interest.
We’ll be keeping an eye on Musk’s visit and any fallout.
Can Europe broker a Ukraine ceasefire?
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: A Quick Take to kick off your week. The big news, everything around Russia, Ukraine, the United States, and Europe. The Europeans now with the ball in their court, a big summit, a coalition of the willing in London this week. And Zelensky very warmly embraced, quite literally, by UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer and by everyone in attendance. It was very different visuals, very different takeaways than the meeting between Zelensky, Trump, and Vance in the Oval Office, which couldn't have gone much worse if everyone tried.
Where we are right now, certainly this coalition of the willing had everyone that mattered in Europe. I mean, not the countries, not the leaders that have been skeptical, that have been more aligned with the Russians, or more, say, in a minimal position, like the Hungarians, like the Slovaks, but everybody else was there. So, you've got the Brits, you've got the French, you've got the Italians, and the Germans. You also have EU leadership, Ursula von der Leyen, Kaja Kallas, and also you have all of the frontline leaders that have the most at stake from a national security perspective: the Nordics, the Balts, the Poles. You even have Canada, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, who doesn't spend very much on defense, but nonetheless going there to show he's aligned with the Ukrainians, whether or not the Americans, who the Canadians rely on completely economically, are not.
Does it matter? Does it matter? If you're asking does it matter in the sense that can the Europeans go it alone without the Americans? I'm still skeptical, though they're putting a lot more on the table now than they were a week ago, and they should have been doing that years ago. And that's going to remain a very big question, and I'm probably going to remain pretty skeptical. But very interesting that the Europeans do now have a level of ownership. Remember that Trump, both when he was running for president and once he became president, said that the United States was going to end this war, that he, Trump, would be responsible for the ceasefire, that he's going to do it himself with the Ukrainians, with the Russians, he could do it in 24 hours. That's obviously an exaggeration, but nonetheless, even as he realized it was going to take longer, he was the dominant actor. That's now changed. Keir Starmer has now told Trump that the Europeans, this coalition of the willing, is coming up with a ceasefire plan, and they are going to present it to the United States, and Trump is expecting it.
So for now, the Europeans don't just have a seat at the table, but they actually are in the driver's seat, in terms of the ceasefire on the back of the Ukrainian-US relationship having functionally blown up, and the Americans saying they're not going to do anything particularly more for the Ukrainians. They're not even prepared to sign the critical minerals deal that Zelensky now says he is prepared to sign. But if the Europeans are the ones that are going to be coughing up the money and providing the troops, then certainly they're the ones that are responsible for the terms of the ceasefire.
Now, that's interesting. And we're hearing certainly that there's going to be a lot more engagement, that potentially Starmer, Macron, and Zelensky will all three come together to the White House to meet Trump maybe later this week, maybe next week. Certainly Zelensky should not be attending meetings like that by himself anymore, I think he understands that, the Europeans understand that as well.
What they should do now, the Europeans, is present a UN Security Council resolution with the plan once Trump has seen it and is prepared to move forward. A simple thing, deciding nothing, just saying that the Security Council supports the path to peace as outlined from the UK summit. This will force Russian amendments, which the UK and France will veto, and then Russia will be forced to veto the resolution. And that's useful in a couple of different ways. First of all, it costs the French and the UK nothing, and they win a fair amount. The news will be all about how their Russian veto was used for the first time since 1989, and it places the Americans on the same side as the Europeans on the ceasefire issue, which is what the Europeans, the Ukrainians desperately need, and frankly, the Democrats and the Republicans in Congress as well.
The UK and France can then show Trump that they indeed don't need to be invited to the table, because they're at the table, they have the ceasefire plan and they're the ones that are driving it. Now, having a ceasefire plan is different from being able to implement the ceasefire and support the Ukrainians, and that is where there's still an awful lot that still needs to be accomplished.
Specifically the one piece of good news, surprising news, is that the Germans are now talking about 800 billion Euro package, outside of their debt break, that would support defense spending and infrastructure spending. They weren't talking about anything remotely like this even a few days ago. It would have to be done well before the end of the month because when the new chancellor comes in, then you are going to have the far left and the far right with the ability to block any constitutional majority. They don't have that capacity now, which means the debt break can be overridden by a vote in the Bundestag. That's really important, and would lead to German leadership in helping to finance this war.
You also have the 300 billion Euros that are frozen, the Russian sovereign assets that are mostly in the hands of the Europeans, the Belgians, as it turns out, and some others as opposed to the Americans, the Japanese. So, that could also be used to support Ukraine to buy more weapons, also to build up Ukraine's military industrial complex. In other words, while this situation is difficult and urgent, I would not yet say that it has fallen apart for the Ukrainians or the Europeans. They are still, as it were, in the game.
Now, the big question overlooking all of this is the United States and Russia, because they still want to do a deal, and that deal is not mostly about Ukraine, that deal mostly is about rapprochement between the United States and Russia over the heads of their NATO allies. This is what Trump is interested in, this is what Putin is interested. And frankly, it's a little easier to do that deal if you don't have a ceasefire, because the Russians don't really want one, than it is to do that deal if a ceasefire is a part of it. That's what has to be watched very carefully because of course, Trump and Putin are talking about where they're going to meet in person, Saudi Arabia maybe in May, Trump would even be willing to go to Moscow. This could include things like the United States taking unilateral sanctions off of Russia while the Europeans would still have them on. Could lead to a lot of business, a much bigger critical minerals deal than the one that was going to be signed between the Americans and the Ukrainians, and now, at least, is off the table.
Also note that the US Defense Department has at least temporarily suspended offensive cyberattacks against the Russians, which is quite something, again, in the context of nothing having been agreed to between the Americans and the Russians, but clearly Trump much more willing to be on Putin's good side right now than he is with Zelensky. So ultimately, that is a very big challenge for the Europeans, but they will be in far better shape if they're able to move on the ceasefire in the near-term, which looks likely, and on support for Ukraine in the medium-term, which looks like more of a challenge.
So, that's it for now. I'll talk to you all real soon.
What Trump-Zelensky fallout means for Ukraine war
President Trump has said that he is not on the Ukrainian side. He's neutral, he's on the side of peace. He's a peacemaker. He just wants to end the war, and that does not mean supporting Ukraine going forward. In fact, because he felt offended by Zelensky, who was not adequately deferential to the American president or the vice president, he said, basically, I'm cutting off support. I am allowing you, by continuing to support you, I'm allowing you to believe you have leverage you don't have. You should accept peace on my terms, and so I'll cut you off and then we'll see how well you can fight.
This is obviously a disaster for Zelensky who was intemperate in my view, in his remarks, absolutely. If you are coming to the United States, and yes, he has expressed thanks to the Americans many, many times on many, many occasions, but he was not well prepared to handle President Trump's ego, which is enormous, which is fragile, and he expects that everyone has to know who's number two and has to stand down when he stands up. And Zelensky did not do that. They ended up talking over each other and Trump got angry, took it personally, and basically threw him out of the White House, canceled the press conference and said, "I'm not supporting you anymore."
I think this relationship is now inexorably broken. I think it's inconceivable that Zelensky will be able to sit down with Trump in the near-term and fix the relationship. Lindsey Graham, who is perhaps Trump's closest confidant among serious senators, said that Zelensky has to either resign or he has to have someone else running point with the United States. I think that's a good read of the situation. Not that I think that Zelensky should resign, but that if you want to engage with the Americans, he's not going to be able to do it himself. Of course, that also happens to be a core demand of Putin, that Zelensky is not the one that engages directly in conversations. Putin won't talk to him, considers him illegitimate. So that's now becoming a talking point that Trump can directly align with, and I suspect he will in the near-term, after already calling for elections in a second phase after a ceasefire. Again, a core Russia demand.
What's going to happen here? Well, first of all, the big question is what are the Europeans going to do? And I use that word intentionally. What are they going to do, not what are they going to say? We all know what they're going to say. They're going to say that they're incredibly supportive of Ukraine, and I saw that from the Poles, and the Germans, and I saw it from the Belgians, and the Dutch, and I saw it from the French, and the Spaniards, I even saw it from Luxembourg, and those expressions of support mean just about as much from Luxembourg as they do from the Germans, unless they stand up and provide far more willingness to give the Ukrainians more financial support for their military, and also provide boots on the ground that are not contingent on a direct American backstop. They have been unwilling to do that for three years, and I suspect they will still be unwilling to do that. And absent that European support and ability to get the Americans back to the table, I think is extremely low. If the Europeans were to take a leadership role and show that they could do it without the Americans or with nominal American participation, then I think it's much more plausible that Trump, irrespective of what just happened with Zelensky, says, "I'm the only one that can get you to the table. I was the only one that made the Europeans lead, and so now, yeah, I'm back, I'm back now because this is the right conditions for peace for the American taxpayers." But of course, what Trump wants to do is end the war, and he now has been given a bigger opportunity to end the war by being able to throw Zelensky under the bus.
And that's what Vance is doing. That's what Elon is doing. That's what all of Trump's supporters on social media are doing. They're saying, "This guy, he's corrupt, he's a dictator, he's a bad guy, he shows no respect to the American president, and why should we support him? Well, the reason you should support him is because he's not a bad guy. It's because he was democratically elected and for three years, he has courageously led his people to defend their country. That's all. To defend their country against an invading force. When the Iraqis invaded Kuwait illegally, the Americans stood up, slapped down Saddam Hussein directly, not indirectly, directly involved in that fighting, to stand for the principle of territorial integrity. And that wasn't even a democracy. That was just a country that yeah, had some oil, but that the United States did not want the rest of the world to think that it would just stand back and stand by while their own country was eaten to shreds by a neighboring more powerful country. That is not where the Americans are today.
Today the Americans are supporting a UN resolution with the Russians, the North Koreans, Belarus, Syria, Sudan, Iran, and Israel, and a few micro states against democracies of the world, saying that territorial integrity is not what's critical. What's critical is just ending the war no matter what. That principle is being thrown out. And the Europeans fundamentally disagree with this. The Europeans feel like there is a gun to their head from the east with the Russians as a direct national security threat, and now a gun to the head from the west, a country that does not support core values of collective security, of rule of law, and of territorial integrity. And that means that the Europeans have to now get their act together immediately or else.
Zelensky is someone who, when the Americans offered to get him out of the country, because he was going to be overrun by the invading Russians, he said, "No, I'm not leaving my country," in a way that the Afghan leadership fled immediately, "No, I'm staying and I'm going to defend my country with my fellow Ukrainians." And that was an extraordinary moment and he has been facing down a much more powerful force, at a threat to his life and his family's lives. He's been on the front lines many, many times. He's not getting much sleep. He's under incredible pressure. And does it all take away from the fact that he talked back to the American president? No, obviously, no. You have to be better capable of representing your country by knowing who you're dealing with when you're coming in to see the US president. But I want to be clear that Zelensky has absolutely nothing to apologize for because the fact is that he is an example of the kind of humanity we need to help ensure that we have peace and stability around the world, someone that will stand up to injustice. And that, from an American president who because he was born of wealth and privilege, faked an injury to avoid military service, I think speaks volumes about what has happened to the United States.
The values that the Americans stand for presently on the global stage are values of power. They are the most powerful, get to write their rules, get to determine the outcomes. And that is true for Putin, it's true for Israel, it's true for the United States, and it's not true for the Ukrainians. It's not true for the Palestinians. It's not true for the Danes, or the Panamanians, or the Mexicans, or the Canadians. And what the Europeans have to now figure out is, are they prepared to be courageous? Are they prepared to step up, even though they're not in the most powerful position? Are they willing to do after three years, after frankly, 11 years since the Russians invaded Ukraine, the first time they've stood back, they've stood by, they haven't stood up for their fellow Europeans. They've allowed the Americans to do the heavy lifting, and now they have a president that is not willing to do that and frankly doesn't agree with them anymore, doesn't agree with their values, doesn't care about shared values, only cares about power.
And so, this is not a question for the Ukrainians. We know where the Ukrainians stand. They stand up. This is not a question for the Americans. We know where the Americans stand. They stand for themselves. This is a question for the Europeans. Are the Europeans willing to stand up for themselves, for their principles, for their values, and for fellow Europeans? And I fear the answer is no. I fear the answer is no. Analytically everything we've seen for the last three years is that they're going to talk a really good game and they're not going to do very much. But we shall see and we shall see very soon because this is the future of the West, this is the future of democracy, and it sure as hell is the future of the Ukrainians.
So that's it for me. I hope you all well and I'll talk to you all real soon.
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Why the US-Ukraine minerals deal changed
What is this going to matter? What changes here? Well, a couple of points. First of all is it's a win, and we shouldn't be surprised. Back at the beginning of January, in our top risks, one of the things that we suggested was that Trump was going to get a lot more wins than a lot of his opponents believed, because he is the most powerful leader in the world. He's in a very strong position and he's willing to use that power against both adversaries and nominal friends. And a lot of people are scared of him, and so they give him what he wants. And that is what we are seeing here, especially for the Ukrainians who are in as weak a position as pretty much anyone that Trump is pushing around right now. So, he gets to say, "Look at this deal. Biden was giving away all of this American aid, and now I'm going and getting money back."
Now, that's not a great look in the sense that other countries around the world look at the United States and say, "We can't trust you guys because you change your mind every administration." So, if one president says that this is going to happen, and the next can just rip it up, and that's every four years or less, then why should we engage in a deal with you? Whether it's the Paris Climate Accord, or the World Health Organization, or the Iranian nuclear deal, the JCPOA, or it is aid to Ukraine that suddenly is not aid to Ukraine anymore. Now, Trump was saying that the United States has given $500 billion in aid to Ukraine, which is vastly more than the Europeans, and all of the European money is loans. That is of course wildly exaggerated, meaning not true, but there is a kernel of truth in it. So it's worth unpacking.
The Americans have provided a little over $110 billion, mostly in aid, 90% of that has been directly aid to the Ukrainians so far. Though, that money doesn't go directly to Ukraine. It goes primarily to American corporations, contractors, who get the money, who do the job, who make profit on it, and who service Ukraine. So, it's not as if there's a lot of corruption in Ukraine on the back of American aid because the money isn't going directly to Ukraine. The Europeans have given more money, more like €135 billion as opposed to the $110 that the US has given. The EU has a larger population, so per capita, it's not all that different. A lot of that European money, about 60% is not aid, it's actually loans in some form, though loans on exceptionally favorable terms to the Ukrainians. So, the fact that there is more aid that is going to Ukraine from Europe that has to be repaid is actually true.
And when Macron pushed back against Trump on that, he pushed back in a favorable way to Macron, shocking, but didn't also tell the full story. Part of the reason why nobody believes anything that politicians say these days, and one of the reasons I don't want to be a politician. Okay, leave that aside. So, Zelensky comes to the US, he does a deal, is he doing a colonial deal? No, another exaggeration. Trump was saying that Zelensky and the Ukrainians have no leverage, they have no cards. That's why he doesn't need to talk to him anymore. Well, if that's the case, then why is it the United States significantly altered the terms of the deal from a week ago, when Zelensky said no, to yesterday when Zelensky said yes? Before the $500 billion was all supposed to pay for previous aid, that term is out of this general agreement.
Also, the idea the Americans would've full control of the investment vehicle, that full control is no longer in these terms of the agreement. So, the terms have been substantially altered, and the reason for that is because Zelensky, of course, does have leverage. Most Republicans in Congress, House and Senate, support Zelensky a lot more than they support Putin, and they've not been happy about the idea that Trump has been flipping to a Russia relationship as opposed to support for Ukraine. Most Americans, including Republican voters, trust Zelensky more than they trust Putin, and they aren't, it's not the thing they're voting on, but they're not super happy about that. And of course, the Europeans themselves very upset about the idea that the Americans would suddenly break from that alliance. Does this matter to Trump? It doesn't matter immensely, but it isn't zero, because if it was zero, then he wouldn't have changed his deal one iota.
It's not because he's getting soft, it's because he recognizes that the other party has leverage. Now, what are the Europeans going to do? French president came to the United States yesterday, it was a reasonably productive conversation, but it didn't lead to any commitment of the US for security guarantees to Ukraine. Neither does the deal that the Ukrainians are signing ensure security guarantees. It does buy a little time. It does show that the US is going to continue to engage with Ukraine, and have some equities on the ground, and maybe continue to provide some weapons, some armaments going forward, some of the so-called strategic enablers, like help with targeting and intelligence, while the Americans are engaging with the Russians, directly and bilaterally, to try to structure a engagement, a re-engagement, of those two countries. I think that Trump is maintaining a lot of optionality for himself here.
If it turns out that the Europeans are going to spend a lot more on defense over the coming weeks and make those commitments, a lot more to the Ukrainians and make those commitments, and be willing to stand troops on the ground, a lot of them on the ground in Ukraine in a post-ceasefire environment, then Trump can pivot, say, "Look at all the things the Europeans are doing that Biden could never have gotten them to do, and now I'm willing to engage because the Europeans are actually picking up their fair share. Because the Ukrainians are going to give the Americans their fair share for doing all this work, it's not on the back of the American taxpayers.”
But if they don't, and frankly, I think it's more likely than not that the Europeans aren't able to get their act together in such a dramatic way in such a short period of time, then Trump hasn't really lost anything. He's engaging in this deal with the Russians, the Ukrainians have a deal with the US, the US doesn't have to put any money into if they don't feel like it, and this re-engagement with Russia precedes a pace that Trump wants. So, that is I think where we are heading right now. I'm not expecting much from the UK Prime Minister, Keir Starmer's visit to the US, he has a much more difficult and let's say distant and cool relationship with the US president than Macron does, and he doesn't have an awful lot to offer directly, though, they're going to step up their defense spending to maybe get to 2.5% over the coming years. Still nowhere close to what Trump wants or demands.
Final thing I would mention is that all of these conversations are happening in the context of the United States that has spent enormous amounts and wasted enormous amounts on national security and on wars over the past decades. I think it is worth asking, in an alternative history, if after Soviet collapsed, what would the world have looked like if the US had decided to disband NATO, didn't need it anymore because it was the end of history? What would've happened if the United States had gone down to 2%, or 2.5% of defense spend of GDP, and spent that money primarily on focus on Asia, together with American allies in Asia, like Japan, like Australia, like South Korea? What would've happened if the United States had not engaged in wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and spent trillions of dollars as a consequence?
Would the world be better off without NATO? Would the world be better off without those wars? And I think the answer is at least worth considering, and while I am not at all comfortable with the United States continually going back on its commitments to allies, continuing ripping up its commitments, because I think that undermines US power, and I'm not comfortable with throwing the allies under the bus, who have fought with the United States side by side, shoulder by shoulder in Afghanistan, and then telling them you're basically on your own in Ukraine.
I'm not comfortable with any of that because I think the alliances matter, but I understand that a lot of Americans are very happy to rip up these arrangements because for the last three plus decades, the US has made huge mistakes by over-supporting and over-funding national security and defense. And as a consequence of that, I think this is a discussion that is way overdue, and a lot of things are going to be broken because we didn't have those conversations in a more rational, civilized, and engaged manner. So, it's worth talking about that too. Look, that's it for me, and I'll talk to you all real soon.
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Ukraine hopes for Europe's help as US negotiates with Russia
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: So much going on around the major confrontation between Russia and Ukraine. The Americans now meeting with the Russians in Riyadh while the Europeans have had an immediate emergency summit, many of them. Not all of the EU, but rather if you will, a coalition of the capable and willing in Paris yesterday.
Where is all of this going? Well, the Europeans clearly now understand that they need to come up with a deal that includes Ukraine before the Americans and Russians create some kind of grand bargain, or a deal will be made over their heads, and probably one that they are not going to be very happy with. President Zelensky of Ukraine is looking much more desperate in this environment, understanding that he is in trouble, not only because his forces are having a hard time maintaining the front lines, that's been true for a while now, but also because he is in danger of losing the United States.
The deal that was offered by Secretary of Treasury Bessent to Zelensky in Kyiv in the past days was exploitative. It was referred to by Zelensky as colonial. It would have meant 50% of development rights, exploitation rights of European resources, Ukrainian resources would go to the United States in a privately held company that the Americans would own. And that this was going to pay primarily for aid that had already been given to the Ukrainians. In other words, under the Biden administration, which is kind of unprecedented and staggering, but nonetheless was the offer. He immediately rejected it, but of course, that has led to a big rift all of a sudden between the United States and Ukraine at a time where Zelensky had been doing everything possible to say, "Yes, we know we need peace. Yes, we know we need to work with Trump. Trump is a peacemaker. We're going to engage." That is a very different position right now.
So, he is counting more on the Europeans, but can the Europeans give him anything? Well, coming out of the meeting in Paris, the answer is not so much. First of all, because Olaf Scholz, who is still chancellor for another week before the Germans have elections, said that it was premature to talk about peacekeepers. Premature? When the Americans are about to cut a deal with the Russians, it's not premature. It's way too late. So Olaf looked weak, he looked bitter, and he undermined any possible consensus. So, this meeting was a real problem.
Still, you had Macron, who was talking about the need to commit peacekeepers. You had the Brits, who wavered. They were saying they're definitely going to commit, but only if there's American backstop, which the United States wouldn't support. Poland had said, "No," because they need all of their troops in Poland, which is a sign of great weakness there and deep concern. The Baltics, the Nordics, they would certainly provide something. It is going to take time, though, and time is one thing they do not have.
We will see what comes out of the Marco Rubio meeting that he is leading his delegation in Riyadh together with a super team of major negotiators from Russia. I say super team because that's the way it's been presented on Russian state media. They have been, for the last 24 hours, extolling Trump, extolling the importance of the special presidential plane they are bringing down to Riyadh for these meetings, talking about the potential of recreating an order between the United States and Russia that is not just about Ukraine, but is about NATO containment. Is about engaging in, essentially carving up the world a sphere of influence orientation, where the Russians get a piece of the Arctic, and the Americans get a piece of the Arctic. And the Russians have their territorial ambitions codified, and the Americans have their own territorial ambitions codified. It is absolutely the antithesis of the world that the Europeans want and that frankly, the Americans had been standing for post-World War II.
Increasingly, the Europeans feel like they are fighting a two-front war, from the Russians on one side who are a direct national security threat, and the Americans who are saying that the Europeans' threat is from inside the house and that the EU is a problem, and you want people who are going to make Europe great again, like the AfD in Germany, who 80% of the Germans consider to be a neo-Nazi party. This is a crisis for the transatlantic relationship. It is a crisis for NATO. The secretary general, indeed, attending those meetings in Paris, what he has to say between the Europeans and the Americans, I'd hate to be in his position right now.
Anyway, lots happening every day. That's where we are right now, and I'll talk to you all real soon.
JD Vance stuns Munich conference with critique on European democracy
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: A Quick Take from the Munich Security Conference. Just finished with the opening speech for Vice President JD Vance. Before that, Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission. Literally standing room only across the conference. I can't remember the last time it was so busy. And so busy because so many people believe that the NATO and the transatlantic alliance are at a crossroads, are facing a time of crisis.
First, the good news. The recognition on the part of the Europeans that action on their part is urgent is pretty consistent across the board. That a 2% spend on defense is not enough, that they have to take much more of a leadership role on Ukraine. That they have to be much more competitive in terms of growth. That indeed many of the criticisms that are being levied on the Europeans by Trump, as well as by Democrats and Republicans in the United States are things they have not taken adequately seriously, and now they do.
I think the level of urgency, the recognition of crisis is true across the board. The willingness to take action is a different story. We will see that over the course of the coming months, but there's no question it is significant.
Go beyond that to what JD Vance had to say. This speech did not include a mention of Russia and Ukraine. This is a speech to the Munich Security Conference to mention separately of elections in Romania overturned by their constitutional court, politicized questions about that to be sure. But not a speech that resonated or landed well for the Europeans in the audience. They were getting a lecture on freedom of speech and democracy from the United States. They were not getting a sense of how strong and secure the alliance needed to be.
JD Vance was talking about democracy for as opposed to protecting from. The Security Conference is of course much more about protecting from. It's about what kind of external threats exist to NATO, which is the reason it exists. And to the extent that Europeans are concerned about the future of NATO, a lot of it is coming from inside the house, a European sense that the Americans are not committed to them anymore. In fact, Defense Minister of Germany, Pistorius actually yelled out during JD Vance's speech, "This is unacceptable." I've never seen anything like that from a European leader during a major US plenary here at the Munich Security Conference before coming here for about 15 years. So that was quite surprising.
Having said all of that, when the vice president met with the German federal president earlier in the day, he was much more willing to talk constructively about working together on Ukraine, especially in terms of having the Ukrainians at the table, including the Europeans. How essential it'd be for everybody to work together to ensure that the Ukrainians can be reconstructed. That they'll have security guarantees and defense.
So to a degree, what we are seeing is a speech for Vance's domestic audience in the United States, as well as some of the anti-EU Euro-skeptic populace in Europe, including the AfD, the Alternative for Deutschland, who, of course, their support is going to the polls in a couple of weeks just like the rest of this country, Germany. But still, the level of tension here is extremely high. The level of trust has been reduced. And pretty much everyone I've talked to in this conference believes that the Russians today are in a considerably stronger position than they were in 48 hours ago. The Chinese are in a stronger position than they were in 48 hours ago. And that's something pretty much nobody in this conference wants to say, wants to hear. That's it for me. I'll talk to you all real soon.
Trump-Putin chat over Ukraine "deeply" worries Europe
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: A Quick Take from Munich, Germany, where the Munich Security Conference is just about to kick off. And it is going to be a historic meeting, and not necessarily in a good way.
Everyone I've been speaking to here, deeply concerned about the sudden conversation, 90-minute conversation, with a full readout from, both the Kremlin and from the United States, between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin. Not so much concerned that a conversation took place, rather that it happened, and Trump is engaging unilaterally without coordinating in advance with the Ukrainians or the Europeans. And in that regard, very, very different than what we've seen over the first three years of the war.
Look, there's no question, everyone does want to see the war wind down. Everyone would love to see a ceasefire. The question is, how and what does the NATO alliance look like after that? What does Europe look like in terms of its engagement, its trust with the United States, the transatlantic relationship? And, of course, what happens with Ukraine? The statements that have been made by Trump and by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth are things that we've heard a lot about privately, not just from the Trump administration, from the Europeans, from the Biden administration too, the idea that NATO membership is not in the cards, long-term, if there's going to be some sort of formal peace agreement, that Ukraine is going to have to give up some kind of territory, not that they should, not that that's reasonable, not they don't have territorial integrity, but there's no way for them to get back all the territory that they had back in 2014. Those are things that have now been said publicly by the Americans. But they are being said both unilaterally and also in advance of any negotiation. In other words, concessions are being made to the Russians before both sides sit down. And that is, of course, a very significant concern, for the Europeans and the Ukrainians.
There is also a question what kind of security guarantees would be provided to Ukraine? According to the United States, certainly will not involve Americans on the ground. No troops. Would be European troops. They're the ones that have to do the bulk of the lifting. They're the ones that have to ensure that there was a response if Ukraine were attacked again, after a ceasefire. Now, it's not that the Americans are suddenly washing their hands of all of this. In fact, the first cabinet official to go to Kiev from the Trump administration, just met with Zelensky in the last 24-hours; that’s Secretary of Treasury Scott Bessent. Why Treasury? Because Trump is trying to get something for giving something. It's transactional, as he always is. And in this case, focusing on critical minerals from Ukraine. Nominally, the number is some $500 billion of what would be Ukrainian resources to the United States in return for ongoing, US military support for Ukraine.
Outgoing German Chancellor Olaf Scholz said, “This is selfish, the Americans shouldn't be doing this.” The Ukrainian president, who actually has to work with the Americans going forward, unlike Scholz, saying, “What a great offer. Happy to talk to you. Want to find a way to make this work?” So, on the one hand, it's not as if the United States is leaving Ukraine high and dry. And certainly, a level of engagement between the Americans and the Russians is very important. It’s essential going forward. But of course, what Putin wants is a deal not only to his favor, but not just about Ukraine. He wants to be talking just to the Americans, and he wants to be talking to them about missile defense, about NATO enlargement, about a whole range of issues that he has, that he takes issue with. And that's something that Trump is perfectly interested in.
At the end of the day, Trump is a lot more interested in cutting a deal for himself that allows the Americans to focus a lot more on China and on Asia, from a security perspective, than working with the Europeans to try to do something collectively on Ukraine. And this is the biggest challenge and also the biggest difference between Trump and Biden, in terms of foreign policy. Biden fundamentally believe that a strong Europe, coordinated with the United States, was long-term in American interests. President Trump does not. He believes that a strong Europe is a bad thing. He wants to see more exits, like Brexit, from other countries. He supports Euro-skeptic movements across Europe. He would much rather have individual negotiations with individual European countries where the Americans are stronger.
What does that mean for the Munich Security Conference? What does it mean for NATO? What does it mean for the transatlantic relationship? Long-term, nothing good. Final point here, the Europeans are taking this seriously, but it's late. They've been told, by Americans for several administrations now, they need to be spending more time and more money on their own defense, their own collective security. Macron has talked about it a fair amount in France. The Polish government is certainly taking the lead on that, especially after the Russians invade Ukraine. But most European governments aren't taking it nearly as seriously and aren't prepared to spend the money. And that reality, for decades now, made much more stark and severe with the Russian invasion in 2014 of Ukraine, which the Europeans did virtually nothing about, and now, when 2022, you've got Trump coming in and saying, “I'm not going to do this,” that's forcing the Europeans in a much more stark way, but also much too late for them to get their act together, in my view.
So, we'll see what we see over the next couple of days, but this is going to be a very, again, historic Munich Security Conference. Glad to be here, and we'll talk to you soon.