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Biden's mistakes in Afghanistan were not "dereliction of duty"
Today we're taking our Red Pen to a recent op-ed from the Washington Post written by Marc Thiessen, a Post columnist, American Enterprise Institute fellow, and former speechwriter for President George W. Bush. It's titled, "Greenlighting the Taliban's takeover of Kabul is a national disgrace," and makes some strong statements about how and why the Taliban came to take control of Afghanistan's capital city. I want to unpack some of his arguments for you and explain why we disagree. So, let's get out the Red Pen.
First, Thiessen argues that "all the horrors the world witnessed over the past two weeks…might have been prevented" had the United States opted to take over Kabul, rather than letting the Taliban do so.
Let's remember: "The enemy gets a vote." Thiessen is comparing the real world, with all of its unpredictability, to a counterfactual one where everything goes according to (his) plan. Even if the horrors he cited had been averted, wouldn't others have unfolded? Putting thousands of Americans back on Kabul's streets would have meant putting them in the crosshairs of terrorist groups like ISIS-K. Do we believe these groups wouldn't have targeted Americans in Kabul with suicide bombings, like the recent airport attack, or even engage them in firefights? Biden had to decide between two unpalatable options. He chose the one he believed would put the fewest Americans in harm's way.
Next, Thiessen cites a former American senior general officer to argue that the "US military could definitely have secured the capital"––at least the green zone where Western embassies are located, plus access to the airport.
For starters, Thiessen bases his argument on the views of one "former senior general officer" whose identity we don't know. How widely shared are those views among current military officials? If the 20-year war has taught us anything, it should be some caution before arguing the United States could secure a city of over six million people indefinitely with a few thousand troops. Before leaving office, the Trump administration brought US troop numbers in Afghanistan to just 2,500, a 19-year low. By the end of July 2021, only 650 remained. Taking over Kabul would've required something politically incredibly challenging: a substantial troop surge that would've put more Americans in danger. Thiessen doesn't explicitly call for a surge, but the upshot of his critique is clear enough. There's an argument for a surge (even if politically very unpopular), he should tell us how many additional troops we would have to send in and for how long to hold onto a city the United States had already lost.
Thiessen also calls the Biden administration's decision to "cede" Kabul to the Taliban "a dereliction of duty unlike any we have seen in modern times."
Keep in mind it was Trump, not Biden, who went over the Afghan government's head back in February 2020 to negotiate with the Taliban and agree to remove all US troops from the country. There were US political considerations for doing so, I get it. But from that point, the Taliban's takeover of Kabul had, at that point, become a foregone conclusion
Next point: Thiessen writes that the administration's withdrawal "put the safety of American civilians, service members and Afghan allies in the hands of terrorists" — referring to the Taliban — "rather than the U.S. armed forces" and "led directly to the deaths of 13 Americans in an Islamic State attack on the Kabul airport."
Earlier, though, he almost presents the Taliban as an organization whose word General McKenzie should've trusted: "[T]he Taliban offered to allow the US military to take responsibility for security in Kabul — but we declined." What makes him believe a terrorist organization intent on retaking power would honor a pledge to allow US forces to secure the capital city? Which Taliban is it?
Finally, Thiessen concludes by arguing that Biden's decision to let the Taliban take over Kabul "led directly to the deaths of 13 Americans in an Islamic State attack on the Kabul airport."
Harrowing as the images coming out of Afghanistan are, Biden had decided to not risk even more US lives in the war's twilight. Staying at the airport and trying to hold onto Kabul for a few more weeks would have helped the United States evacuate more Afghan partners, but it would also have risked the lives of thousands of US soldiers.
One thing I think many of us agree on — this has been a sad and embarrassing ending to the 20-year war in Afghanistan. We've left countless Afghan allies behind, despite promising them safe passage. August's events will no doubt cast an added shadow of grief over the coming anniversary of the 9/11 attacks. The Biden team certainly made mistakes in executing this exit. But "dereliction of duty?" No, not in my view.
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Israel-UAE relations & the Abraham Accords are not at risk under Biden
We're taking our Red Pen to an op-ed from the Washington Post, written by well-known radio host and columnist Hugh Hewitt. It's titled, "The Biden Administration could derail the Abraham Accords. It mustn't."
Hewitt is arguing that one of the most important foreign policy accomplishments of the Trump presidency, no question there, the normalization of diplomatic relations between Israel and the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco should not be unraveled by President Biden and his foreign policy team.
Now in fairness, President Biden has spent the bulk of his first few weeks in office undoing many of Trump's policy decisions. Rejoining the Paris Climate Accord for example, and the World Health Organization, ending the Muslim ban, reversing the ban on transgender people joining the military, to name just a few. But does that mean the Abraham Accords are kaput? Not a chance. Let's get out the red pen.
Hewitt hangs the bulk of his evidence on a specific aspect of the deal with the UAE involving the sale of US fighter jets to the Gulf nation. The Biden administration has halted that sale for the moment. And Hewitt writes, "With the announcement last week that the new administration will review a sale of a batch of fighter jets to the UAE, one of the most important diplomatic achievements could be in question."
That's a really big leap. To be clear, we're talking about one specific aspect of the deal, for starters, not the whole enchilada. Let's look at the context. It's not actually unusual for a new administration, either Democrat or Republican, to press pause on arms sales initiated by the previous one. It happens frequently, and those deals usually tend to get approved and eventually move forward. Further, the UAE doesn't seem all too worried. Its US Embassy, which had fantastically close relations with Jared Kushner in the Trump administration, tweeted that the pause was expected, and the nation is looking forward to working with the Biden administration.
Next, Hewitt argues that the fighter jets are "the crucial glue holding together US interests in the regions" and that the Abraham Accords could unravel without them. The Accord was important because it recognized the reality that Israel and the Gulf States had actually built a productive and quiet relationship, something frankly not appreciated under the previous Obama-Biden administration. The Trump deal didn't actually create that relationship, though it certainly did help it along. Remember, Trumps first trip as president was actually to Saudi Arabia and Israel, very unusual. And the UAE is not about to throw away its relationship with Israel, which it finds strategically very important, much less with the United States it's critical ally, even if the fighter jet sale were to go south. Which again, we don't expect.
Hewitt also writes, "The Iranians are not happy that the UAE may prove to be our wingman in any future conflict with the mullahs in Tehran." Well, to be fair, the UAE didn't actually sign up to be a "wingman." The US and UAE have differing views about the threat that's posed by Iran. And the Iranians are more concerned about the political alignment against them than they are more fighter jets in the region.
And finally, if you want to have a better sense of where the Biden Administration is heading on this issue, all you have to do is look at what they've already publicly said. During his Senate confirmation hearing, Secretary of State Tony Blinken said the US would keep its embassy in Jerusalem. And National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan described the Abraham Accords as "positive" for both security and the economy in the Middle East. Two big Trump accomplishments that the Biden team is absolutely signed up for. And keep in mind that even at the height of an incredibly heated presidential campaign, Joe Biden himself never denounced the deal. In fact, he actually openly supported it.
So, a great undoing really isn't in the works, at least when it comes to the Abraham Accords. We can expect a different approach to a lot of things in the Middle East from the Biden Administration, in terms of the Iranian Nuclear deal for example, no question. Also, restoring aid to and diplomacy with Palestinians who were not directly engaged in the Trump deal.
But a 180 on the Abraham Accords, that's not happening.
So, that's your Red Pen for this week. Stay safe, stay warm, and watch the Super Bowl, but be sure to avoid people. Talk to you soon.
"Fixing" US foreign policy isn't the real challenge Biden would face
But let's get specific.
Number one, Rogin writes that President Trump has attacked "the previous bipartisan consensus that the United States has a unique duty to lead a global world order based on the advancement of freedom, human rights and the rule of law."
Hey, Josh—the Iraq War, GITMO, and drone strikes are calling. They want you to know America acted unilaterally long before Trump became President. It's true. President Trump was the first to say "America First" out loud—(I mean, since we tried to stay out of WWII, that is)--but it's far from a new philosophy.
Number two, on the point of Trump potentially having broken the systems critical to diplomacy, he writes, "It could take decades to repair the institutions Trump intentionally damaged…"
Now sure, Trump gutted the State Department and he's clogged up the World Trade Organization, and this is…a bad thing. Though we'd argue the institutions are resilient and it won't take decades for them to bounce back, if we want to actually rebuild them. While others, so far, he's talked a big game, but hasn't done very much—take NATO, the IMF, the United Nations, even the World Health Organization.
On Iran, Rogin writes "Biden can't return to the Iran deal but won't be able to strike a new one.
Who says? I mean, I'm not saying a new deal with Iran will be easy (the last one wasn't, and it wasn't exactly comprehensive), but Biden is going to resume negotiations (if he becomes president) and will have broad international support for doing so. Plus, Iran is in far more desperate economic shape now than they were four years ago. They're incented.
I also think there's a big point about the United States that Rogin's article ignores. The barriers to becoming the world's policeman again aren't just partisanship—or because of Trump's presidency or GOP leadership in Congress. Polls consistently show that Americans are tired of so-called "endless wars" and extensive international engagement. There's also real discontent about US trade policy--which many feel hasn't done much to help everyday Americans.
Joe Biden, should he win on November 3 or later,will face major challenges in restoring global leadership—but they aren't just coming from Republicans or Trump supporters. He would have to overcome domestic political opposition—including from a lot of Democrats—if he wants to set the nation on a different path.
