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In this episode of GZERO AI, Taylor Owen, host of the Machines Like Us podcast, reflects on the five broad worries of the implication of the US election on artificial intelligence.
I spent the past week in the UK and Europe talking to a ton of people in the tech and democracy community. And of course, everybody just wanted to talk about the implications of the US election. It's safe to say that there's some pretty grave concerns, so I thought I could spend a few minutes, a few more than I usually do in these videos outlining the nature and type of these concerns, particularly amongst those who are concerned about the conflation of power between national governments and tech companies. In short, I heard five broad worries.
First, that we're going to see an unprecedented confluence of tech power and political power. In short, the influence of US tech money is going to be turbocharged. This, of course, always existed, but the two are now far more fully joined. This means that the interests of a small number of companies will be one in the same as the interests of the US government. Musk's interests, Tesla, Starlink, Neuralink are sure to be front and center. But also companies like Peter Thiel's Palantir and Palmer Luckey's Anduril are likely to get massive new defense contracts. And the crypto investments of some of Silicon Valley's biggest VCs are sure to be boosted and supported.
The flip side of this concentrated power to some of Silicon Valley's more libertarian conservatives is that tech companies on the wrong side of this realignment might find trouble. Musk adding Microsoft to his OpenAI lawsuit is an early tell of this. It'll be interesting to see where Zuckerberg and Bezos land given Trump's animosity to both.
Second, for democratic countries outside of the US, we're going to see a severe erosion of digital governance sovereignty. Simply put, it's going to become tremendously hard for countries to govern digital technologies including online platforms, AI, biotech, and crypto in ways that aren't aligned with US interests. The main lever that the Trump administration has to pull in this regard are bilateral trade agreements. These are going to be the big international sticks that are likely to overwhelm tech policy enforcement and new tech policy itself.
In Canada, for example, our News Media Bargaining Code, our Online Streaming Act and our Digital Services Tax are all already under fire by US trade disputes. When the USMCA is likely reopened, expect for these all to be on the table, and for the Canadian government, whoever is in power to fold, putting our reliance on US trade policy over our digital policy agenda. The broader spillover effect of this trade pressure is that countries are unlikely to develop new digital policies over the time of the Trump term. And for those policies that aren't repealed, enforcement of existing laws are likely to be slowed down or halted entirely. Europe, for example, is very unlikely to enforce Digital Services Act provisions against X.
Third, we're likely to see the silencing of US researchers and civil society groups working in the tech and democracy space. This will be done ironically in the name of free speech. Early attacks from Jim Jordan against disinformation researchers at US universities are only going to be ramped up. Marc Andreessen and Musk have both called for researchers working on election interference and misinformation to be prosecuted. And Trump has called for the suspension of nonprofit status to universities that have housed this work.
Faced with this kind of existential threat, universities are very likely to abandon these scholars and their labs entirely. Civil society groups working on these same issues are going to be targeted and many are sure to close under this pressure. It's simply tragic that efforts to better understand how information flows through our digital media ecosystem will be rendered impossible right at the time when they're needed the most. At a time when the health and the integrity of our ecosystem is under attack. All in the name of protecting free speech. this is Kafka-esque to say the least.
Fourth, and in part as a result of all of the above, internationally, we may see new political space opened up for conversations about national communications infrastructure. For decades, the driving force in the media policy debate has been one of globalization and the adoption of largely US-based platforms. This argument has provided real headwind to those who, like in previous generations, urged for the development of national capacities and have protectionist media policy. But I wonder how long the status quo is tenable in a world where the richest person in the world owns a major social media platform and dominates global low-orbit broadband.
Does a country like Canada, for example, want to hand our media infrastructure over to a single individual? One who has shown careless disregard for the one media platform he already controls and shapes? Will other countries follow America's lead if Trump sells US broadcast licenses and targets American journalism? Will killing Section 230 as Trump has said to want to do, and the limits that that will place on platforms moderating even the worst online abuse, further hasten the enforcement of national digital borders?
Fifth and finally, how things play out for AI is actually a bit of a mystery, but I'm sure will likely err on the side of unregulated markets. While Musk may have at once been a champion of AI regulation and had legitimate concerns about unchecked AGI, he now seems more concerned about the political bias of AI than about any sort of existential risk. As the head of a new government agency mandated to cut a third of the federal government budget, Musk is more likely to see AI as a cheap replacement for human labor than as a threat that needs a new agency to regulate.
In all of this, one thing is for certain, we really are in for a bumpy ride. For those that have been concerned about the relationship between political and tech power for well over a decade, our work has only just begun. I'm Taylor Owen and thanks for watching.
Putin has been warning them not to do that. They decided they were going to, the Russian response has been to formally change their nuclear doctrine so that they would be considered to be in a state of war legally against any country that allowed Ukraine to use their missiles against Russia. In other words, essentially, Russia is claiming that they're now at war with France, with the UK, with the United States. And also, the Russians used a medium range missile hypersonic nuclear capable directly against the Ukrainian target in Dnipro.
In other words, what we're seeing from Putin is, "I'm showing you what you're doing is moving towards World War III, and that's how I'm responding." Does that mean that Putin is actually escalating towards direct war with NATO allies? The answer to that is no. He wasn't doing that when he was losing the battle in Ukraine in the early months. He's certainly not doing it now that he's winning.
And he is winning. He has more troops on the front lines, including those from North Korea, those from Yemen, those that he's getting from other countries. Also, he's taking more territory on the ground in Ukraine at a faster pace now, more significant amounts of territory in Southeast Ukraine than at any point since the opening months of the war. Plus Trump is President-elect. Trump has said, "I want to end this war." And he is coming in just in a couple of months.
So what Putin is doing is not threatening World War III. He's instead showing off just how bad this Biden policy is, this existing NATO policy is. He's making it easier for Trump to pivot away and say, "I'm the peacemaker. We were heading towards World War III, this horrible escalation. I'm the guy that got the great deal done and look how brilliant I am." Putin is facilitating that.
Now, of course, to make that happen Trump still has to give Putin something that he wants. He has to give an outcome that is acceptable to Putin. And Putin's made clear, at least thus far, that he's not going to give up any territory that he has. That he's not prepared to accept that Ukraine would be able to join NATO. He's also said that Ukraine can't continue to have a functional armed forces which is something that would be completely unacceptable to Ukraine.
The devil's going to be in the details here. There clearly is an opportunity for Trump to end the war. He's promised he's going to end the war, and I think he can. I think he can create a ceasefire. The Ukrainian leadership has already made clear that they are supportive of ending the war, but they're not just going to listen. There has to be a back and forth conversation with the Americans. Seeing what it is that Trump is prepared to put forward, and whether or not the Russians are capable of accepting it, are willing to accept it. Even though it will look like a win for Russia compared to where they would've been under Biden, under Harris, or at any other point in the last couple of years.
Still, if you are Putin, there is an open question. You're taking land right now. The Ukrainians don't have the people to continue to put up a strong defense. Why wouldn't you delay this out for another three, another six months? Take more land. Try to get all the territory that you have formally annexed over the course of the war. Why not settle the war on your terms? A lot easier to do if you're winning than losing. And the question there will be to what extent Trump is willing to cause material punishment to Putin if he doesn't say yes.
And that's an open question. Trump historically has been willing to take easy wins that don't necessarily play well over the long term. Look at Afghanistan. He wanted to get the Americans out. He cut a deal with the Taliban. It was a deal that was clearly very advantageous from a military and from a governance perspective for the Taliban than it was for the United States. He cut that despite the fact that the allies were not supportive or coordinating. That undermined the US deeply. Biden then continued with that plan. And it was one of the biggest losses that the US has experienced over the last four years.
Now, that of course, was a loss that ultimately fell on Biden. This would be a loss that would ultimately fall on Trump. And so does he want to risk that? That's a very interesting question. And of course, you also have to look at Trump's staff because he can make a phone call with Zelensky and with Putin, but ultimately, it is the secretary of state, the national security advisor and others that are going to have to work out the details of that agreement. And those people, at least thus far, are not people that are oriented towards giving away the store to Putin. They're people-oriented towards mistrust of Putin, towards a hard line against the Russians, towards support of Ukraine.
I am thinking here that number one, there's a reasonably high chance that Trump can get the win that he wants, but number two, this isn't likely to be a walk in the park for the Russian president. The Europeans need to play here as well. And what will be important, there's been a few formulated conversations thus far between President-elect Trump and some of the European leaders.
They haven't gone very far, but they've also not blown up the bilateral relationships. Their ability to work with Trump advisors on Trump, and on a greater coordination of what an ultimate solution or settlement of the Russian-Ukraine war would be, will make a dramatic difference as to what extent this is sustainable. To what extent this leads to not only Ukraine that can continue to defend itself and the territory that it is left with, but also can integrate into Europe, can be politically successful as a democracy over time. And that NATO will stay strong and stay together and stay aligned with the United States because they don't have another choice. There is no autonomous European military capacity. It's either NATO sticks together or it fragments.
Those are all things that we're going to watch very carefully over the course of the next couple months. But for now, an escalatory period. And it's all performative and it's all oriented towards what happens when Trump becomes president. That's it for me, and I'll talk to you all real soon.
As Trump prepares to return to the White House, his foreign policy picks are already showing just how radically his presidency could reshape geopolitics. New York Times Correspondent David Sanger joins Ian Bremmer on GZERO World to discuss just what a Trump 2.0 foreign policy could look like for some of the key geopolitical flashpoints today. From the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East to the increasingly strained US-China relationship, the only thing we can say for sure is that the Trump sequel will look far different from the original.
And that uncertainty, Sanger tells Bremmer, is why Trump won the election. "If you voted for Donald Trump in the 2024 election, it was probably with a thought that these institutions need to be blown up." One of the biggest questions, however, is just how Trump will approach the Ukraine war, and if he'll follow through on his campaign pledge to end the conflict in "24 hours." "Trump would love to come in as the man who ended the Ukraine war" Sanger says, "But the only way I can imagine in my limited way for how you do that in 24 hours is you have a call of Vladimir Putin and you say, Vlad, what do you need?"
GZERO World with Ian Bremmer, the award-winning weekly global affairs series, airs nationwide on US public television stations (check local listings).
New digital episodes of GZERO World are released every Monday on YouTube. Don't miss an episode: subscribe to GZERO's YouTube channel and turn on notifications (🔔).
Trump’s return to power—amid global wars, strained alliances, and economic tensions—could radically reshape the world order. It threatens to deepen rifts with Europe, complicate Middle Eastern conflicts, and push US-China relations to a breaking point. That might not be a bad thing, according to Ian Bremmer. He breaks it down on Ian Explains.
GZERO World with Ian Bremmer, the award-winning weekly global affairs series, airs nationwide on US public television stations (check local listings).
New digital episodes of GZERO World are released every Monday on YouTube. Don't miss an episode: subscribe to GZERO's YouTube channel and turn on notifications (🔔).
Jon Lieber, Eurasia Group's head of research and managing director for the firm's coverage of United States political and policy developments, shares his perspective on US politics from Washington, DC.
This is what we're watching in US politics this week: It's Trump's transition, of course. Lots of activity happening over the course of the week with some unexpected developments, including a lot of very unusual cabinet appointees. Sean Duffy at Department of Transportation, former "Real World" star and congressman, who has very little experience with transportation other than presumably driving a car, and of course, competing on the "Real World/Road Rules Challenge" is going to be in charge of the transportation department.
Other picks like Pete Hegseth have been a little more controversial. The former Army National Guard member and Fox News host has been accused of sexual assault. Not a great look for the incoming Secretary of Defense. But he's nowhere near as controversial as the recently withdrawn pick, Matt Gaetz, the firebrand Congressman from Florida who resigned his seat in order to become Trump's attorney general, and then found out that no Republican wanted him in that job.
Gaetz's withdrawal will allow some of the more controversial attention to be focused on people like RFK Jr. as the Secretary of Health and Human Services, somebody with a long career in the nonprofit management space, but no experience in public administration and who's been extremely critical of the US's Public Health Administration, including on toxins in foods, additives in foods, vaccines, and the approval process for them. And he's tapped into a strain of anger among Republicans at the public health apparatus that they say failed to protect the public during the COVID-19 epidemic, pointing to inconsistent and sometimes unnecessary masking guidelines. Things like social distancing, keeping the schools closed, and of course the vaccine recommendations that a lot of Republicans rejected during that pandemic. RFK's confirmation odds, however, look pretty good if you look at the relatively warm reception that he's been received with by most Republicans.
One area that's still totally in doubt for the most part is Trump's economic team. It's been two weeks since the election, there's no treasury of the secretary, there's no USTR. There is a commerce secretary pick, another Trump ally who has no experience in public administration, Howard Lutnick, a lot like Wilbur Ross in the first administration, but potentially leaving Trump's trade czar, Robert Lighthizer, without any clear role. So there's a lot more clarity on the national security side than there is on the economic side for now. That may change over the weekend. And of course, the one thing with President Trump is you could always expect the unexpected.
Ian Bremmer shares his insights on global politics this week on World In :60.
Ukraine has launched US-made long-range missiles into Russia for the first time. Will this change the course of the war?
I don't think so. First of all, the reason the Americans were dragging their feet for so long is because they didn't believe it would have any strategic impact in the war to give that permissioning to the Ukrainians and they were worried that it might lead to Russian escalation. That escalation is less likely given that Trump has been elected and he's going to be in power in just a couple of months, so the Russians basically have to deal with it, and they'll probably end up hitting more Ukrainian sites in the next couple of months. But I don't think it's really going to help the Ukrainians. I don't think it's going to hurt the Russians that much. What I do think is that the Russians are more likely to give better weapons, more capable weapons, to the Houthis, for example. So, if the Americans are going to arm proxies better, then the Russians will arm proxies better, and that could lead to bigger problems in the Gulf.
How likely will Trump be able to carry out mass deportations when he's in office?
I think he will be capable. He certainly was elected in part on that intention, on that promise. This is something that Biden really did not pay attention to until way too late and he lost a lot of votes in blue cities where people felt like there were just far too many illegal immigrants and the costs were great, and the security concerns were real. And so, the fact that he says he's going to use the military, that's potentially a Supreme Court question, but especially when you talk about people that have committed crimes in the United States, why they should still be in the US is a very serious question. And I wouldn't be surprised at all if 300,000, 500,000 deported in the first year. In other words, a hell of a lot higher than you've seen under Biden. There will be an inflation cost there, but it's one that I don't think Trump is going to take a big hit for.
Will there be political fallout from Hong Kong's decision to jail pro-democracy activists?
Not really, because China has changed the national security law. They've completely integrated Hong Kong into the Chinese political system and the pro-democracy activists don't have anyone that's willing to support them, not the UK, not the United States. I mean, they're human rights organizations, and you'll see members of Congress on the Democrat and Republican side that'll complain about it, but they won't do anything. So on balance, I don't think it matters, and that means, or I should say, it doesn't matter for China, which means very little blowback.
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Carl Bildt, former prime minister of Sweden and co-chair of the European Council on Foreign Relations, shares his perspective on European politics from Delhi, India.
Is Europe prepared for a Trump presidency?
And that's of course the big issue around every capital of Europe. There are two major issues and concerns.
One of them, obviously, the Russian war against Ukraine. What will be the US policy? Trump has promised to make peace within 24 hours. That's not going to happen. Putin is determined to continue this particular war. What would be the consequences then? Is Trump going to throw Ukraine under the bus, abandon support and thus abandon de facto concerns for the security of Europe? How would Europe react to that big issue?
Second big issue, tariffs. Trump has said that tariffs is the word that he loves most of all words. And he said that he's going to impose 10, 20% tariffs on all imports and far more on imports, of course, from China. That's going to have hugely negative effects for the global economy, also for the European economy, US economy and everyone else. What's going to be the European reaction to that? Counter tariffs or trying to line up with other global trade actors to preserve as much as we can, open up a big global trading system? Huge issues. No answer until by January 20th we know what the Trump administration is going to do. One conclusion, fairly obvious; we better buckle up.