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Viewpoint
Viewpoint: With his reelection bid, Ecuador’s Noboa seeks more time to bring violence under control
Supporters hold cardboard cutouts of Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa, days before the Ecuadorian presidential election, in Guayaquil, Ecuador, on Feb. 4, 2025.
Ecuadorians will head to the polls on Feb. 9 to choose their next president against a backdrop of spiraling violence similar to that of the last presidential election in 2023. That was an early vote called by then-President Guillermo Lasso in an attempt to avoid impeachment. Daniel Noboa, the fresh-faced son of a banana magnate, achieved an upset victory, assumed the presidency, and launched an aggressive crackdown against the drug trafficking gangs terrorizing the country.
Less than two years later, the 38-year-old president is asking for a full term in office (four years) in this weekend’s regularly scheduled election. Noboa says he wants to finish what he started, and his clear lead in the polls suggests that voters are inclined to give him the opportunity. We sat down with Eurasia Group expert Risa Grais-Targow to learn more about the upcoming election.
What are voters’ biggest concerns?
The main issue by far is security, followed by economic concerns. There was a crisis of electricity outages toward the end of last year, but that has been abated by recent rains (the country is heavily dependent on hydropower) and fallen lower on the list of voter concerns. However, there has been a renewed deterioration of the security situation, and the start of this year has been one of the most violent ever.
What is driving this violence? Are political candidates being targeted, as in 2023?
No high-profile candidates have been targeted this time (presidential hopeful Fernando Villavicencio was shot and killed in 2023), but some local officials have been killed and there may be a political motive behind the latest wave of violence. Noboa has really made the fight against organized crime a pillar of his presidency. When he took office in January 2024, he declared a state of emergency, brought the military out onto the streets, and took control of the country’s prisons, which had been a hotbed of criminal activity. So criminal groups may be intensifying their battles for control of drug-transit routes partly in the hope that the resulting uptick in violence will lead voters to conclude the president’s approach is not working.
Is it working? Given these still high levels of violence under Noboa, why is he leading in the polls?
Noboa’s policies initially brought a dramatic decline in homicide rates and other violence. Since then, it’s possible that criminal groups found ways to work around them. Still, levels of violence are lower than at their late 2023 peak. More broadly, voters support Noboa’s policies and believe that he is doing the right thing or trying to do the right thing. They think he needs more time. He's only been in office for just over a year, so I think voters are still, at this juncture, willing to give him the benefit of the doubt.
Are there other reasons for this high level of support for Noboa?
I think that he is still viewed by voters as a bit of an outsider, someone who is shaking up Ecuadorian politics. He came out of nowhere in 2023 to win the election. He's very young and still kind of feels like a fresh face. The other thing he has going for him is that his main opponent, Luisa Gonzalez, is not a strong candidate with a clear message on the issues voters care about. She represents the correismo movement launched by former president Rafael Correa, which has a very loyal base but also is strongly disliked by some parts of the electorate.
What has happened to correismo? It used to be a dominant force in Ecuadorian politics, but its fortunes seem to have declined in the last couple of elections.
The movement has struggled to come up with a compelling forward-looking campaign message, focusing more on attacking Noboa and peddling nostalgia about conditions during Correa’s time in office (2007-2017). Moreover, the country’s security crisis has focused attention on decisions Correa made such as expelling the US military from the base in Manta. Similarly, the country’s current reliance on hydropower and shaky electricity grid stems from decisions made under Correa, including his flagship Chinese-built Coca Codo Sinclair hydroelectric dam, which has major structural problems.
At the same time, Noboa’s young National Democratic Action party seems to be consolidating its position. What is the significance of this?
Ecuadorian politics seems to be consolidating around two main parties, National Democratic Action and Correismo, which marks a departure from its typical fragmentation. This can be a stabilizing force for a country with a long history of political instability and volatility.
What are some things Ecuador’s next president could do to address the country’s problems?
Noboa wants to amend the constitution to allow foreign military bases in Ecuador, reversing the policy instituted by Correa. The country is doing battle with multinational criminal organizations – the groups in Ecuador report, for example, to Mexico’s Sinaloa cartel – so having foreign military and intelligence assistance is potentially a big deal. This is a popular idea locally but will need to be put to a public referendum. In terms of electricity supply, Noboa has been changing regulations to stimulate investment in new generation capacity, and I think if he is elected to a new four-year term, that could help get some of these projects moving. Finally, under the terms of the country’s financial support package from the IMF, the next president will have to raise tax revenue and cut back on fuel subsidies. The latter is a particularly challenging issue that has prompted mass public protests in the past.
Edited by Jonathan House, Senior Editor, Eurasia Group
Viewpoint: With Putin’s protection, is Lukashenko’s reelection in Belarus a foregone conclusion?
Russia's President Vladimir Putin and Belarus' President Alexander Lukashenko take part in a signing ceremony following a meeting of the Supreme State Council of the Union State of Russia and Belarus in Minsk, Belarus, on Dec. 6, 2024.
Ahead of Sunday’s election in Belarus, there is little doubt that Alexander Lukashenko, Europe’s longest-serving leader, will win a new term in office. After the protests that erupted following the 2020 elections, threatening his grip on power for the first time, a government crackdown supported by Russia has eliminated any opposition to the president.
Yet a new term for the 70-year-old leader, who has complained about health problems, will likely raise questions about potential succession planning in his next term. Regardless of what comes next, Russian President Vladimir Putin, who considers neighboring Belarus a critical part of his country’s sphere of influence, will make sure its interests are protected.
We sat down with Eurasia Group expert Alex Brideau to learn more about the upcoming election.
What do we know about Lukashenko’s true level of support?
Lukashenko has been in power for more than 30 years, ever since he won Belarus’ first and only genuine democratic presidential election, held in 1994 a few years after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Since then, it has been hard to tell just how genuine Lukashenko’s public support is. He has routinely won reelection in votes that were neither free nor fair. Many of his challengers have been arrested for standing against him.
Lukashenko’s reelection in 2020, though, demonstrated that whatever popularity he previously enjoyed had eroded and that his hold on power looked shaky. Public outcry over manipulated results that showed another landslide victory against a credible opposition candidate, Svetlana Tikhanovskaya, prompted major demonstrations that threatened Lukashenko’s hold on power for months. Major repression by the security forces and support from Russia allowed him to regain control of the situation.
Is there any chance of a repeat of the 2020 results or unrest?
This election is going to look very different from the anger of five years ago. Belarus’ security services continue to repress the formal opposition. Parties have been banned and their leaders have been arrested or forced to flee the country. Attempts to protest the results will be met with arrests and force, most likely. The regime may hope that holding the election in January instead of August, as happened in 2020, might limit the appetite for demonstrations. As for the election itself, there is little mystery as to who will win. Lukashenko won’t have a serious challenger, instead facing candidates who are considered to be loyal opposition.
What matters with this vote?
Given his age and past statements suggesting he is concerned about his health, there will be at least some question as to whether Lukashenko might consider a succession plan during his new term. Lukashenko has talked about stepping aside before, only to stay firmly in charge. And it’s doubtful that a succession plan would truly lead to him giving up his control. Lukashenko’s control of the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly gives him a way to exert power if he decided he wanted to transfer the presidency to a loyalist.
How do outside powers view the election?
Russia will recognize the election results, allowing it to maintain its influence over Belarus. Lukashenko isn’t exactly liked in Moscow. His leadership has been considered erratic, and he has thumbed his nose at Moscow’s interests at times when it either helped him at home or when he tried (and failed) to cozy up to the West. But he has become even more dependent on Russian economic and military support since 2020, as Western governments imposed heavier sanctions and even restricted air travel from Belarus. Putin’s policies have treated Belarus much the same way he has approached Ukraine, seeing it as an integral part of Russia’s sphere of influence. Russia has used a bilateral “Union State” treaty from 1999 to boost its role in the country. If there were a crisis stemming from the election, Moscow could very well intervene to ensure that its control was intact.
How about the West?
The US and EU members, meanwhile, will not consider the election legitimate. But so far they aren’t saying all that much. Having already imposed a large number of sanctions against the economy and Belarusian leaders both before and after the 2020 crackdown, there is only so much they are able to do to affect Lukashenko’s control.
Edited by Jonathan House, Senior Editor of Eurasia Group.
Following the end of the "traffic light" coalition, Federal Chancellor Olaf Scholz has submitted a request to the president of the Bundestag for a vote of confidence in the Bundestag.
Faced with a political impasse preventing action on acute economic and geopolitical challenges, the German parliament will hold a vote of confidence in Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s government on Dec. 16. Based on an agreement among the main parties in the Bundestag, lawmakers will deliver a vote of “no confidence,” paving the way for snap elections on Feb. 23.
We asked Eurasia Group expert Jan Techau to explain what set off this chain of events and where it is likely to lead.
What has prompted this vote of confidence?
The chancellor called the vote after long-simmering tensions finally brought down the ruling coalition of Scholz’s Social Democrats, the pro-business Free Democrats, and the Greens. There are big ideological divides among these three parties, and it was never an easy marriage. Initially, they could paper over these divides with money for each party’s pet projects. But a little over a year ago, the Constitutional Court struck down large parts of the 2024 budget, saying they were financed with an illegal repurposing of unused pandemic-relief funds. That set up endless negotiations and finally a showdown over the 2025 budget, which ended with Scholz firing the finance minister, the Free Democrats’ Christian Lindner, and the subsequent collapse of the coalition agreement.
So, it sounds like fights over spending priorities are the main issue shaping German politics?
They are a symptom of a broader economic crisis that has undermined competitiveness, growth, and tax revenue. The country has high labor and energy costs and a high reliance on exports, especially to China. For a long time, China bought nearly everything that Germany produced, from machinery to cars and chemicals. But China has developed its own industries and is no longer just a customer but increasingly an aggressive competitor making many of the same goods. To put it simply: Germany is a high-cost country reliant on exports whose main customer no longer wants to buy all its stuff.
How are geopolitical issues shaping the domestic debate?
All these economic problems come at a time of mounting geopolitical challenges. Donald Trump’s election victory in the US is expected to bring increased pressure on Germany and other European countries to harden their stances against China. Trump could force Germany to choose between its economic reliance on China and its security reliance on the US. At the same time, you have the war in Ukraine and Russia’s hostility to Germany and the rest of the West that has prompted significant – and very costly – efforts to rebuild Europe’s defense capabilities.
What seems like the most likely outcome of the February elections?
The conservative Christian Democrats, led by Friedrich Merz, have a substantial lead in the polls. It seems unlikely that any other party will be able to close the gap by Feb. 23. They will need to form a coalition government (one-party parliamentary majorities and minority governments are very uncommon in the German system), probably with the Social Democrats and maybe a third party as well. One key watchpoint will be the performance of the two extremist parties, the far-right Alternative for Germany and the far-left Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance. They have no prospect of entering government this time around, but if they obtain a combined one-third of the seats in the Bundestag, they could block legislation requiring changes to the constitution, which needs a two-thirds majority. Such a blocking minority could hamper the next government’s ability to implement a forceful reform agenda.
What is the reason for the conservatives’ strength?
There are two factors. The first is that voters’ number one concern at the moment is the state of the economy. This issue has traditionally favored conservatives, who are seen as more competent in this realm. The second is the collapse in the popularity of the three parties of the ruling coalition amid a widespread sense of crisis and malaise. They have recovered a bit recently, but at one point the approval ratings of the three parties combined were at about the same level as those of the conservatives.
Assuming a conservative-led government emerges, what does that mean for domestic policy?
If the Christian Democrats form a coalition with the Social Democrats, they will have to jettison many conservative ideas. The German system is geared toward stability and continuity, an approach that has worked extremely well, though the downside is that it’s hard to make big changes when needed. The question is whether the current crisis is big enough to force change. I expect an overhaul of the so-called debt brake, a strict limitation on government borrowing that has restrained policymaking. But beyond that, a raft of politically difficult measures are needed to deregulate industries and lower labor costs to restore German competitiveness. We’ll see if the next government can deliver.
How about foreign policy?
There would certainly be more engagement with the EU. The Christian Democrats pride themselves on being the pro-EU party of Germany in the tradition of Konrad Adenauer and Helmut Kohl. My guess is that the next government will remain reluctant to embrace the proposals for common borrowing backed by some other EU countries. Still, it could be more supportive of other joint initiatives. Merz had been more hawkish in his rhetoric toward Russia but has recently toned it down because he knows there are a limited number of votes he can win with this approach. Regardless, foreign policy will be a somewhat lower priority for the next government than getting the economy going again.
Edited by Jonathan House, Senior Editor at Eurasia Group.
Viewpoint: G20 leaders grapple with global inequality in Trump's shadow
A member of the cleaning crew walks past a G20 Summit sign outside the Museum of Modern Art, the venue of the G20 summit, in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, on Nov. 14, 2024.
Amid geopolitical tensions fanned by wars in Europe and the Middle East and Donald Trump’s reelection in the US, world heads of state will gather in Rio de Janeiro for the G20 Leaders’ Summit from Nov. 18-19. They will discuss proposals to combat global inequality and climate change and try to agree on a common position toward the conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza in a carefully worded closing statement. Following the summit, Brazil’s Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva will host China’s Xi Jinping on a state visit in Brasilia, where the two will announce a series of partnerships in trade and investment.
We sat down with Eurasia Group expert Julia Thomson to learn more about this year’s G20 Summit.
What items would you highlight on the agenda?
Brazil, which holds the G20’s rotating presidency this year, tried to keep divisive geopolitical issues out of the subject matter meetings held in preparation for the summit, allowing for the approval of communiques with policy recommendations on a wide range of issues. I think those related to global inequality, a priority issue for the Brazilian presidency, are likely to get the most attention when the heads of state meet. There are two main proposals: the creation of a new tax on the super-wealthy and the new launch of a Global Alliance Against Hunger and Poverty.
There is not much consensus yet about the tax – what the rate would be, how it would be levied – but the Brazilian presidency considers it a victory to have gotten the issue on the agenda and thinks the proposal can be fleshed out in the coming years. With the Global Alliance Against Hunger and Poverty, Brazil aims to export ideas such as the Bolsa Familia program of cash transfers that have been successful at reducing hunger in Brazil. Thirty-one countries have already signed on to the initiative and another 27 have asked to join.
What impact will Trump’s election have on the summit?
The impact will be greatest on the discussion of climate and sustainability policies, another one of Brazil’s priority areas. Brazil and other emerging market countries have been pressing for assistance in financing climate change mitigation efforts from the wealthy industrialized countries that bear more responsibility for the carbon emissions causing global warming. That already fraught conversation will become much more difficult with Trump, a noted climate skeptic, poised to assume the presidency of the world’s largest economy and second-largest carbon emitter next year. I understand that Lula has been updating his planned speech at the summit to reflect this reality. A silver lining for Brazil is that South Africa, another leading global south country, will assume the G20 presidency next year, so the work done this year on this issue will likely continue.
What do you expect G20 leaders to say about the conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza?
Drafting the final communique, which will have to mention these issues, will obviously present some challenges. There are stark divisions among G20 members about the wars in Ukraine and Gaza. So, the most likely outcome is some vague language about the desirability of peace, as in previous years.
Outside of the G20 agenda, what else do you expect from this gathering of world leaders?
Lula will meet with US President Joe Biden on the sidelines, though Biden’s lame-duck status limits the potential for important outcomes from their conversation. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen will be at the summit, which creates the opportunity to advance the discussions on a trade pact between the EU and the Mercosur bloc of Latin American countries, which is expected to be finalized in the coming months. But there will be much more focus on Xi Jinping’s follow-up state visit to Brasilia. Chinese officials are expected to announce a slew of investments in sectors of the Brazilian economy ranging from satellites to logistics and infrastructure. Xi will be arriving in Brazil after a stop in Peru to attend the APEC Leaders’ Summit and the inauguration of the Chancay port, which is majority-owned by a Chinese company. There are plans to link this Pacific Ocean-facing port to Brazil to open up a lower-cost trade route to China.
So, it sounds like Lula is expecting some good outcomes. Will that help him politically?
There was more optimism at the beginning of the year, when Lula and his team did not foresee a Trump victory and there was this idea that geopolitical conflicts could have eased by now. Still, Brazil sees hosting the G20 as good for its foreign policy agenda, offering the opportunity to dialogue with the world’s main economies. Brazil sees itself as a non-aligned country striving to maintain good relations with the US, China, and Europe.
Edited by Jonathan House, Senior Editor at Eurasia Group.
Sculptures seen on the street before the 31st Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Economic Leaders' Meeting on Nov. 12, 2024 in Lima, Peru.
Global leaders are descending upon Peru this week for the 2024 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum amid an increasingly conflict-ridden world — and just a week after American voters reelected Donald Trump to the US presidency. The year’s meetings are focused on critical economic and environmental challenges, as well as the need to bolster bilateral and multilateral ties in the Asia-Pacific region. With outgoing President Joe Biden meeting up with Chinese President Xi Jinping at APEC, GZERO reached out to Eurasia Group expert Gabriela Vasquez Madueno for her take on what to watch at the event.
What is APEC, and why does it matter?
The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, a forum of 21 economies from across the Pacific Rim focused on promoting sustainable economic growth, trade, and investment in the region, is convening its Leaders’ Meeting this week in Peru. The gathering brings together economies that represent nearly 40% of the world’s population, almost half of global trade, and approximately 60% of global GDP.
While APEC’s formal economic impact remains limited, it is still significant as a platform for diplomatic engagement and bilateral and multilateral cooperation. It provides space for growing economies such as Indonesia and Mexico and major powers like the United States and China to engage and collaborate on issues ranging from climate change and sustainable development to the digital economy.
APEC takes a consensus-based approach, which means all members have an equal voice, and it relies on voluntary commitments and capacity building – rather than treaties – to achieve its goals. So, again, its impact remains limited. APEC, however, is a useful forum to build consensus on topics that may, in the future, become binding commitments in other fora or in trade agreements. It’s also worth noting that APEC is one of few multilateral forums, apart from the WTO, where Taiwan is recognized as a separate economy. This unique status allows Taiwan to participate in global economic discussions and engage with other member economies, including China.
What are the themes for this year’s APEC meetings?
This year’s theme, “People, Business, Prosperity,” focuses on finding innovative solutions to the region’s most pressing challenges. Resilient growth has been a priority. The summit this week aims to promote inclusive and interconnected growth, address the informal economy by utilizing digital platforms for better economic integration, and prioritize resilient growth in the face of global challenges like climate change and food security.
Members are working to facilitate trade and investment in the region by contributing to the development of the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific agenda. They have also defined low-carbon hydrogen policy frameworks to support regional energy transitions and initiatives to prevent and reduce food loss and waste. Participants are putting forward several initiatives to promote sustainable and resilient finance, as well as an exchange of policies aimed at utilizing digital platforms to integrate the informal economy and boost economic integration.
What are the main challenges of APEC?
The recent US election and the pending potential shift in foreign policy under Donald Trump has cast a long shadow on proceedings this week. As such, the US has taken a less active role in the present APEC event, as the next administration will prioritize bilateral discussions over multilateral ones. There will be little room for further integration considering the change of administration, as it is believed the Trump administration will prefer negotiating directly with individual states, rather than working through regional groups. Also, Trump’s threat of tariffs will cause APEC economies to fret.
This future shift creates uncertainties within the forum and potentially undermines its effectiveness in the coming years.
Additionally, the growing geopolitical rivalry between the US and China further complicates discussions and potentially impacts the overall agenda. Other member economies are finding themselves caught in the middle, forced to navigate the competing interests of these two major powers. Beijing, for its part, will use the summit to build its attraction among non-US member countries, some of which are feeling anxious about a Trump presidency, by offering unilateral concessions over tariffs and visas, among other measures.
So this event is a crucial test of the prospects for regional cooperation and global economic stability given today’s geopolitical tensions.
What to watch from this year’s APEC
The 2024 APEC Economic Leaders' Week is hosting several significant bilateral and multilateral meetings. Key leaders, including US President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping, are going to be on hand for the event. Biden and Xi are set to meet at APEC, a White House source said Wednesday, and both men will then head to Brazil for the Group of 20 summit.
Xi’s inauguration of the $3.5 billion Chancay port – the largest project China has invested in Latin America in recent years – during his visit to Peru reflects China’s presence in the region. This poses a challenge for the White House in South America, where China's geopolitical influence has continued to grow. Xi, with Trump 2.0 looming, will likely emphasize Beijing’s ability to serve as the region’s free-trade champ, presenting China as a counterweight to the tariff controls being threatened by Trump.
All eyes will be on any potential meetings or informal conversations between US and Taiwanese officials, particularly between US President Joe Biden and high-level representatives from Taiwan, such as the head of TSMC.
In addition to political leaders, several prominent CEOs are in attendance at APEC. These include Jamie Dimon of JPMorgan Chase, Karan Bhatia of Google, and Shou Zi Chew of TikTok. The latter’s presence is particularly interesting given the ongoing risk of being federally banned in the US because of its resistance to selling itself.
We’ll be watching for any major developments or announcements from APEC – and for signs of the forum’s potential strength in the years to come.
Climate activists project a message onto the Embassy of Azerbaijan ahead of COP29 climate talks, in London, on Nov. 7, 2024.
Donald Trump’s election victory last week will loom large in the minds of delegates at this year’s UN climate conference (COP29) in Baku, Azerbaijan. The government, corporate, and civil society representatives meeting from Nov. 11-22 will be forced to reckon with the return of the climate skeptic who withdrew the world’s largest economy from the Paris Agreement during his first administration. We asked Eurasia Group expert Herbert Crowther how the prospect of Trump’s return to office will affect COP29 and UN efforts to mitigate climate change more broadly.
What has Trump’s attitude generally been toward climate concerns?
Trump was largely dismissive of climate change as a pertinent economic or political issue during his first administration. Though not prominently on display during the recent US election cycle, his attitude toward the issue has not changed since his first term – which will likely become more evident when he takes office next year. He will almost certainly move to scale back programs to develop new low-carbon technologies championed by President Joe Biden’s administration, including those created by the Inflation Reduction Act. That will put more burden on state and local-level officials, who helped fill the climate policy void during Trump’s first term and kept the US energy transition moving forward.
How will Trump’s election affect the mood at COP29?
Trump’s election will significantly dampen the atmosphere at COP29, both in terms of negotiating priorities and broader sentiment among negotiators. Trump’s election will make it harder to reach a consensus on ambitious new targets, particularly for climate finance. Delegates will not regard any commitments made by the outgoing Biden administration as very credible; consequently, other governments will be more reticent to make ambitious promises of their own. In terms of broader sentiment, many negotiators will already begin turning their attention to where the COP process will go next year when Trump takes office and likely withdraws the US from the Paris Agreement again (Biden’s administration rejoined the agreement). The COP process has been largely focused on advancing the key Paris aim of limiting global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels.
Given this context, what COP29 objectives are likely still feasible?
One area where negotiations can still likely move forward involves the so-called Article 6 rules for the sale and purchase of carbon emissions credits. Talks around Article 6 have resumed this year after their very public breakdown last year at COP28. They will not be dramatically altered by the US election result and are still trending in a positive direction. For the issue of carbon market rules, the US has stuck to a negotiating position that is more aligned with that of emerging markets, meaning it is not a hurdle to reaching a deal in Baku.
What objectives are not?
Negotiations on assistance from developed economies to emerging market economies to finance climate change mitigation efforts is likely an area that will suffer the most at COP29 as a result of Trump’s victory. There was already limited room for consensus on a new umbrella target for global climate finance – the so-called New Collective Quantified Goal, or NCQG. Trump’s election will likely move the conversation even further away from targets like the $1 trillion in annual climate finance deployment that many emerging markets had been pushing for. Another important topic that will be affected by Trump’s election is the next round of country-level climate plans – the so-called nationally determined contributions, or NDCs. By next February, all parties to the Paris Agreement must submit new plans covering their emissions goals until 2035. With Trump’s election and a worsening outlook for agreements at Baku, more of these plans are likely to present cautious targets, which bodes poorly for medium-term efforts to combat climate change.
Where does the COP process go from here?
A second Trump administration will almost certainly withdraw from the Paris Agreement again. Though the COP process already survived one US absence during Trump’s first term, the global climate policy environment faces greater challenges today. The timeframe to meet targets is shorter, and tensions have intensified between industrialized and emerging markets over who bears the most blame for climate change and should pay for mitigation efforts. Many US states, corporations, and financial institutions will remain relevant players at COP and will continue to push the US energy transition forward, but they will not be able to compensate fully for the lack of federal policies. Meanwhile, the US absence will place greater pressure on China and the EU to assume more of a leadership role in COP and shoulder greater financing commitments. This year’s conference will provide some early signals about that, but 2025 — especially the buildup to COP30 — will be the real litmus test.
Edited by Jonathan House, senior editor, Eurasia Group
Supporters of Georgia’s pro-Western and pro-EU opposition groups hold a joint final campaign rally ahead of the upcoming parliamentary elections in Tbilisi, Georgia, on Oct. 20, 2024.
The Eurasian country and former Soviet republic of Georgia – not the southern US state – is at risk of tilting back into Moscow’s sphere of influence. All eyes will be on the Oct. 26 election to see if the ruling Georgian Dream party – which has slowly shifted the country’s alignment away from Brussels and toward Moscow in recent years – retains control after these crucial parliamentary elections.
We spoke with Tinatin Japaridze, a Georgian-born regional analyst at Eurasia Group, about what’s at stake.
What is the pre-election atmosphere like in Tbilisi?
The atmosphere is simultaneously charged with anticipation and significant uncertainty about the election outcome. Political and social polarization has reached profound depths. The ruling Georgian Dream and the four main opposition coalitions appear disconnected from the majority of the public, who are increasingly feeling political fatigue toward the electoral process, even though many understand that the stakes are incredibly high.
What are the main issues for voters? Is Russia’s invasion of nearby Ukraine having an impact?
Since last spring, tens of thousands in Tbilisi have rallied in support of Georgia’s European future and against Russia’s ongoing aggression. Georgia, a former Soviet bloc country, is facing a critical choice – it can either move forward toward Europe or find itself reverting back toward Russia. It cannot pursue both paths at once. However, in rural areas, the decision is less clear-cut. While most recognize that the “European idea” is essential for Georgia’s growth and progress, this understanding often fails to address the immediate “bread and butter” needs of those living outside the few major cities.
The Georgian Dream, the ruling party, has been in power since 2012. Are they expected to win this election? What accounts for its enduring success?
A landslide win for the Georgian Dream is out of the question, and gaining a constitutional majority in the parliament seems very unlikely. That said, the ruling party is widely expected to garner more votes than any single political party – but probably not enough to avoid the need to form a coalition government with the opposition, which is a reality that neither side is prepared to accept. The “us vs. them” mentality will likely dominate amid deep-rooted interpersonal and intra-party tensions, significantly diminishing the prospects for collaboration between the two sides. Over the past year, as the ruling party started to gear up for what was clearly going to be the most competitive election it has faced since the Georgian Dream came to power in 2012, Russia has increased its support through official rhetoric and positive assessment of the ruling regime’s role in stabilizing relations with Moscow. There have also been thinly veiled, pro-Kremlin disinformation campaigns that have permeated the state-controlled media outlets.
Do you expect any unrest/violence around the election? A smooth government-formation process?
The days following the election will be pivotal in revealing the broader landscape, particularly because both sides will likely dispute unfavorable results. This is expected to lead to chaos, instability, and mass protests. Earlier this spring, up to 200,000 Georgians took to the streets in response to the Georgian Dream’s reintroduction of the controversial foreign agent law. If the election results, which may or may not become available on the night of Oct. 26, are unfavorable for the ruling party, the government and its security services are expected to attempt another violent crackdown. In the event of the Georgian Dream’s defeat by the opposition, a peaceful transfer of power is highly unlikely.
What will the election mean for the country’s relations with the West and with Russia?
The extent to which the West recognizes the election as free and fair will play a significant role here. If the international community rejects the results and the ruling party blatantly steals the vote, Tbilisi could experience increased isolation from the West. This would leave it more vulnerable to direct interference from Russia and increased involvement from China. By the same token, for the West, losing Georgia means losing its foothold in the South Caucasus, a situation neither the US nor Europe is prepared to accept. Western partners will use both incentives and deterrents to prevent Georgia from falling entirely under Kremlin influence.