Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: Hi everybody. Ian Bremmer here and a Quick Take on the assassination of Hamas political leader, Ismail Haniyeh, in Tehran while he was attending the inauguration of the new Iranian leader, Pezeshkian. Almost certainly carried out by the Israelis. This is a big attack. It's an enormous success for the Israeli Defense Forces. It is potentially a very significant escalation in the conflict across the Middle East with a so-called Iran-led Axis of Resistance, of which Hamas, of course, is a core part. Also shows the weakness of the United States in its lack of influence over the Israeli government, over the Israeli military. So an awful lot of moving parts here.
Let's first talk about what we know. This is an enormous embarrassment. It is a security failure. It is an intelligence failure for the Iranian government. The idea that the leader, the political leader of Hamas who was there invited by the Iranian government in a secure military compound for the inauguration taken out and killed by the Israelis, enormously embarrassing. The Supreme leader has already said that there will be significant retaliation. The Iranian permanent mission in the UN said special operations in kind, which implies not military targets, but perhaps civilian government targets in Israel. This clearly has the potential to spill over into broader conflict between Iran and Israel. The one thing that would really have a regional impact, a global economic impact despite the prices of oil and also likely draw the Americans directly in. I wouldn't say that this is more likely than not to happen, but it is more likely than at any point that we've seen in the war thus far. That probably includes even when we had the attack on the Iranian leader in Syria and Damascus by the Israelis and the Iranian response with drones and missiles. That's the first point, is that now we need to watch very carefully for when and what that Iranian escalation is likely to be, and does it end there or do the Israelis continue in a spiraling tit-for-tat? Iran, of course, is not just a non-state sort of member of the Axis. It doesn't just engage in terrorism, though they fund it widely across the region and more broadly, this is a country that is close to having nuclear weapons capability. They have a very large military, they have a very significant presence across the region. They now have established diplomatic relations with most of the states across the region. Anything that they do that is escalatory has global ramification, so that's the first point.
Secondly, the fact that this is the death of the Hamas political leader. On the one hand, you now have a very significant number of leaders, military and political of Hamas that have been eliminated by Israel. So if the intention is to take out Hamas from Gaza and their ability to have sort of their existing leadership, those that ordered the terrorist attacks on October 7th, if that is the military intention of Israel, they are closer to being finished with the war in Gaza than they have been before. If the point is you have to remove Hamas as an idea, Hamas as an organization that has political support and people that are willing to take up arms to support them there, Israel is much farther than they were on October 7th, and that's a serious problem because of course, the desire of average Palestinians to avenge this strike is going up. Palestinians, not just in Gaza, but also in the West Bank and refugees in Jordan, and more broadly across the region. So likelihood that we see expanded terrorism, expanded radicalism on the back of this is also going up.
The United States, as I mentioned, was not aware, had no coordination with, no intelligence sharing with Israel in the run-up to this attack. Let's keep in mind the US did everything they could to defend Israel when the Iranians were sending drones and missiles against them. Israel is the closest ally of the United States in the Middle East. It gets more military support, more economic support and aid from the US every year than any other country, not just in the Middle East, but in the world, and yet Biden's ability, Kamala Harris's ability, Secretary of State Blinken's ability, the US Administration's ability to influence Israeli outcomes in terms of a negotiated settlement, a ceasefire, humanitarian aid, nature and scope of military operations has been exceptionally limited. This has not been coordinated military operations between the US and Israel. The Americans have been providing the arms, they've been providing the money, and the Israelis have been doing what they want, and that is a vulnerability. It's a big vulnerability for Kamala Harris, probably her most significant vulnerability when we look at the upcoming elections. Now, it is true that Harris is more supportive of the Palestinians than Biden. She's more focused on a two-state solution. She's more focused on trying to prevent further humanitarian disaster on the ground in Gaza than Biden has been. But her making that distinction while she is serving as Vice President for President Biden is exceptionally hard, and so again, I think this is going to be a problem. She's going to have to answer more questions about this on the campaign trail. She's not going to have very good answers, certainly won't have good answers as long as she's not president and Biden's not planning on stepping down.
It's also a problem because Biden's ability, given his own age, his frailty to make strong statements, to be out there every day to be driving US foreign policy in this crisis is open to question. I think there are a lot of people, not just Republicans that are going to raise questions if God forbid this escalates and looks like it is turning into a war between Israel and Iran. Is Biden capable of leading the country in a situation of true emergency? And I think there are a lot of good reasons to say the answer to that is no. And I mean, if it were up to me, I'd say that he actually does need to step down because that's important, but I also think it's incredibly unlikely that's going to happen, and that's the reality that we face.
More broadly, I don't think this is going to break the Abraham Accords. I think even though the Arab states are quite angry about the fact that this has happened, I don't see, for example, the Emiratis, the Bahrainis, others from maintaining diplomatic relations with Israel. Saudi Arabia continues to want to do a lot with Israel on the national security side, but you will not see them opening diplomatic relations until this present Israeli government is gone.
I also didn't even mention the fact that, of course, there was also strikes on Beirut, the Lebanese capitol just a day ago, that assassinated a significant military leader of Hezbollah. Nominally ultimately responsible for the rocket strikes that killed some 11 Israeli citizens in the occupied territory of the Golan. That on the one hand, definitely shows that Israel has exceptional intelligence and the ability to take these leaders out in a way that they have not for Hamas military leadership in Gaza. If you are Hezbollah and you're thinking about opening a broader war against Israel, that kind of reality quick response is going to give you pause.
The fact that the Israelis said that's it, that is all they're doing in response to those rocket attacks, I think makes it more likely that the Lebanon front is stable, and certainly the oil markets have reflected that. That's very different than what we are seeing, what we are likely to see as a result of this assassination in the Iranian capital. So an awful lot going on. A very dangerous environment, a political cycle that isn't opportune to responding to it, and lots more to talk about over the coming days and weeks I'm sure.
That's it for me, and I'll talk to you all real soon.