Partitioned Ukraine, Hamas’s bet, Dem veepstakes, and more: Your questions, answered

It’s been at least a couple of days without a historically unprecedented event in the United States (it’s the Middle East’s turn now). No presidential assassination attempts, no “bloodless coups,” no furniture sex scandals ... Boring, I know. But it also gives me the chance to answer one more batch of your questions before going on summer break.

As always, the following may be lightly edited for clarity. If you want a chance at having your questions answered in the future, send me an email here and follow me on Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, Instagram, and Threads to know when I’m doing a new AMA.

What are you reading right now?

Right now, I’m almost finished with “Never Let Me Go” by Kazuo Ishiguro. I got it when it came out in 2005, but for some reason I never got to it back then, and I gotta say I’m finding it a wonderful summer read. This is generally my favorite time of the year to get away from my day-to-day and spend time thinking about stuff that’s outside my usual wheelhouse.

Have you ever interviewed Trump?

No. I’ve interviewed plenty of core Trump supporters, including Jared Kushner, JD Vance, and Steve Bannon. But not Trump. Or Biden, for that matter. I would, though. Just say when and where, Mr. President.

How do you think Trump’s reelection would affect US-Brazil relations, with Brazilian President Lula being an avid critic of the former White House tenant and keeping an ambiguous but slightly anti-American rhetoric (reinforced by equally ambiguous and cumbersome relations with Iran, China, Russia, Cuba, etc.)?

The interesting thing about Trump is that he doesn’t really care much about your rhetoric, your values, or your allies as long as you pay him a “fair” price for whatever he thinks you’re getting out of the bilateral relationship. There was a lot more anti-American rhetoric from Kim Jong-un than from Lula in his first term, and yet Trump was more than willing to go to North Korea and try to cut a deal with him ... His foreign policy is mostly transactional. If Lula is prepared to engage on those terms, US-Brazil relations should be just fine despite the obvious policy/ideological daylight between them.

What is your explanation for Hamas’s decision to attack Israel? They knew it would be militarily impossible to win this war, yet they still attacked. Is there a rational explanation for this? Or was it merely an emotionally driven decision, for the lack of a better word?

Yes, they knew it was going to be militarily impossible to win the war, but that doesn’t mean starting it was irrational from their perspective. As Clausewitz said, after all, war is just politics by other means. It’s conceivable that Hamas set out to achieve a strategic goal far more ambitious than a tactical battlefield victory: to provoke an Israeli response so brutal that it would alienate the Jewish state’s allies, push Palestinians (and the Arab world) further into Hamas’s arms and away from moderation and the two-state solution, and ultimately undermine Israel’s long-term security and legitimacy. The death and suffering of innocent Gazans and the decimation of the organization’s command structure was an acceptable price to pay for that, as Hamas’s military leader Yahya Sinwar acknowledged (although I’m not sure Hamas’s recently assassinated political leader, Ismail Haniyeh, would agree).

As for the timing, I think Hamas realized it was fast becoming irrelevant and saw a unique opportunity to change that. Irrelevant because up until Oct. 7, Israel was in the strongest opportunity diplomatic position it’d been in decades, while geopolitics were turning against the Palestinians, and even the Arab world had largely moved on from their plight. A unique opportunity because the far-right Israeli government led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had taken its eye off Gaza security concerns due to domestic preoccupations of its own making, leaving the country exposed to an attack that might not have been possible otherwise.

Yuval Noah Harari suggests that democracy cannot survive without “a feeling of special love and care for your particular community [a good flavor of nationalism].” He suggests that this “is a precondition for democracy and without strong patriotic feelings ... democracy cannot survive.” If you agree, how do we get (back) to that place, and do so without descending into jingoism?

I’m not sure I agree with Yuval’s premise that “strong patriotic feelings” are essential for democracy. It’s true that as societies get larger and people feel more disconnected from each other, you need some connective glue, but lots of things can provide that. Sometimes it can be provided by something tribal or ethnic or religious identity, and frequently that becomes dangerous and exclusionary. But I don’t think patriotism is the only way to give people a sense of community. Sometimes that can be forged in a unique historical experience, such as through tremendous hardship or good times. And sometimes it can be forged by a sense of common values.

The fact that patriotism and nationalism seem to be features of most modern nation-states doesn’t mean they are necessary features. Until recently, we thought everyone had to be in the office five days a week to be productive. Then, the pandemic hit, and we found out we were wrong. I think it’s possible there are other ways to forge durable democracies with social cohesion that we’re not even aware of.

What is the best possible outcome of the war for Ukraine under current conditions? And what is the most probable outcome?

I think the best realistic outcome would be for the Ukrainians to accept a US and NATO-brokered agreement to end the fighting along the current front lines. Freezing the conflict would make it much easier for the Europeans to take the lead on funding Ukrainian reconstruction and fast-track EU membership, and for the entire West to provide Kyiv with hard security guarantees (potentially including troops). This is the best outcome because Ukraine doesn’t have the manpower to win back all its land, but it can still end up in a stronger geopolitical position than it was before the invasion without having to accept Russian sovereignty over the occupied territories.

I wouldn’t say that this is the most probable outcome, though, because there’s so much uncertainty around what Trump and Harris would do, where Congress will be, and how the Europeans would react. In many ways, I think Trump and Harris would both agree that what I just laid out is the best possible outcome. But, and this is very important, Trump would make those decisions unilaterally, whereas Harris would try to bring America’s European allies along. This would impact how hard it’d be to get to the outcome in question.

What is the path to NATO membership for Ukraine?

It requires the Americans to be willing to say it’s a good idea in a concrete way, which they haven’t been willing to do. Absent that, there’s no path. If Trump wins in November, there’s definitely no path. If Harris wins, there still may be no path.

The hard truth is that Ukraine is no closer in the process to becoming a member than when it was first invited in 2008. Back then, there were two routes the United States and NATO could’ve taken to protect Ukraine. They could’ve either made them a member right there and then, in which case Russia would’ve never invaded. Or they could’ve never invited them in the first place. But opening the door without actually providing a roadmap was the worst of all possible worlds for Ukraine. This is true of Georgia as well.

What do you expect from the incoming Mexican government?

I expect continued economic growth and development because the external environment is so favorable. US-China relations are only getting worse, driving more nearshoring and friendshoring. Mexican labor is cheaper than Chinese labor. The US economy is doing incredibly well compared to all other G7 economies. North American supply chains are completely integrated. Also, President-elect Claudia Sheinbaum and her new cabinet are more technocratic and business-friendly than AMLO. That’s positive.

On the negative side, a lot of the “reforms” that AMLO is demanding and Sheinbaum – as a strong loyalist – is pursuing, including most problematically the judicial reform, will undermine the rule of law, undermine inbound investment, and ultimately be a drag on Mexican growth.

What US foreign policy challenges do you foresee from corporate capture?

On balance, I would say that corporate capture has much more impact on domestic US policy than it does on foreign policy these days. That hasn’t always been the case. And it doesn’t mean there’s no influence at all. Certainly, part of the reason why Trump has said that he wants to reverse the Biden administration’s transition energy policies and undo its AI regulation executive order is because of the financial support he gets from fossil fuel companies and Silicon Valley firms.

But what’s interesting is that today’s landmark US foreign policies are not particularly driven by corporate interests – and indeed can run counter to them. Think of the Russia-Ukraine war, where Washington has been trying to provide a level of support to Kyiv beyond what the military-industrial complex is able to produce. Or for the best example, consider America’s hardline bipartisan policy toward China, featuring decoupling in strategic sectors despite there being huge corporate interests with massive exposure to the Chinese market.

Who of the current candidates do you think is Harris’s best choice for VP, in terms of electoral impact?

Data shows that vice presidents don’t usually matter much electorally either way. But this may turn out to be such a tight race that any decimal point could make a difference. With that in mind, I think Harris has to go for whoever can help her pick up a swing state, which is why Pennsylvania Gov. Josh Shapiro and Arizona Sen. Mark Kelly are the hands-down favorites. On balance, I think Arizona is a bit more of a stretch for Democrats so Kelly adds slightly more to the ticket. But either would be fine.

What does the rest of the world think about the upcoming US elections?

Everyone except for the most hardcore American adversaries is concerned about the state of our political system. Pretty much all US allies and neutral countries worry about what domestic division and dysfunction mean for both the consistency and the direction of US leadership on the global stage. Unsure of what the United States stands for anymore, they’re anxious about their ability to influence and hedge the impact of the outcomes that matter to them over time.

The only countries who see this as an opportunity are Russia, Iran, and North Korea – agents of chaos whom we dubbed “the axis of rogues” in this year’s Top Risks report. Even China, whose fragile economy is highly dependent on global peace and stability, does not want the US to descend into the kind of uncontrolled chaos that would leave them holding the bag.

When Paul Nitze was 54, he turned down JFK’s offer of national security advisor because he did not think the job was important enough. What are some dumb decisions you have made in this year of life?

I said that Javier Milei was going to completely fail when he took over as president of Argentina. I thought that in part because I took a lot more of his rhetoric as a complete outsider at face value than I should have, as opposed to realizing he was saying all those outrageous things in campaign mode. I also underappreciated how much the Peronists would find it necessary to cooperate with him to get something done rather than get blamed for his failure. Argentina is now doing considerably better than I expected, so that was a pretty dumb decision.

But like most dumb decisions, the most important thing is being willing to admit that you were wrong and then pivot. I’ve found this to be quite an important life skill, especially when you make a living out of actually trying to understand the world as it is.

If I wanted to join Eurasia Group, how would you advise that I go about it?

Two points. The first is that we employ only the most exceptional political analysts out there. Some of them are very experienced and have made their names globally already. Others have just come out of college or grad school but are brilliant. What they all share is a global orientation, a relentless curiosity to understand the world, and a willingness to listen to radically different perspectives and to work with others who do so, too. If you don’t have those basic qualities, don’t bother applying because (1) you most likely won’t get the job, and (2) if you somehow do, you’re neither going to like it nor be good at it.

The second point, and I wish this weren’t true, is that Eurasia Group is still a small-ish firm. We get hundreds, sometimes thousands, of applications per open position but as a company of around 250, we don’t have a large enough HR department to give every capable candidate an adequate screening. So a way to stand out is to make an impression on people in the organization who can vouch for you. Write, tweet, and – most importantly – network. Not with me (I don’t hire other than the team that directly reports to me) but with any EG analysts who are driving the analytical work in your field.