Podcast: Russia's view of the Ukraine war: a Kremlin ally's perspective

Transcript

Listen: After months of grueling warfare, heavy casualties, costly equipment losses, and with little to show for it, what are Russia’s goals heading into the Ukrainian counteroffensive? Is there any hope for resolution in a conflict the Kremlin describes as an existential battle with NATO for the future of Russia itself?

On the first episode of the GZERO World podcast’s newest season, Ian Bremmer sat down with former director of the Carnegie Moscow Center and Kremlin ally, Dmitri Trenin, to hear the Russian perspective of the war in Ukraine.

Bremmer and Trenin spoke just hours before Wagner Group head Yevgevy Prigozhin led an armed rebellion that made it within 125 miles of Moscow, a crisis that represented the single most brazen challenge to the Kremlin’s authority in post-Soviet Russia.
On the GZERO World with Ian Bremmer podcast, Trenin gives his opinion of Prigozhin’s role in Russia’s military, Russia’s goals in the war, its relationships with allies like China and Belarus, nuclear deterrence, and more. GZERO World strives to present a diverse range of views. Many will strongly disagree with Trenin's opinions, but hearing Russia’s perspective on the war could bring a better understanding of the paths to compromise.

TRANSCRIPT: Russia's view of the Ukraine war: a Kremlin ally's perspective

Dmitri Trenin:

This war is of existential importance for Russia. Either it protects its national security interest in Ukraine, and widely in Europe's East, or the future of Russia will be very bleak.

Ian Bremmer:

Hello and welcome to the GZERO World Podcast. This is where you'll find extended versions of my interviews on public television. And today we are talking about the view of the war in Ukraine from Moscow. After more than a year of grueling warfare, massive casualties and equipment losses with little to show for it, what are Russia's goals heading into the Ukrainian counteroffensive? Is there any hope for resolution in a conflict the Kremlin describes as an existential battle with NATO for the future of the country? I'm talking about all this and more with Dmitri Trenin. He's a former colonel in the Russian army and former director of the Carnegie Moscow Center.

We spoke hours before Wagner Group Head Yevgevy Prigozhin launched his brief armed rebellion against the Russian military, a crisis that represented the single most brazen challenge to the Kremlin's authority in post-Soviet Russia. And the fact that a former Russian intelligence officer and Putin ally didn't see Prigozhin as a challenge just hours before the attempted coup, raises a lot of questions about whether the Russian president's grip on power is as strong as previously believed. And one more note before we begin, Trenin has rebranded himself as a hardliner for the war since the invasion began. And some listeners might find what he says alarming or factually wrong. I think you can handle it. I don't endorse his opinions, but I know it's important to hear candid views from the Russian perspective so we can all better understand possible outcomes or paths to compromise. Let's get to it.

Announcer 1:

The GZERO World Podcast is brought to you by our lead sponsor, Prologis. Prologis helps businesses across the globe scale their supply chains with an expansive portfolio of logistics real estate, and the only end-to-end solutions platform addressing the critical initiatives of global logistics today. Learn more at prologis.com.

Ian Bremmer:

Dmitri Trenin, thanks so much for joining us on GZERO World.

Dmitri Trenin:

Thank you very much, Ian. Thank you for having me.

Ian Bremmer:

Since the war has started back last year in February, you are the first guest I've had from Russia. And I'm very interested to have a chance to chat with you about your perspective on the war and the implications globally.

Dmitri Trenin:

I salute you for breaking the ice. I think we need it.

Ian Bremmer:

Let me start with where we are right now. I saw Putin giving a speech, taking some questions from some military bloggers in the past weeks, talking about some ammunition challenges, fighting challenges. One, it seemed like he was less upbeat than I have seen him publicly before. And also, of course, we are at the beginnings of this Ukrainian counteroffensive. How do you think the war is... from Russia's perspective, how is the war going?

Dmitri Trenin:

Well, I think that the war has taken on a character of a war of attrition. I think most people here expect the hostilities to last awhile, maybe a long while. The war is not seen as one between Russia and Ukraine proper, rather it's seen as a war between Russia and the US-led collective West, with Ukraine the tip of the spear. And I don't think that the early expectations of a quick and decisive victory survive in any quarters now here in Russia, but I think most people believe that Russia will ultimately prevail. The issue is, at what cost? How long it would take? What sort of an effort would be also needed inside the country? To what extent Russia will mobilize its resources to fight the war?

Most people over the last 16 months have learned to adapt to a very strange reality of a major war being waged with... I think outwardly the country looking very much the same. You go to Moscow, you go to Saint Petersburg, you go to smaller cities and towns across the country, and life is by and large as it used to be. There is normalcy all around you. But at the same time, you switch on TV sets and you hear stories about attacks, counter-attacks, casualties, artillery shelling, also civilians dying, part of Russia's own territory being subjected to shelling and refugees resulting from that. So there are all sorts of things that are very new and unexpected, I should say. But this is all wrapped in a general veneer of normalcy.

Ian Bremmer:

It's true certainly, that the Russian economy has not collapsed and a lot of the early expectations of the West that the sanctions would have, have not played out in terms of the way the Russian economy is functioning. But at the same time, a lot of Russians have been killed, a lot of Russians have been injured, hundreds of thousands of Russians have been sent into the fight. Young men, of course, more than that have fled the country, as we saw, to Georgia, to other border crossings. This speaks of an awful lot of families and communities that are suffering because life isn't normal in that very real way. I'm sure that you didn't mean that when you said that it feels normal. How are people responding to that aspect of the war?

Dmitri Trenin:

Well, I think again, it very much depends on whether you have someone, a member of the family on the frontline, or if you don't. I think that those who have their family members out there fighting or in the forces close to the frontline, you will be very concerned about what's happening. You'll be very concerned about your loved ones. On the other hand, if you are not in that category, then in places like Moscow, you don't really feel that a lot of people are focused primarily on the war. People go about their business on a daily basis, and people are planning holidays in wherever, Turkey, Egypt, the Maldives, people who can afford that. Other people are worried about, let's say, less expensive things.

In some other localities, there's a larger number of younger people and middle-aged people who have either been mobilized in this partial mobilization or have signed a contract with the defense ministry and volunteered to fight. They receive pretty substantial benefits, which helps their families, which helps the communities. And there, I should say, the level of patriotism could be even higher than among the people who are not affected by the war directly. It's a very mixed picture.

Ian Bremmer:

You suggested that Russia feels like they are fighting against NATO. And of course, we're not talking about NATO troops on the ground in Ukraine, but I assume you mean the intelligence support, the military support, the training, all of that. Do you think that Putin was aware before he made the decision to invade on February 24th that he was going to be fighting against NATO? Did he expect that level of support of Ukraine from the United States and its allies?

Dmitri Trenin:

My guess, based on the publicly available information, Putin's own statements, the concept of the special military operation as it appears to outside observers, I don't think that initially there was much expectation of any fighting. There was also some expectation, I think, that what used to be called healthy forces within Ukraine, say the pro-Russian element in the Ukrainian political class, would use this opportunity to actually topple the Zelenskyy government and come to power, and then welcome Russian forces and relying on the support of the bulk of the Ukrainian army who would be fighting the nationalist battalion such as the Azov and then some of the others. It's a far cry clearly from what emerged.

And Putin, you would recall that within weeks after the start of the special military operation, when I think he realized that things were not going according to plan, he engaged the Ukrainians in peace negotiations. The negotiation started in March, first in Belarus and then in Turkey. And by late March, early April, a treaty was ready, was initialed even, that was supposed to end the war. And I should tell you that by that time, any talk of peace after Russia had already suffered a few thousand people as casualties in that war, that idea of peace was pretty unpopular in Russian society, and yet Putin was very much behind it, and-

Ian Bremmer:

More unpopular.

Dmitri Trenin:

That piece was not concluded, that piece was not finalized because of the intervention from the United States and the United Kingdom, that did not, in my view, want to leave Putin off the hook.

Ian Bremmer:

That's contested, of course.

Dmitri Trenin:

Well, I'm talking about the way it's seen here.

Ian Bremmer:

I know. And I think it's important for people to understand what the Russians are hearing domestically, I really do. Of course, you didn't mention that the Ukrainians had experienced far more deaths and casualties including civilian deaths and casualties in that war at that point. And so the idea that the Ukrainians having just been invaded would support a peace, also from a political perspective, the amount of pressure far greater on Zelenskyy than possibly would've been on Putin at the time. You said that Russia views itself as fighting against NATO. Russia, of course, is largely fighting by itself. Even close countries like Kazakhstan have tried to play a more independent role even after Russia provided thousands of troops to help defend the Kazakh president months before.

China, a very close partner of Russia, providing no military support at all for a Russian military that badly needs it. Again, Putin said publicly, just a few weeks ago, that they need more military capacity. China not providing it, only Iran really providing significant support because of course, the Iranians are already sanctioned very heavily by the West. They have less to lose. How disappointing is it for Russia that in this war that you are suggesting the Russians are perfectly legitimate in fighting and they're fighting against all of NATO, that Russia has to fight basically by itself?

Dmitri Trenin:

Well, I think it's taken as a fact, and there was no expectation of Russia's formal allies in the Collective Security Treaty Organization, such as Kazakhstan and some of the others, to join Russia in that fight. In fact, the only country that gives Russia material support in that war among its allies is Belarus. And that's all. There was no real expectation of China joining Russia in that fight, because it is accepted here that China is, its own man, if you like, its own master and will only engage when, China's interests-

Ian Bremmer:

In a way that Belarus is not. Yeah, I agree.

Dmitri Trenin:

Well, Belarus is a close ally. We have a union state with Belarus, and it's not just a phrase, the amount or the degree of integration between Belarus and Russia is also in defense and security, is formidable. China is certainly a superpower, and China will do what is in China's interest. Engaging in a proxy war against the United States, on the side of Russia is certainly not believed to be in China's interest.

Ian Bremmer:

I agree.

Dmitri Trenin:

But, China has been an important source of various materials, civilian materials. And when Russia's trade with the European Union, it's largest economic partner, collapsed virtually, China picked up part of that. Again, acting out of its own interest, not out of any favor to Russia. Russia is not expecting favors from anyone. It's not seen as disappointing, but rather, it's seen as Russia being, well the word 'punished' is wrong here, but Russia being ganged up against because of its determination to protect and defend its own national interest. That's how it seems.

Ian Bremmer:

But given that Russia's essentially fighting by itself with Belarus against the most powerful military actors in the world, doesn't this imply that the Russian leadership needs to have a sense of reality for its own people, for its own survival, for its own long-term perspectives, and therefore needs to be more modest about what it thinks it can actually accomplish?

Dmitri Trenin:

Well, Ian, I think that the Russian leadership and the bulk of the Russian people have a sense of history. This is not the first time that Russia has been confronted by, let's say, the combined forces of the West. This is the first time, however, that Russia has no allies in the West. We had allies in both 1812 and 1941 wars, Britain in the first case, and the United States and Britain in the other one. This time, the entire West is against Russia, that is ascribed to the success of US foreign policy, to the success of US, call it hegemony, call it dominance, call it leadership, whatever you want to call it. The United States has the power, and it has shown that power, to mobilize the West against Russia.

On the other hand, the countries of Europe have moved against Russia, countries such as Germany, even against their own best economic interest. And that is another very new factor that people have noted here. It's a very big challenge for Russia, and I think this supports the thesis that this war is of existential importance for Russia. Either it protects its national security interest in Ukraine and widely in Europe's East, or the future of Russia will be very bleak.

Ian Bremmer:

And Russia has lost a lot of credibility. There was a belief among American defense analysts and NATO defense analysts that once the Russians invaded, they would be able to roll over Ukraine very quickly. They were wrong. They saw the incompetence, they saw the inadequacy of Russian defense forces, and that made the Russians look very weak. They see now Mr. Prigozhin running the Wagner Group on the ground in Ukraine and basically cursing the Russian defense minister and the head of the regular armed forces of Russia on an almost daily basis. From the West's perspective, he looks like a lunatic, but he also looks anti-patriotic. First of all, is Prigozhin, are his rants, do they get any play inside Russian media at all? Are the Russian people aware of them? What do the Russians need to do to not look so incredibly weak on the global stage?

Dmitri Trenin:

Well, they need to win. They need to win that war in Ukraine. And if you like, defeat, well, the combined forces of the West in Ukraine. That's the only path to winning back credibility in the West. With regard to Prigozhin, his statements, comments, what have you, are widely disseminated through the network of telegram channels. They're not on the evening news every day. But the achievements of the Wagner Group are recognized publicly. Prigozhin himself, is not very much in the official news, but as I said, most people get their news, their analyses from virtually, dozens and hundreds of independent telegram channels, and they report on Prigozhin statements often. I think that, again, this is my own guess, that Prigozhin has the latitude that he enjoys because the president, the commander in chief, wants to keep the defense ministry on its toes. He wants to have some internal patriotic debate, or at least people checking on one another.

And that's why he meets with the war correspondents, to also have very, often very unorthodox views and views that are not in line with what the official is reporting to the President. The president comes from the intel community, and the intel community, you need several sources to get a wider, a fuller picture of any situation, and he uses that. Politically, I don't think it matters. The idea that somehow Prigozhin is a challenge to Putin is just ludicrous. That's what it is. And I would say that initially, you would recall what I was saying when I was commenting on the special military operation, it was certainly much more special than military. Putin was not preparing to fight, he was preparing, I think, to deter, to give backing to the internal Ukrainian forces who would rise up to the occasion and do the toppling of the regime in Kyiv. That sort of thing. And make place for replacement regime.

Russia did not start the war with the shock and awe, although it had the capability of doing that, there's no question that Russia could have bombed Kyiv and could have eliminated the headquarters of the Ukrainian military, the headquarters of the Ukrainian intel service, could have switched off Ukrainian television, could have blown up the bridges across the [inaudible]. There were many things and they were-

Ian Bremmer:

There were massive cyber attacks that largely failed.

Dmitri Trenin:

Exactly.

Ian Bremmer:

It's certainly true that Russia did not try to destroy Kyiv, but it tried to take it and it failed. I do think it's interesting that, Russian deterrence no longer seems to stand up to the Americans, the Europeans, others providing longer range missiles, F-16s, all of these things. I have seen growing levels of saber-rattling, nuclear saber-rattling from people like former Premier President Medvedev, some from President Putin himself. And I'm wondering how you think about the Russian nuclear force/deterrent, the largest in the world, and the role that it does or should play?

Dmitri Trenin:

Well, I think that one of the surprises of this entire conflict was the inability of Russia's nuclear deterrent to keep the United States from intervening in a proxy conflict, in a proxy war, in an area of utmost strategic importance to Russia. Ukraine is a huge place, it's the largest country in Europe outside of Russia. It's a country that is led by a virulently anti-Russian regime, which has been in existence since 2014. This conflict did not start-

Ian Bremmer:

And certainly much more so now.

Dmitri Trenin:

This conflict started eight years back or nine years back, and it's been a conflict, a low level, low intensity conflict, waged mostly in Eastern Ukraine. And Putin's attempts to somehow deal with the situation in Donbas through diplomatic means, it was essentially revealed as futile, as former President Hollande and former Chancellor Merkel basically stated that they, through the Minsk Agreement, did not mean to proceed toward a solution, rather that was a time-winning gimmick to help Ukraine build a strong military. Basically, Ukraine is actually a very serious, as we all know today, a very serious military force-

Ian Bremmer:

Military power.

Dmitri Trenin:

Led by a virulently anti-Russian regime.

Ian Bremmer:

Again, as the Russians in the Donbas were claiming that there were no Russian forces that were ordered there or fighting there. Again, the level of misinformation that was going on in terms of the fighting on the ground since 2014 in the Donbas has been significant, relatively equivalent numbers of casualties on both sides, all of those things.

Dmitri Trenin:

This conflict did not start out of the blue on the 24th of February. It has at least a nine-year history preceding it. And if you look back a decade before that, you can see that this whole business of Ukraine being invited to NATO, being conditioned with the elite, being drawn into the Western camp, this was a challenge that essentially, no Russian leadership would've been able to tolerate.

Ian Bremmer:

Again, a country should not have a sovereign right to decide which strategic alliances it wishes to be a part of? That's the perspective.

Dmitri Trenin:

No. When the Ukrainian leadership was negotiating NATO membership for Ukraine, the idea of NATO membership was supported by a minority within Ukraine, and yet the leadership was very much pushing that forward. Now again, various countries can take various leaderships and various countries can take various decisions, but each decision carries a price, and that applies to Russia, that applies to the United States, that applies to Ukraine. And what I see today and what worries me most today, is that the trajectory of the Ukraine crisis, you talked about Western involvement, Western support, all the way from the Javelins to the F-16s and possibly beyond, long-range missiles and all that stuff, I see this trajectory taking us all, and I mean, you and me as well, toward a direct military collision between Russia and NATO.` And if there is such a collision, then an exchange, a nuclear exchange between Russia and the United States may not be seen as a fantasy.

Ian Bremmer:

This is the most dangerous time, geo-strategically since 1962. I think you and I fundamentally agree on that. You've also been directly involved in some high level and not reported, at least not widely reported, track two, track one-and-a-half discussions between Russians and Americans, trying to see if there might be any way to end this confrontation. Do you come away with any sense of progress or hope from those discussions so far?

Dmitri Trenin:

Well, I wouldn't characterize them necessarily as either track one-and-a-half or high level. Maybe high level in terms of professional experience and knowledge of things and all that. But certainly, there's been no attempt to my knowledge between the two countries to start discussing how to end this conflict on terms that would satisfy the interests of the respected parties. I think it's important though, to stay in touch, to keep the lines of contact open. For 30 years, we've built relationships and we learned to respect one another, we learned to see and accept the differences that separate us. But we also trust, still trust, I think, many of our colleagues on the other side as professionals. There's a limit to what professionals can do, what experts can do, they can offer advice, they can talk more broadly to the interested public, they can raise important issues. But essentially, decisions are made by political leaders.

And my conclusion as of today is that, political leaderships are not there yet to think in terms of a new equilibrium and a new geopolitical setup in that part of the world. The US strategy, which is built on Russia being a weakling, and there being no limits to how much the United States or how far, or how high the United States can escalate this conflict, makes me think of a Russian roulette with a nuclear bullet sitting in the revolver, and this gives me a lot of fear, a lot of concern.

Ian Bremmer:

I take that very seriously, Dmitri. That's, again, why I wanted to talk to you, and I really appreciate you coming on the show today.

Dmitri Trenin:

Thank you, Ian. Thank you.

Ian Bremmer:

That's it for today's edition of the GZERO World Podcast. Do you like what you heard? Of course you did. Well, why don't you check us out at gzeromedia.com, and take a moment to sign up for our newsletter, it's called "GZERO Daily."

Announcer 1:

The GZERO World Podcast is brought to you by our lead sponsor, Prologis. Prologis helps businesses across the globe scale their supply chains with an expansive portfolio of logistics real estate, and the only end-to-end solutions platform addressing the critical initiatives of global logistics today. Learn more at prologis.com.

Subscribe to the GZERO World Podcast on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Stitcher, or your preferred podcast platform, to receive new episodes as soon as they're published.