Podcast: This Long Bloodstained Sand

TRANSCRIPT: This Long Bloodstained Sand

Ian Bremmer:

Do you think Turkey today is an ally of the United States?

Faysal Itani:

Oh, I have to think about this, actually. I don't have a quick and clever answer for you.

Ian Bremmer:

We have no friends but the mountains. That's an old Kurdish proverb that pretty much sums up their current troubles. With US special forces largely removed from northeastern Syria and the future of Kurdish homes being carved up in Ankara, Damascus, and Moscow, this stateless Mideastern people, again, are finding themselves in the familiar station, the victims of changing priorities.

Ian Bremmer:

When President Trump decided to officially withdraw American troops from the region, many people, including some in his own administration, were shocked, but the Kurds themselves, my guest today says, "Not so much."

Ian Bremmer:

Hello and welcome to the GZERO World Podcast. I'm Ian Bremmer and this is the place to hear extended interviews with the world leaders, newsmakers, and experts I feature on my public television show every week.

Ian Bremmer:

After nearly four years of heavy fighting, Kurdish fighters, supported by US Forces, had helped to defeat much of ISIS. It wasn't something that lawmakers wanted to walk away from in the United States, though America's adversary, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, had effectively won back much of his country. Success against ISIS was among the rare triumphs for the US-Kurdish alliance. The Kurds had lost more than 11,000 soldiers in that fighting, but the partnership was clear. America got greater influence in the region, an ally willing to do the heavy lifting against ISIS. The Kurds got the implicit backing of the US military, keeping their rivals at bay. But what about afterwards? With virtually all of ISIS's territory regained and thousands of ISIS fighters languishing in jails, President Trump wasn't exactly quiet about America's plans.

Donald Trump:

It is time to give our brave warriors in Syria a warm welcome home. Great nations do not fight endless wars.

Ian Bremmer:

Trump tried to withdraw last year, but former Defense Secretary Jim Mattis pushed him back. Mattis is gone now, and with impeachment proceedings bearing down and growing pressure from Ankara, which for decades has fought autonomy seeking courage linked to those fighting inside Syria, Trump finally made his move. On today's podcast, I'll ask a simple question: what happens next? The lucky guest who gets to answer? Syria expert at the Atlantic Council Faysal Itani. Let's get to it.

Announcer:

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Ian Bremmer:

Faysal Itani for the Atlantic Council, senior Fellow Middle East stuff. Good to see you.

Faysal Itani:

You too. You too.

Ian Bremmer:

There's plenty of stuff to talk about in the Middle East these days.

Faysal Itani:

Yes, there is.

Ian Bremmer:

Syria, a big story. On a scale of one to 10, 10 being an awesome decision, one being really, really stupid. What we've seen the Trump administration do in Syria over the past weeks has been a ...

Faysal Itani:

I'm going to cop out and say a five.

Ian Bremmer:

A five?!

Faysal Itani:

Yeah.

Ian Bremmer:

Now you realize that there's probably no one that has been opining on this issue on television that would call it a five. So who are you trying not to offend?

Faysal Itani:

No, to be honest with you, I think I'm caught between calling it a disaster because of the way it's being done and some of the motives behind it, but also I'm placing it in the geopolitical context, which is that we trapped ourselves in Syria a few years back and it's been leading us to this point since about, I think, the middle of the conflict four or five years ago. And so I didn't under this presidency, didn't see it going anywhere good. And I kind of saw us stuck between, do we dig in further and try to iron out these contradictions in our policy or actually do we just say, "Wait a minute, these contradictions are not addressable at a cost that we can accept? And so should we start planning a way out?" I think we should have started doing that years ago.

Ian Bremmer:

So the contradictions are what?

Faysal Itani:

The main one that stares us in the face really is the Turkey problem. The entire base of-

Ian Bremmer:

They're an ally, and yet they're attacking our friends on the ground.

Faysal Itani:

Yes, in a nutshell. And our friends on the ground in the PYD ...

Ian Bremmer:

Explain the PYD for people watching.

Faysal Itani:

The political aspect of the main Kurdish faction that is running the war against ISIS essentially on the ground as our infantry, so to speak. So there's the PYD. The YPG is their armed branch. But I'll use it interchangeably just to make life easier. They are essentially the entire foundation of our Syria policy. They're our partner on the ground. They're the force against ISIS. And they are supposed to be the local ally we have to dig in and build a long-term presence in that country. And then project power from there.

Faysal Itani:

And of course, to their north is Turkey who's been fighting their mother organization, the PKK in Turkey for 40 years. And that was something we just kind of tried to skirt around and tried to hope that the Turks wouldn't notice or that we'd get them to calm down and lay off. I just saw that as something we over-promised the Kurds that we would protect them from that. And matters came to a head and we had to make a decision. And not only did we have to make this really painful decision, there is a president in the White House who instinctively and temperamentally doesn't want to have anything to do with it anyway. So I always feared that the second it was going to be challenged, it was going to fall apart like a house of cards.

Ian Bremmer:

Well, he's been challenged on this of course, several times now. I mean, this is not the first time he's tried to pull out of Syria.

Faysal Itani:

True.

Ian Bremmer:

Right. The numbers we're talking about are fairly small.

Faysal Itani:

Yes.

Ian Bremmer:

I mean, we're talking about a thousand troops. So I mean, to the extent that there's a contradiction, it's not a very big contradiction.

Faysal Itani:

The problem is that whether you have a thousand troops or 10 troops in northern Syria, once the Turkish military starts coming in, either you got to pull them out of the way or you got to protect them. This is only two options you have.

Ian Bremmer:

Did you believe that the Turks were ever going to make that invasion into Syrian territory if the Americans had kept the troops there?

Faysal Itani:

Yes, eventually. I did believe that. I didn't expect it at the time it happened. I didn't predict it. I wouldn't say that. But I thought it was the inevitable outcome.

Ian Bremmer:

Risking the deaths, the lives of American soldiers, NATO allies across the border.

Faysal Itani:

I think they made a calculated bluff. And they calculated that if they did it, we would not stand up and fight. And I think that was the correct calculation, frankly, unless they had a president on the other side who was very clearly telling them, "That's a red line and it won't stand." And they didn't have that. Right? Yeah. President Trump.

Ian Bremmer:

Let's talk about the Kurds for a second. The Turks say the PYD are terrorists. Lindsey Graham says they're heroes that are fighting terrorism. Who's closer to the truth?

Faysal Itani:

It depends on which side you're sitting.

Ian Bremmer:

As a Lebanese, I mean, you work with everybody.

Faysal Itani:

Yeah, that's true.

Ian Bremmer:

You're an analyst, so you should be able to actually say this.

Faysal Itani:

Okay, look. For me, it doesn't actually matter that much. I mean, I have no interest in labeling the PYD a terrorist group because as far as American interests are concerned, we're fine with the PYD. They've helped us, we've helped them. On the other hand, if I was the Turkish government, of course they're going to see it through that prism, right? Because they see the PYD and the guys they've been fighting for 40 years in Turkey, which is the Kurdish separatist movement, the PKK.

Ian Bremmer:

Inside Turkey.

FaysalItani:

That's the same thing. And at the leadership level, they are the same, at the very kind of strategic level of command. So I wouldn't label them that. And so far as American interests are concerned, but I see no way to make Turkey change their mind about it, if that makes sense.

Ian Bremmer:

So I say this in part because when Obama was considering at the beginning of the Syrian War what American policy was going to be, he was looking for so-called moderates in Syria to work with. And he had a hard time.

Faysal Itani:

Yes, he did.

Ian Bremmer:

And so here we are, a very small American contingent on the ground working with these guys. How much does it matter in the region, on the ground that the Americans have decided to cut bait and leave these guys high and dry?

Faysal Itani:

It matters a lot, I think.

Ian Bremmer:

Because?

Faysal Itani:

Because it's basically, you're screaming out to the world that you can't trust the United States, that their partnership is not worth anything, that you can make sacrifices and they will pull out and leave you high and dry. From that perspective, of course, I cannot defend what they've done to the Kurds. That's obscene that they played their allies that way. Things could have been handled more responsibly from the start, but they weren't. And we kind of plowed into this position.

Faysal Itani:

And one of the things you mentioned was that this isn't the first time President Trump wanted to get out of Syria. One of the problems is that he said really literally that he wanted to get out last December. And then we had these 10 months to try to decide what are we going to do about the fact that that's what the president essentially wants to do. What if we run into an obstacle? How are we going to sell the president on it? I think our national security bureaucracy spent the last few months just trying to kind of Trojan horse a more ambitious Syria policy and hoping the president kind of...

Ian Bremmer:

Wouldn't notice.

Faysal Itani:

I guess. Yeah. I mean, it's a crude way of putting it. But wouldn't notice, would be distracted, would think it was something it wasn't. And that's I think part of the error. And I think that's actually also a betrayal of the Kurdish Allies.

Ian Bremmer:

Are the Turks, honestly, winners here? I mean, Erdoğan in the initial phases, certainly acts like he's gotten everything he wants. But of course the Kurds now have a new ally on the ground, the Russians who are taking different territory. How does that play for Erdoğan?

Faysal Itani:

I think that's an excellent question. I think to describe him as a winner is I think a bit too positive. I think he had a hierarchy of needs in Syria. Some things that really have to get done, and some things that, "Ah, that would be nice." Luxury goals, so to speak. Luxury goal would've been to have a robust sphere of Turkish influence in Syria.

Ian Bremmer:

Not going to happen.

Faysal Itani:

I don't think so, no, because he's already been out maneuvered by the regime, by the Russians, by everybody. The number one priority was, and I'm going to say it, even though he didn't say it in so many words, to get the US military out of there and break that alliance between the US military and the Kurds. I think that was the worst nightmare scenario for the Kurds. And they accomplished that. Even if we keep a few troops here and there, that trust and alliance, that's broken. He can rely on the fact [that] at the end of the day, that the Russians want regime sovereignty over most of Syria or all of Syria, and he can rely on the fact that the PYD under a regime umbrella is going to be much more constrained than they were under an American umbrella. And so for him, that's a better outcome. I hate to call it a win. I mean, there's very few winners in Syria, but it's ticking an important box for him, I think.

Ian Bremmer:

That matters domestically for him, of course.

Faysal Itani:

Absolutely. Yeah.

Ian Bremmer:

I mean, given the need to undermine his own Kurdish political parties.

Faysal Itani:

Absolutely. That's an interesting component of this. He's got an important Kurdish constituency politically, but they're not PKK, they're pro-Erdoğan. And this is also, despite how divisive the guy is, there is, I mean, Turkish national sentiment is very kind of zero-sum, very powerful. They are all on board with the fact that PKK is evil and the PYD are a bunch of terrorists. So I think there's pretty much a natural consensus over this, and it plays well for him.

Ian Bremmer:

So at home, I mean, what I'm hearing is Modi in Kashmir, Xi Jinping in Hong Kong, Erdoğan in northern Syria, it works pretty well, right?

Faysal Itani:

In a sense. Yeah. Yeah. I think we as the United States tend to think differently a bit about the world. We believe in victories and satisfying outcomes. But I think people like these powers in the region and the Levant, don't see the world that way. They don't see that it's possible to achieve a satisfying outcome in anything. For them, that's just the way of the world. And you nibble at the margins of things and you make sure you're okay. And that's I think what Erdoğan and Putin, and Assad, that all of these guys are doing. And the PYT.

Ian Bremmer:

Now, in the Middle East, nibbling at the margins generally is modus operandi for politics. That's the way it works. Look, I haven't asked you directly about it, but still it's interesting in telling that you haven't brought it up yet, which is ISIS. So I'm not even going to ask the question. Let me just say, ISIS.

Faysal Itani:

This is bad for the anti-ISIS campaign. There's no way to put it any other way. Why? Partly because we are good at fighting them. So were the PYD. And that relationship militarily worked very well. Partly because the regime is A, not very good at fighting full stop. And ISIS is a pretty strong fighting force. And partly because we don't know exactly how enthusiastic and interested they are anyway, in fighting this kind of ugly fight.

Ian Bremmer:

Is it true that Assad was during the war, cooperating, facilitating oil from ISIS out?

Faysal Itani:

Yes. There was a black market overlapping with the security forces on the Assad regime side that were trying to get natural resources into the regime territory. And in fact, ISIS also allowed the regime to operate some of the bureaucracies and some of the facilities and the infrastructure on their side of the equation. There was a very bizarre couple of years where this was happening, mostly because the regime frankly just wanted to keep its area running and didn't care about ISIS because they were fighting the broader insurgency.

Ian Bremmer:

Now they care more?

Faysal Itani:

I don't know how to answer the question because we never tested them. We don't know what the regime is like against ISIS when there's nothing else going on. I mean, people think that the regime has a history of cooperation with ISIS and therefore they're going to help ISIS out. I don't think that's the case. I think the regime has a history of using jihadi groups against their rivals, which is what they did. And now the rivals are gone.

Ian Bremmer:

Because the Russians have a history of being pretty concerned about Islamic jihadi groups. Starting in Chechnya and Tajikistan and moving out. Right?

Faysal Itani:

True.

Ian Bremmer:

So are the Russians now the most important player in Syria?

Faysal Itani:

I think at the level of high politics, yeah.

Ian Bremmer:

What about at the level of actual military forces and accomplishment?

Faysal Itani:

Yes. Yes. I'll put it this way. If you remove the Russians from the equation today, the map of Syria, of control, will look very different in a year because the Russians are not there anymore. I think they're the single most important actor. But like other powers have found in Syria, once you go past that point, your ability to control things on the ground starts to weaken and dissipate. I think the Russians are having the same problem that others have had.

Ian Bremmer:

So looking back at ISIS for a second. We have this talk about some 10,000 plus ISIS members and families that have been jailed, held in this territory by Kurds. The Turks ostensibly are now responsible for them. How much is there a real risk that ISIS is going to be able to reconsolidate its force structure in Syria and indeed in Europe?

Faysal Itani:

I think there's a major risk of these guys being broken out of detention and rejoining ISIS core as it were at the moment. The circumstances that allowed them to grab a third of Syria and a third of Iraq and its natural resources, et cetera, very peculiar. And they're just not there anymore.

Ian Bremmer:

Huge power vacuum.

Faysal Itani:

Absolutely. Had state collapse in Syria and you had complete military collapse in Iraq. Things are not where they were. I mean now we have the Russian military, the insurgency is over, the Iranians are there. The Kurds have learned to fight and they have weapons. They still are in some places. And they're going to cooperate with the regime just like they cooperated with us in that fight. So ISIS is not going to be able to sweep like it did. I don't think so, in my own peril I make predictions about this sort of stuff, but I don't think so. But I think the prisoner element, which was so important for ISIS in 2012 and 2013, when they had that campaign they did in Iraq where they broke everybody out of prison, it's called breaking the walls, I think. And they replenished essentially their ranks. I think they will try to do it.

Ian Bremmer:

You didn't mention foreign fighters.

Faysal Itani:

No.

Ian Bremmer:

Trump has been very critical of the European unwillingness to take these foreign fighters, to detain them. Obviously, the security conditions would be more effective if that had been the case.

Faysal Itani:

Yes.

Ian Bremmer:

Is that true? Is his criticism appropriate?

Faysal Itani:

For the most part, yeah. I think last week, if I'm not mistaken, a couple of European countries decided they're going to take back a handful of fighters of their nationals over there. But no, I think that is, first, I think it's an egregious shirking of responsibility on their part. And second of all, yes, I think having them there is worse than having them in the West within the penal system. I think the concern is mostly not a security concern on their part, it just seems that they don't want to handle them in the legal system and in the judicial system because there's no system that would absorb them in process.

Ian Bremmer:

And let the Americans take care of it. It's literally like someone else is doing it, so we couldn't be fussed.

Faysal Itani:

Yeah. Unfortunately, that's very common when it comes to us with our European allies in places like the Middle East where there's a lot of ugly work to be done. The United States ends up doing it. I think part of Trump's gamble perhaps is that if we leave, this will stop the freeloading and shift the burden onto the Europeans to take care of this mess as he calls it. I'm not sure that's accurate, to be honest with you. I think this is going to be left to the regional powers, not the Europeans.

Ian Bremmer:

Now, I thought it was interesting to see Pete Buttigieg and his response in criticizing Trump saying, "Look, I don't want the same footprint that we have right now, but I think Siri is the right outcome, and Afghanistan should be more like that. Small presence, counterterrorism, supporting intel, and helping ensure that all hell doesn't break loose." Is that an appropriate response or not? Again, in the context of you saying that there are such huge contradictions about American policy on the ground and they're trying to find a way to get out.

Faysal Itani:

I have nothing against the model he's proposing. I think it's a good model. But the problem with how we've implemented it in Syria, I think we've thought of Syria as a kind of technical CT problem that if we have the right forces in place-

Ian Bremmer:

Counterterrorism?

Faysal Itani:

Yeah, counterterrorism problem. If we have the right forces in place, we resource them, and we train the locals, then ... And that's what the US military is good at, right? That's the kind of machine it is. Professional military. And the geopolitics of it I just think never figured into the equation. I'm not saying the Turkey thing was a completely insurmountable problem. There could have been a slightly other way to do this, at least I'm going to propose it even if it would've gone to hell if it had been tried, which is to have a much broader base within Syria, a base of support for the United States and their mission. A much more popular base, political base, rather than piling it all on the PYD. I think that was a mistake.

Ian Bremmer:

How do you get that?

Faysal Itani:

That would've required, frankly, would've required entering the series of a war. There would've been no other way to do it.

Ian Bremmer:

And you think the Americans should have done that?

Faysal Itani:

At one point, yes. Early on.

Ian Bremmer:

To avoid the bloodshed?

Faysal Itani:

To avoid the bloodshed, to deter our rivals from increasing their sway, to create that sort of situation that we think we've created with the PYD, but in a much more lasting manner. I don't think the US should've done it single handedly or should have even borne the brunt of the ground force. But yeah, I think there was a window in 2012, 2013 when something like that could have happened. That's a long time ago though.

Ian Bremmer:

No, I know. But that's red line time, right? I mean that's when Obama thought about it. The Brits were saying sort of yes, and then voted against [it]. The French win favor. But when you look around, there weren't a lot of others.

Faysal Itani:

No, no. No, sir. And for me, the August 2013 episode was really the turning point in all this. And I thought after that, given the implications of the decision and what we were signaling, that it was not worth it anymore to involve ourself in the regime opposition dynamic. But that was the time when it could have happened.

Faysal Itani:

The problem is that the more you want to broaden your popular base in Syria, the more you come into conflict with the regime. The PYD were a bit different because they had this kind of hands-off agreement with the regime that everybody's going to mind their own business, for now at least. And therefore centuries, that was one of the big reasons why we ended up teaming up with them. Because they were in a compartment that was away from the rest of the war. And now they're not. Now they're part of the broader puzzle.

Ian Bremmer:

But your point being that ultimately, that muddle wasn't going to hold.

Faysal Itani:

I didn't think there was any way to sell it to Turkey without just making an adversary of them. Full stop.

Ian Bremmer:

Do you think Turkey today is an ally of the United States?

Faysal Itani:

Well, I have to think about this actually. I don't have a quick and clever answer for you.

Ian Bremmer:

I mean, they are definitionally in terms of NATO, but are they actually functionally an ally of the US?

Faysal Itani:

No, I don't think so. But I think we have also a part to blame in that not just the Turks to be honest.

Ian Bremmer:

And the blame of the United States is what?

Faysal Itani:

We violated the core national security interest of theirs and expected them to eventually come to terms with it and told ourselves that they would. And they didn't. Now does that make Erdoğan a good ally or not? No. Does that make this invasion defensible? No. It's a bunch of mercenaries and extremists who are-

Ian Bremmer:

So some core national interests are in a sense, too far apart for the alliance to functionally operate?

Faysal Itani:

I think this was just a bridge too far for the relationship.

Ian Bremmer:

And that's something you think the Americans should have considered when they were thinking about this muddle solution of a thousand troops on the ground?

Faysal Itani:

I do think so, but I also have begun to feel and believe that there's something about Sunni extremist jihadists that drives everybody in the Washington machine insane temporarily and gives everybody tunnel vision.

Ian Bremmer:

Even more than Iran?

Faysal Itani:

Yes, I think so. Because Iran is so difficult to do something about. We could hate on Iran all we want on TV, but what are you going to do? Right?

Ian Bremmer:

Well Sunni extremism is very hard to do something about. But you think you're doing something about it.

Faysal Itani:

Yeah, it's easy to act. It's not easy to accomplish.

Ian Bremmer:

It's not easy to accomplish. Yeah, exactly.

Faysal Itani:

Sure. Sure. But it's like it's become that a whole national security apparatus has become very good at responding to this problem. And it's politically very popular. It's easy, it's not very casualty ...

Ian Bremmer:

Intensive.

Faysal Itani:

Casually intensive. So I think that happens to our national security apparatus. It was not helped by the civilian leadership over these two presidencies, I think, because it was allowed to take that course that it took.

Ian Bremmer:

So you're here in Washington now. And you have experienced the transitions in the defense department, in the joint chiefs, in state, and the NSC in the White House. How has that changed how you think about America's role in the region? The policy process?

Faysal Itani:

If I may speak honestly, it's been actually very disturbing because when I moved here as an immigrant and immediately joined this policy, national security and stuff like that, I had this perception of the United States, as you know, okay, imperfect power, but a Goliath of some sort that when it decides it wants to do something, it does it effectively. And as a result, my policy positions were much more bold and ambitious. But now, as I've seen it over the past couple of years especially, go the direction it has, I've become much more kind of restrained in what I think can be accomplished with this machine. That doesn't mean I think it'll stay that way, but I think we are in a position where we are incapable of handling complex national security crises. And that actually motivated part of my answer at the beginning when I gave the five out of 10.

Ian Bremmer:

It's within the context of what's doable.

Faysal Itani:

I think the home front is in very bad shape, honestly.

Ian Bremmer:

So now that you've seen the sausage being made, you don't want to eat as much of it.

Faysal Itani:

I've just made humble by it I think. I think that-

Ian Bremmer:

This is my sujuk analogy for you. I mean, I'm just trying to do something in the region.

Faysal Itani:

No, I honestly think-

Ian Bremmer:

We'll run a translation for that underneath and it'll be fine.

Faysal Itani:

Sure. Well you're going to get in trouble with the Turks.

Ian Bremmer:

And that's fine. It's not a problem. This whole show is doing that. There's no question.

Faysal Itani:

I think this house needs to be put in some sort of minimal order. And let's see. That's not for me to do or for any one person to do. But I think there's a sort of consensus among some of us that that's the case. And there's others who still think despite the machinery being in bad shape, despite the American public being kind of skeptical of foreign interventions, that we can still do the sort of stuff that we were trying to do in the Northeast in Syria. Again, I'm not even proud of this position, but this is what I think.

Ian Bremmer:

See, I mean, what's interesting about what you said though, you said absent the United States, most of what's going to be happening, it's going to be happening within the region, dealing with ISIS mostly happen within the region. So it's not like the Europeans are picking it up, the Chinese are picking it up, or even the Russians are picking it up strategically, which does imply that the Middle East is one of the places where actually a new set of leaders across the board could actually make a difference.

Faysal Itani:

Internationally?

Ian Bremmer:

Or in the US.

Faysal Itani:

Yes, I think so. Yeah. I think the US can make a big difference in the Middle East, especially at the level of power politics and competition, which then cascades down to all the other politics. Are we able to reform and remake nations and people? No, that's not the job of the United States. But the United States was doing a lot of good things also in the region from grassroots support, to diplomacy, to policing, to these light, imperial footprint stuff that they do. And I don't think that should all go. I'm not at all of that point of view that the United States should just get out. But I just think that this was a problem from hell, partly of our own creation, and we don't seem well-placed at home to deal with it properly.

Ian Bremmer:

Faysal Itani, good to see you.

Faysal Itani:

Thank you.

Ian Bremmer:

That's our show this week. We'll be right back here next week. Same place, same time. Unless you're watching on social media, in which case, it's wherever you happen to be. Don't miss it. In the meantime, check us out at gzeromedia.com.

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